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The ability to learn multiple languages simultaneously is a fundamental human
linguistic capacity. Yet there has been little attempt to explain this in evolu-
tionary terms. Perhaps one reason for this lack of attention is the idea that
monolingualism is the default, most basic state and so needs to be explained be-
fore considering bilingualism. When thinking about bilingualism in this light, a
paradox appears: Intuitively, learning two languages is harder than learning one,
yet bilingualism is prevalent in the world. Previous explanations for linguistic di-
versity involve appeals to adaptation for group resistance to freeriders. However,
the first statement of the paradox is a property of individuals, while the second
part is a property of populations. This thesis shows that the properties of cultural
transmission mean that the link between individual learning and population-level
phenomena can be complex. A simple Bayesian model shows that just because
learning one language is easier than two, it doesn’t mean that monolingualism
will be the most prevalent property of populations.
Although this appears to resolve the paradox, by building models of bilingual lan-
guage evolution the complexity of the problem is revealed. A bilingual is typically
defined as an individual with “native-like control of two languages” (Bloomfield,
1933, p. 56), but how do we define a native speaker? How do we measure pro-
ficiency? How do we define a language? How can we draw boundaries between
languages that are changing over large timescales and spoken by populations with
dynamic structures? This thesis argues that there is no psychological reality to
the concept of discrete, monolithic, static ‘languages’ - they are epiphenomena
that emerge from the way individuals use low-level linguistic features. Further-
more, dynamic social structures are what drives levels of bilingualism. This leads
to a concrete definition of bilingualism: The amount of linguistic optionality that
is conditioned on social variables.
However, integrating continuous variation and dynamic social structures into ex-
isting top-down models is difficult because many make monolingual assumptions.
Subsequently, introducing bilingualism into these models makes them qualita-
tively more complicated. The assumptions that are valid for studying the general
processes of cultural transmission may not be suitable for asking questions about
bilingualism. I present a bottom-up model that is specifically designed to address
the bilingual paradox. In this model, individuals have a general learning mecha-
nism that conditions linguistic variation on semantic variables and social variables
such as the identity of the speaker. If speaker identity is an important condition-
ing factor, then ‘bilingualism’ emerges. The mechanism required to learn one
language in this model can also learn multiple languages. This suggests that the
bilingual paradox derives from focussing on the wrong kind of question. Rather
than having to explain the ability to learn multiple languages simultaneously as
an adaptation, we should be asking how and why humans developed a flexible
language learning mechanism.
This argument coincides with a move in the field of bilingualism away from asking
‘how are monolinguals and bilinguals different?’ to ‘how does the distribution of
variation affect the way children learn?’. In this case, while studies of language
evolution look at how learning biases affect linguistic variation, studies of bilin-
gualism look at how linguistic variation affects learning biases. I suggest that the
two fields have a lot to offer each other.
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Gwerth cynnydd yw gwarth cenedl
a’i hedd yw ei hangau hi.
Etifeddiaeth, Gerallt Lloyd Owen
There are no handles upon a language
Whereby men take hold of it
And mark it with signs for its remembrance.
It is a river, this language,
Once in a thousand years
Breaking a new course
Changing its way to the ocean.
It is mountain effluvia
Moving to valleys
And from nation to nation
Crossing borders and mixing.
Languages die like rivers.
Words wrapped round your tongue today
And broken to shape of thought
Between your teeth and lips speaking
Now and today
Shall be faded hieroglyphics
Ten thousand years from now.
Sing - and singing - remember
Your song dies and changes
And is not here to-morrow
Any more than the wind
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“Two languages in one head? No one can live at that speed.”
Eddie Izzard
1.1 Introduction
This thesis looks at the interaction between the fields of language evolution and
bilingualism. This involves re-examining the link between the learning mecha-
nisms of individuals and the linguistic properties of populations - what we might
call ‘languages’. Studies of cultural evolution have used simplifying assumptions
that undermine the importance of variation between speakers (see chapter 5).
This thesis explores the implications of re-introducing a consideration of bilin-
gualism into questions about the evolution of language and culture. The major
contribution of this thesis is a concrete definition of bilingualism that is valid
across sub-disciplines and different timescales.
Nativist approaches to linguistics have argued that the object of study should be
the core linguistic knowledge that all humans share, separated from use, positing
a genetically specified Universal Grammar that constrains the possible languages
that individuals can learn (e.g. Chomsky, 1965). In order to study this, the ob-
ject of study was abstracted to the ‘ideal speaker’, undermining the importance
of linguistic variation (De Groot, 2010; Cook and Newson, 2007; Sorace, 2011b).
Nativists assume that by studying the distribution of the properties of languages
that are observed, linguists can make inferences about the properties of Universal
Grammar (see Kirby et al., 2012 for discussion).
Proponents of cultural evolution have opposed the nativist view by arguing that,
although there is a genetic basis for general processing biases, the structure of
language we currently observe is influenced by cultural transmission (e.g. Kirby
et al., 2007; Christiansen and Chater, 2008; Smith, 2009; Ferdinand and Zuidema,
2009; Kirby et al., 2012; Tamariz et al., 2012). Models of cultural transmission
demonstrate that strong linguistic universals can emerge from populations of
learners with weak innate biases. This makes it difficult to draw inferences about
the learning biases of individuals from population-level phenomena (Kirby et al.,
2007; Smith, 2009; Thompson et al., 2012; Kirby et al., 2012).
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I will argue that researchers in the field of cultural evolution have chosen simpli-
fying assumptions that are appropriate for opposing the nativist claims but may
not be suitable for answering questions about bilingualism. All scientific studies
require some amount of abstraction when approaching a particular problem, but
I will demonstrate that models that place variation at their core can come to
very different conclusions to those that add variation in later. In doing so, I will
show that a proper consideration of bilingualism can inform the debate on how
population-level phenomena emerge from interactions between individuals.
The basis of this argument will be the adoption of a concrete definition of bilin-
gualism. While typical definitions of bilingualism involve native competence in
more than one language (Bloomfield, 1933), I will show that the concepts that
this kind of definition are based on are problematic. According to this thesis,
bilingualism is defined as the amount of optionality that is conditioned on social
variables. For example, if my linguistic signal changes depending on the identity
of my interlocutor, then I am bilingual to some degree. I will demonstrate that it
is possible to build an abstract model of cultural transmission based on this defini-
tion. While researchers in the field of bilingualism are interested in many factors
such as processing (Roux and Trémoulet, 2002; Bialystok and Craik, 2010), ex-
ecutive control (Hernández et al., 2010; Sorace, 2011b), pragmatics (Gumperz,
1982), identity (Myers Scotton, 1983) and politics (Myers Scotton and Ury, 1977),
the model will not take these factors into account. Instead, the aim is to reveal
general principles of bilingual cultural evolution. A model that does take more
factors into account or that attempts to fit a specific, real-world case can validly
be built upon this more abstract model.
However, I will go further to argue that bilingualism should also be a funda-
mental aspect of models of cultural evolution in general. Some approaches have
considered questions such as whether bilingualism can be stable over evolution-
ary time (e.g. Abrams and Strogatz, 2003), or why humans have developed the
ability to learn multiple languages when this appears to be a redundant abil-
ity (e.g. Hurford, 1991; Hagen, 2008). I will argue that language acquisition is
fundamentally about conditioning linguistic variation on semantic variation. If
social variables explain the variation in the linguistic signal, then bilingualism
will emerge. That is, a general learning mechanism that can condition linguistic
variation on semantic variation can not only learn the elements of a single lan-
guage, but multiple languages (see also Sternberg and Christiansen, 2006). The
key element that is needed for the emergence of bilingualism is variation in social
variables. This also requires allowing variation within and between individuals.
The definition of bilingualism used in this thesis is robust across different fields
and different timescales. It can be used to unite the fields of language evolution
and bilingualism. Traditionally, studies of language evolution might ask questions
such as “How did the ability to learn language evolve?” or “How does the struc-
ture of language change over time?”. Studies of bilingualism might ask “How
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do individuals acquire and use two languages simultaneously?”. However, I will
argue that both fields can address the question of “How do linguistic variation,
social structures and learning biases coevolve?”, and will benefit mutually from
converging their research aims accordingly.
The rest of this introduction introduces the ‘bilingual paradox’ and the approach
to bilingualism that this thesis uses. The end of this chapter gives a note on
terminology and the structure of the thesis.
1.1.1 The bilingual paradox
The motivation for this thesis was an apparent paradox. Intuitively, learning two
languages is harder than learning one, yet bilingualism is prevalent in the world
(see page 5)1. If individuals were biased towards monolingualism, then why is
there linguistic diversity? As Sapir puts it:
“If all the individual variations within a dialect are being constantly
levelled out to the dialect norm why should we have dialect differences
at all? Ought not the individual variations of each locality, even in
the absence of intercourse between them, to cancel out to the same
accepted speech average?”
(Sapir, 1921/1970: 149-150, cited in Nettle (1999b)).
This thesis offers three resolutions to the bilingual paradox. First, from a tradi-
tional language evolution approach, the ability to learn multiple languages may
not be so surprising. The second resolution comes from top down modelling of it-
erated learning and suggests that the inference in the paradox does not hold. The
first part of the paradox (the difficulty of learning two languages) is a property
of individuals, while the second part (bilingualism) is a property of populations.
This thesis shows that the way languages are transmitted over generations in a
social network means that the link between individual learning and population-
level phenomena is complex. Indeed, just because learning one language is easier
than two, it doesn’t mean that monolingualism will be the most prevalent prop-
erty of populations.
The third resolution realises that discrete languages may not be the best unit
of measurement of the complexity of the input, nor of whether an individual is
bilingual. Rather, it is the number of conditioning factors that make learning
1This will be referred to as ‘the bilingual paradox’ throughout this thesis. Although related,
it should not be confused with Petitto and Kovelman’s ‘bilingual paradox’ (Petitto and Kovel-
man, 2003) which recognises that people are in awe of the learning abilities of children, yet
worry that input from two languages will confuse them. Neither should the ‘bilingual paradox’
presented in this chapter be confused with Sorace’s ‘bilingual paradox’ (Sorace, 2011a) which
notes that bilingual children appear to exhibit benefits in non-linguistic domains, but deficits
in some areas of language competence.
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difficult, and bilingualism is a property of linguistic use. If the linguistic input
divides clearly along social variables, then bilingualism may emerge. The bottom
up model suggests that the bilingual paradox is asking the wrong question. In-
stead, evolutionary linguists should be asking how linguistic diversity, cognitive





Expectations about linguistic homogeneity
Figure 1.1: This thesis considers the link between individual learning biases and
population-level cultural phenomena. This link may be complicated by factors
such as the way individuals learn, the structure of the population and individual’s
expectations about linguistic homogeneity or ‘bilingualism’.
1.2 Approaches to bilingualism
Bilingualism is often seen as a secondary phenomenon of investigation in linguis-
tics (De Groot, 2010; Chomsky, 2000). Chomsky suggests that the object of study
for linguistics should be the ‘ideal speaker’ who knows their language perfectly
in a homogenous population (Chomsky, 1965). This approach undermines the
importance of bilingualism for an evolutionary theory of the origins of language
(e.g. see Chomsky, 2000; Cook and Newson, 2007). This is by no means the only
approach: many other linguistic theories see variation as essential. Some ancient
theories of the origins of language as far back as the 3rd century BCE emphasise
the role of variation between individuals and between groups (see Nemeth, 2011).
There was also opposition to the idea of idealising populations as homogenous
in the early days of modern linguistics (e.g. Breal, 1893, see Andresen, 1990).
There are researchers who investigate bilingualism in a generativist framework
(e.g. (Roeper, 1999; Hancin Bhatt, 2008; Satterfield, 1999; MacSwan, 1999)).
The debates between nativist and functionalist explanations has also become less
polarised in recent times (see Hurford, 1990).
4
Despite these alternative approaches, the kind of nativist approach exemplified
by Chomsky is taken seriously to the extent that proponents of cultural evolu-
tion often present their research as being in opposition to it2. Proponents of
cultural evolution also present their research as being in opposition to nativist
approaches typified by Chomsky (e.g. Kirby et al., 2012). While strong na-
tivist views assume that linguistic universals arise primarily due to biological
factors (see Hauser et al., 2002; Kirby et al., 2007 for reviews), there is a growing
literature that argues that linguistic universals are the product of an interac-
tion between biological evolution, individual learning and cultural transmission,
and that linking population-level phenomena to individual learning mechanisms
is not straightforward (Hurford, 1990;Kirby et al., 2007;Smith, 2009;Thompson
et al., 2012;Levinson and Gray, 2012;Dunn et al., 2011, see chapter 3). Much
of this work has been been carried out through abstract computational models
of cultural transmission (e.g. Bayesian, agent-based models, phylogenetic mod-
els). While the models demonstrate a complex link between individual biases
and population-level phenomena, the initial models adopted the ‘ideal speaker’
as a model of individuals. That is, individuals in the model could only speak
one language, they only learned from one teacher and individuals’ knowledge of
languages was categorical.
The field of language evolution is not alone in assuming that monolingualism
is the default, as criticisms of other fields such as generativism (Cook and New-
son, 2007), neurolinguistics (Grosjean, 1989), language acquisition (Petitto and
Kovelman, 2003), psycholinguistics (De Groot, 2010, p. 342) and sociolinguistics
(Otsuji and Pennycook, 2010) demonstrate. The perception of the prevalence of
bilingualism is artificially low especially for native speakers of global languages
such as English (Thomas and Wareing, 1999; Kostoulas-Makrakis, 2001; Dem-
beck and Minnaard, 2012; Luchtenberg, 2002; Yildiz, 2012). However, exposure
to multiple languages is the norm in the majority of societies. Although hard
data on bilingualism is sparse due to economic, political and theoretical reasons
(e.g. Paliwala, 2012, and see chapter 3), the majority of people in Europe de-
scribe themselves as knowing more than one language (54%) and trilinguals are
the majority in 8 countries in Europe (European Commission, 2012) - a goal
that the European Commission has set for all countries in the European Union
(European Commission, 2012). This is despite the fact that the levels of bilin-
gualism in Europe have actually declined in recent years (European Commission,
2012). There is an assumption that other regions of the world have higher levels
of bilingualism than Europe, with estimates varying between 50% (Wolff, 2000)
and two-thirds (Crystal and Wang, 1997) being bilingual. In some countries such
2From a total of 1303 publications included in the Language Evolution and Computation
Bibliography (http://groups.lis.illinois.edu/amag/langev/), the number of citations Chomsky
receives is 552 according to the list of “Other relevant highly cited publications” induced from
full-text references in this bibliography. Chomsky authored 6 of the top 10 publications in this
list. For the 993 publication records that included a list of references, there were 799 references
to Chomsky in 347 publications (35% of all publications).
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as China, up to 80% of the population are estimated to be bilingual (Baker and
Jones, 1998).
However, not only is bilingualism in the lay sense the norm, I argue that varia-
tion between speakers and optionality within speakers are fundamental aspects of
linguistic systems. Indeed, while some researchers see the ability to learn many
languages as a problem for a theory of grammatical knowledge (e.g. Roeper,
1999), others see variation as a central feature (e.g. Sorace, 2000). If a construc-
tion has optionality, there can still be agreement between people on the level of
optionality. For example, some verbs only permit a particular auxiliary while
others can take more than one on a graded scale of acceptability, although there
is consensus in the variation used (Sorace, 2000).
The bottom-up model, presented in chapter 7, includes a general learning mech-
anism which conditions linguistic variation on semantic variation and a dynamic
social structure that is observable by learners. The model demonstrates that a
mechanism that can learn one ‘language’ can learn many, if linguistic variation
can be conditioned on social variables. While other models have had to be aug-
mented or changed to cope with bilingualism, bilingualism emerges ‘for free’ in
the bottom up model by building in variation from the start (see also a similar
argument by Sternberg and Christiansen, 2006; Sternberg, 2006).
1.2.1 Defining bilingualism
In order to construct this model, a concrete definition of bilingualism is needed.
Mackey (2000) notes a relaxing of the definition of a bilingual over time: Bloom-
field defined it as “native-like control of two languages” (Bloomfield, 1933, p. 56)
(which matches a lay understanding of the term ‘bilingualism’); Haugen qual-
ified it as the ability to produce “complete meaningful utterances in the other
language” (Haugen, 1953, p. 7); Diebold, seeing problems with this, suggested
bilingualism involved “contact with possible models in a second language and the
ability to use these in the environment of the native language” (Diebold, 1961, p.
111); and Mackey simply stated that bilingualism was “the alternate use of two or
more languages by the same individual” (Mackey, 2000, p. 22). Most definition
of bilingualism, however, involve the concepts of discrete languages and level of
attainment.
It is intuitively easy to encode the Bloomfieldian notion of bilingualism in an
abstract model: discrete languages can be captured by discrete variables and na-
tive control can be modelled by assuming that a speaker either knows or does
not know a particular language. However, both concepts are problematic. Chap-
ter 3 argues that identifying discrete languages is not straightforward, which
means that counting the number of languages an individual speaks is difficult.
The problem of defining the “native speaker”, or measuring attainment has also
been questioned theoretically (e.g. Escudero and Sharwood Smith, 2001; Davies,
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2003; Medgyes, 1992; Hyltenstam and Abrahamsson, 2003) and empirically (e.g.
Dabrowska, 2010; Street and Dabrowska, 2010; Mulder and Hulstijn, 2011, see
section 8.3). Indeed, after defining bilingualism as above, Bloomfield admits “Of
course, one cannot define a degree of perfection at which a good foreign speaker
becomes a bilingual: the distinction is relative” (Bloomfield, 1933, p.56).
Therefore, the definition of bilingualism typically depends on two of the most
controversial and possibly least well-defined concepts in linguistics - competence
and ‘languages’. Models that use concepts that are not concrete (they cannot
easily be mapped onto the real world) may have little real explanatory power, or
may adversely affect the direction of research. In order to look at bilingualism in
a cultural evolution framework with abstract models, this thesis requires a more
concrete definition of bilingualism.
Certainly there are many existing definitions of types of bilingualism (for re-
views, see Butler and Hakuta, 2004; De Groot, 2010). Researchers have focussed
on differences in proficiency (Peal and Lambert, 1962), language organisation
(Weinreich, 1953), age of first acquisition (Genesee et al., 1978), functional abil-
ity (Diebold, 1961), the effect of a second language on the first (Lambert, 1975),
sociolinguistic status (Valdés and Figueroa, 1994) and sociolinguistic identity
(Hamers and Blanc, 2000). There are sometimes conflicts between different ap-
proaches. For example, Grosjean notes that all bilinguals who are not ‘balanced’
fall into an intermediate category and tend to be ignored by researchers (Gros-
jean, 1985).
Identifying each sub-type of bilingualism has its difficulties. For example, But-
ler and Hakuta (2004) identify two types of problem in determining whether an
individual is a balanced or dominant bilingual: How to determine proficiency in
each language and how to compare proficiencies. Similarly, Mackey (2000) sug-
gests that the measurement of bilingualism requires consideration of the degree
of competence, the function of language use, and to what extent an individual
alternates between languages and is able to keep them separate.
However, nowhere in either of these articles do the authors address the prob-
lem of identifying separate languages in the first place. It is often assumed that
researchers know how to divide the linguistic variation in a community into rel-
evant sub-categories that we call language. That is, even if researchers do settle
on a particular definition of a sub-type, identifying a bilingual in a particular
case still relies on the intuitions of the researcher. There are examples of studies
that define languages through the way individuals use them (e.g. the concept of
a ‘medium’, Gafaranga, 2000, 2008), and the next chapter will explore this further.
I am not trying to argue that previous research is misguided. Studies of bilin-
gualism typically use definitions of bilingualism that are productive given the
research questions. However, I am arguing that researchers’ definitions of bilin-
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gualism have been fairly interest specific and context dependent, which prevents
their application across research questions. As Roeper (1999) argues,
“The concept of bilingualism has never received a widely acknowl-
edged formal definition (to my knowledge). One can even ask: should
it receive a clear formal definition? Its cousins, dialects, interlan-
guage, foreign language, and speech register all remain important
social terms, but unclear theoretical terms. Dialects, for instance,
are sometimes defined as “mutually intelligible” languages, which is a
valuable human and holistic characterization, but not a formal one.”
(Roeper, 1999, p.169)
Different fields will also typically consider different levels of analysis and different
timescales. Sociolinguists might ask how speakers use varieties to construct and
manage identity (individuals in real time). Developmental linguists might study
how children acquire multiple varieties (individuals over years). Studies of lan-
guage change might consider whether bilingualism is stable over time (populations
over generations). Finally, evolutionary linguists might consider the evolutionary
stability of the ability to learn multiple varieties (populations over evolutionary
time). The goal of this thesis is to construct a definition of bilingualism that can
be applied in all of these approaches.
1.3 A concrete definition of bilingualism
This section introduces the concrete definition of bilingualism developed in this
thesis. Since this definition is referred to throughout the thesis, here is as good
a point to introduce it as any. Although the definition might seem obvious, it
was not the starting assumption of this thesis, but the result of exploring bilin-
gualism in an evolutionary light and of building and exploring models of cultural
transmission.
The definition is the following: The amount of bilingualism in a population is
the amount of optionality that is conditioned on social variables. For example,
optionality might be conditioned on speaker identity. If I speak differently to
Mary than I do to John, then this is some amount of bilingualism. This means
that bilingualism is a continuum, not a categorical concept. The level of difference
could be very small or very large - I could vary in register, accent, syntax, vo-
cabulary or use linguistic varieties that were entirely mutually incomprehensible.
The level of bilingualism depends on the amount of variation that is explained
by the social variables. Any observable social variable is a candidate, including
aspects of an interlocutor’s identity, social context, location, time of day and so
on. A method for calculating this empirically is suggested in chapter 7.
Optionality exists wherever there are linguistic forms in competition within a
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speaker’s utterance. That is, if the production of one variant necessarily excludes
the production of another variant (including a ‘null’ variant with no overt from).
This defines bilingualism as a property of populations, with a bilingual commu-
nity being one with a particular distribution of variation. While there is work on
studying linguistic variation in an evolutionary framework (Greenberg, 1963; Net-
tle, 1998, 1999a; Nettle and Romaine, 2000; Baker, 2003; Dunbar, 2003; Roberts,
2010b; Dunn et al., 2011; Evans and Levinson, 2009), there has not been much
consideration of the distribution of variation in a population. In fact, bilingual-
ism being a property of a population opposes some views of bilingualism. For
instance, Mackey (2000) states that “if language is a property of the group, bilin-
gualism is a property of the individual”. I suggest that the view of bilingualism
as a property of the individual derives from the bias to study linguistic compe-
tence rather than linguistic use. If bilingualism is defined through reactions to
social variables, such as interlocutor identity, then it cannot be measured in an
individual in isolation3.
It is unlikely that there are any communities of moderate size that score zero on
this metric of bilingualism. Even populations generally considered to be monolin-
gual will have some amount of linguistic variation conditioned on social variables.
For example, the gender of the pronoun used to refer to an interlocutor can be
conditioned on the sex of the interlocutor (e.g. Hausa has a separate 2nd person
pronoun for male and female referents: Siewierska, 2011; Newman, 2000). There
are also statistical tendencies in the way ‘monolingual’ speakers use lexical items
based on context and speaker identity (Altmann et al., 2011). However, any
population that is considered to involve bilingualism by researches in the field
of bilingualism should always have a higher amount of bilingualism according to
this measure.
There is one element of this concept that does not intuitively fit with other
conceptions of bilingualism. Under the concrete definition, if every member of
the population under scrutiny speaks two varieties that are recognised elsewhere
as separate languages, there is no bilingualism. That is, if everyone speaks in
the same way to everyone else, and if there is no social variable on which the use
of either variety is conditioned (e.g. social context), then everyone is essentially
speaking the same variety. There is an awareness in the sociolinguistics literature
that communities that have been ‘bilingual’ for a long time may be qualitatively
different from those that are undergoing social change (e.g. Wei and Milroy,
19954). However, contentious examples of this in the real world would be very
3It would be possible to quantify the amount of variation that a single speaker conditions on
social variables. However, this would still be a measure of use and would take into account the
individual’s proportions of interaction with other people, effectively making it a measure of a
population. Since an individual’s use of language is not independent from others’, this measure
could also only properly be understood as being relative to the measure of the population.
4“Like other researchers who have worked with immigrant communities, we are conscious
of the need for a model of on-going social and linguistic change, since code-switching and
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rare. Perhaps an example would be Castilian Spanish and Catalan in Barcelona,
although the varieties are divided by history, politics and identity.
‘Social variables’ are factors of the social identity of the speaker or social context of
the conversation, in contrast with ‘non-social variables’, which are semantic vari-
ables that are independent of these factors such as properties of the objects being
described (e.g. colour). What I am labelling ‘social variables’ can be equated
with what Bell (1984) identifies as factors affecting ‘stylistic’ or ‘intraspeaker’
variation. Linguistic variation is affected by linguistic factors, such as phono-
logical effects, and extralinguistic factors. The extralinguistic factors include in-
terspeaker and intraspeaker factors. Interspeaker factors include the differences
between speakers such as class or age. For example, a speaker from an upper class
might speak differently to one from a lower class. Intraspeaker factors include
the identity of the addressee or the topic of conversation5. Indeed, the definition
of bilingualism above is close to Bell’s concept of audience design as a factor in
linguistic variation. For some linguistic variables, the proportion of ‘style shift’
can be measured quantitatively. For example, Coupland (1984) demonstrated
that shop assistants shifted their proportions of intervocalic [t] voicing to match
the proportions used in the social class of their customers. While the linguistic
difference between a change in ‘style’ (e.g. choice of lexicon or vowel) is usually
at a lower level from a change in ‘language’ (e.g. syntactic differences), from the
perspective of this thesis, it is difficult to draw a categorical boundary between
the two (see also Gumperz, 1967). Indeed, as Bell puts it, “Audience design also
accounts for bilingual or bidialectal code choices. ... The monolingual depends on
a linguistic variable being used differentially among speakers in the community to
make it socially evaluated and available for the individual speaker to style-shift.
The bilingual situation simply sharpens the process and makes it more visible”
(Bell, 1984, p. 145, 158).
While this thesis focuses on social variables concerned with speaker identity,
other social variables such as formality or location are also candidates for this
measure. This allows this measure of bilingualism to fit the concepts such as ‘di-
alect’, ‘diglossia’ or ‘register’. Indeed, some see code-switching between languages
and switching between registers as analysable under a single framework (Halmari
and Smith, 1994). However, this means that it is possible to have ‘bilingualism’ in
a population where everyone speaks identically, but uses, for instance, a different
variety for formal occasions. That is, the linguistic uniformity of a population
and the amount of linguistic variation in a population are independent. Everyone
can agree that there’s more than one way to say something. This approach goes
against certain models of cultural evolution that see uniformity and variation as
opposing ends of a single continuum (e.g. Abrams and Strogatz, 2003;Steels and
language choice patterns need to be modelled very differently from those in well-established
bilingual communities (Boeschoten, 1990).” (Wei and Milroy, 1995, p. 284).
5While Bell (1984) also labels interspeaker variables as ‘social’ factors, here I use ‘in-
traspeaker’ and ‘interspeaker’, to avoid confusion with my use of ‘social’ variables above.
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Belpaeme, 2005;Castelló et al., 2008, see section 5.3).
However, this measure of bilingualism is still open to the biases of the researcher
in a number of ways. First, the selection of social and linguistic variables to mea-
sure is not specified. There is also the question of how to compare different levels
of linguistic structure (see Winters, 2011 for some possible solutions). However,
as chapter 8 will show, rather than carefully selecting a few high-level features,
using as many low-level features as possible is preferable and now feasible due to
advances in statistical analyses (the individual differences approach, see chapter
8).
Secondly, the choice of the population to study will affect the apparent diver-
sity, a point also made by Greenberg (1956). In computational models, it is
easy to include the entire population, and to divide it according to social fac-
tors encoded in the model. Doing this in the real world might be harder, since
populations migrate and change. However, the purpose of the measure in this
thesis is not to measure and compare real-world populations (although this would
be a feasible and interesting extension), but to explore the general processes of
bilingual cultural transmission.
Although other conceptions of bilingualism have been used in abstract models,
this thesis argues that they use concepts that cannot be mapped back onto the
real world on theoretical grounds. The most significant shortcoming is the failure
to embed the linguistic system within a dynamic social structure. Chapter 3 will
show that when linguists talk about multiple languages, they are either pointing
at low-level variation or social factors such as politics, history, geography, iden-
tity and so on. The definition of bilingualism used in this thesis places social
structures and variation between speakers at the centre of the model.
1.4 A note on terminology
In this thesis I will follow Gafaranga (2008) and others by using ‘bilingualism’ as
an umbrella term for knowledge of more than one language, where some would use
‘multilingualism’. In chapter 3 it will become clear that there are many different
interpretations of how to define ‘languages’, and I will argue that the most valid
concept of ‘bilingualism’ is as a continuous measure of how intraspeaker variation
is conditioned on social variables, not a categorical measure of competence. How-
ever, I will indicate what I mean more specifically as I discuss various concepts.
A basic rule of thumb is that what I mean by ‘bilingualism’ contrasts with the
focus of generativist linguists on a ‘monolingual’ ideal speaker.
Part of this thesis will also argue that there is no valid way to divide linguistic
variation into discrete ‘languages’ without considering complex social variables.
That is, that the concept of a ‘language’ as a monolithic, discrete, static entity
11
is not valid in an evolutionary framework. However, eliminating this term in
a study of bilingualism is very difficult (see section 3.13), especially when real-
world examples are required. I would like to make clear that there is no reason to
doubt that a sociolinguist, going into a specific linguistic context could usefully
and validly distinguish the languages being spoken in that community. However,
this usually involves complex social variables such as politics, history, geography,
power, economics and identity. Rather than try to come up with a definition of
bilingualism that explains how sociolinguists carve up the linguistic diversity of
the world into languages, the definition this thesis uses is a minimal, concrete
definition that can be applied to any population of individuals that communicate
over any timescale.
1.5 Structure of the thesis
While the bulk of the thesis concentrates on cultural evolution, chapter 2 con-
siders a more traditional language evolution approach to bilingualism. It argues
that the cognitive mechanisms that allow the learning of multiple languages are
evolutionarily old. Instead of a mechanism that handles bilingualism specifically,
an evolutionary approach to bilingualism should look for a general learning mech-
anism that conditions linguistic signals on social variables. Chapter 3 argues that
languages are not discrete entities that can be separated from social factors. This
supports the use of the concrete measure of bilingualism and leads to some re-
quirements for valid models of the cultural evolution of bilingualism. Chapter 4
is a brief discussion of a problem that emerges from this: if ‘languages’ are not
discrete, then how can we identify bilingualism? I use arguments from biology
to suggest that bilingualism can be studied as a phenomenon in its own right.
Chapter 5 reviews how bilingualism is represented in previous models of cultural
transmission, concluding that most models violate the requirements discussed in
chapter 3. Chapter 6 presents a top-down model that explores the implications of
introducing the possibility of bilingualism. Its conclusions will differ from those
of the models in the previous chapter, demonstrating that the assumptions about
bilingualism can affect the direction of research. However, this model, too, uses
an impoverished notion of ‘bilingualism’. Chapter 7 presents a bottom-up model
of cultural transmission using the concrete definition of bilingualism and adher-
ing to the requirements set up in chapter 3. By comparing the top down and
bottom up models, I demonstrate that different assumptions can lead to differ-
ent solutions to the bilingual paradox. Chapter 8 discusses the implications of
this approach to bilingualism for (non-evolutionary) studies of bilingualism and
language acquisition. Chapter 9 provides a short conclusion.
There are three technical appendices which explain the technical details of the
models. However, the implications of the thesis should be clear without under-
standing these. The final appendix includes some manuscripts of work written
during the time spent on this thesis (Roberts, 2011; Roberts, in press).
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Chapter 2
The evolution of bilingualism
“Hence even the names of things were not originally due to convention,
but in the several tribes under the impulse of special feelings and
special presentations of sense primitive man uttered special cries. The
air thus emitted was moulded by their individual feelings or sense-
presentations, and differently according to the difference of the regions
which the tribes inhabited. Subsequently whole tribes adopted their
own special names, in order that their communications might be less
ambiguous to each other and more briefly expressed.”
Epicurus, 3rd Century B.C.E.1
“The diversity of languages arose with the building of the Tower after
the Flood, for before the pride of that Tower divided human society,
so that there arose a diversity of meaningful sounds, there was one
language for all nations, which is called Hebrew.”
Isiodre Hispalensis, 7th Century C.E.2
2.1 Introduction
This chapter uses a traditional approach to the evolution of language to deter-
mine what the the status of the ability to learn multiple languages should be.
It argues that the default assumption should be that it is evolutionarily older
than the ability to learn one language. This might be counterintuitive because
learning multiple languages is usually thought of as being a more complex task
than learning a single language. However, if we see the necessary ingredient for
bilingualism as the ability to condition signals on social variables (as the mea-
sure of bilingualism presented in chapter 1 suggests), then the default assumption
above is the one that makes sense. Put another way, it seems difficult to imag-
ine a mechanism that could learn one language that couldn’t also learn multiple
languages. This is part of the motivation for the bottom up model in chapter 7.
1Epicurus Letter to Herodotus in Diogenes Laertius 10.75-6 English translation from Chilton,
C. W., The Epicurean Theory of the Origin of Language. A Study of Diogenes of Oenoanda,
Fragments X and XI (W) The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 83, No. 2, 1962, 160; cited
in Nemeth (2011).
2Isidorus Hispalensis, 1911, 9.1.1 English translation from Isidore of Seville, The Etymologies
of Isidore of Seville, Barney, S. A. - W. J. Lewis - J. A. Beach - O. Berghof eds., Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006; cited in Nemeth (2011).
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Section 1 reviews previous theories of the utility of linguistic variation between
individuals, but demonstrates that there has not been a lot of work on variation
within individuals. Section 2 discusses whether we should assume by default a
specific cognitive mechanism for dealing with multiple languages. This provides
one resolution to the bilingual paradox by suggesting that the number of discrete
‘languages’ is not necessarily the best measure of the complexity of the language
learning task. Rather, it is the complexity of the conditioning factors that poses a
challenge to learners. Section 3 uses a comparative approach to demonstrate that
other species primarily condition signals on social variables, while conditioning
signals on non-social semantic variables is more difficult. This suggests that part
of a bilingual ability (conditioning signals on social variables) is evolutionarily old.
This motivates a view of the evolution of language which sees a consideration of
bilingualism as a core component.
2.2 Selectionist arguments
There are relatively few theories of the evolution of an ability to learn multiple
languages (see Sternberg and Christiansen, 2006). However, there are several
theories that explain linguistic variation as adaptive at the group level, based
on co-operation. Baker (2003) suggests that the ability to conceal information
from other groups using an unfamiliar language could drive the creation of dif-
ferent languages. Dunbar (2003) notes languages diverge easily and quickly, one
explanation being that different dialects make it more difficult for freeriders to
take advantage of the cooperation of others by making it easy to spot outsiders
(learning to speak like a native is difficult). The emergence of linguistic diversity
motivated by the resistance to freeriders was demonstrated in an experiment by
Gareth Roberts (Roberts, 2010b, although the social structure was an important
factor, see section 7.3.2.1 in chapter 7). However, these theories rarely consider
bilingualism. Having one language that is not shared by outsiders is enough to
spot and resist freeriders. Bilingualism, if anything, is an advantage to potential
freeriders. These theories see an ability to acquire fluency in many languages as
part of the problem.
The apparent ease of children to acquire multiple languages is seen as a puz-
zle, due to an assumed trade-off between adaptive advantages of being able to
communicate (e.g. Hagen, 2008) and investment of finite resources into learning
languages (e.g. Petitto and Kovelman, 2003). It is been argued that the lan-
guage capacity has clear adaptive advantages (Pinker and Bloom, 1990; Sober,
1984, Chomsky, 1982, p.18-193, see Hurford, 1991 for a short review), either for
survival or reproduction. However, it is also been argued that there is no adap-
tive advantage to learning multiple languages (Hagen, 2008). Hagen argues that
3The faculty of language is “highly useful and very valuable for the perpetuation of the
species and so on, a capacity that has obvious selectional value”(Chomsky, 1982, 18-19).
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in the early historical environment of humans, the advantages of learning a sec-
ond language in adulthood would be much less than learning one in childhood,
so the ability to learn languages in adulthood would not be selected for. While
there are criticisms of the precise explanation4, Hagen points out two important
factors for the adaptationist argument. First, language acquisition ability, includ-
ing bilingual acquisition, is underpinned by genetic constraints (which is widely
accepted, e.g. Chomsky, 1980; Hurford, 1991; Hauser et al., 2002; Dale et al.,
2010). Second, the adaptiveness of bilingualism relies on the social dynamics of
communities. For example, Hagen suggests that bilingualism would be adaptive
in situations where groups met often enough to set up long-term trade, but not
often enough to integrate. Later chapters will demonstrate that dynamic social
structures are a key part of cultural transmission where bilingualism is possible
and section 5.8 in chapter 5 will consider the evolution of biases for learning mul-
tiple languages based on different fitness functions of bilingual ability.
Hurford (1991) has a similar hypothesis about the ‘critical period’ effect for first
language acquisition: The ease with which a language can be learned appears to
change over the life history of an individual (e.g. puberty), and these changes
appear be under genetic control. If knowing a language for longer gives an indi-
vidual a greater advantage, then individuals should evolve to be good at learning
language early in their lifetime5. Although it is hard to imagine an adaptive
advantage for a diminished ability for language learning at a later point in life
(Hurford, 1991, p.172), Hurford suggests that this is a problem of perspective.
Because there is a finite amount of resources that can be devoted to language
acquisition, language acquisition is simply not ‘boosted’ for later life events.
These arguments typically focus on first language acquisition or adult second
language acquisition, not simultaneous early bilingual acquisition. However, the
assumption of a finite capacity for language leads to the puzzlement over why hu-
mans are so good at learning two languages at once (Petitto and Kovelman, 2003).
That is, bilingual acquisition is often seen as redundant. However, different lan-
guages are never directly compatible (see the literature on linguistic diversity and
linguistic relativity, e.g. Fausey and Boroditsky, 2008; Boroditsky et al., 2011;
Lakoff, 1990; Talmy, 1985; Levinson, 2003; Evans and Levinson, 2009). While
bilingual individuals may have multiple words for the same objects, there may
be different connotations associated with words in each language, so there is still
contrast in meaning (e.g. Bolinger, 1968; Clark, 1987; Goldberg, 1995; Croft,
2001). The bottom-up model presented later demonstrates that unconditioned
(redundant) variation is indeed not stable.
4Hagen suggests that gaining resources through brute force would be more adaptive than
trade (which would require communication), citing archaeological evidence of violence. Hagen
also suggests that early humans would have belonged to small, isolated communities that did
not interact often. See Hirschfeld (2008) for a critical response to the archaeological evidence.
Recent genetic studies suggest that early humans had significant amounts of contact with other
communities (Henn et al., 2011).
5However, Hurford is cautious about framing this as ‘adaptive’.
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I suggest that the confusion about the redundancy of learning multiple languages
involves the use of the wrong ‘unit’ for calculating linguistic capacity. Rather
than the number of languages (so that bilinguals have half the capacity in each
language, see Martin-Jones and Romaine, 1986), it is the number of conditioning
factors that should be counted. That is, real redundancy is the number of distinct
linguistic units that encode the same meaning, where meanings are distinguished
by contrasts in any semantic variable - including social variables (e.g. speaker
identity). This means that a bilingual language system, as defined in this thesis,
is not redundant, because the extra variation encodes social meanings. In this
case, one possible measure of redundancy would be the proportion of linguistic
variation not accounted for by the learner’s mental language (the residual vari-
ation). The residual variation in the linguistic systems that emerge under the
bottom-up model in chapter 7 tends to reduce. Again, Hurford suggests that
linguistic capacity can only be measured in principle, not in practice (Hurford,
1991, p.168), but the way researchers think about this principle can affect the
kinds of questions that are asked.
The resources any child has for learning language are finite, and so there must
be a trade-off between learning how linguistic variation is conditioned on social
and non-social factors. For example, a child cannot commit maximum resources
to learning both the differences between how each parent names objects and to
learning names for as many different objects as possible6. However, this ‘compu-
tational level’ style expression of the problem may obscure some complexities of
the actual implementation. Bilingual children reach linguistic development mile-
stones at the same pace as monolinguals (e.g. Pearson et al., 1993; Werker and
Byers-Heinlein, 2008). In order to do this, it is suggested that children raised
in bilingual environments have different learning strategies, for example paying
attention to different cues (Healey and Skarabela, 2009; Brojde et al., 2012), be-
ing less likely to use principles such as mutual exclusivity (Byers-Heinlein and
Werker, 2009a), or becoming more flexible in their learning and so are able to
acquire two languages in the time monolinguals learn one (Kovács and Mehler,
2009). This flexibility demonstrates that the language learning mechanism adapts
to the input during development, and that the genetic basis for learning adapts
across generations to selection pressures. The effects of these two factors are easy
to confound, and may interact in complex ways themselves. Cognitive flexibility
may not be specific to language learning, either, since changes in brain structure
have been found after learning in other domains such as physical co-ordination
skills (e.g. juggling, Draganski et al., 2004; video-game playing, Green and Bave-
6Burkett and Griffiths (2010) describe a Bayesian model where learners have a bias over
the amount of variation to expect between speakers, which resembles this kind of trade-off.
This model is reviewed in chapter 5. Frank et al. (2009) also describe a Bayesian model of
word learning that has a trade-off between the size of the lexicon and the number of one-to-one
mappings between objects and words. However, neither model includes social variables such as
the identity of speakers. Burkett and Griffiths’s model is extended in chapter 6 to include this
kind of consideration.
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lier, 2008 or navigating, Maguire et al., 20007)
2.3 Cognitive Flexibility
Recent studies suggest that the structure of language can be shaped by cultural
processes under two pressures: learnability and expressivity (e.g. Kirby et al.,
2008). However, these measures may not be straightforward. The section above
argued that the learnability of a linguistic system is not absolute, since learning
mechanisms can adapt to the linguistic system. Therefore, a ‘bilingual’ system
may not be half as ‘learnable’ as as a ‘monolingual’ system. That is it may not
be possible to apply a simple ‘learnability’ measure to any given linguistic system
without also considering its context. With regards to expressivity, bilinguals can
express themselves through codeswitching (Gafaranga, 2007, 2008), so there are
exponentially more ways to express yourself with each language you learn (This
point is also made by Quay, 2008 and Hoffmann, 2001a). Furthermore, the re-
lations between languages can change over time (Hoffmann and Stavans, 2007).
Again, the expressivity of a language is a function of the context of the system,
and the kinds of aspect that speakers need to express.
In fact, the potential flexibility of bilinguals (or, from another perspective, the po-
tential speciality of monolinguals) may suggest a relaxing of selection pressures on
the learning mechanisms, rather than active selection (Ritchie and Kirby, 2007;
Deacon, 2010a). That is, when the learning abilities of children with diverse types
of input (monolingual and bilingual) are considered in their entirety, the salient
feature appears to be a selection for flexibility. So, rather than asking “why
is there so much linguistic variation?”, evolutionary linguists could equally ask
“why is the language acquisition capacity so flexible?”. The questions are related,
but point in different directions. The question about variation is perhaps based
on the premise that there are strong, language-specific constraints on language
learning and, as suggested above, leads to a view of monolinguals as the norm and
proper object of study and bilinguals as “two monolinguals in one” (Grosjean,
1989). That is, the presumed origin of diversity is linked to factors of the individ-
ual learning mechanism. On the other hand, the question about flexibility might
be answered by saying that a flexible learning capacity is clearly more adaptive
than an inflexible one in certain circumstances, those circumstances being diverse
and unpredictable input. The flexibility question now leads to questions about
the sources of the diversity that requires this flexibility. This thesis suggests that
dynamic social structures provide one source, and possibly another is the cultural
transmission process itself. Therefore, two perspectives on the same problem lead
to different objects of study.
7These examples come from Bialystok (2011), who points out that learners typically choose
to engage with these other domains, so there is a certain amount of self-selection, while the
exposure to multiple languages as a child is thrust upon language learners.
17
A similar argument is made by Pinker and Bloom: “instead of positing that
there are multiple languages, leading to the evolution of a mechanism to learn
the differences among them, one might posit that there is a learning mechanism,
leading to the development of multiple languages” (Pinker and Bloom, 1990, p.
716). Sternberg and Christiansen (2006) suggest that this is based on the idea
that learned behaviour that is selected for can come to be genetically encoded
(the Baldwin effect, Baldwin, 1896; Newman, 2002), but that this pressure re-
duces as the behaviour is increasingly encoded, making learning easier (Hinton
and Nowlan, 1987). This means that there still might be room for variation in
languages after selection. However, Sternberg and Christiansen suggest that this
is also the wrong perspective:
“Like Pinker & Bloom, Baker does not directly argue for a selection-
ist model of language differentiation as such, but gives a reason for
language differentiation after selection for the linguistic ability has
already taken place. What both theories are lacking, however, is an
explanation for how this language system can not only accommodate
language variation across groups of individuals, but also the instanti-
ation of multiple languages within a single individual. ”
(Sternberg and Christiansen, 2006, p. 335)
Sternberg and Christiansen argue that any account of language evolution must
include an explanation of the bilingual case, since it is a fundamental ability.
However, rather than being selected for, Sternberg and Christiansen suggest that
the bilingual ability came “for free” as a by-product of the more general learning
mechanism that was selected for. In support of this, they demonstrate that a
neural network trained on two languages simultaneously is able to learn both8.
That is, a mechanism that is capable of learning one language is capable of learn-
ing many. This demonstrates that a proper consideration of bilingualism can
change the approach to, questions about, and solutions to, language evolution.
I will make a similar argument: Some top-down models of cultural transmis-
sion started with monolingual assumptions and added mechanisms for dealing
with bilingualism (see chapter 5). The bottom-up model I present has a single,
domain-general learning mechanism. While Sternberg and Christiansen (2006)
show that such a mechanism can handle two varieties in the input at once, my
model demonstrates that dynamic social structures can bring about the diversity
8A simple recurrent network was trained to predict the next word in a corpus created by
two simple grammars - English and Japanese. The input nodes represented the lexical items
from both languages. The input to the network included no explicit marking of which language
a word belonged to. The network was trained on sequences of words from sentences in one of
the languages, with a small probability of switching languages between sentences. The trained
network responded differently to the two languages, although this was “local-scale language
separation rather than the emergence of two completely distinct lexicons...grouping by language
and part of speech gave a highly significant result, seeming to imply that the network attends
to both language and part of speech, rather than primarily focusing on one.”(Sternberg and
Christiansen, 2006, p. 338). For more details of the model, see Sternberg (2006)
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in the input in the first place.
If a general learning mechanism can lead to bilingualism, then we might expect
to see abilities analogous to bilingualism in other animals. The following section
considers this possibility.
2.4 A comparative approach
How should the ability to learn multiple languages be treated in an evolution-
ary framework? The sections above suggest that the current default assumption
about bilingualism is that before humans had an ability to learn more than one
language, they had to have an ability to learn a single language. This section
uses a comparative approach to evaluate this assumption. I will demonstrate that
other species exhibit aspects of the capacity for bilingualism such as optionality,
inter-species communication and the ability to condition signals on social vari-
ables. The latter is important for the argument of this thesis, since I argue that
bilingualism is the amount of linguistic optionality that is conditioned on social
variables. I argue that the default assumption about the evolution of a bilingual
ability is that it is evolutionarily older than the emergence of compositional, sym-
bolic communication.
Before looking at other species, the comparative approach to language evolu-
tion is presented. Hauser et al. (2002) approach the study of the evolution of
language by considering what elements contribute towards the ‘Faculty of Lan-
guage’. In the broad sense of the term, this covers all the prerequisite elements
that are required for linguistic communication. This involves cognitive capaci-
ties such as acoustic string segmentation and semantic processing, but also much
more basic features such as memory. That is, features of the Faculty of Language
in the broad sense (FLB) are found in humans and animals. The narrow sense
of the term (FLN) refers to those capacities that are involved in language alone.
Recursive syntax has been suggested as one example (e.g. Hauser et al., 2002,
although see Pinker and Jackendoff, 2005).
The comparative approach has been used to answer the question of what belongs
to FLN and to FLB. Animals have been shown to be capable of a number of pro-
cesses required for language, including categorical perception of speech sounds
(Kuhl and Miller, 1978) and mutual exclusivity (Kaminski et al., 2004). From
studies of divergent and convergent evolution of these traits, some important fea-
tures have been identified. For example, many species that exhibit vocal learning
have direct neural connections between the brain and vocal motors, while non-
vocal learners do not (see Doupe and Kuhl, 1999).
It has been assumed that the bilingual ability emerged from a pressure to learn
multiple languages (see selectionist arguments above). That is, the bilingual abil-
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ity is often assumed to belong to the faculty of language in the narrow sense (FLN,
see Hauser et al., 2002). For instance, top-down approaches to cultural evolution
have tended to add in sensitivity to social variables as a secondary, more complex
part of the learning mechanism (see chapter 5). This suggests that they assume
that conditioning on non-social semantic variables was primary. However, If other
species exhibit the ability to condition complex signals on social variables, then
this is evidence that the mechanisms behind bilingualism developed before hu-
man language. In that case, the bilingual ability may be part of the faculty of
language in the broad sense (FLB).
2.4.1 Optionality
A basic requirement of a bilingual system is optionality. That is, the ability to
respond in the same way to two different signals. There are plenty of examples of
optionality in animal signalling, including species with limited cognitive process-
ing that are evolutionarily distant from humans. For example, van Wilgenburg
et al. (2010) find that ants respond in the same way to more than one chemical
composition. They conclude that “similar to spoken language, the chemical lan-
guage of social insects contains “synonyms,” chemicals that differ in structure,
but not meaning” (van Wilgenburg et al., 2010, p. 756) 9. Another way to think
about this is optionality. Just as a human may choose to say ‘teacher’ or ‘instruc-
tor’ or a bilingual may choose one language over another, ants respond in the same
way to different molecules (of course, ants don’t ‘choose’ the molecules). Perhaps
a closer analogy to chemical compositions is optionality in syntax. I could say
“Mary gave John a book” or “Mary gave a book to John” - slightly different
orders with the same basic meaning. If I change the order too much, the meaning
becomes different (e.g. “John gave Mary a book”).
Another analogue of bilingualism might be the use of multimodal cues. For
instance, primates communicate through vocalisations , hand gestures (Hobaiter
and Byrne, 2011; Call and Tomasello, 2007; Hopkins and Leavens, 1998), fa-
cial gestures (Redican and Rosenblum, 1975) and olfactory cues (Jolly, 1966).
Ay et al. (2007) demonstrate that this robustness is a property that naturally
emerges in signalling systems. Furthermore, they prove mathematically that ro-
bustness is a lower bound on the complexity of a signalling system. This result is
linked to the results of iterated learning experiments (e.g. Kirby et al., 2008)10.
9Although see Phipps, C. ‘Ant synonyms and linguistics envy’ http://thelousylinguist.
blogspot.co.uk/2010/08/ant-synonyms-and-linguistics-envy.html
10This is not an analogy, but a formal similarity. In these experiments, participants are
taught labels for a structured meaning space (e.g. objects with colour, shape and movement).
They are then asked to produce the labels, given the meanings. These productions are then
used as the input for the next participant in a chain of learners. If there is a bottleneck on
learning, for instance the participants aren’t exposed to every label, then structure emerges in
the labels. Sub-parts of the labels correlate systematically with sub-parts of the meaning (e.g.
all red objects will contain the same sub-string). Kirby et al. (2008) call this ‘compositionality’,
but is in fact directly related to the measure of robustness used in Ay et al. (2007). In both
20
Therefore, we should expect communication systems that are more complex to
be more robust and therefore exhibit redundancy by, for instance, having more
than one signal for a given aspect of meaning. Indeed, if we see language as a
complex system (Beckner et al., 2009; Cornish et al., 2009), then we should ex-
pect to observe this kind of functional redundancy (Ay et al., 2007; Winter and
Christiansen, 2012).
2.4.1.1 Inter-species semantic communicaiton
Other evidence for optionality comes from cases of inter-species semantic commu-
nication. Many species utilise the signals of other species. In a broad sense, there
appear to be universal threat signals (e.g. bright colours, size, aggression, see
Morton, 1977). However, these are often innately specified rather than learned,
indexically linked to physical properties and evolutionary old (see also Hinton
et al., 2006). However, there are cases of species responding to more specific
signals of other species.
A large proportion of songbirds mimic the calls and songs of other birds (Kelley
et al., 2008)11. For example, Flower (2011) demonstrates that fork-tailed dron-
gos (a passerine bird) mimic the alarm calls of meercats in order to get food. A
drongo will give the call ‘honestly’ when predators are present, but will also give
the call when there are no predators so that the meercats will abandon their food
for the drongo to steal. The drongos even mimic the alarm calls of other birds
when doing this, meaning that their false alarms do not destabilise the apparent
reliability of the signal.
Other examples include the following: sika deer use food calls of macaque mon-
keys as a cue for finding fruit dropped by the macaques (Koda, 2012)12; vervet
cases, the structure in the communication system is measured using the correlation between
a distance matrix between signals and a distance matrix between meanings (although there
is no structured meaning space in Ay et al., 2007). Ay et al. define robustness in terms of
“insensitivity to channel occlusion through channel redundancy coupled to high information
flow” (Ay et al., 2007, p. 446). Their model demonstrates that “a pressure towards an increase
in robustness ... will always lead to an increase in the complexity of the message by promoting
structured correlation in the channels” (Ay et al., 2007, p. 445). In the iterated learning
experiment, strings linked to meanings become learnable (insensitive to channel occlusion) and
expressive (high information flow), in presence of a bottleneck (channel occlusion), because the
same substrings refer to the same sub-meanings in many labels (redundancy), allowing labels
for previously unseen meanings to be reconstructed accurately. In Ay et al. (2007)’s model,
selection for robustness naturally leads the signalling system to a trade off between ‘specificity’
and ‘generality’. Similarly, in the iterated learning case, the system trades off ‘expressiveness’
and ‘learnability’ (see also Cornish et al., 2009). However, a formal proof of the equivalence of
these results is beyond the scope of this thesis. Additionally, this result is couched in terms of
concurrent multimodal signalling, while bilingualism is associated with having non-correlated,
independent signals.
11However, in the majority of cases there is no functional explanation, rather they are likely
to be learning by frequency and using calls in inappropriate contexts (Kelley et al., 2008)
12Although it is currently unclear whether they are responding to the food calls in particular,
or just the presence of macaques (Koda, 2012).
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monkeys respond to the territorial and alarm calls of superb starlings (Seyfarth
and Cheney, 1990); ring-tailed lemurs respond to the alarm calls of Verreaux’s
sifakas (another species of lemur, Oda and Masataka, 1996); and Yellow-casqued
hornbill birds respond appropriately to Diana Monkeys’ alarm calls (Rainey et al.,
2004).
However, many of these capacities may be innate rather than learned. For exam-
ple, captive ring-tailed lemurs who had never heard the sifakas’ alarm calls also
responded appropriately to sifaka playbacks (Oda and Masataka, 1996). Oda and
Masataka argue that they are therefore responding to shared acoustic features
rather than to an associated meaning. Although most examples of inter-species
communication do not involve the transference of ‘concepts’, some examples do
show evidence for this.
Zuberbühler (2000) studied communication between Diana monkeys and Camp-
bell’s monkeys. Diana monkeys respond appropriately to Campbell’s monkeys’
alarm calls for leopards and eagles. Furthermore, their responses suggest they
are attending to the meaning rather than the acoustic signal. If a Diana mon-
key hears a leopard or a leopard alarm call, it calls out loudly, but if it hears a
second leopard or leopard alarm, it is quieter, presumably because of the risk of
predation (the same is true of eagle alarms). Diana monkeys were primed with
Campbell alarms for either leopards or eagles then probed with either the sounds
that eagles or leopards make (growls and shrieks). They responded loudly to each
combination, apart from where the Campbell alarm corresponded to the predator
type (e.g. Campbell leopard alarm followed by a leopard sound). In these cases,
the Diana monkeys were quieter, suggesting that they thought the predator was
already present13. Zuberbühler concludes that “Diana monkeys can flexibly use
and assess information derived from the communication of other species” and
that “semantic understanding can be based on arbitrary signals, as it is the case
for word meaning” (Zuberbühler, 2000, 717).
However, there is no current evidence to suggest that Campbell’s reciprocate
in their comprehension of Diana Monkey’s calls. The latter issue is discussed by
Magrath et al. (2009) who study the alarm call responses of 3 ecologically dis-
tinct avian species and find that responses may be reciprocal, but not necessarily
symmetrical. Different species reacted to each other’s alarm calls in proportion
to the ‘reliability’ of the call as a cue to one of the listener’s predators. That is,
not all predators of species A are predators of species B, so the A’s alarms are not
always reliable for species B, and species B responds appropriately. In Magrath
et al.’s study, some species responded in the same way to three different calls.
The examples above are evidence of animals responding to the signals of other
species. This is analogous to bilingualism in a broad sense. For instance, Diana
13In this sense, the Diana monkeys are adapting their vocalisations to the listener (the preda-
tor).
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monkeys seem to have the same appropriate response to two different signals.
However, I suggest that it is better to see these examples above as animals who
exploit cues in their environment. In species with greater cognitive capacities,
these cues might extend to properties beyond the speaker’s identity to tertiary
objects or concepts.
2.4.2 Conditioning signals on social variables
I suggest that other species primarily use signals that are conditioned on social
variables such as the identity of the individual producing the signal. For example,
identifying conspecifics (e.g. Gottlieb, 1971) or kin (e.g. Holmes and Sherman,
1983; Holmes and Mateo, 2007), finding a mate (Zahavi, 1975; Hamilton and Zuk,
1982; Evans and Hatchwell, 1992b; Candolin, 2003) or evaluating a competitor’s
relative strength (Rohwer, 1982; Evans and Hatchwell, 1992a; Tibbetts and Dale,
2004). It is the conditioning on other semantic variables (triadic reference) that is
difficult (e.g. Tomasello, 2006; Cartmill and Byrne, 2010; Hurford, 2010; Leavens
and Bard, 2011).
Although other species do condition signals on non-social semantic variables,
for instance alarm calls for predators (e.g. Seyfarth et al., 1980) or the qual-
ity of food (see Slocombe et al., 2010; Slocombe and Zuberbühler, 2006), these
instances tend to be restricted to species with higher cognitive capacities (see
Hurford, 2010, although a counter-example would be honey bees communicat-
ing the location of nectar, von Frisch, 1947; Gould, 1974). Even when there is
communication about other things, it is often combined with social meanings, for
example the reliability of an alarm call is assessed by the identity of the caller
(e.g. Cheney and Seyfarth, 1988). Primate vocalisations may also be modified by
the social context, for instance who is in the audience (Hauser, 1993; Slocombe
and Zuberbühler, 2007; Call and Tomasello, 2007).
This might suggest that the basis of a ‘bilingual’ ability, in the sense of the
ability to condition signals on properties of the signaller, is evolutionary older
than the ability to condition signals on non-social semantic features. Indeed, re-
cent research suggests that there is a selective pressure on signalling systems of
finches for conspecific identification (Deacon, 2010a; Kagawa et al., 2012).
This thesis suggests that the only evolutionarily valid way of conceptualising
bilingualism is as an ability to condition signals on social variables. In this case,
the answer to whether animals have this ability may be trivially ‘yes’.
2.4.3 Developmental plasticity
The sections above showed that many species condition signals on social vari-
ables, but not non-social variables. Why is this the case? One answer is that
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developmental plasticity is needed in order to allow more complex signalling sys-
tems. Studies of birdsong suggest that domestication can foster developmental
plasticity (see below).
The domesticated Bengalese finch exhibits very complex song patterns in com-
parison to its wild relative the white backed munia (Okanoya, 2004). Okanoya
suggests that the survival pressures were relaxed for the domesticated finch, al-
lowing learning mechanisms to become more flexible and allow greater variation
and complexity in songs. Okanoya (2010) also shows that Benglaese finches, un-
like the munia, learn from many tutors, splicing whole segments of songs from
many individuals to create their own song. This might introduce more complex-
ity into the signal over time. Furthermore, Soma et al. (2009) find that chicks
select tutors based on their song complexity. In this sense, the learner’s song
is conditioned on social factors: the perceived fitness of the singer. Similarly,
Hultsch and Todt (1989) and Hultsch and Todt (1996) report a ‘context effect’
in nightingales, whereby they separate songs learned from different tutors.
However, Kagawa et al. (2012) has shown that vocal learners who co-inhabit
areas with other species of vocal learners have less complex song. That is, reli-
able species identification may be orthogonal to song complexity. This suggests
that the development of an ability to condition signals on social variables does
not necessarily lead to greater signal complexity. Only when the environmental
pressures are relaxed to allow cognitive plasticity may the two aspects coevolve.
2.4.4 Bilingualism before symbolic communication
Given the observations above, a view of the evolution of semantic systems is sug-
gested. This view is speculative, but gives an idea of the impact that thinking
about ‘bilingualism’ as an evolutionarily old ability can have on theories of lan-
guage evolution.
The view is something like the following. Much of animal communication is
limited to and grounded in information relevant to shared survival interests, that
is, food, predators and mating. Humans are capable of communicating about
topics beyond their immediate survival needs. This difference possibly requires
the ‘ungrounding’ of signals from the domains in which they evolved and ‘re-
grounding’ in other domains (e.g. Flack and De Waal, 2007; Núñez, 2010). If the
ability to condition signals on individuals could be ungrounded to allow learning
from contexts, then this would allow a semantic system to develop. For instance,
Flack and De Waal (2007) observe that a submission gesture used during conflict
(an immediate response) between pigtailed macaques is also occasionally used in
peaceful interactions to signal subordination (an ongoing pattern of behaviour).
The submission gesture has been ‘ungrounded’ from its original context in order
to signal a different meaning. A ‘bilingual’ ability to condition signals on context
could have preceded a symbolic signalling system. Okanoya and Merker (2007)
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have a similar hypothesis which sees string segmentation and context segmenta-
tion as necessary preadaptations for a semantic system.
This ungrounding process would require two things. First, the selection pres-
sure on the original system needs to be lifted by some other mechanism such
as a change in the environment (e.g. Isbell and Young, 1996) or domestication
(e.g. Okanoya, 2004; Deacon, 2010b). Secondly, there would have to be system-
atic variation between groups of speakers so that generalisations could be drawn.
One source of this could be contact between groups, suggesting that dynamic
social structures were an important part of the development of semantic systems
(see also Dunbar, 1993).
2.5 Conclusion
Asking whether non-human species have capacities for bilingualism in the broad
sense may affect the way we approach bilingualism. This chapter has reviewed
studies that show that animals have capacities compatible with certain aspects
of bilingualism, but without other features of human language. These capacities
stem from very basic abilities to respond appropriately to cues in the environ-
ment. Many other species condition signals on properties of the speaker (e.g.
fitness, threat, see Gottlieb, 1971; Rohwer, 1982, see section 2.4), while condi-
tioning signals on non-social semantic variables (e.g. food or predators) is rarer
(c.f. Seyfarth et al., 1980; Slocombe et al., 2010; Slocombe and Zuberbühler,
2006).
The evolutionary picture is therefore the following. The ability to condition
signals on semantic variables is evolutionarily old. Relaxed selection (e.g. due to
domestication, Ritchie and Kirby, 2005; Hare et al., 2005) leads to developmental
plasticity (Deacon, 2010b; Okanoya, 2004; Takahasi and Okanoya, 2010). Indeed,
we see evidence of this plasticity in studies of bilingualism that show that learners
adapt their learning strategies to the input (Byers-Heinlein and Werker, 2009a;
Brojde et al., 2012; Healey and Skarabela, 2009; Kovács and Mehler, 2009, see
section 5.9.3). Plasticity in learning allows linguistic variation which, coupled
with dynamic social structures, can be conditioned on social identities. This
would bring about what this thesis recognises as bilingualism.
The hypothesis here is speculative, and there is much to be added from the neuro-
science and development literature. However, I suggest that it is the right default
assumption for an evolutionary approach to bilingualism. Rather than being a
secondary ability that should be studied after the main ‘problem’ of language
evolution is solved, it can be seen as a central part of the story. Furthermore,
instead of looking for a mechanism that specifically deals with the learning of
multiple languages, we should be looking for a general, flexible learning mecha-
nism that allows language learners to pick out relevant dimensions of variation
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in their input. This suggests that the ‘bilingual paradox’ presented in chapter
1 is using the wrong unit of analysis. Learning two ‘languages’ is not necessar-
ily hard, it depends on the complexity of the conditioning factors. There may
be a trade-off between resources devoted to learning how linguistic variation is
conditioned on social and non-social variables. The next chapter considers the
psychological reality of discrete languages further.
This approach can have an impact on the way cultural evolution is modelled,
and the conclusions that come out of those models. In contrast to the approach
suggested in this chapter, chapters 5 and 6 discuss top down models of cultural
evolution that assume that individuals have a specific mechanism for learning
multiple languages. By comparing these models with a bottom up model which
uses a general, flexible learning mechanism, I will argue that the top down ap-
proach can draw misleading conclusions about bilingualism.
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Chapter 3
Languages are not discrete
“I was asked by the teacher one day to identify a picture of what I
knew perfectly well my mother referred to as a “spatula.” But for the
life of me I could not think of the word in English.”
Phillip Roth (1969) p. 107
3.1 Introduction
The main claim of this chapter is that there is no valid way to categorise lin-
guistic variation into languages on a purely linguistic basis. Sober (1980) calls
this the ‘line-drawing’ problem1. Put another way, when pointing to a ‘language’,
linguists are either pointing to low-level linguistic features, or a mix of linguistic
and non-linguistic cultural traits. I use studies of bilingualism to support this
point.
If ‘languages’ are not concrete concepts, but instead epiphenomena that emerge
from populations of individuals, then it might be invalid to assume they have a
psychological reality in the learning mechanisms of individuals. This has implica-
tions for models of cultural evolution. The conclusion involves three requirements
for such models.
The following sections will show that purely linguistic measures fail to demarcate
a consistent concept of a language. Furthermore, these failures will repeatedly
demonstrate the importance of low-level linguistic features, valid representation
of individuals and complex, dynamic social structures. Many of the arguments
below will draw on studies of bilingualism and are intended to flesh out the im-
portant features of an evolutionary theory of bilingualism.
The idea that languages are not concrete concepts is not new (see Haugen, 2009
for a history of the concepts of a ‘language’ and a ‘dialect’ and a review of differ-
ent definitions of the two). However, even very recent publications feel the need
to remind readers that languages are not discrete. For instance, Croft (in press)
remarks that:
1Sober borrows this from the field of biology, but applies it specifically to language: “The
problem of making the idea of languages as social entities scientifically respectable seems to be
beset by line-drawing problems.”(Sober, 1980, p. 396)
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“... a language as a population is neither homogeneous or sharply
delineated. It is a complex system of multiple, partially overlapping
populations of linguistic structures of different degrees of community
inclusiveness. Each individual has a linguistic repertoire which re-
flects her knowledge and exposure to the communities in the society
in which she engages in joint actions (shared practice). One con-
sequence of this complex population structure is that an individual
is familiar with linguistic variants for (roughly) the same meanings
from different communities in which she interacts. Hence a speaker
has multiple variants available to her, which are associated to greater
or lesser extent with specific communities in her mind. Those vari-
ants may belong to what linguists would call different languages, in a
multilingual society, even though they may be combined into a single
utterance (what sociolinguists call code-switching).”
(Croft, in press, sec. 4.1)
Neither are these groupings of variants stable over time. For example, Lamb
(2011) discusses complex shifts in the perception of divisions between regional
varieties in Scotland within the last 100 years. Even Chomsky, who advocated
the study of the ‘ideal speaker’ in a homogenous community (Chomsky, 1965,
p. 3) recognises that the definition of a language is dependent on many extra-
linguistic factors:
“To say that people speak different languages is a bit like saying they
live in different places or look different, notions that are perfectly
useful for ordinary life, but are highly interest-relative. We say that a
person speaks several languages, rather than several varieties of one,
if the differences matter for some purpose or interest.”
(Chomsky, 2000, p. 43-44)
While it is intuitive that there exist high-level categories of linguistic features like
languages (see Goldberg, 2009; Gelman, 2003), there is little controversy over the
idea that the way linguistic variation is divided into languages is dependent on
non-linguistic factors. However, it is worth setting out a careful argument against
the idea that a ‘language’ is an abstract concept with a concrete analogue that
is useful for an evolutionary approach to bilingual cultural transmission.
3.2 Measures of languageness
The concept of a language is central to the comparative approach to linguistics
(see Lehmann, 1993). It is assumed that the variation in speakers’ speech can be
divided into high-level categories called ‘languages’ (e.g. English, German, Pi-
rahã) and that being able to speak two or more languages (bilingualism) is seen
as qualitatively different to having optionality within a language (see Bloomfield,
1933; Grosjean, 1989). Models of cultural evolution have considered how the dis-
tribution of languages with different properties change over time (e.g. Abrams
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and Strogatz, 2003; Griffiths and Kalish, 2007, see chapter 5). This is done by
explicitly specifying languages in the model as monolithic objects that can be
acquired directly and are fixed over time. In this chapter I will argue that there
is no way to validly categorise linguistic variance into ‘languages’ on a purely
linguistic basis. What linguists identify as languages are emergent groupings of
lower-level variation that are dynamic and context sensitive. Of course, linguists
do productively categorise linguistic variance into languages, and I am not ar-
guing that linguists are unaware of the problems with doing so. My argument
only applies to the best way of allowing a consideration of bilingualism in an
evolutionary framework.
An intuitive approach to this argument is to ask whether there is any coher-
ent way of measuring how many languages someone speaks. If there is no valid
way to demarcate a constistent concept of a ‘language’, then the concept may
be invalid. This would suggest that the concept of a monolithic, discrete, static
language is not a concrete property that should be directly represented in a model.
Hurford (1991) argues that measuring linguistic abilities is valid in theory, al-
though not practically:
“Of course, it is quite beyond present-day linguistics to assign actual
numbers to, say, my command of English. But the central psycho-
logical realist assumption of modern (generative) linguistics is that
language users enjoy potentially infinite use of finite sets of repre-
sentations stored in their finite brains. If these representations, or
mental grammars, are finite, then in principle they can be assigned
actual numbers indicating the amount of information they contain,
even though in practice the determination of what the numbers should
be is out of the question.”2
(Hurford, 1991, p.173)
However, even if the number of languages a person can speak can be objectively
determined, but is defined through more appropriate lower-level concepts (the
‘representations’ in the quote above), then we must question the usefulness of the
high-level concept. This is essentially an eliminitavist approach3.
The difference between languages has been defined using subjective measures,
language use, mutual intelligibility, typology, descent, physiological measures and
2The conception of language capacity used in Hurford (1991) is an absolute scale whereby
individuals with a higher capacity are more likely to survive or reproduce. However, there is
no inclusion of the effects of the similarities between individuals (so that an individual with a
small capacity in variety A has a higher chance of mating with another individual who knows
A than an individual with a high capacity in variety B). That is, this conception assumes a
monolingual society.
3The approach in this chapter owes a lot to Irvine (2011) which applies eliminitavism to the
concept of ‘consciousness’.
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functional measures. I will show that these measures fail to pick out a concrete
feature in the real world that is relevant for an evolutionary approach to bilin-
gualism. First, a brief discussion measuring linguistic diversity, since measures of
linguistic diversity have been used as proxies for bilingualism.
3.2.1 Measures of linguistic diversity
While attempts have been made to measure linguistic diversity, these have been
biased towards capturing the diversity between individuals, not within individu-
als. For example, the Greenberg diversity index, as formalised by Lieberson and
Dil (1981) measures the probability of any two randomly chosen people having the
same mother tongue. This has been used as a canonical measure in the explana-
tion of linguistic diversity (e.g. Nettle, 1999a). However, the Greenberg diversity
index is weak when it comes to another measurement of diversity: bilingualism.





Where Pi is the proportion of the total population that comprises the i
th lan-
guage group. So, if you have a country with two languages, and each is spoken
by half the population, you have a diversity of 0.5. However, an assumption is
that the percentages of the population that speak a language sum to 1. If you
have a country with two languages where everybody speaks both, then the GDI
comes out as -1. Put another way, in a country where there are two languages,
A is spoken by 75% and B is spoken by 50% (so 25% are bilingual), this yields a
diversity of 0.1875. If the goal of the measure is to correctly predict the chances
of any two people speaking the same language, then this value should be 75%.
As bilingualism is a common part of most peoples lives, the GDI probably under-
predicts diversity.
The original paper on measuring linguistic diversity (Greenberg, 1956) actually
discusses several ways of calculating linguistic diversity in a population. The
‘split personality’ method counts bilinguals as multiple people - one for each of
their languages. The ‘random speaker’ method calculates the probability of two
people picking the same language at random from the languages they know. Both
of these methods also have weighted versions which take into account the relative
resemblance of each language pair. The ‘random speaker-hearer’ method calcu-
lates the probability of a hearer understanding another speaker speak a language
chosen randomly from the ones they know. The ‘index of communication’ is the
probability that any two people have a language in common. Greenberg is aware
of the difficulties of applying these measures accurately:
“It is also to be noted that in the measures involving polylingualism
described here, no account is taken of an individual’s relative com-




























Figure 3.1: Different measures of diversity applied to the same populations from
Greenberg (1956). The populations include speakers of 5 languages. In the
20% condition, each language is spoken monolingually by an equal proportion of
the population. In the 50% condition, one of the languages, M, is now spoken
by half of each language community. In the 100% condition, everyone in the
population speaks language M. Only one type of measure changes monotonically
with the prevalence of language M. Languages are related with a weighting of
0.5. The different points show the values for the different measures of diversity:
split personality (black circles); weighted split personality (red triangles); random
speaker (green crosses); weighted random speaker (blue xs); random speaker-
hearer (blue diamonds); communication index (pink inverted triangles).
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not as yet been developed, and, if developed, could hardly be ap-
plied on a scale that would allow them to be ascertained for an entire
population. On the other hand, ranking as first language - usually
the mother language as opposed to others - is possible, and is even
found in some census reports; but there does not seem to be any
non-arbitrary way of giving this fact mathematical expression”
(Greenberg, 1956, p.112)
Greenberg goes on to argue that these measures are very susceptible to the biases
of the researcher, and must be considered along with the specific context in which
they are applied. Figure 3.1, adapted from Greenberg (1956), demonstrates that
the different methods for measuring diversity lead to very different diversity values
for the same populations. Therefore, there are many possible approaches to
measuring diversity. Similarly, chapter 6 demonstrates that there are many ways
to measure bilingualism in top-down models.
3.3 Subjective measures
The following sections evaluate different ways of counting languages. Perhaps
the most obvious way to identify the number of languages someone speaks is to
assume that speakers have a good intuitive idea of the answer. Certainly, most
people’s self-reports will be consistent and confident (see Blanche and Merino,
1989). However, speakers’ own intuitions about linguistic phenomena may reflect
the linguistic reality poorly (see Ready-Morfitt, 1991; MacIntyre et al., 1997; and
Language Log’s archive on ‘Ignorance of linguistics’ http://languagelog.ldc.
upenn.edu/nll/?cat=61). While social groups are often identified by their lan-
guage4, conceptions of what constitutes a language are often affected by politics,
history and national identity (e.g. MacEachern, 2001; Mufwene, 2005; Haugen,
2009; Lamb, 2011) . For example, Mufwene (2005) points out that many names
of languages simply refer to the way a certain (historical) group of people spoke
(e.g. German means the way people called Germans speak). Particularly, the
distinction between a dialect and a language may be affected by the strength of
local identity (Haugen, 2009; Lamb, 2011).
Some definitions of what it means to speak a language have been offered. For
instance, Haugen (1953) suggested that a minimal requirement for classifying an
individual as being able to speak a language was the ability of that individual to
“produce complete meaningful utterances” in that language. While this might
have worked well for a particular case study, there are obvious problems with this
kind of definition: What counts as ‘complete’ or ‘meaningful’? For instance, is
4From (Hill, 1978, p. 7): “Local groups are often named for lexical items in their dialects,
e.g. Pitjantjara: ”those having the word pitja ‘come’ ”; Ngatatjara: “those having the word
ngatja ‘this’ ” (Gould 1969:63), and a large complex of local groups named after words for ’yes’
and ’no’. Another common pattern is tribal names translatable as “good speakers” or “bad
speakers” (Tindale 1974:43).”
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the phrase “Bonjour” a complete meaningful utterance of French and, if so, does
knowing this word imply the individual speaks French? The problem of applying
this definition is captured in Diebold (1961)’s description of linguistic fieldwork
into bilingualism:
“...the ability to produce ‘complete meaningful utterances’ in Spanish
offered a pragmatically valid boundary between bilingual and mono-
lingual which withstood random retestings. Nevertheless, I soon be-
came dissatisfied with writing off 81% of the San Matenios as ‘mono-
lingual’ on the basis of Haugen’s definition of bilingual proficiency,
since I had noted a minimal use of Spanish among many of these pur-
portedly monolingual Huave-speakers. Since bilinguals are recruited
from this group, it appeared that this would represent the minimal
incipient situation of bilingual learning. Yet the fact remained that
these individuals could not sustain even limited conversation with a
Spanish-speaker, and I remained at a loss for a means of quantifying
their knowledge of Spanish.”
(Diebold, 1961, p. 110)
There seems to be a trend in studies of bilingualism to assume that there is a
dissociation between languages, and then to try to find a way of measuring that
difference. In the case above, the subjective measure fails because the linguistic
behaviour of the speakers does not fit into a simple binary category. I will discuss
this problem further on, but for now let us focus on other problems with subjec-
tive measures.
Another problem pointed at here is the difficulty of measuring proficiency. As
Hurford points out, “It is not actually feasible to quantify and represent in a
graph the language abilities of individuals in a population, with the level of lan-
guage ability on the y-axis, and numbers of individuals with these levels on the
x-axis” (Hurford, 1991, p.168). Furthermore, people’s self-rating of their linguis-
tic competence, often used in surveys, is affected by non-linguistics factors such as
anxiety or perception of cultural groups (see MacIntyre et al., 1997, and section
8.3).
Even with what are traditionally thought of as well-defined languages, categori-
sations of linguistic variants can be very subjective (see the discussion of Thomas
and Allport, 2000 in chapter 8, section 8.4 for an example). Subjective mea-
sures fail to demarcate a concrete, abstract concept of a language. Indeed, their
very subjectivity suggests that languages are complex constructions which in-
volve more than linguistic features. If this is the case, then subjective measures
do not support the representation of languages as monolithic entities in a model
of language evolution. In the following sections, I will show that objective mea-
sures also fail to circumscribe a coherent concept of ‘language’ that is relevant
for investigating language evolution.
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3.4 Psycholinguistic measures
Psycholinguistic experiments demonstrate that listeners’ perceptions are different
when in different language modes. This seems to suggest that discrete languages
are a cognitive reality. For example, bilinguals shift their perceptual bound-
aries between sounds depending on which language they believe they are listen-
ing to (Elman et al., 1977; Janson and Schulman, 1983). This affect has also
been demonstrated for monolinguals with knowledge of more than one accent
(Niedzielski, 1999). While this point might be mitigated by allowing a broader
definition of a language, perception can be altered by very subtle social cues. For
example, Drager and Hay (2006) and Hay and Drager (2010) ran an experiment
where speakers of English from New Zealand were presented with tokens of vow-
els ranging from raised and fronted (used in Australian English) to lowered and
centralised (used in New Zealand English). Participants’ perception of the vowels
was affected by whether they had seen a stuffed toy koala (associated with Aus-
tralia) or a toy kiwi bird (associated with New Zealand) prior to hearing them.
As Hay and Drager suggest, linguistic and social information are closely related
(see also their paper on ‘sociophonetics’, Hay and Drager, 2007).
If perception can be shifted by social cues, then it might be simpler to assume
that languages are social concepts. At any rate, it seems simpler to assume that
a single mechanism is responsible for the effects of linguistic and non-linguistic
cues. Indeed, social cues can be stronger than linguistic cues (Kang and Ru-
bin, 2009; Lindemann, 2002). Other studies found evidence of ‘reverse linguistic
stereotyping’ as participants perceived more accented speech when they believed
they were listening to a non-native speaker (Rubin, 2011; Kang and Rubin, 2009;
Rubin et al., 1997)5. Under some conditions, semantic comprehension was ac-
tually poorer when listeners believed the speaker was non-native. This would
suggest that it is better to see categories of ‘languages’ as being indexes of social
categories. This kind of approach is the basis for the bottom-up model presented
in chapter 7.
3.5 Defining languages through use
Although formal approaches might fail to demarcate a consistent concept of a
‘language’, speakers do use linguistic variation systematically (e.g. Auer, 1999;
Gumperz and Hernandez-Chavez, 1972; Poplack, 1988; Gafaranga, 2008), so an
analysis of use might provide a good measure of language. For instance, Ga-
faranga (2000) uses discourse analysis to analyse speakers’ conceptions of lan-
guage. Below is an extract of a translation of a conversation between two speak-
ers who speak French, English and Kinyarwanda. The parts of the conversation
originally in Kinyarwanda are in normal font, French is italicised and English is




A: Refugees like him are (.) schools here are private (.) they are
private so that he must pay to study at this university.
B: umh
A: But as he doesn’t have money he has had to apply for a grant from
the (. ) they call it local government
B: umh
A: Local authority well it is like
B: // it is like a municipality
A: that’s right it is like a municipality (.) he got a grant from the
local municipality
(Gafaranga, 2000, p. 338)
Halfway through the conversation, speaker A forgets the French word ‘municipal-
ity’ and initiates a repair sequence. Since the speakers are bilingual, speaker A
uses the English word to request help from speaker B to remember it. Speaker A
has been switching happily between French and Kinyarwanda, so why not just use
the English word to continue the conversation? Gafaranga suggests that this is
evidence of a dissociation in the minds of the speakers between a Kinyarwanda-
French ‘medium’ and an English ‘medium’. That is, the speakers are treating
French and Kinyarwanda as a single ‘language’ and English as a separate one.
Although this is a productive way of defining languages, it still does not pro-
vide a solid basis for including an abstract representation at the language level
in a model of language evolution. Gafaranga’s main point is that high-level cat-
egorisations of linguistic variation (what he calls ‘mediums’) are dynamic and
context-specific. The exact partitions in variation that speakers use may change
over time, and one group of speakers may partition the variation differently to
another (see also Otsuji and Pennycook, 2010; Kostoulas-Makrakis et al., 2006).
For example, French is considered a stand-alone ‘medium’ in some communities.
Given this, it seems invalid to specify a priori fixed, high-level ‘languages’ in
a model. Rather, the model should encode low-level variation which may be
grouped by speakers into categories that can be measured in the model (see also
Blommaert, 2010).
3.6 Mutual intelligibility
Mutual intelligibility has been used to define boundaries between varieties (see
Voegelin and Harris, 1951; Yamagiwa, 1967). Simply put, if two speakers cannot
understand each other, they must be speaking different languages. Nettle (1999a)
demonstrates the problems with this approach. First of all, comprehension is per-
haps a gradient measure and it is unclear how best to test this. For instance,
should one control for pragmatic cues, a common ancestor language or cultural
differences? People are adept at communicating without previous experience of
35
each other’s languages (Levinson, 2006), and some instances of mutual intelligi-
bility are often misleading (for example, a study of mutually intelligible words
between Ainu, spoken in Japan, and Welsh: Batchelor, 1905, 1.X). Linguists can
also differ in their analyses of intelligibility. For instance, Warner (1937) claimed
the differences between the dialects of the Murngin from Australia were minimal
and mainly “imagined”, while Brendt and Brendt (1964) claimed that the dialects
were actually mutually unintelligible (cited in Hill, 1978).
Secondly, even if a good measure of comprehension could be agreed upon, there
is the problem of dialect chains. This is a case where a number of communities
extend over a large geographic space and each community can understand its im-
mediate neighbours, but the variation drifts until communities at extreme ends
of the chain cannot understand each other. In this case, it becomes unclear where
to draw the line between languages.
For example, there have been several analyses of the varieties spoken in Japan
(see Shibatani, 1990, p. xiii). They have been classified based on grammatical
differences into 2 dialects (Shimmura, 1904) and 3 dialects, (Tôjô, 1954) and
based on phonetic similarities into a different 3 dialects (Kindaichi and Hirano,
1989). The definition of dialects are often politically motivated: when Korea was
annexed by Japan, Korean was classified by a respected linguist as a ‘dialect’ of
Japanese (see Lee and Ramsey, 2000, p.131). Many of these studies, however, re-
alise that the boundaries are fuzzy and serve a particular purpose (Tôjô, 1938, see
Preston and Long, 2002, 177-178). Tokugawa and Miyazima (1977) also makes
the point that differences between the dialect divisions that people perceive and
those that actually exist, but both are valid objects of study (see Preston and
Long, 2002, p. 177-178). Onishi (2010) shows how ‘geolinguistics’ on Japanese
varieties has moved away from the classification of broad dialects towards looking
at the history of individual words.
In a computational model it may be more easy to specify and measure mutual
intelligibility. For example, the number of words speakers know in common. If
this is the case, however, one could use this measure directly to define linguistic
communities dynamically and avoid coarse categories such as a ‘language’.
3.7 Typology
The formalist approach to linguistics has developed a set of parameters to de-
scribe the features of a language. For example, basic word order, morphological
case markings and so on. Differences in these formal properties could be used
to differentiate languages. Indeed, Roeper (1999) sees bilingualism as existing
wherever an individual has conflicting typological parameter settings. However,
there are two problems. The first problem is that this approach uses a very differ-
ent concept of bilingualism than that which is used in sociolinguistics or the one
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defined in this thesis. Indeed, Roeper states that his sense of ‘Theoretical Bilin-
gualism’ is “orthogonal to the obvious social dimensions of bilingualism which
understandably have given predominant stature to the sociolinguistic perspec-
tive on bilingualism” (Roeper, 1999, p. 169, my emphasis). When it becomes
clear that social contexts influence the choice of mini-grammar that speakers use,
Roeper still maintains that social aspects of language are not part of linguistics:
“Why do languages have pockets of [Theoretical Bilingualism]? This
would seem to be highly inefficient from a formal point of view. The
answer, as we hinted above, may lie outside of formal linguistics.
What makes a social register distinctive? What conveys to people
the sense that a different level of communication is involved if, among
bilingual speakers, one or the other language is chosen? These are
deep questions which go beyond linguistics and my realm of exper-
tise.”
(Roeper, 1999, p. 183, emphasis mine)
In another section, Roeper suggests that social registers are really also a part of
UG: “Formal or Informal Speech Registers are recognizeable as a choice of a dif-
ferent application of principles within UG” (Roeper, 1999, p. 183). Roeper then
appears to offload part of the explanation of the irregularities of child speech onto
this social register, usefully putting them beyond the scope of formal linguistics
(Roeper, 1999, p. 183). Furthermore, Roeper’s approach seems to overestimate
bilingualism. Individuals in a community can be in agreement that two conflict-
ing grammatical options are perfectly grammatical without the community being
considered ‘bilingual’ (e.g. Sorace, 2000). Indeed, Sorace sees knowledge about
this kind of variation as a core part of linguistic competence.
The second problem relates to the psychological reality of categorical grammati-
cality - the basis for the formal parameters. Bard et al. (1996) show that gram-
maticality judgements are in fact more graded than previously assumed. Fur-
thermore, Spruit (2006) show that grammaticality judgements change gradually
over geographic areas rather than form more solid boundaries. If this is the case,
then even formalist approaches cannot draw categorical boundaries between lan-
guages. On this basis, representing whole languages as a single unit in a model
does not seem valid.
Finally, there is the reductionist argument. If we can specify the distances be-
tween languages using lower-level measurements, why not just use those in a
model instead of the more abstract concept of ‘language’?
3.8 Descent
Just as biological species may be identified by their evolutionary descent, lan-
guages may be identified by their diachronic descent. For instance, English is
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‘closer’ to Dutch than Norwegian because English and Dutch both descended
from the West Germanic branch while Norwegian is part of the North Germanic
branch. However, Hurford and Dediu (2009) argue that these kinds of taxonomies
in linguistics conflate the descent of people and the descent of linguistic varia-
tion. While some studies have shown a correlation between genetic, geographic
and linguistic descent (Novembre et al., 2008), in theory the two paths of descent
may be totally independent6. For example, genetic descendants of African slaves
in Jamaica speak a variety of English that is linguistically descended from Eu-
rope. If these are two separate mechanisms in the real world, then they should
be separate in the model. That is, representing individuals independently from
their linguistic system is important for a consideration of linguistic diversity, and
a first step towards a valid model of bilingualism. Indeed, as Croft notes, “The
replication of tokens of linguistic entities ... is mediated by speakers: linguistic
entities cannot reproduce by themselves” (Croft, in press, section 1.2).
In addition to this, it is unclear how clean the descent of linguistic features really
is. Mufwene (2005) argues that the descent of linguistic systems does not happen
at the level of languages:
“Although some ethnographic considerations suggest that selection
also applies at the level of languages, when speakers target primarily
features of a particular language over those of others, what we know
about language mixing and the development of creoles suggests oth-
erwise. Languages are selected indirectly through the fact that their
features (sounds, words, combinatoric rules, and particular ways of
packaging meanings) wind up constituting the majority of those se-
lected from the combined feature pool of the language varieties in
contact. Although clearly favored, the indirectly selected language
(variety) also bears the influence of (some of) the disfavored varieties
and is therefore modified into a new variety.”
(Mufwene, 2005, p. 33)
This theory makes an empirically testable hypothesis: that sub-features of lan-
guages will exhibit different histories of descent. The next sub-section demon-
strates this quantitatively, suggesting that descent fails to work as a criterion for
identifying languages.
3.8.1 The descent of English words
Mufwene’s suggestion that linguistic systems combine in a piecemeal fashion can
be quantified. For example, English is considered a Germanic language, but as-
pects (e.g. the lexicon) are heavily influenced by the other languages its speakers
came into contact with and borrowed from (French, Welsh, Spanish etc.). Al-
though the ‘last common ancestor’ of two languages such as English and Welsh
6(Hill, 1978, p. 3) also discusses the difficulty of defining discrete geographic ‘areas’.
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might be Proto-Indo-European by some estimations, it is clear that they have
been influencing each other much more recently. I attempt to quantify this by
analysing an etymology dictionary of English.
The Online Etymology Dictionary (http://www.etymonline.com) is a digital
collection of the roots of English words. The dictionary contains entries such as
the following:
pace(1) “a step” late 13c., from O.Fr. pas, from L. passus “a step,” lit.
pp. of pandere ”to stretch (the leg), spread out,” from PIE *pat-no-
Harper (2012a)
These entries were automatically parsed to give a descent of each word. For ex-
ample, the entry for “pace” would result in a link from modern English to Old
French to Latin to Proto-Indo-European. Parsing around 6,000 of these entries
resulted in a graph with languages as nodes and borrowing links as edges. The
resulting structure is more graph-like than tree-like, with many possible paths
through language nodes to English (see figure 3.2, scale-free test KS = 2.6904,
p < 0.00001)7. This demonstrates that ‘English’ has a complex descent, with
lots of horizontal transfer. It also means that the same original word can have
multiple routes into English, such as the Old Norse word ‘skrækja’ which is the
origin for both ‘screech’ and ‘shriek’ in modern English (Harper, 2012b)8.
However, other studies that test the influence of horizontal transmission have
concluded with the opposite response. Bowern et al. (2011) show that lateral
transmission does not account for a significant proportion of variance in the de-
scent of basic vocabulary items. Simon Greenhill (private communication) points
out that the level of analysis affects the answer to this question. Core vocabulary
is likely to change less than the wider set of words considered in the etymology
study above. Of course, as Hurford and Dediu (2009) suggest, many sources
only contribute a few words to English, and may be ignored. However, it still
leaves two branches that make significant contributions: Germanic and Romance.
Maybe we can use this graph of connections to demarcate a higher-order grouping
from the bottom up. Graphs can be divided into statistically relevant clusters
using network modularity (see Newman, 2006). An optimal modularity will split
the graph to maximise the average degree (number of connections) within clus-
ters. The network modularity categorisation for this graph splits the graph into
three sections which align closely with Germanic, Romance and ‘other’ languages
7Nodes: 49, Edges: 182, Transitivity: 0.176, Shortest Path: 1.32, Weighted Shortest Path:
2.15 based on number of words borrowed, Average path length between any two nodes = 1.87,
Assortitivity: -0.375), Average Erd os number for modern English = 1.25. That is, language
nodes are an average of 1.25 steps away from English. Average clustering coefficient = 0.244.
Network diameter = 5 (largest path distance between two nodes).
8This example suggested by Jim Hurford.
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(precision = 0.9, recall = 0.86, F = 0.88). That is, high-level linguistic categories
are detectable just from low-level linguistic features.
There are two problems with categorisation through network modularity, how-
ever. Firstly, for tractability the optimal partition must be estimated (Newman,
2004) and so the clusters are statistical, not categorical. In this case, it seems
like an unhelpful abstraction to use the categories when there is finer-grained
information available. Secondly, the number of modules in which to divide the
network is usually specified as a parameter. That is, the algorithm could find
four, five or six clusters to specify a more fine-grained clustering. Although the
categorisation in the graph fits with a language-family level analysis, lower-level
categorisations may be just as valid.
Furthermore, the eliminitivist argument works here too: If high-level categories
can be defined through low-level linguistic features, then it is probably best to
work with the low-level features. However, even in this analysis, the language
nodes are abstractions - they represent waypoints in time and represent cultural
communities as well as linguistic ones. All in all, it seems like an invalid ab-
straction to see whole languages as having tree-like descents. If this is the case,
then defining languages through descent seems intractable. Certainly, if one were
to model the diffusion of language on the basis of this analysis, encoding whole
languages would seem invalid and unhelpful.
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Figure 3.2: A graph of the descent of English words through other languages.
Arrows point from source to borrower.
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3.9 Statistical learning
Infants can use the statistical properties of their linguistic input to differentiate
languages. The earliest differentiations are made according to rhythmic features,
for instance syllable timing, stress timing and mora (e.g. Pelucchi et al., 2009
see Cutler, 2005 for a review). If infants can differentiate languages based on
low-level features, perhaps languages are concrete, categorical units. However,
the relationship between learning biases and languages is not so straightforward.
Languages should adapt to the learning abilities of infants (Saffran et al., 2008),
and infants adapt the cues they pay attention to based on the languages they
are exposed to (Hay and Saffran, 2012; Cutler et al., 1989). Infants also exhibit
similar statistical learning for non-linguistic stimuli (Saffran et al., 2007, 1999).
This suggests that infants have low-level statistical learning abilities rather than
high-level linguistic categorisations.
Some proponents of top-down models would argue that this is enough justifi-
cation for building computational agents with internal representations of discrete
languages (Griffiths and Kalish, 2007). In this case, I make two points. First, later
chapters will show that different conclusions can come out of models where this is
or is not the case. Secondly, the categories that would be delineated by statistical
learning biases may not be useful for a study of bilingualism. Statistical biases
might align with particular types of languages (e.g. based on rhythm types, see
Goedemans and van der Hulst, 2011), and these might follow evolutionary laws
that are amenable to study in such an abstract model. However, it is unlikely
that these language types would consistently line up with the distributions of
linguistic variation that were socially relevant. That is, infants can differentiate
two distributions of linguistic variation in a given context, but this doesn’t mean
that these distributions are relevant at the population level in all situations across
all time. Without a contrast in social variables, there may be nothing on which
to condition the variation. Indeed, as the definition of bilingualism in this the-
sis suggests, without a salient difference at the social level, it seems meaningless
or arbitrary to talk about many languages. Therefore, the statistical learning
abilities of children suggest that models should not pre-specify what the relevant
units of learning should be. Rather, computational agents should apply general
statistical learning mechanisms to their input which identify relevant semantic
features (e.g. see special issue of the Journal of Child Language, MacWhinney,
2010). The bottom up model presented in chapter 7 follows this suggestion.
3.10 Physiology
Maybe the previous measures are too high-level and we can get a tractable, qual-
itative measure of difference between language by looking at the hardware of
language: the brain. Roux and Trémoulet (2002) report dissociations between
languages using cortical stimulation of patients undergoing brain surgery. In or-
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Figure 3.3: The exposed cortex of a French-Spanish bilingual being tested for
speech arrest in French (left) and Spanish (right) from Roux and Trémoulet
(2002). Areas labelled ‘N’ show normal speech activity. Areas marked ‘L’ are
the locations of stimulation when speech arrest was observed. The dotted circles
show two areas where speech arrest was observed for one language but not the
other.
der to avoid damaging language-specific parts of the brain, surgeons first ‘map’
language-sensitive areas of the brain. This is done by exposing the brain while the
patient is still awake and getting them to do a reading task while the surgeons
stimulate parts of the cortex with small electrical currents. Stimulating some
parts causes speech arrest - either loss of control of vocalising muscles or tempo-
rary anomia. Roux and Trémouletreport that stimulating areas of a bilingual’s
brain can cause speech arrest (an inability to recall words) for words belonging
to one language but not the other (see figure 3.3).
This dissociation between physical processing areas suggests a qualitative dif-
ference between languages. However, Roux and Trémoulet also report significant
individual differences (see figure 3.4), including many cases of brain areas that
caused speech arrest in more than one language. Pinning down how cortical areas
come to differentiate between languages may be difficult because the relationship
between cortical areas and language learning is poorly understood. Tests are yet
to be done to see whether the dissociations between languages in the brain can
also be reduced to lower-level differences. This may simply be a second-order
problem.
Even if the brain is able to dissociate languages categorically, given that the
other measures in this chapter fail to do so, we must ask on what basis the brain
is able to accomplish this task. It is likely that non-linguistic factors are used
such as context, speaker identity, cultural background and so on. If this is the
case, then models should also use these features.
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Figure 3.4: Sites of dissociations between languages for 7 patients from Roux and




The final measure considered here is functionality. The linguistic systems of in-
dividuals in isolated communities may have adapted to different cognitive niches,
and so one might be able to differentiate languages on this basis. For example,
Lupyan and Dale (2010) demonstrate a correlation between population size and
the morphological complexity of their language. They explain this by hypoth-
esising that larger communities are more likely to have more second language,
adult speakers. Since adults find morphology more difficult to learn than chil-
dren (Clahsen et al., 2010), populations with a greater number of adults will have
a bias against morphological marking. Therefore, English - a global language with
perhaps more second language speakers than first language speakers - is less mor-
phologically complex than the language of a smaller, more isolated community
such as Welsh. That is, the languages have adapted to different ‘linguistic niches’
(see Lupyan and Dale, 2010, see also Roberts and Winters, 2012 for a criticism
of Lupyan and Dale’s hypothesis). One could appeal to the adaptive function of
a linguistic system in order to try to categorise them into different languages.
However, this approach recognises that the differences between adaptive func-
tions emerge from use and context, rather than being pre-specified. Furthermore,
it recognises the impact that societies have on the language they use, suggesting
that languages are better seen as population-level phenomena, not individual-
level phenomena. Again, this does not support the use of an abstract concept of
language in a model of language evolution.
3.12 Summary
The sections above have demonstrated that different ways of attempting to dif-
ferentiate ‘languages’ are problematic. For instance, they may be inconsistent,
be based on factors other than linguistic ones or just refer to low-level categories.
The next sections consider the implications of this for models of language evolu-
tion. First, the argument of eliminating the concept of monolithic, static, discrete
languages is considered.
3.13 Eliminating the concept of discrete languages
As we have seen above, different ways of measuring languages ignore the complex-
ities of linguistic variation, for instance by ignoring how variation is distributed
over speakers and concentrating on typological similarities. This section consid-
ers whether the concept of a language could be usefully eliminated from the field
of linguistics. Craver (2007) argues that there are three reasons a concept may
be invalid: underspecification, taxonomic errors and misidentification (see also
Irvine, 2011). Concepts that meet these criteria may be usefully eliminated from
the field (the concept should no longer be used to explain phenomena). Concepts
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like aether in physics or the idea that the body is controlled by four ‘humours’
in medicine have been eliminated for this reason (see Whittaker, 1910; Arikha,
2008). The next three sections show that identifying ‘languages’ also leads to
underspecification, taxonomic errors and misidentification.
3.13.1 Underspecification
A concept underspecifies the pheonomena it tries to describe if it does not cap-
ture all its relevant aspects. The previous sections demonstrated that, while a
‘language’ may be treated as a linguistic concept, there are many considerations
beyond purely linguistic ones that go into specifying languages. This suggests
that the concept of a ‘language’ underspecifies the complexities of how linguistic
systems vary between and within individuals.
3.13.2 Taxonomic errors
A language may be identified by linguists as a coherent linguistic unit, but in fact,
as the sections above have shown, some divisions between languages are based
on cultural or political differences. Also, as shown in the section on language
use, speakers may treat varieties that others regard as separate languages as a
single ‘medium’. Furthermore, its possible that linguists group variation that is
functionally differentiated, such as different ‘dialects’ under a single ‘language’.
Also, the concept of a ‘language’ is often affected by the precise question of the
researcher, as discussed in section 3.3. As Sober puts it “there is no linguistic
justification for treating Danish and Swedish as different languages but Mandarin
and Cantonese Chinese as different dialects of the same language” (Sober, 1980,
p. 398).
The question of how categories like languages extend through time is also un-
clear. Clearly, there is a difference between the linguistic system currently spo-
ken in London, and the language spoken there 3,000 years ago. Some of these
changes might have been fairly abrupt due to invasion or migration, but without
reference to social historical events, drawing lines between Old English, Middle
English and Modern English is a fairly arbitrary exercise.
Conflicting with this descent-orientated categorisation are speaker-orientated con-
cepts such as a ‘medium’ which is a group of languages treated by individuals
as a single system (Gafaranga, 2008) and creoles which are a combination of two
languages in contact. There are geographic concepts such ‘sprachbund’ which
is a geographic area with closely related linguistic structures (see Thomason,
2000; Enfield, 2005), or ‘sprechbund’ which is a geographic area with closely re-
lated systems of use (see Sorensen, 1967, p. 677). Additionally, as section 3.5
showed, pre-existing definitions of language do not necessarily line up with the
way speakers use linguistic variation. It seems that categorising linguistic vari-
ation into ‘languages’ often lumps together diverse linguistic systems, or divides
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linguistic systems that are very similar. These are criteria for a concept making
a ‘taxonomic error’.
3.13.3 Misidentification
According to Craver (2007), the elimination of a concept should only be consid-
ered seriously if it misidentifies its target phenomenon. If a concept is misiden-
tified, then the phenomenon it refers to does not exist and using the concept is
of little practical or explanatory use. It is possible that the concept of discrete,
static languages is not useful for an evolutionary approach to bilingualism.
However, the concept of a language is clearly entrenched in linguistics, and it
is clear that a lot of progress has been made using the concept. Eliminating
entrenched concepts, especially ones where problems are widely acknowledged,
might not be productive for the field (Brigandt, 2003; Ereshefsky, 2010). A
project that seriously considered eliminating the concept of a language from lin-
guistics is well outside the scope of this thesis.
Yet in terms of an evolutionary approach to bilingualism (how the distribution of
linguistic variation changes over time), I do argue that there is no concrete ana-
logue of a ‘language’ in the real world. This has been demonstrated by showing
that there is no objective way of defining languages. This raises the question of
whether the concept of a ‘language’ is useful for explaining processes of language
evolution. If fact, chapter 8 will show that studies of bilingual language acquisi-
tion have started to describe their work without reference to high-level linguistic
categories. Researchers have been focussing on how exposure to low-level linguis-
tic variation affects language learning. If this trend continues, then perhaps the
concept of a ‘language’ will be eliminated without explicit attempts to do so.
3.14 Requirements of a model of bilingual cul-
trual evolution
In this chapter I have shown that many methods of measuring a categorical differ-
ence between languages are either invalid or rely on and emerge from lower-level
distinctions. However, many measures of ‘bilingualism’ rely on these discrete,
high-level categories. In this case, it is unclear what these measures of ‘bilingual-
ism’ are actually measuring. So, even if the formal eliminitavist argument does
not hold, at the very least it is likely that the concept of a ‘language’ is very sensi-
tive to the precise context of study or the research question of the researcher. This
means that, if discrete languages are not valid abstract concepts, then they should
not be encoded into models that explore bilingual cultural evolution. A ‘language’
in a model of language evolution should be a dynamic, context-dependent, emer-
gent property of lower-level features. It follows that ‘bilingualism’ must also be
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an emergent property that must be measured from the bottom up.
If there’s no psychological reality to the concept of a language as a population-
level phenomenon (as suggested by this chapter and by e.g. Chomsky, 1980),
then there is an argument for not representing this unit in the minds of individu-
als in a model of cultural evolution that considers bilingualism. I argue that the
concept of bilingualism only makes sense in a cultural evolution framework as an
emergent, population-level phenomenon which can be measured as the amount of
linguistic optionality that is conditioned on social variables. This view, together
with the arguments from the current chapter, suggest three requirements for a
model that studies bilingualism in a cultural evolution framework.
Firstly, that the abstract units of the model be low-level linguistic features, not
whole languages. For instance, it is not valid to simply represent an individual as
knowing a language or not as a binary feature. It is valid, however, to represent
an individual as knowing a linguistic feature or features such as a phoneme inven-
tory, lexical items, or syntactic features such as headedness or basic word order,
assuming that these can be linked to specific cognitive processes in the individual.
Secondly, models should represent individuals explicitly. Some models confound
the concepts of an individual and their linguistic system (see the next chapter).
While this does not matter for a model of monolingual speakers, a difference
emerges when individuals can adopt many varieties. I argue that the concept of
bilingualism relies on how language is used between individuals. Therefore, mod-
els should represent a concrete number of individuals and tie specific linguistic
utterances to specific individuals.
Finally, the social structure in these models should be complex and dynamic.
By complex, I mean that individuals do not necessarily have an equal probability
of hearing an utterance from any other individual, within and between gener-
ations. The sociolinguistic literature suggests that imbalances in and changes
to the social structures are part of the driving force for linguistic change (e.g.
Kaufman and Thomason, 1988; Mufwene, 2001; Winford, 2003). Wichmann and
Holman (2009) also argue that complex social structures should be a key feature
in a model of language change. The most extreme example is two populations
that are entirely isolated. Other cases are possible too, such as a population
having two sub-populations that are more likely to communicate within their
sub-population than between it. Imbalances in the probability of communication
are also important. For example, consider a situation with a dominant majority
population and a minority population. A real world example might be an immi-
grant community who have retained their native language as well as adopting the
host community’s language. Individuals in the minority population might com-
municate equally often with individuals from either community, but individuals
from the majority community might be much less likely to communicate with an
individual from the minority community than the majority community.
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Social structures should also be dynamic. Linguistic diversity is driven by contact
between groups (e.g. Nettle, 1999a), which involves the social structures chang-
ing. For example, two communities that come into contact move from isolation
to being more or less integrated. Communities may also split and diverge. Mod-
els that consider linguistic diversity over evolutionary time (many generations)
should consider the possibility that social structures can change. This is not
a new argument. Modelling social structures as static and endogenous (where
decent happens only within groups) has been criticised in other fields such as
human ecology (see Lee, 1972). Jane H. Hill also argues as far back as 1978 that
dynamic social structures are a key aspect of understanding areal phenomena,
multilingualism, pidgins, diglossia and critical period effects (Hill, 1978). Hill
suggests individuals can adapt - in their language, behaviour and genetically - to
structures beyond the local group. For instance, the Yanomama, though they live
in an area that appears to be conducive to linguistic homogeneity, speak several
languages and have a commonly spoken ‘high’ variety that is used for commu-
nicating between local groups (see Hill, 1978, p. 11-12). Despite this, what Hill
would identify as the ‘dialect tribe’ model have become the norm in computa-
tional models of the cultural evolution of language (see chapter 5). While models
must make simplifying assumptions to understand general processes, I argue that
dynamic populations are a central feature for the study of bilingual cultural evo-
lution.
If these three requirements are met, then the issue of discrete languages can
be circumvented. The next issue is how to measure bilingualism in a model with-
out discrete languages. Following the definition of bilingualism developed in this
thesis, bilingualism can be measured as the amount of linguistic variation that is
conitioned on social factors. This only requires low-level variation and contrast in
social variables, which the three requirements above ensure. These requirements
are implemented in a bottom up model presented in chapter 7.
3.15 Conclusion
This chapter argued that there is no consistent way to divide linguistic varia-
tion into discrete, higher-level categories like ‘languages’ on a purely linguistic
basis. This might suggest that ‘languages’ do not have a psychological reality in
the minds of learners, and so models of bilingualism should not encode discrete
languages. Three requirements for valid models of bilingualism were suggested.
These will be used to evaluate current models of bilingual cultural evolution, and
also to motivate a bottom up model of bilingualism in chapter 7. However, if
‘languages’ are epiphenomena - categories that emerge from lower-level phenom-
ena - then ‘bilingualism’ as the ability to speak more than one ‘language’ may
also be an epiphenomena. The next chapter considers this issue and argues that





“I’d love it if I were bilingual, I’d love it if I were multilingual. If I
had many different languages, I’d be a richer person.”
Noam Chomsky (in Baron Cohen, 2004)
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter argued that ‘languages’ are not monolithic, static, discrete
entities, but can be seen as ‘epiphenomena’ that emerge from use, culture, pol-
itics, identity and so on. This suggests that representing discrete languages in
models of bilingual cultural evolution may not be valid. However, by arguing for
the elimintion of this view of languages, a problem arises: if bilingualism is know-
ing more than two ‘languages’, then bilingualism may also be an epiphenomnea,
and so subject to the same eliminitavist argument. It has been argued that this is
the case, and so bilingualism is not a productive object of study for evolutionary
linguistics (see Chomsky, 1980, 2000; Sober, 1980).
I oppose this position in two ways. First, it is possible to measure bilingual-
ism without using a discrete notion of languages. This is based on the amount of
linguistic variation that is conditioned on social factors, as described in the first
chapter. This measure will be implemented in a model in chapter 7.
In this chapter, I oppose the eliminitive case for bilingualism by using arguments
from biology about the relevance of the concept of a ‘species’ (Sober, 1980). The
parallel that I’d like to draw between biological and cultural evolution for the
purposes of this thesis is a historical one: The kind of problem that biology faces
when trying to study speciation is the kind of problem that linguists face when
studying linguistic diversity. That is, how to think about low-level features that
are in competition but that are grouped into individuals, who themselves are part
of larger groups that are defined by, but also emerge from the low-level features.
I argue, in parallel with Sober (1980) that just because ‘languages’ do not have
a psychological reality, it does not mean that bilingualism cannot be a valid ob-
ject of study in its own right. If bilingualism at the population can be shown to
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exhibit law-like behaviour, then it can be studied in its own right, and may pro-
vide insights into questions about language evolution. The aim of the bottom-up
model in chapter 7 will be to demonstrate this point.
The first section in this chapter discusses the idea of conceptualising languages
as species, and parallels between problems in biology and linguistics. The second
section discusses the argument that bilingualism is an epiphenomena, and there-
fore not relevant to the study of language evolution. The final section discusses
the implications for abstract models of cultural evolution.
4.2 Languages as species
One of the conceptual problems in this thesis is how to relate concepts at the
individual level to concepts at the population level. This has also been a problem
for biology. The debate over whether the concepts and approaches of evolution
can be applied to language is as old as the theory of evolution. Darwin realised
that languages might be subject to evolutionary pressures (Darwin and Ghiselin,
1874) and a contemporary, Schleicher, was quick to start pointing out the simi-
larities and differences (Schleicher, 1863).
Mufwene (2001) promotes a view of language as an analogue of species (rather
than an organism e.g. Christiansen and Chater, 2008) based on three points:
Languages are collections of idiolects, while idiolects are more like organisms;
Languages die in protracted ways, unlike organisms; Languages are acquired in
a piecemeal fashion. Although animals don’t fit this view, other organisms such
as viruses do change their genetic makeup over their lifetime.
The problem of identifying languages has many parallels with identifying a ‘species’
in biology (see Ereshefsky, 1998). The most relevant definition may be based on
the ability to mate (in linguistics analogous to mutual intelligibility), genetic sim-
ilarity (typological similarity), phenotypic similarity (phonetic similarity), evolu-
tionary history (cultural history), behaviour (language use) or ecological niche
(cognitive niche). Some of these are discussed in the previous chapter. These
concepts are problematic in biology as well as linguistics. For example, a ‘ring
species’ (Mayr, 1942) is a group of sub-species where each sub-species can mate
with their neighbouring type, but not necessarily with every member of the group
(e.g. Larus gulls, Haffer, 1982, although see Liebers et al., 2004). Drawing a
species boundaries in this situation based on mating is difficult, and there are
parallel situations in linguistics (Sober, 1980; Nettle, 1999a and see section 3.6
on page 34 on dialects in Japan). For instance, Radcliffe-Brown (1930) finds that
an indigenous community in Australia might use many dialects, or a single di-
alect might span many communities, concluding that “it is difficult to say exactly
where one language ends and another begins” (Radcliffe-Brown, 1930, p. 37).
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However, there are some problems raised by bilingualism that potentially con-
fuse the language-as-species analogy. First, while many conceptions of separate
species rely on the inability to mate, as Diebold (1961) points out in his essay
on ‘incipient bilingualism’ that “biological change is almost totally divergent.
Linguistic and cultural change, on the other hand, is rarely if ever free from con-
vergence. The analogue of biological speciation in linguistic change is language
and dialect formation; but mutual unintelligibility, unlike mutual infertility, is no
block to systemic convergence.” That is, learners can learn any combination of
languages, regardless of how divergent the languages have become. Either this
means that there has been no divergence in languages - that there is only one
language species - or that a different process is involved. The situation becomes
more complicated if one considers bilinguals. If languages are species, what is the
analogue of a bilingual individual? Two separate organisms? An organism with
two sets of genes? Do two language ‘organisms’ inhabit one brain-ecology? This
seems to go against studies of bilingualism and language mixing that show that
an individual has a single systematic linguistic system (e.g. Gafaranga, 2007).
The nature of this problem has two origins. The first is that a cultural, linguis-
tic system is being pressed into an analogy with biological evolution. While it is
perfectly reasonable to assume that linguistic variants are subject to evolutionary
processes, this does not imply that there will be analogues at all levels of analysis.
However, there is another kind of problem that is faced by linguistics which
is not such a concern for evolutionary biologists. This is the argument of this
chapter: I suggest that part of the confusion of how to represent linguistic struc-
tures in an evolutionary framework is actually based on the invalid concept of
a language, or rather as an assumption that a bilingual is qualitatively different
from a monolingual (or indeed that the monolingual is the ‘default’). In later
chapters, I will argue that rather than needing to count the number of systems,
we can just assume that each individual has a learning system that conditions
linguistic variance on semantic variables. All individuals exhibit variation, but if
socio-cultural variables are important for a particular group of individuals, then
the phenomenon we recognise as bilingualism should emerge.
This approach does not rely on specific analogues with evolutionary biology, but
does use the trick of disregarding high-level categorisations that are imposed by
researchers and instead seeing how categories emerge from low-level variation,
interactions with the environment and social structure.
4.3 Epiphenomena
The previous chapter argued that ‘languages’ are epiphenomena. That is, a
property that is caused by certain configurations of lower-level features, but not
something that had a consistent ‘psychological reality’ in the minds of speakers.
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By extension, ‘bilingualism’ as conceptualised as knowledge of more than one
language, is also an epiphenomena. Chomsky suggests that this means that
bilingualism is not a productive object of study for evolutionary linguistics:
“This branch of the study of language [Generativism] is indeed marked
by an absence of any role for community and culture ... There is noth-
ing of any significance known, at least to me, about community and
culture that relates to these questions about the nature of a certain
biological system. ... Bilingualism is normal to the species in the
trivial sense that the world is so complex that strict monolingualism
is almost unimaginable. In that sense it is natural to the species but
I don’t see anything deep about that.”
Chomsky (2000)
Chomsky suggests that linguists should focus on language in the individual rather
than language in a society. Sober (1980) relates the line-drawing problem in lin-
guistics to the reasons why Chomsky (1980) opposes the study of languages as
social entities. First, it is difficult to draw lines between dialects synchronically
or diachronically, making it difficult to state criteria for distinguishing objects of
study. Chomsky also sees languages as properties of groups, as ‘epiphenomena’
arising from interactions of individuals. That is, they are effects, not causes.
Sober characterises Chomsky’s argument as “so even if line-drawing problems
could be solved, there still would not be a reason for thinking that socially shared
languages are needed to explain anything” (Sober, 1980, p.397).
With regards to the second argument that population-level languages are just
epiphenomena, Sober notes that this is a reductionist argument. That is, the
linguistic representations of individuals are ‘epiphenomena’ of lower-level brain
processes, yet this does not mean that studying individual psychology is in-
valid. By extension, then, the fact that population-level phenomena in linguistics
are ‘epiphenomena’ of the interaction between individuals does not mean that
population-level phenomena cannot be studied in their own right.
With regards to the first argument about the line-drawing problem, Sober notes
that the same problems exist in defining biological species, yet a ‘species’ is a
generally accepted concept in biology. This is possible because of ‘population
thinking’ (Mayr, 1963). Populations obey evolutionary laws, so there might be
no need to define them in terms of their constituents. Sober suggests that it is
possible to see languages as social entities and linguistics as the study of what
individuals in speech communities have in common. It is then possible to prove
that population-level phenomena are real by describing the laws that they obey:
“To show that properties of social wholes are not simply artefacts of
the properties of their parts, one must show how such social prop-
erties are connected to each other in a law-like way. ... Given such
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interconnections, particular events can be explained in terms of social
properties and their laws; this sort of explanation entails that social
properties are not mere epiphenomena, since the explanation will at-
tribute causal efficacy to populations’ possessing the properties they
do. ... only the elaboration of empirical theories can fully vindicate
the idea of social reality”
(Sober, 1980, p. 404)
The literature on bilingualism might provide some evidence. For example, the
learning of a second language is affected by how it relates to a learner’s first
language (see De Groot, 2010). Also, exposure to multiple ‘languages’ (socially
defined clusters of linguistic variation) affect individual cognition. For instance,
executive control profiles (Treccani et al., 2009; Hernández et al., 2010), word
learning heuristics (Houston-Price et al., 2010; Byers-Heinlein and Werker, 2009a;
Healey and Skarabela, 2009; Merriman and Kutlesic, 1993) or meta-linguistic
knowledge (Bialystok, 1991; Serratrice et al., 2009). ‘Bilingualism’, then, seems
to be a useful concept for describing effects on individual cognition. This co-
evolution is discussed further in chapter 8.
However, as the previous chapter argued, defining bilingualism in terms of knowl-
edge of the number of discrete languages a person ‘knows’ is problematic. The
issue of encoding languages in models of cultural evolution is now discussed.
4.4 Abstractions in models
Abstract models of cultural evolution have also been looking at the interaction
between individual biases and population-level phenomena. For instance, un-
der certain assumptions, the distribution of linguistic types in a population will
converge to the prior biases of its individuals (Griffiths and Kalish, 2007). This
is a good demonstration that linguistic distributions at the population level are
epiphenomena, but not necessarily that they have causal effects. However, some
recent models allow the biases of individuals to adapt to the population-level
phenomena, in a similar way to the evidence from studies of bilingualism might
suggest (Smith and Thompson, 2012; Thompson, 2012; Thompson et al., 2012).
The bottom-up model presented in chapter 7 also allows the linguistic represen-
tations of individuals to be influenced by population-level phenomena.
Some models of cultural evolution are designed to oppose the claim that there
are transparent links between population-level phenomena and individual biases
(Kirby et al., 2007; Thompson et al., 2012). The models demonstrate that ob-
serving strong linguistic universals in the world does not necessarily mean that
individuals have strong language-specific biases. Rather, cultural transmission
can amplify weak, general biases. However, by setting the models up to oppose
strong nativist arguments, they have assumed that there is a psychological re-
ality to high-level linguistic categories. That is, the model has individuals who
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share internal states that are monolithic, discrete and fixed across time and the
population-level phenomena are direct measures of these internal states. Chom-
sky might argue against the point about the relationship between universals by
claiming that linguistic systems of populations do not have a psychological real-
ity (Chomsky, 1980) and so social forces are uninformative for the study of the
internal representation of the individual (Chomsky, 2000).
The issue of the transparency of the relationship between individuals’ internal
representations and the population-level phenomenon is brought into sharp focus
when trying to model bilingualism. In the top-down models mentioned above
(and discussed further in chapter 5), the population-level phenomenon is simply
a count of the internal representations of individuals. Put another way, individu-
als have internal representations of the population-level phenomena. It is unclear
whether this really does support the study of social phenomena. Furthermore,
models that represent whole ‘languages’ as discrete, static entities assume that
the line-drawing problem can be solved.
The previous chapter argued that ‘languages’ are complex, population-level phe-
nomena that can only be identified through they way individuals use them in a
particular context. In this case, individuals are unlikely to have evolved biases
over discrete ‘languages’. It may not even be possible to define a universal set of
discrete ‘languages’ that align with learned internal representations. Therefore,
for models that are designed for studying bilingualism in a cultural evolution
framework, it might be invalid to encode individual representations as being es-
sentially not distinct from the population-level phenomena. In response to this, a
bottom up model is presented in chapter 7 where the individual representations
and the population level phenomenon (bilingualism) are clearly separate.
However, this is a complex issue. Many models that make the assumptions above
are not specifically designed to answer questions about bilingualism. Further-
more, the authors argue that the dynamics of the model only need to approximate
the real world at some level for them to be insightful (e.g. Griffiths and Kalish,
2007, p.450-451). Similarly, Ke (2004) recognises that languages are complex en-
tities, but argues that abstract languages may still be analysed at the population
level:
“In linguistics, however, very often an abstract language system is
taken as the object of analysis. This level of analysis disregards the
distinction between idiolect and communal language, and neglects the
heterogeneous nature of language at both levels. As a consequence,
explanations for observed patterns based on this abstract level of anal-
ysis are often inadequate. However, this is a necessary step for lin-
guists to identify interesting phenomena in the first place. At this
abstract level of analysis, the self-organization framework can also be
applied. ”
(Ke, 2004, p. i)
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Nettle suggests that this is argument also applies to linguistic diversity in dynamic
social networks:
“It is clear ... that the formation of any particular ethnolinguistic
group will be a complex interplay of many locally specific factors; for-
mation of social bonds will depend upon precise topographical, mili-
tary, epidemiological, demographic, and cultural situations, as well as
more nebulous contingencies such as the rise and fall of local prestige
and influence. However, I believe general explanations are appropriate
for the global trends.”
(Nettle, 1998, p. 361)
This suggests that the level of abstraction of the model should be guided by the
questions of the researcher, rather than aim to model reality perfectly. Many
of the cultural evolution models see the linguistic units as representing low-level
features such as word order, rather than whole languages. It is conceivable that
individuals really do have cognitive biases over these units (e.g. Diamond, 1991,
p. 143). The point of contention is whether the distributions in the world re-
flect the strength of these cognitive biases in a straightforward way (Kirby et al.,
2007; Thompson et al., 2012). The difference between modelling these lower-
level features and modelling bilingualism is that bilingualism is a purely social
phenomenon. That is, you can’t identify whether an individual is bilingual by
studying them in isolation. Bilingualism can only be measured through the inter-
actions of individuals. In contrast, the word order that a speaker used would be
identifiable by their utterances alone. It is less clear, then, whether bilingualism
at the population level relates straightforwardly to an individual cognitive bias. A
model that assumed that there was a relevant cognitive bias (e.g. for the amount
of variation to expect in your input, see Burkett and Griffiths, 2010, discussed in
chapter 5) already makes a strong assumption about individual cognition.
Rather than attempt to construct a philosophical argument that addresses this
issue, this thesis instead demonstrates that two approaches can lead researchers
to different conclusions. This is done by comparing the results of two models.
The first is a top down model, which assumes that learners have a cognitive bias
over the distribution of variation to expect (chapter 6). The second model is a
bottom up model that assumes there is a general statistical learning mechanism
that is sensitive to social cues (chapter 7). The bottom up model also uses a
measure of bilingualism that is based on how individuals use low-level variation.
Using this kind of measure means that bilingualism is not based on the concept
of discrete languages.
Both models will suggest slightly different resolutions to the bilingual paradox.
The top down model suggests that the prevalence of bilingualism does not need
to be underpinned by a strong bias to expect bilingualism. On the other hand,
the bottom up model suggests that bilingualism emerges due to dynamic social
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structures which support contrasts in social identity. Furthermore, it is possible
to measure bilingualism in the bottom up model without reference to discrete
internal representations of individuals. At the very least, then, it seems that
exploring this problem from many perspectives is prudent.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter argued that bilingualism can be studied as a phenomenon in its own
right. Doing so would involve showing that the phenomenon of ‘bilingualism’
exhibited law-like behaviour. This can be seen in the effect of variation in the
input on cognition (see above and chapter 8). It could also be demonstrated
by constructing a model to study the dynamics of bilingualism. The next few
chapters look at two types of model that do this. However, the first type, top
down models, usually assume that individuals have internal representations of
discrete ‘languages’, which have been shown to be problematic in this chapter the
previous chapter. This motivates a bottom-up model that uses a concrete measure
of bilingualism. Instead of being measured as a count of internal representations,
bilingualism in the bottom up model can be measured by looking at the amount





“Bir dil bir insan, iki dil iki insan”
One who speaks only one language is one person, but one who speaks
two languages is two people.
Turkish proverb
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapters argued that bilingualism should not be thought about as
the ability to speak multiple discrete, static languages. Instead, bilingualism was
defined as a property of populations based on how linguistic variation is condi-
tioned on social variables. The previous chapter suggested some requirements for
models investigating bilingualism under the framework of the cultural evolution
of language. The current chapter reviews some models of cultural evolution that
are related to bilingualism in the light of these requirements. I will argue that
the majority of models have some kind of assumption that monolingualism is
the goal of the learners or the most normal, rational expectation for a learner to
have. Even a cultural evolution model that is designed to study learning multiple
languages from multiple teachers (Burkett and Griffiths, 2010) may not be en-
tirely suitable for studying bilingual cultural evolution. A challenge for top down
models is to continue to produce solid results for increasingly complex models.
The final section discusses the literature on flexible learning mechanisms from
studies of bilingualism that would be desirable to model.
Sections 2 and 3 review some mathematical and agent-based models of cultural
evolution and point out biases against bilingualism. The bulk of this chapter
discusses models of iterated learning in some amount of technical detail. The
main focus will be Bayesian models of iterated learning. For readers who are not
immersed in this literature, sections 5.4 and 5.5 provides a brief introduction to
this kind of model, and a summary of the conclusions of these models relating to
bilingualism. Section 6 reviews Burkett and Griffiths (2010)’s model which in-
cludes agents who learn multiple ‘languages’ from multiple teachers. These agents
have expectations about the number of languages they will observe in their input.
These expectations turn out to be important for the dynamics of the model. Sec-
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tions 7 and 8 review some extensions of this model that allow these expectations
to be learned from the input or evolve biologically. It will be demonstrated that
these, too, tend to make assumptions that limit the possibility of bilingualism.
After a brief summary in section 9, section 10 discusses the problems of repre-
senting bilingualism in top down models. It will be argued that current top down
models need a more sophisticated conception of bilingualism. However, the chal-
lenge to top down models is not necessarily to reflect real systems more closely,
but to continue to produce solid results for increasingly complex models.
5.2 Mathematical models
Abrams and Strogatz (2003) (extended in Stauffer et al., 2007) present a mathe-
matical model of language death. It assumed that there is a population of agents
and two possible languages. Agents decide to adopt a language based on the
proportion of people who speak it and the cultural status of the language. Over
many generations, one language tends to dominate. The model was fitted to real
data of the decline of minority language speakers and, with some tuning of the
parameters, fit reasonably well1. Castelló et al. (2008) also extended the model to
include different social structures2. More complex structures extended the time
the system took to reach uniformity. However, in populations with ‘community
structure’3, where agents could adopt either language or both, linguistic diversity
could persist indefinitely. Sub-communities in the population that are poorly
connected to the rest of the population were resistant to being ‘invaded’ by the
other language.
The problem in this model, for the purposes of this paper, is the way language
is represented (also discussed in Fernando et al., 2010). Languages are mono-
lithic entities - agents either know a language or they do not. In fact, in the
original model, individuals could only know one language, so bilingualism was
impossible. Furthermore, there is no scope for the perception of the division be-
tween languages to change based on social factors. As I have argued in chapter 3,
languages are social constructs that are continuously re-constructed from gener-
ation to generation, rather than options that are fixed through time. While some
1Although Fernando et al. (2010) point out it is a phenomenological model rather that
a mechanistic model that can fit the data but not explain what the mechanism behind the
behaviour is. Furthermore, Stauffer et al. (2007) demonstrates that an agent-based model of
the same process provides qualitatively different results to the mathematical model. Reali and
Griffiths (2010) also demonstrate that s-curves in the shifting of frequencies can be observed
without assumptions about prestige, see section 5.9.1.
2This was an agent-based model where individuals could speak one of two languages or both,
and the two languages were socially equivalent.
3This refers to the following condition: “Social networks are organized into communities with
dense internal connections, giving rise to high values of the clustering coefficient. In addition,
these networks have been observed to be assortative, i.e., highly connected vertices tend to
connect to other highly connected vertices, and have broad degree distributions.” (Toivonen
et al., 2006, p. 851)
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linguistic features may be represented in a binary way (e.g. the basic order of
subject and object), languages are much more complicated entities. That is, the
measure of ‘bilingualism’ in this model is not equivalent to the measure suggested
by this thesis (i.e. the amount of linguistic variation conditioned on social struc-
tures). Although much more complex models have been constructed which allow
more realistic social aspects (e.g. Castelló et al., 2008; Fernando et al., 2010),
they still maintain a discrete division between languages.
The second kind of problem that this model makes is a misunderstanding of the
key aspects of language change. This model is typical of many physics models
that look at the quiescence of a process in a closed system (in the thermodynamic
sense). That is, the system is perturbed once and the resulting oscillations are
studied before the system converges. However, one of the most obvious points
from the bilingualism and sociolinguistics literature is that linguistic change is
driven by changes in population or social structure or in cases of language con-
tact (in physics terms, when energy is injected into the system). Indeed, Mufwene
(2005) assumes as a first principle of trying to understand what causes linguistic
change that “variation within a population is likely to remain stable unless some-
thing happens in its external ecology that disturbs the ‘balance of power’ between
competing variants” (Mufwene, 2005, p. 23). The model is a weak representation
of the process of linguistic change because it does not allow the interaction of so-
cial structure and language structure. Indeed, Abrams and Strogatz (2003) were
forced to admit that “contrary to the models stark prediction, bilingual societies
do, in fact, exist” (Abrams and Strogatz, 2003, p. 900).
Although not directly connected with the main literature in this chapter, and
although it has very different aims, another mathematical model deserves some
attention. Fernando et al. (2010) present a mathematical model of the dynamics
of language death. They note that Abrams and Strogatz, 2003’s model does not
suggest any mechanisms by which the decline of the minority language emerges.
In order to rectify this, a much more complex model is constructed. Individ-
uals speak either a low-status language (L), a high status language (H) or are
bilingual (B). Individuals mate to produce children, though speakers of H cannot
mate with speakers of L (although see Piller, 2000). Therefore, parents can be
of four types: HH, LL, HB or LB. Children inherit their language state based on
the frequency of languages they are exposed to, which is determined both by the
state of their parents and the frequencies of languages in the community4. This
process is iterated to produce generations of learners. The proportions of each
speaker type is tracked over time. There are seven parameters that determine
the dynamics of the model:
1. The initial proportions of L and H
2. The probability that a child of LL or LB parents will acquire H based on
what they hear from the community
4Fernando et al. (2010) note that the second process is Lamarckian rather than Mendelian.
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3. The probability that a child of HH or HB parents will acquire L based on
what they hear from the community
4. The ratio of data received from parents and the wider community
5. The amplification of H heard due to exposure to public sources (e.g. Tele-
vision).
6. The proportion of conversations heard by a child as a result of government
intervention (e.g. education)
7. The rate at which children who learn only H can be taught L.
For each of these parameters, Fernando et al. suggest a plausible range and the
data that would be required to estimate the parameters in the real world. For
instance, variables 2 and 3 above could be estimated from data from De Houwer
(2007). The baseline dynamics of the model demonstrate that L declines in fre-
quency until it becomes extinct, as in Abrams and Strogatz (2003). However,
by manipulating the parameters, Fernando et al. demonstrate that prestige (the
third parameter above) actually has little impact on the maintenance of L. Bet-
ter strategies for maintaining L include increasing the amount of exposure to the
low-status language (variable 6 above) and teaching the low-status language to
children who speak the high-status language (variable 7 above). These interven-
tions increase the number of bilingual speakers (and couples where one parent is
bilingual), rather than monolingual L speakers.
The model includes complex, dynamic social structures, but still only includes
two monolithic, discrete, static languages. Also, the social structures are not in-
dependent from the linguistic identity of the speakers, so more parameters would
be needed to model language contact situations. Furthermore, the individuals
have no cultural identity separate from their linguistic identity, so one cannot
measure the amount of linguistic variation that is conditioned on social variables.
The strategies for maintaining L lead to a community where around a third of
the population are bilingual and half are monolingual. For the kind of timescale
the model aims at describing (500 years, see Fernando et al., 2010, p.66), it is
unclear whether the contrast between languages and the prestige of H could be
maintained. Certainly, this model has little to say about how divisions between
languages occur in the first place. However, the scope and purpose of the model
is clear and fit the research question well. The implications of this model on
bilingual language policy are discussed in chapter 9.
5.3 Agent based approaches
Agent based models have been used to study how linguistic variation in a popu-
lation evolves (e.g. Steels, 1996; Nowak and Krakauer, 1999; Briscoe, 2002; Steels
and Belpaeme, 2005; Vogt, 2005; Gong et al., 2008; Puglisi et al., 2008; Loreto
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et al., 2010; Baronchelli et al., 2010; Gong and Wang, 2010). A full literature
review is outside the scope of this thesis. However, one paradigm is discussed
here because of its assumptions about bilingualism. The minimal naming game
(Gong et al., 2008; Puglisi et al., 2008; Loreto et al., 2010; Baronchelli et al.,
2010) is a model where individuals try to converge on common labels for com-
mon categories for a continuous meaning space. The paradigm is often couched
in terms for learning categorical boundaries for colours and their corresponding
names. Individuals do this by playing guessing games in pairs. The agents are
presented with a context of a sample of colours. One agent refers to one of the
colours using a label and the other agent must guess which colour the first agent
was referring to. Depending on whether the guess is correct or not, the memories
and categorical boundaries of the agents is updated.
The interesting factor for this thesis is the assumptions that are made about
this updating process. The minimal naming game is set up so that the goal of
the system is uniformity between individuals. This goal is typically approached
by trying to limit the amount of linguistic variation in the system. In Roberts (in
press, included in section D.1 in appendix D), I argue that the updating algorithm
implements a mutual exclusivity principle. For instance, if the guesser guesses the
correct referent, both agents discard all other ‘competing’ labels for that refer-
ent’s colour category. The measurement of the progress of the system also usually
involves a measure of increasing uniformity and decreasing or bounded linguistic
variation (also used in other types of model, e.g. Castelló et al., 2008). However,
decreasing the variation is not the only logical route to uniformity. Uniformity
can also be achieved by distributing the variation evenly (i.e. if agents remem-
ber all labels they encounter then uniformity will also decrease over time). In
Roberts (in press) I show that the mutual exclusivity features are not necessary
for uniformity, and in complex social structures can actually inhibit uniformity.
The social structures are an important factor, then, in the route the system takes
to uniformity. Indeed, diversity can emerge when agents are spatially distributed
(Steels and McIntyre, 1999), or when the social network adapts over time so that
individuals who communicate successfully are more likely to interact, even with
the standard minimal naming game algorithm (Lipowska and Lipowski, 2011).
A researcher interested in bilingualism, then, might be biased to start looking
at complex social structures immediately. This can lead to further differences
in the approach to the model. For example, the model looks at how the system
reaches an efficient state, but there is more than one way to approach efficiency,
too. In a fully connected social network, the communicative efficiency can be
measured by the number of labels each individual needs to store. However, in a
more structured network communicative where some agents don’t need to com-
municate effective with some others, the communicative efficiency might need to
be based on actual communication success (see Steels and McIntyre, 1999; Gong
and Wang, 2010).
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The choice of social structure also affects some more basic choices in the model
such as how interactions are managed. For example, in a regular network (with
an even number of agents), pairs of agents can interact simultaneously so there
are discrete interaction phases. However, this is not necessarily possible in a (non-
probabilistic) social structure where there may be imbalances in the number of
neighbours that agents have (imagine a hub with three satellites: not everyone
can talk to a neighbour at the same time).
In general, then, considering bilingualism can affect the features that are desirable
in a model, including the assumptions about the learning biases of individuals,
the parameters of the model and the measures of the progress of the model.
5.4 Introduction to Bayesian modelling
The remaining parts of this chapter will consider Bayesian models of language
learning. This section introduces the basic concepts behind these models. Bayes’
law provides a way to assign probabilities to hypotheses given evidence that
is observed and prior knowledge of the situation. Bayesian language learners
calculate the rational language (or ‘hypothesis’) to adopt given the languages
they observe being spoken to them and a learning bias. This gives a simple
way of modelling a learner who learns from data but also has a parameterisable
‘innate’ bias towards learning certain kinds of language. As an example, consider
a learner trying to establish the sentence order of syntactic items such as subject,
verb and object. The possible ‘hypotheses’ include SVO, SOV, VSO, VOS, OSV
and OVS. A learner assigns a probability to each hypothesis, and then selects
a hypothesis to use based on these probabilities (there are different ways to do
this, see section 5.4.4). The overall probability of a hypothesis (the posterior
probability) is calculated from two sources - the learning bias (prior probability)
and the observed data (likelihood). These are described below.
5.4.1 Likelihood
The likelihood of a hypothesis is simply the probability that it would generate
the observed data. So, for instance, observing many sentences that agreed with
SVO order would mean the likelihood of the SVO hypothesis would be high and
the likelihood of the VSO hypothesis would be low.
5.4.2 Prior
The prior probability or prior bias is a probability that is assigned to a hypoth-
esis independently of the data. For example, a learner may assign higher prior
probabilities to languages that have subjects at the start of a sentence due to a
processing advantage given typical semantic processing priorities (see Diamond,
1991, 143). Griffiths and Kalish suggest the following interpretation of the prior:
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“The standard interpretation of the prior ... as representing the ex-
tent to which the learner believes in a hypothesis before seeing any
data is perhaps not the best way to understand the role that it plays
under this view of language acquisition. The prior is better seen as
determining the amount of evidence that a learner would need to see
in order to adopt a particular language. Thinking of the prior as
expressing the amount of evidence a learner would need in order to
choose a particular language makes it clear how it can encode the
biases of learners: only hypotheses with positive prior probability will
enter into consideration, and hypotheses with higher prior probabil-
ities are easier to learn (requiring less evidence, and ultimately less
data).”
(Griffiths and Kalish, 2007, p.450)
5.4.3 Posterior
A total probability for a given hypothesis, called the posterior probability, is
calculated by combining the likelihood and the prior probabilities using Bayes’
law (Bayes and Price, 1763). This gives the rational posterior probability for a
hypothesis given the likelihood and prior probabilities. The probabilities for all
hypotheses can be calculated to give a probability distribution over languages.
5.4.3.1 A non-linguistic example
To clarify the Bayesian model, here’s an intuitive example. Imagine that I have
a die and you have to guess how many sides it has. The possibilities of the die
having 1 side, 2 sides, 3 sides and so on are your ‘hypotheses’. I roll the die
behind a screen so you can’t see. I then tell you the value on the face (the data).
Imagine I roll the die three times and the highest number you observe is 6. You’re
likely to think that I have a 6 sided die. However, imagine instead that I rolled
the die three times and the highest number you observed was 3. You might still
want to guess I have a 6 sided die, because you know those are the most common
type of dice. This knowledge represents your prior bias. Now imagine that I
continue to roll the dice a million times and still the highest value is only 3. At
this point, you might be more willing to guess that I really do have a 3 sided die.
The posterior probability captures the balance between your prior bias and the
data you observe.
5.4.4 Selecting a hypothesis
After assigning probabilities to each hypothesis, a Bayesian language learner has
to choose a hypothesis with which to produce data for the next generation. Grif-
fiths and Kalish (2007) identify two types of learning algorithms. Maximum a
posteriori learners (MAP) choose the hypothesis to adopt for production that has
the maximum posterior probability. Sampling learners (SAM) choose a hypothe-
sis by sampling the hypotheses in proportion to their posterior probabilities (i.e.
they may adopt any hypothesis, but are are most likely to adopt the one with
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the highest posterior probability). Learning algorithms can be implemented that
interpolate between these two extremes (Kirby et al., 2007).
Dediu (2009) reviews previous work on the differences between these learning
algorithms when implemented in an iterated learning framework. This involves
learners learning a language, then producing input for the next generation. The
stable distribution of languages in chains of SAM learners will converge to the
prior (Griffiths and Kalish, 2007). The ‘distribution of languages’ is the probabil-
ity of a given learner selecting each language in a given generation. So, the ‘stable
distribution of languages’ is the value of this probability distribution after a chain
has been run for many generations. In the SAM case, the stable distribution is
equal to individuals’ prior probability distribution over languages. This is due to
an iterative effect of the prior distribution favouring certain languages which are
then produced with a probability dependent on that prior distribution.
Griffiths and Kalish (2007) show that the output of SAM learners can be used
to estimate their prior probability distribution, but the same is not necessarily
true of MAP learners. The stable probability distribution over languages tends
to exaggerate the individual prior probability distribution. For example, consider
the following (rather extreme) prior probabilities: SOV: 60%, SVO: 40% and all
others: zero probability. Initial learners may produce a range of sentence types.
After many generations, SAM learners may will be producing SOV 60% of the
time and SVO 40% of the time. On the other hand, MAP learners will only be
producing SOV sentences.
Dediu (2009) looks at populations of mixed learner types. Populations of SAM
learners behave like single chains of SAM agents (converging to the prior) and
populations of MAP learners behave like single chains of MAP agents (one hy-
pothesis dominates). However, mixed populations of SAM and MAP learners
behave more like single chains of SAM learners. Dediu then added complex social
dynamics. This involved many populations in a structured space with overlap-
ping generations, mating, learning primarily from the mother, a small amount
of learning from neighbouring populations and migration between populations.
Here, the stable distributions converge to the individual’s prior, even populations
of only MAP learners.
Smith and Kirby (2008a) show that the MAP algorithm is the evolutionarily
stable strategy. They set up a population of SAM and MAP learners where in-
dividuals reproduce, passing on their learning strategy to their offspring. The
probability of an individual reproducing was tied to ‘communicative accuracy’,
that is, the proportion of the population with the same hypothesis as that in-
dividual (see section 5.8 for more on measures of communicative accuracy and
bilingualism). A population of SAM learners could always be invaded by a pop-
ulation of MAP learners. This was because, given the same data, MAP learners
will converge on the same hypothesis while SAM learners may choose different
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hypotheses. This means that the ‘communicative accuracy’, and therefore fitness,
of the SAM learners was lower. Based on this, Kirby et al. (2012) conclude that
“sampling is a bad strategy for coordination problems like language”.
However, Ferdinand and Zuidema (2009) demonstrate that this result is due to
a symmetrical hypothesis space. With an asymmetric hypothesis space, SAM
learners may be more stable because they have fewer hypotheses to converge
upon. If the structure of the hypothesis space means that there are multiple pre-
ferred hypotheses, then adopting a single language may leave an agent less likely
to be able to communicate with the whole population. Put another way, if agents
receive the same data, then MAP learners will converge on the same hypothesis.
However, if agents receive different samples of data or data from different sources,
then MAP learners might choose opposing hypotheses, while samplers would be
more likely to overlap.
The top down model presented in the next chapter allows agents to adopt multiple
languages. This leads to an asymmetric hypothesis space which has an effect on
the stability of different approaches to learning. However, it remains to be tested
whether SAM and MAP algorithms are better adapted for different hypothesis
space structures.
5.5 Modelling cultural evolution in a rational
framework
A Bayesian framework has been used to model the interaction of individual learn-
ing, cultural transmission and individual learning biases (Griffiths and Kalish,
2007; Kirby et al., 2007; Niyogi and Berwick, 2009; Ferdinand and Zuidema, 2009;
Smith, 2009; Burkett and Griffiths, 2010; Smith and Thompson, 2012; Thompson,
2012). In these models, generations of learners are exposed to linguistic data and
adopt a language type to use themselves. They do this by considering the data
they observe and a prior bias over the language types they expect to observe.
The prior bias is a preference for a language type that is independent from the
data. The learners produce data from this language type for the next generation
and the process iterates.
There are two opposing results regarding the link between the distribution of
linguistic features and the learning biases of individuals. Griffiths and Kalish
(2007) show that there are some assumptions that lead to a transparent link be-
tween individual biases and population-level phenomena. That is, the linguistic
distribution can be used to make inferences about the learning biases of individ-
uals. However, models using other assumptions show that weak cognitive biases
can be amplified by cultural transmission into strong linguistic universals (Kirby
et al., 2007; Smith, 2009). In this case, the population-level phenomena are not
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isomorphic to the individual biases of learners. This goes against a strong na-
tivist assumption that there is a direct link between the distribution of linguistic
typologies in the world and the innate learning biases of individuals (Kirby et al.,
2012; Thompson et al., 2012). The recent debate has focussed on whether the
link between individual biases and population-level phenomena remains opaque
under a range of conditions. This has meant extending the model from single
agents learning single languages to include multiple learners in each generation
and the ability for an individual to adopt multiple languages.
In order to obtain results for more complex models (e.g. multiple speakers),
models make simplifying assumptions about certain aspects (e.g. languages are
monolithic and discreet). I will argue that researchers have been biased towards
making assumptions that limit the validity of these models relating to bilingual-
ism.
5.5.1 Summary of Bayesian models
This section provides a short summary of the history of cultural evolution with
Bayesian language learners. A more detailed description of a more advanced
model is given in the next section.
The first Bayesian language learning models included agents who could only adopt
single language types (e.g. Griffiths and Kalish, 2007). The initial Bayesian mod-
els found opposing results with regards to how individual biases and population-
level phenomena are linked. Griffiths and Kalish (2007) showed that the dis-
tribution of linguistic types converged to the prior distribution over those types
(‘convergence’). For instance, in a model with two language types, if the prior
bias for type A was 20% higher than type B, then eventually the distribution of
language types (either over an infinitely long chain of single learners or in a single
generation with a large populaiton) would include 20% more speakers of type A
than type B. However, a different result was obtained with MAP learners (see
section 5.4.4): the process of cultural transmission could exaggerate the eventual
distribution of language types, so that the proportion of the language type that
was favoured by the prior bias was higher than the prior probability assigned to
it (‘non-convergence’, Griffiths and Kalish, 2007; Kirby et al., 2007). That is, the
cultural transmission process complicated the link between individual biases and
population-level phenomena.
Niyogi and Berwick (2009) criticised these models on the basis that only learning
from one individual “doesn’t embrace the full darwinian picture” (Niyogi and
Berwick, 2009, 10124). Smith (2009) modelled learning from multiple teachers,
but where learners still adopt only one language. In this case, one of the linguistic
types tended to dominate (non-convergence), according to the bias, the amount
of data observed, the number of teachers and the initial distribution of linguistic
types.
67
Ferdinand and Zuidema (2009) demonstrate that convergence or non-convergence
is sensitive to population size, population structure (see also Stadler, 2009), prior
bias homogeneity and the structure of the hypothesis space5. They conclude
that maintaining rationality in models with complex social structures is difficult.
Noting that Smith’s model violates the rationality assumption, Burkett and Grif-
fiths (2010) find a way of letting agents rationally learn multiple languages from
multiple teachers. This introduces a prior bias over the amount the linguistic
homogeneity of an agent’s input. Extensions of this model allow the strength of
this bias to be learned (Smith and Thompson, 2012) or evolved (Thompson et al.,
2012). The latter suggests that expecting low variation in the input (‘monolin-
gualism’) is the solution that is most likely to evolve.
The next section presents the model of Burkett and Griffiths (2010) in detail
and discusses whether it is a good model of bilingualism. The sections after
that discuss the extensions to this model and demonstrate that they make im-
plicit monolingual assumptions. I will demonstrate that considering bilingualism
changes the nature of the debate about how individual biases and population-
level phenomena are linked. The focus on the debate has shifted from assump-
tions about separate learning biases to assumptions about expectations about
diversity in the input.
5.6 Learning multiple languages from multiple
teachers
Burkett and Griffiths (2010) present a model where agents learn “multiple com-
plete linguistic systems” from “truly divergent inputs” (Burkett and Griffiths,
2010, p. 60). That is, learners take into account that the data they receive
may be generated by different speakers who may speak more than one language.
Below I summarise the model.
5They implement two population structures: monadic, with a single chain of learners, as
in previous models and polyadic, where the same data is passed to many individuals at each
generation, analysed separately, then the data generated by each individual is pooled for the
next generation. They find that the stable distribution for samplers in a polyadic chain does
not converge to the prior. Furthermore, while samplers converge to the prior with symmet-
rical hypothesis spaces (as in other models), they diverge from the prior as the structure of
the hypothesis space becomes more asymmetrical (the model in the next chapter also has an
asymmetrical hypothesis space). They also find differences between samplers and maximisers in
populations where individuals have different prior biases. The stable distribution of heteroge-
neous samplers converges to the average of their prior biases. However, the relationship between
the stable distribution for heterogeneous maximisers and their prior biases is more complex (see
Ferdinand and Zuidema, 2008b). Ferdinand and Zuidema (2009) suggest that MAP learners
may not always be the evolutionarily stable strategy (in contrast with the results of Smith and
Kirby, 2008b, see section 5.4.4).
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5.6.0.1 Hypothesis space
The data that the agents observe consists of words which are produced by a
language with a certain probability. An agent’s hypothesis is then a probability
distribution over languages. For example, in a situation where there are two
possible languages, L1 and L2, an agent could have a hypothesis h where p(L1|h)
= 0.6 and p(L2|h) = 0.4. This is a continuous hypothesis space. A ‘monolingual’
hypothesis would be one where the whole distribution is assigned to one language
(e.g. p(L1|h) = 1 and p(L2|h) = 0). By contrast, then, a ‘balanced bilingual’
would have a hypothesis with a uniform distribution (p(L1|h) = 0.5 and p(L2|h)
= 0.5).
5.6.0.2 Likelihood
The likelihood of a hypothesis producing the data that a learner observes is cal-
culated according to the process of production. Agents produce data by, first,
selecting a language based on the distribution in their hypothesis. In the exam-
ple above, the agent would choose language L1 60% of the time (where p(L1) = 0.6
and p(L2) = 0.4).Then, wordsareproducedgiventheselectedlanguage.Forinstance, inasystemwithtwowordsw1
and w2, the probability of L1 producing w1 is ε (set close to 1) and the probability
of L1 producing w2 is 1-ε (therefore, very low). The opposite is true for language
L2.
5.6.0.3 Prior
The prior bias in the model is proportional to two factors: First, a bias over the
languages, which we’ll call β, like in the other Bayesian models above. Secondly,
the concentration parameter α, which represents how often a learner expects to
hear new languages. This can range from expecting a single language in the
entire population (as α nears zero) to expecting each teacher to speak a different
language (as α nears infinity). This method provides a general solution to cultural
transmission in populations, thus maintaining rationality (see previous section).
5.6.0.4 Posterior
A learner observes utterances and calculates the most likely distribution over
languages given the likelihood of each hypothesis and their prior bias according
to Bayes’ law.
5.6.0.5 Iteration
The agents in this model use a sampling algorithm to select a hypothesis. They
then produce data according to this hypothesis, as described in section 5.6.0.2.
This data becomes part of the input for the next generation of learners. This
process of exposure to data, induction of a hypothesis and production of data
is iterated for many generations. The change in proportions of hypotheses over
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generation can be tracked. From these dynamics, the stable distribution of hy-
potheses can be estimated. This represents the probability of a given generation
adopting each hypothesis.
5.6.1 Results
The results show that with high α, the distribution of languages in the popula-
tion comes to reflect the prior distribution (convergence, in line with the results
of Griffiths and Kalish, 2007). In this situation, learners effectively expect each
teacher to speak a different language. This means that the dynamics are more
like a chain of single learners. That is, path of a single language back in time
through a transmission chain of learners does not diverge. However, with a low
α a single language type tends to dominate, depending on prior biases and ini-
tial data conditions (non-convergence, in line with the results of Smith, 2009).
In this situation, agents assume that all the speakers in a population speak the
same language, as in a monolingual society. That is, the α parameter defines a
continuum in the model dynamics which range from convergence to the prior to
sensitivity to initial conditions (non-convergence).
Therefore, the two seemingly opposing results about how individual biases and
population-level phenomena are related (convergence to the prior and non-convergence)
can in fact be described as extreme ends of a single continuum. This continuum
is realised by taking into account multiple languages, multiple teachers and the
structure of the population. Arguably, by considering bilingualism, the nature of
the debate has changed. The transparency of the relationship between individual
biases and population-level phenomena now depends on the expectations that
learners have about the linguistic homogeneity of their input.
Some obvious questions arise: Is there an analogue for this expectation in human
infants? If so, what is the default expectation, or is it a bias that can flexibly
adapt to the situation? Some extensions of the model have produced results rel-
evant to these questions (see sections 5.7 and 5.8). First, however, I consider
whether this model is a good model of bilingualism.
5.6.2 Representing bilingualism
Burkett and Griffiths (2010)’s model allows agents to adopt multiple culturally
transmitted features from multiple speakers. This section considers whether it
is a good model of bilingualism by comparing it to the list of requirements for
models of bilingualism developed in chapter 3.
The first requirement concerned the representation of languages. The purpose of
Burkett and Griffiths (2010)’s model was not to model bilingualism, but to model
how individual biases and population-level distributions were linked. However,
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the results relating to this issue rely on an assumption of the ability to divide the
linguistic variation into discrete languages:
“Intuitively, we expect that if learners are able to appropriately sep-
arate their input into distinct languages, then the learning dynamics
will resemble those from the single teacher setting.”
(Burkett and Griffiths, 2010, p. 60)
Whether discrete languages are concrete concepts is a complex issue, discussed
in the previous chapter. As Griffiths and Kalish (2007) argue, the processes in
top-down models do not need to implement real processes of learning to be valid.
Infants certainly can differentiate between languages in their input (see section
3.9 in the last chapter). However, the assumption in the model is that learners
can divide linguistic variation into the same whole languages as their cultural
parents. That is, there is a fixed set of possible discrete languages that is con-
stant across all time. Put another way, a word belonging to language 1 in the last
generation cannot be interpreted as belonging to language 2 in the next genera-
tion. Chapter 3 argued against this assumption, suggesting that whole linguistic
systems are defined dynamically by use. Although the learners observe low-level
features, the linguistic space of languages is static.
There are two possible solutions to this. First, the parameter that dictates how
likely a word is to be produced by a given language (ε) could also be induced,
rather than set to a fixed value. This would allow the mapping between words
and languages to change. Secondly, Reali and Griffiths (2010) find a solution for a
similar model for a hypothesis space with infinitely many languages. This means
that subsequent generations are unlikely to produce exactly the same languages.
However, there are further problems connected with these solutions: the divi-
sion of languages cannot be conditioned on the identity of the teachers. Agents
receive their data from multiple teachers, but do not take into consideration how
the variation is distributed across those teachers. That is, the identity of speakers
is not observable, and agents induce how homogeneous the population is, not how
homogeneous each individual is. A high value of α actually means that learn-
ers expect every teacher to speak all possible languages (Smith and Thompson,
2012). This fails the second requirement for a bilingual model that individuals
should be represented explicitly. The next chapter suggests a model where agents
can identify speakers (although with a simpler model of transmission).
The final requirements are also not met. Agents have the same probability of re-
ceiving data from all teachers, so the social structures are not complex6. Neither
are the social structures dynamic. While the α parameter does have implications
for assumptions about social structures, it cannot change in this model (see the
6Although Smith (2009) does look at the effects of the number of cultural parents.
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sections below for models where it can change). Given the aim of the model, and
given that the dynamics of this kind of system are not well understood, this is a
reasonable assumption. Also, as Ferdinand and Zuidema (2009) suggest, defining
more complex social structures can lead to much more complex models, meaning
tractability can become an issue. Researchers can therefore be biased against
exploring complex social structures to begin with. In chapter 7 I construct a
bottom up model of cultural transmission that allows complex, dynamic social
structures from the start. However, rather than seeing the bottom up model as
opposing the top down models, it is hoped that the bottom up model makes clear
the features that are relevant for a model of bilingual cultural transmission. This
could help with the extension of the lineage of top down models.
However, for the purposes of this chapter, top down models of cultural transmis-
sion appear to have assumptions that limit the ability to explore bilingualism,
even when they model the transmission of multiple languages.
5.7 Learning the prior bias
Burkett and Griffiths’s model specified an innate bias for the amount of linguistic
variation to expect in the input. What is the most likely setting of this bias for
human learners? Smith and Thompson (2012) explore this question through two
extensions of Burkett and Griffiths’s model: One where agents learn α and one
where α evolves. This section and the next describe these models.
Smith and Thompson (2012) use iterated Bayesian language learners who adopt
hypotheses which are distributions over languages, as in Burkett and Griffiths’s
model above. In the first extension, agents estimate the homogeneity of the pop-
ulation (the value of α) at the same time as estimating their hypothesis over
languages. This means that an agent’s linguistic experience affects their prior
biases, in line with experimental work showing that bilinguals make different
assumptions about the variation in their input from monolinguals (e.g. Byers-
Heinlein and Werker, 2009a; Healey and Skarabela, 2009; Houston-Price et al.,
2010; Merriman and Kutlesic, 1993; Pruden et al., 2006; Hirsh-Pasek et al., 2000;
Brojde et al., 2012; Healey and Skarabela, 2009; Kovács and Mehler, 2009; Costa
and Santesteban, 2004, see section 5.9.3 on page 82).
An agent adopts an α value using Bayesian inference, based on the amount of
variation they observe in their input, and a prior bias on this observation. This
requires a prior over α that specifies an agent’s expectations about their expecta-
tions about linguistic homogeneity of a population. This higher-order prior can
be uniform, so the agent adopts a value of α based on the data alone, or it can
be skewed towards adopting a particular value of α. We’ll call the peak of this
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skew δ (the value they are most biased towards adopting)7. The results show
that in populations with low δ, α converges on δ. Also, with low δ the stationary
distribution of language types is sensitive to initial conditions (non-convergence,
in line with Smith, 2009). That is, there is convergence to the prior over α, but
not to the prior over languages (β). The result is the opposite for high values of
δ. Higher δ leads to convergence to the prior over β (convergence, in line with
Griffiths and Kalish, 2007), but an exaggeration of α.
Experimental evidence shows that infants’ expectations about the homogene-
ity of their input is flexible and adapts to their experience (see section 5.9.3). In
this case, infants raised in a monolingual community may expect little variation
in their input, like agents with low α, while infants raised in a bilingual commu-
nity are like agents with high α. The model therefore suggests that there may
be qualitative differences between how prior biases are linked to population-level
distributions in monolingual and bilingual communities.
5.8 Evolving the prior bias
If the expectation about the linguistic homogeneity of a population is innately
specified, then the precise value might evolve over time. Burkett and Griffiths
(2010)’s model has been extended so that α is ‘biologically’ specified and evolves
under a selection for communication (Thompson et al., 2012; Smith and Thomp-
son, 2012; Thompson, 2012).
This is implemented in the following way. Each agent has a string of zeros and
ones representing alleles in their genome. The prior bias is the proportion of allele
types. This is under selection for communication: individuals inherit their genes
from a single parent, with a small probability of point mutation. An individual’s
probability of reproducing is related to how accurately it could communicate with
others in the population.This is assumed to be the proportion of individuals in
the population who speak the same language.
Smith and Thompson (2012) demonstrate that there is strong selection for low
values of α. That is, populations typically evolve to expect low variation in their
input. Recall that Burkett and Griffiths (2010) find that low α leads to non-
convergence. However, this result is dependent on the measure of communicative
success that determines an agent’s fitness. Thompson (2010) demonstrates that
with different assumptions, high α can evolve (see the section 5.8.1 below for a
criticism of these measures).
7This is labelled θ in Smith and Thompson, 2012, but conflicts with the use of θ in other
models, so I have re-labelled it here for consistency.
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5.8.1 Measures of fitness based on communicative accu-
racy
The fitness of the agents in the evolutionary models (Thompson et al., 2012;
Smith and Thompson, 2012; Thompson, 2012; Kirby et al., 2012) is linked to
communicative accuracy. Communicative accuracy is the probability that two
agents are able to exchange signals that align with the same meaning for each
agent. There are two problems with the implementation of this measure in (Kirby
et al., 2012). First, they assume that communicative accuracy can be measured
directly from their hypotheses. This makes assumptions about communication
that favour monolingualism. Secondly, a straightforward measure of commu-
nicative accuracy is not necessarily a good index of reproductive fitness. Some
alternative measures are suggested that highlight this point.
A measure of communicative accuracy is fairly straightforward for agents who
adopt a single, discrete hypothesis (although assumptions could be made about
weighted similarity as in Greenberg, 1956). However, agents in the ‘multilingual’
model adopt a distribution over languages. Thompson (2010) defines two possi-
ble measurements of communicative accuracy for this case. Here I describe those
measures and demonstrate that the measure chosen in Kirby et al. (2012) actually
fits a narrow definition of bilingualism.
Type 1(used in Smith and Thompson, 2012; Kirby et al., 2012), “Monolingual”:
Fitness is proportional to the probability that two agents will produce the same
language at a given time. Formally, if P (xh) is the probability that agent x will





P (Ah) · P (Bh) (5.1)
Therefore, the fittest pair are the ones that will always produce the same, sin-
gle language. The least fit pair will be the ones that always produce different
languages. Pairs that produce languages with the same frequency, but with no
strong skew towards one language will receive a median fitness. This measure has
been used in other models (Nowak et al., 2001; Briscoe, 2000).
However, the measure privileges ‘monolingualism’. If two agents both only speak
L0, they receive a communicative accuracy (CA) of 1.0. If both agents speak
language L0 50% of the time, then CA = 0.5. If two agents speak L0 and L1
40% and 60% of the time respectively, CA = 0.48. The conception of language
here is as a monolithic, discrete entity, so that two language types are completely
mutually unintelligible. The measurement is also equivalent to the following in-
terpretation: Given agent A’s typical proportion of language types, calculate the
proportion that agent B will understand, assuming that agent B comprehends L0
in proportion to θ and L1 in proportion to 1− θ. This means that the θ value is
taken as a measurement of comprehension, too. However, the assumption means
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that it is impossible to be fully competent in both languages. This means that
an agent with θ = 0.5 is an analogue of a ‘semilingual’ individual (or more ac-
curately, a ‘double semilingual’) who does not have native competence in any
language (Bloomfield, 1927; Hanseg̊ard, 1968; Cummins, 1976). Martin-Jones
and Romaine (1986) characterises this view as imagining discrete languages as
containers with an ideal finite capacity that are ‘filled’ with input. The containers
are assumed to be universal and fixed (see chapter 3 for arguments against this).
There is an implicit assumption that ideal monolingualism is the ‘normal’ course
of language development. This view of competence has been criticised as not be-
ing supported by linguistic evidence (Skutnabb-Kangas, 1981; Martin-Jones and
Romaine, 1986). Part of the problem here is that production and comprehension
are assumed to be completely dependent. Before discussing this further, I will
present the second measure (described in Thompson, 2010).
Type 2, “Parity”: Communicative accuracy is determined by the similarity be-
tween agents’ hypotheses. This can be calculated directly from the hypothesis
value. If θx is the hypothesis of agent x, then the communicative accuracy is just
the difference in θ between two agents:
CA(A,B) = 1− |θA − θB| (5.2)
So agents who only speak L0 receive a communicative accuracy of 1, as do agents
who only speak L1 (as in type 1), or two agents who both speak L0 40% of the
time and L1 60% of the time (θ = 0.4). If one agent speaks L0 40% of the time
and the other speaks L0 60% of the time, then CA = 0.8. This measure means
that all homogeneous populations are equally fit. In this case, high α values
(expecting high variation) can evolve, but this is still not underpinned by strong
innate constraints for specific language types (Thompson, 2010).
The conception of a language with this measurement is slightly different. In-
dividuals understand each other best when they use similar proportions of each
language. The measure can be characterised as follows: If agents produce utter-
ances in proportion to their θ, what’s the maximum proportion of utterances that
would be the same language type? Put another way, given the typical utterances
of two agents, how efficient is the optimal alignment?
The difference between type 1 and type 2 is similar to the distinction drawn in
the bottom up model presented in chapter 7 between two different types of intel-
ligibility (see section 7.3.2 on page 7.3.2). One type - comprehensive intelligibility
- measures the similarity of agents’ utterances as an analogue of the proportion of
utterances that one learner typically produces that another understands. This is
broadly analogous to communicative accuracy type 1 here. Another type - func-
tional intelligibility - measures the proportion of utterances that interlocutors
understand when they design their utterances for each other. Communicative
accuracy 2 above is similar to functional intelligibility in the sense that agents
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‘accommodate’ each other by aligning their utterances. In the bottom up model,
the difference between these two measures is taken as an index of bilingualism.
However, successful communication is usually thought of as involving the pro-
duction and comprehension of an utterance. There are no assumptions about
comprehension in the model. Agents ‘know’ that both types languages are possi-
ble, and may be exposed to both languages, but they adopt a distribution over the
production of these languages. For real learners, the proportions of production
and the level of comprehension of a language can be independent. For instance,
children may develop a passive competence in a minority language (Lincoln, 1979;
Baker and Jones, 1998, p. 495; Baker, 2011, p. 101-102), and ‘non-reciprocal’
language use is common in trade situations (see Croft (2003)).The literature on
minority language acquisition also demonstrates that the proportion of languages
in a child’s input is not simply related to the resulting comprehension in each
language (e.g. De Houwer, 2007). If it were, then bilinguals with native compe-
tence in both languages (see Peal and Lambert, 1962; Butler and Hakuta, 2004;
Grosjean, 1982; Myers Scotton, 2006) could not exist. Since there’s no division
in the model between production and comprehension, conceptions of bilingualism
can be difficult to realise.
5.8.2 Alternative measures of fitness
The two measures above are not the only possibilities, however. Below I list some
other possible measures of fitness that could be explored8.
Type 3, “Linguistic Exogamy”: Assume that agents preferentially mate with
other agents who are most linguistically different. This models linguistic ex-
ogamy: communities where marriage is restricted to members of different lin-
guistic communities (e.g. Jacobs, 1937; Sorensen, 1967; Monod, 1970; Jackson,
1983). This practice often maintains multilingualism (see also Hill, 1978, p.13-
16). The appropriate fitness payoff function FP is therefore the inverse of the
communicative accuracy function:
FP (A,B) = 1−
∑
h∈H
P (Ah) · P (Bh) (5.3)
Type 4, “Bilingual”: Assume that agents who are bilingual receive the highest
fitness. Prestigious bilingualism is attested in many communities, and is often
linked with the power to communicate between groups (see e.g. Laycock, 1985;
De Mej́ıa, 2002; Hning et al., 2012; Nettle, 1999b). We can reflect this in the
measurement by weighting the fitness payoff by how close the agent’s θ is to the
8To bolster the arguments in chapter 8, these suggested measures and implications emerged
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Figure 5.1: The relationship between an agent’s hypothesis θ and its compre-
hension of language types L0 and L1 for the ‘dominant language’ measure of





FP (A,B) = 2
∑
i∈H
P (Ai) · P (Bi) · |θA − 0.5| · |θB − 0.5| (5.4)
Type 5 “Dominant Language”: Assume that a speaker always understands their
dominant language, and understands their non-dominant language in proportion
to the balance of their θ, according to some function. The level of comprehension
of language type Li (where Li ∈ 0, 1) by agent x is:
Comp(x, Li) =
{
1 if |θ − Li| < 0.5









For instance, G(x) can return values so that the comprehension of the weaker
language is linearly (γ = 1) or exponentially (e.g. γ = 1
2
) related to the balance
of θ (see figure 5.1)9. The variable γ, therefore, describes how difficult a second
language is to learn, fitting one of the premises of the bilingual paradox. An
exponential function reflects the idea that native competence in a second language
is hard to obtain. The fitness payoff is therefore calculated as








P (Ai) P (Bj) Comp(A,Lj) Comp(B,Li) (5.7)
Figure 5.2 shows how the communicative accuracy between two agents varies as
a function of their hypotheses for the different measures described above. The
‘monolingual’ and ‘parity’ measures lead to different evolutionary stable values
of the expectation of the amount of variance in the input (Thompson, 2010), so
the other measures described here should also have an impact on the range of α
(although it is unlikely that this would lead to strong innate biases either).
Furthermore, in the real world, it is probable that the way communicative suc-
cess and fitness are related will change over time. For instance, the prestige of
bilingualism would depend on the linguistic variation being conditioned on social
variables, otherwise there would be no social advantage in being bilingual. This
situation is unlikely to come about unless the society is stratified. A model that
considered the evolution of a bias for linguistic variation (e.g. Smith and Thomp-
son, 2012) should therefore also consider dynamic social structures.
In this section, I have shown that the choice of fitness function in the model
of cultural evolution above had an implicit monolingual bias. A careful consid-
eration of bilingualism revealed more parameters that could be explored in the
model.










































































































































Figure 5.2: The fitness payoff between two agents with different hypotheses (θ values) for
different fitness payoff functions. Warmer colours represent higher fitness payoff.
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5.8.2.1 Preliminary results
In order to get some idea of the impact of different fitness measures, Smith and
Thompson (2012)’s model which includes an evolving α parameter was run with
the dominant language fitness metric10. The ‘bilingual paradox’ questioned why
bilingualism is prevalent if acquiring two languages is difficult. This model allows
us to manipulate the difficulty of learning a second language (the γ parameter)
and observe the linguistic diversity and expectations about linguistic diversity
that emerge.
The model was set up so that individuals had a strong bias towards low val-
ues of α (gamma distribution shape parameters = (1,1)) and a moderate bias
towards language L1 (β = 0.6). A population of 100 individuals evolved for 100
generations and the final values of α and the final mean value of hypotheses in
the population were recorded. Individuals reproduced according to the ‘dominant
language’ fitness metric. Simulations were run for a range of the γ parameter of
the fitness metric, which dictates how easy a second language is to acquire.
Figure 5.3 shows the results. As γ increases, there is a qualitative shift in the
results of the simulations. With γ < 0.5 (learning a second language is hard),
low α evolves (‘monolingual’ expectation, convergence on the prior) and the dis-
tribution of languages is exaggerated (L1 comes to dominate, non-convergence).
However, with γ > 0.5 (learning a second language is easier), high α evolves
(‘bilingual’ expectation, non-convergence) and the distribution of languages con-
verges to the prior.
There are two interesting observations to be made. First, unlike Smith and
Thompson (2012)’s results, high values of α can evolve in some situations. Sec-
ondly, Smith and Thompson (2012) found that varying the prior over α interpo-
lated between the convergence and non-convergence results in the model where
α was learned. The results above suggest that the same interpolation can be
achieved in the evolving α model by keeping the priors fixed and manipulating
the part of the fitness metric that controls how easy a second language is to learn.
That is, the communicative fitness metric is an important part of the debate about
the relationship between individual biases and population-level phenomena. The
results suggest that ‘bilingualism’ can emerge even if learning a second language
is moderately difficult (0.5 < γ < 1).
10The code for the model was supplied by Bill Thompson. The results presented here are
preliminary because they are the focus of current investigation by Thompson, Smith and Kirby.
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Figure 5.3: Preliminary results for the evolving α model. Left: the final mean values of α
in the population as a function of the value of γ (how easy a second language is to learn).
The prior over α favoured low values of α. Right: the final mean values of the hypotheses of
individuals. The prior over hypotheses was 0.6. Points shown are the mean of the last five
generations of a single simulation. As γ increases, there is a qualitative shift in the dynamics
of the model around γ = 0.5.
5.9 The implications of bilingualism for top down
models
The sections above reviewed models of cultural evolution that included some
element of bilingualism. However, many initial models make simplifying assump-
tions that undermine bilingualism. The Bayesian models of cultural transmission
above have developed to include a fairly complex and domain-specific mechanism
that allows a form of bilingualism. However, as Thompson (2012) points out, the
inclusion of bilingualism was not motivated by questions about bilingualism, nor
because learning multiple languages is more realistic, but to validate the assump-
tions about rationality when learning from multiple teachers. Researchers have
been biased towards making certain assumptions and asking certain questions.
These have lead researchers away from modelling bilingualism in a concrete way.
Although this paradigm is relatively new, bilingualism has not been a priority in
the history of these models.
The next chapter rolls back the developments made above to reveal the differences
in research direction that might have been taken if bilingualism was a priority.
The first model in the next chapter is essentially a re-implementation of the model
from Griffiths and Kalish (2007) and the second model is a re-implementation of
the model from Smith (2009). They’ll suggest a resolution to the bilingual para-
dox.
However, this chapter and the last provided some arguments suggesting that
the way languages are represented in these models are not valid for a study of
bilingualism. In this section I discuss this issue. Section 5.9.1 considers whether
the validity of a bilingual interpretation of the models is problematic given the
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intended purpose of the models. Section 5.9.2 discusses whether bilingualism can
make a qualitative difference to the to what evolves in this kind of model. Section
5.9.3 argues that flexible learning mechanisms are an important part of language
learning, based on studies of bilingualism. They should therefore be part of com-
putational models. These arguments result in a challenge to the top down model
approach, discussed in section 5.9.3.2. The main challenge is not necessarily to
incorporate the complexities of bilingualism, but to continue to produce solid
results with more complex models.
5.9.1 The purpose of top-down models
The top down models above describe a problem where individuals must induce
the likely state of another individual according to the behaviour they observe
and a bias towards inducing certain states. The models demonstrate the prob-
lems with linking population-level phenomena with individual biases, intended to
oppose strong nativist assumptions about the origins of the structure of language.
However, the models are very abstract and are not realistic when it comes to the
representation of linguistic features nor the mechanisms of learning (see McClel-
land et al., 2010). I have also argued that their representations of languages are
not compatible with the theory of bilingualism developed in this thesis. How-
ever, does this mean that the models cannot provide insights into bilingualism?
The answer depends on whether one sees the models as explanations or as tools.
The purpose of these models is not necessarily to explain how language learning
works, but to be a tool for exploring the dynamics of cultural transmission. As
Griffiths and Kalish argue:
“The Bayesian framework is not supposed to be interpreted as a state-
ment of the mechanistic process by which language acquisition takes
place, with learners maintaining a hypothesis space in their heads and
updating a distribution over those hypotheses. Rather, it is a com-
putational level analysis (Marr, 1982), as is generally emphasized in
rational models of cognition ... , focusing on the abstract computa-
tional problem and a method for solving that problem. So long as
the actual process underlying language acquisition approximates this
solution, our results will have implications for understanding human
behavior.”
(Griffiths and Kalish, 2007, p.450-451)
The Bayesian framework gives a formal and precise way of specifying a situa-
tion where individuals learn from observation and an ‘innate’ bias, and where
behaviour is transmitted culturally. The precise specification of this problem al-
lows the causes of phenomena at the population level to be provably linked to
properties of individuals. Rather than models of reality, then, these models can
be seen as null models (Reali and Griffiths, 2010). Null models demonstrate the
properties we would expect to see without more complex explanations.
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For example, Reali and Griffiths (2010) demonstrate how distributions of lin-
guistic variants can change over time by drift (i.e. when no variant is ‘fitter’ than
any other). The dynamics of their model exhibit similar properties to real lan-
guages such as s-shaped language change curves and power-law relations between
a word’s frequency and rank and between a word’s frequency and rate of replace-
ment. They suggest that “by identifying which properties of human languages
can be produced by iterated learning alone, we can begin to understand when ex-
planations that appeal to other factors are necessary” (Reali and Griffiths, 2010,
p.431).
Without a null model, it is difficult to tell whether a certain mechanism is neces-
sary to explain the phenomena of interest. More complex aspects of learning or
linguistic features can then be added to these null models and the effects of these
more realistic features can be determined by contrast. Furthermore, null models
may be crucial for integrating real data into abstract models (Blythe, 2012).
Another way of looking at these models is as ‘idea models’ (e.g Kirby and Hurford,
1997). That is, the cultural transmission of language underpinned by biological
cognitive biases is a complex system. It is difficult to intuit about how the system
might work, so computational models like the ones described here are used in or-
der to help think about these kinds of systems. They are not necessarily intended
as explanatory models that reflect the way a process actually works. The results
of these models can work together with empirical evidence and theoretical work
towards an argument (see Scott-Phillips and Kirby, 2010 and Cornish et al., 2009,
p. 199).
A crucial question is whether the abstractions made by the model are valid.
All models must make abstractions, but these will have an effect on the con-
clusions. I have argued in chapter 3 that the concept of monolithic, discrete,
static languages is not realistic. That is, at an implementational level, language
learners are not able to perceive what ‘language’ is being spoken. Instead, the
perception of different languages is built up from low-level linguistic variation and
social aspects. There is therefore a question about whether it is valid to study
computational agents that have biases towards particular ‘languages’. However,
the Bayesian models studied here are computational level models, not implemen-
tation models. It is less clear if a complaint at the implementation level can affect
a computational level model. As I noted in chapter 3, it is certainly possible to
identify separate languages in specific contexts, so why not assume that learners
eventually become sensitive to the distinctions between the languages they per-
ceive and subsequently use this information?
For certain research questions, such as the extent to which cultural transmission
can explain language structure, the abstraction to monolithic, discrete, static lin-
guistic units might be valid. However, different research questions have different
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relevant abstractions, so care must be taken when borrowing models that were
built for one purpose into a model built for another purpose. Abstractions that
are suitable for arguing against a strong nativist position may not be suitable for
studying bilingualism in a culturally transmitted framework. When looking at
bilingualism, I argue that linguistic divisions that can be described as separate
languages must emerge from the model, not be pre-encoded. That is, part of the
object of interest for a cultural evolution approach to bilingualism is how divi-
sions between ‘languages’ or ‘mediums’ come about in the first place. However,
it is only by comparison with the current Bayesian models of iterated learning
that I am able to show that certain abstractions have important implications for
my research question.
In addition to this, however, I make a slightly different claim. In later chap-
ters I will argue that dynamic social structures are an important part of what
drives levels of bilingualism. The current Bayesian models have fixed social struc-
tures and agents that are not sensitive to the identity of speakers. I compare these
with a bottom-up model that I present in chapter 3 which involves dynamic social
structures and agents that use social information. I will show that the conclusions
about how population-level phenomena and individual biases are linked can differ
depending on the assumptions about these issues. In this case, I am revealing an
abstraction that has consequences both for research questions concerning bilin-
gualism and for questions of cultural explanations of language evolution. While
the results do not necessarily speak against proponents of cultural transmission,
they deserve to be explored.
5.9.2 Populations of languages and populations of learn-
ers
Bilingualism involves a certain mapping from a population of linguistic variants
to a population of individuals. As chapter 3 showed, even within the field of
bilingual language acquisition and sociolinguistics, the understanding of how to
specify this mapping is contentious and often based on somewhat arbitrary con-
ventions. In the initial models presented in this chapter, learners can only learn
one language. Therefore, there’s no difference between counting the systems of
individuals and counting the variants in the whole population. This means that
there’s only one way to map the two levels, in which case bilingualism, in the
sense understood by this thesis, cannot emerge.
Later models included the ability to adopt multiple languages from multiple
teachers, introducing a distinction between the population of variants and the
linguistic systems of individuals. Therefore, what has come to light by discussing
the models above in terms of bilingualism is a distinction between two levels of
language: low-level variants and an individual’s system of variants at a higher
level. However, agents in the models above don’t use information on which teacher
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produced each utterance, meaning they can’t take into account the higher-level
systems of individuals.
Evolutionary theory suggests that the dynamics of selection at different levels
might be different (Godfrey-Smith, 2009). In a model where learners are biased
towards expecting little variation (low α), the distribution of variants can con-
verge to a single variant (everyone speaks one language). In this case there is no
difference between the distributions of individuals’ systems and the distribution
of variants. This means that the fidelity of transmission between generations can
be high because an individual’s system is simple and the likelihood of moving
away from the ‘monolingual’ hypothesis is small. When learners expect a lot of
variation (high α), the distribution of variants reflects the prior bias of learners.
However, the distribution over systems may be different (as demonstrated in the
model in the next chapter), and the fidelity of transmission of systems between
generations may be lower than the transmission of variants. As Godfrey-Smith
(2009) argues, a shift in the fidelity of transmission can alter the level of selection
in an evolving system.
In section 5.9.3 below I will discuss some evidence that children raised bilingually
have different expectations about diversity in their linguistic input. Communi-
ties of bilinguals should therefore exhibit different dynamics than communities
of monolinguals. In line with this, the models above find different relationships
between individual biases and population-level phenomena depending on the ex-
pectations about diversity (Burkett and Griffiths, 2010; Smith and Thompson,
2012).
I argue that in order to conduct an investigation into bilingual cultural evolu-
tion, properties of both the linguistic population and speaker population must
be respected. First, there must only be weak selection between linguistic vari-
ants - learning one variant does not exclude the learning of another. Secondly,
individuals must be fully represented in the model so that there can be variation
in the linguistic systems of teachers that can make a difference to the learning
process of learners. Accordingly, the next chapter presents a top-down model
where individuals do take into account the identity of the speaker. The chapter
after that presents a bottom-up model which allows learners’ linguistic systems
to be sensitive to the identity of individuals.
5.9.3 Flexible biases
Studies of language acquisition are revealing important aspects of the language
learning process that models of cultural evolution should try to capture. For
example, in the recent conference on the evolution of language (EvoLang9), Saf-
fran (2012) demonstrates that flexible learning biases are an important aspect
language learning. Saffran suggested that we should see learning as a chain of
processing where linguistic input is processed by a statistical learning mechanism
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that causes some kind of linguistic knowledge as output. For instance, exposure
to speech sounds cues infants to the phonetic divisions of the language. This
initial knowledge then affects the learning of the transition probabilities between
phonemes, which cue infants to word segmentation. This segmentation then af-
fects how labels for words are learned. It was striking that Saffran’s depiction of
this process was very close to how evolutionary linguists think about the iterated
learning process. However, an element central to Saffran’s approach that has
not yet been addressed to a great extent in the field of language evolution is the
flexibility of biases. That is, allowing the learning mechanisms to adapt to what
is being learned (cf. Smith and Thompson, 2012, see section 5.7). Developmental
linguistics studies have been demonstrating the flexibility of learning processes
(Merriman and Kutlesic, 1993; Byers-Heinlein and Werker, 2009a; Houston-Price
et al., 2010; Pruden et al., 2006; Hirsh-Pasek et al., 2000; Brojde et al., 2012;
Healey and Skarabela, 2009; Kovács and Mehler, 2009; Smith et al., 2011). A
challenge for top down approaches is to model this complex system.
Researchers find it intuitive that the mechanism that handles learning two lan-
guages is the same one that handles three (Grosjean, 1989)11, yet there is still a
concern about assuming the same learning mechanisms are used by monolinguals
and bilinguals (Grosjean, 1989). The cultural evolutionary approach taken in
this thesis emphasises that the differences in the way monolinguals and bilinguals
approach learning is mediated by their linguistic experience. That is, while all in-
fants start with the same basic learning mechanisms, they are flexible and adapt
to the linguistic and social situations they are placed within. Recent experimental
work has demonstrated the extent of this flexibility. For example, infants modu-
late their use of the mutual exclusivity principle (Merriman and Bowman, 1989;
Markman and Wachtel, 1988) in word learning based on their language experience
(Merriman and Kutlesic, 1993; Byers-Heinlein and Werker, 2009a; Houston-Price
et al., 2010). These findings are being investigated using models, approached from
the top-down (Frank et al., 2009) and bottom up (Fazly et al., 2010) perspectives.
Infants pay attention to different cues in word learning at different points in
development (Pruden et al., 2006; Hirsh-Pasek et al., 2000) and depending on
their experience with languages (Brojde et al., 2012; Healey and Skarabela, 2009).
Kovács and Mehler (2009) demonstrate that children exposed to two languages
adapt their approach to learning. When exposed to two linguistic patterns, bilin-
gual infants learned both while monolingual infants learned one. This helps bilin-
guals acquire two languages in the same timeframe as monolinguals acquire one
(see Pearson et al., 1993; Werker and Byers-Heinlein, 2008).
11“A multilingual language system is potentially noisier than a bilingual language system, but
the mental processes and mechanisms that handle this increased level of noise are presumably no
different from those involved in dealing with the extra noise in a bilingual system as compared
with a monolingual system.” (De Groot, 2010, p. 2). Although see Hoffmann (2001b) for a
discussion of the similarities and differences between bilingual and trilingual acquisition.
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Exposure to multiple languages can also cause cognitive advantages in non-
linguistic domains (see De Groot, 2010, chapter 7, for a summary). For example,
thinking in a second language leads to more rational choices (Keysar et al., 2012)
and bilinguals may perceive causal agency differently to monolinguals (Fausey
and Boroditsky, 2008, 2011), something that Lucas and Griffiths (2010)’s model
of causal relationships might be able to address.
Theories of cultural evolution hypothesise that languages change in a response to
learnability and expressivity pressures (Kirby et al., 2008; Cornish et al., 2009).
But the studies above demonstrate that this learnability is dynamic and depends
on the context of learning. For example, the learnability of a language is affected
by the previous experience of the speaker, as is evident from studies that show
that a first language influences how a second language is learned (see De Groot,
2010). Changes to a child’s social environment (e.g. going to school) can change
the kinds of competition that exist between languages (Hoffmann and Stavans,
2007). Learnability also changes over cultural time: cultural evolution can lead
to coadaptation of different features of language, making them easier to learn in
combination (McCrohon, 2012).
5.9.3.1 Task Switching
Another domain of flexibility is the response to task switching. Bilinguals with
an imbalance in their proficiency (e.g. L2 learners) exhibit an asymmetrical lan-
guage switch cost (Meuter and Allport, 1999). Switching from the more proficient
language into the less proficient language is easier than the other way around (be-
cause the more proficient language requires more ‘inhibiting’). This predicts that
the balance in proficiency is related to the symmetry in the switching costs (see
Calabria et al., 2011; Meuter and Allport, 1999; Costa and Santesteban, 2004).
In line with this prediction, switching costs between an L1 and an L2 are symmet-
rical for highly proficient bilinguals (Costa and Santesteban, 2004; Costa et al.,
2006). However, in opposition to the hypothesis, trilinguals who are highly pro-
ficient in two languages still don’t exhibit an asymmetrical switch cost between
a proficient L1 and a weaker L3 (Costa and Santesteban, 2004; Costa et al.,
2006). Switching costs for these highly proficient bilinguals was independent of
age of acquisition, proficiency and similarity of the target language. Costa and
Santesteban (2004) hypothesise that there is a qualitative difference in the mecha-
nism used by proficient bilinguals. The difference in the mechanisms derives from
the way communicative intents become uttered lexical items. Below I summarise
two hypotheses about this process
The hypotheses derive from the ‘lexical selection’ framework (Caramazza, 1997;
Dell, 1986; Levelt, 1993, 2001; Levelt et al., 1999). Under this framework, pro-
duction proceeds in two steps: First, a communicative intention activates lexical
items, including the target lexical item, but also lexical items that are semanti-
cally connected with the target. Secondly, a selection mechanism is needed to
86
select an item for production, based on their activation. Lexical items from both
languages of a bilingual are activated (e.g. Colomé, 2001; Costa et al., 2000,
2003; De Bot, 1992; Gollan and Kroll, 2001. However, it is less clear whether
lexical items in the other language compete for selection. Some assume that lexi-
cal selection is language specific, so that activated lexical items in the non-target
language are not candidates for selection (Costa, 2005; Costa and Caramazza,
1999; Costa et al., 1999; Roelofs, 1998). This is similar to theories suggesting
that selection mechanisms are sensitive to other properties of lexical items such
as word class (i.e. nouns, verbs etc., Dell, 1986, see Costa and Santesteban,
2004). Other models assume that the selection mechanism is insensitive to the
target language, and instead the activation of lexical items is different for target
language and non-target language items before selection (La Heij, 2005; Poulisse
and Bongaerts, 1994; Green, 1986, 1998; Hermans et al., 1998).
As mentioned above, L2 learners exhibit asymmetrical switching costs, consis-
tent with a language-independent selection mechanism. However, the result for
highly proficient bilinguals suggests that they have a language-specific selection
mechanism (Costa and Santesteban, 2004, p. 505-506). This would account for
the symmetrical switch costs even with weaker languages.
The relevance of these studies on switch costs for this thesis are now discussed.
First of all, the apparent qualitative difference between different kinds of bilin-
guals demonstrates the importance of considering experimental participants with
a wide range of linguistic backgrounds. More importantly, while this thesis has
debated whether monolithic, discreet languages that are stable across time can
have a psychological reality, the results here suggest the picture is even more com-
plicated. All bilinguals exhibit language switching costs, so switching between
“language schemas” (Green, 1998) does require some cognitive effort, suggesting
that there is some cognitive reality to the division of lexical items according to lan-
guage. However, the results from the highly proficient bilinguals above suggests
that the level of processing at which ‘languages’ are relevant can depend on the
individual’s linguistic experience. The qualitative difference above could point to
a highly flexible learning mechanism12. Different populations, then, might have
radically different learning and production biases.
This research also has an impact on the debate in this thesis about whether bilin-
gualism requires specific learning mechanisms: Calabria et al. (2011) find that
bilinguals with symmetric language switching costs have asymmetric switching
costs in non-linguistic domains. They argue that, while general executive control
12However, it is also possible that the coarse categories of L2 learner versus highly proficient
bilingual could be misleading. Costa and Santesteban (2004) use self-selection to recruit and
ask participants to report their age of onset, number of years of regular use and self-assessed
proficiency. Perhaps the use of more fine-grained, objective measures, as suggested by the
individual differences approach, would reveal that individuals had a quantitative difference in
a single mechanism ‘type’ that varied on a continuum from greater use of inhibition to greater
use of selection.
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processes are involved (Abutalebi et al., 2008), there might be sub-systems of ex-
ecutive control processes that specifically deal with switching between languages
(Calabria et al., 2011).
The top down model discussed in this thesis assumed there was a specific mecha-
nism for handling multiple languages while the bottom-up model suggested that a
single general learning mechanism underlies bilingual and monolingual language
learning. While the importance of social variables could change in the bottom
up model, it assumed that the mechanism for learning (multiple) languages was
not different from the statistical learning mechanisms in any other domain. In
both cases, these assumptions were made partly for convenience. However, the
results from Calabria et al. (2011) suggest that at least some individuals exhibit
specific mechanisms for dealing with multiple languages. If this is the case, then
the top down and bottom up models may represent different ends of a continuum
of responses to learning.
5.9.3.2 A challenge to top-down modelling
The studies above suggest that learning biases are flexible and adapt to properties
of the input. A challenge to top-down modelling that investigates how individual
biases and population-level phenomena are linked is to capture this kind of fea-
ture. This might be difficult because of tractability issues. Analytical results are
difficult to acquire for the most advanced current models, so the challenge is not
necessarily whether the rational approach is valid, nor whether top-down models
can provide a good argument against nativism, but whether they can continue to
produce solid results for increasingly complex models.
One aspect of this is addressing criticisms that the hypothesis space is assumed to
be known in advance of learning. The discussion of the flexibility above suggests
that learning processes might be able to radically adapt to relevant cues in the
input. So, as well as evaluating hypotheses, learners may need to generate them
in the first place - two aspects that may be underpinned by different processes
(Sulik, 2012).
Another aspect is modelling sequential learning. Experimental evidence also
shows that learning strategies are affected by the order of input. For exam-
ple, Smith et al. (2011) find that participants’ cross-situational word learning
strategies are affected by the amount of referential uncertainty, but also whether
words are presented in blocks or interleaved with other words. The order of the
acquisition of languages may also have an effect on how they are learned (e.g.
Dewaele, 1998). Bottom-up sequential learning approaches fit intuitively with
this effect while many top-down models traditionally batch-process their input
(McClelland et al., 2010; Levy et al., 2009).
However, there are several developments in top down methods that are addressing
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these problems. Frank et al. (2009) demonstrate that Bayesian models can suc-
cessfully learn mappings between words and objects from cross-situational data
from real child-directed speech. Incremental Bayesian models have been devel-
oped (e.g. Blei et al., 2004; Gomes et al., 2008; Blei et al., 2010), and have
been applied to language learning to reproduce real psychological memory effects
(Levy et al., 2009; Driesen et al., 2011) . It would be interesting to see if it would
also model affects of language attrition. Statistical Bayesian methods have been
applied to unsupervised learning of linguistic structure (e.g. Goldwater and Grif-
fiths, 2007; Gao and Johnson, 2008), including learning from multiple languages
simultaneously (Snyder et al., 2008; Naseem et al., 2009, 2012). In the latter case,
simultaneous multilingual input actually improved part-of-speech tagging by up
to 53% because multiple cues are available. This appears to argue against the
premises of the bilingual paradox.
Methods such as variational Bayesian inference (e.g. Attias, 1999, MacKay,
2003, p. 422-436) allow unknown parameters, hidden variables and model se-
lection, which could capture aspects of cognitive flexibility discussed above (see
Driesen et al., 2011). These kinds of models have been applied to natural lan-
guage tasks such as grammar induction (Kurihara and Sato, 2006). Variational
Bayesian methods may also yield results more efficiently than Gibbs sampling,
used in the models above (Beal, 2003).
Given these advances in empirical top-down methods that use complex data,
there is a great potential for developing cultural evolutionary models that can
replicate the kind of flexibility in learning that the bilingualism literature ex-
hibits.
5.10 Conclusion
This chapter has identified a number of models of the cultural evolution of lan-
guages that make simplifying assumptions that favour monolingualism. Many
models represent languages as monolithic, static and discrete, or make simplifying
assumptions about learning mechanisms that make acquiring multiple languages
difficult.
The top down models above have developed to represent language learners who
can speak multiple languages and have an expectation about the amount of vari-
ation in their input. These expectations are a key part of the question of how
individual biases and population level phenomena are linked. This is an impor-
tant question for evolutionary linguistics because it can inform arguments against
traditional nativist claims about language. Depending on the assumptions about
expectations about variation in the input, some results demonstrate that ob-
serving strong linguistic universals in the world does not imply that they are
underpinned by strong cognitive biases.
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However, the models were not designed to study bilingualism, so caution is re-
quired when interpreting their results in terms of bilingualism. I have argued that
the expectations about the number of ‘languages’ in the models above might not
necessarily map onto real cognitive biases, partly because, as argued in chapter 3,
‘languages’ may not have a psychological reality. The next chapter reconstructs
some of the models discussed in this chapter with a focus on bilingualism and
demonstrates different results from the ones above. This will reinforce the point
that a researcher’s assumptions about bilingualism can affect the conclusions of




“Le langage est source de malentendus.”
Language is the source of misunderstandings
de Saint-Exupéry (1943), Chapter XXI
6.1 Introduction
Previous chapters discussed the idea of the bilingual paradox: we expect one lan-
guage to be easier to learn than two, yet bilingualism is prevalent in the world.
Iterated learning with Bayesian agents, then, seems like a good framework for
addressing this question since it is designed to study how individual learning bi-
ases (like two languages being more difficult to learn than one) are related to
population-level distributions (like the prevalence of bilingualism). This chapter
explores Bayesian models of iterated learning that allow bilingualism.
The first model simply lets learners adopt more than one hypothesis, but only
contains a single learner at each generation. This model explores the differences
between samplers and MAP learners and the problems with measuring bilingual-
ism in this kind of model. The second model allows learners to adopt multiple
hypotheses from multiple teachers. Also, learners can observe the identity of their
teachers and form hypotheses for each teacher independently. The second model
demonstrates how the two aspects of the bilingual paradox can be true at the
same time. This is due to an unintuitive, complex link between individual learn-
ing and population-level phenomena. Indeed, in the second model, bilingualism
is more likely than monolingualism, even when individuals have a bias towards
learning just one language.
Although neither of these models meet the criteria for rationality that is ad-
dressed by Burkett and Griffiths (2010) (discussed in the last chapter), they do
highlight the assumptions that go in to the more complex models. I suggest that,
if researchers had prioritised the study of bilingualism after the development of
the initial Bayesian iterated models (e.g. Kirby et al., 2007; Griffiths and Kalish,
2007), then the current debates might be different. Particularly, the first model
demonstrates that there are many ways to measure the stationary distribution,
so whether the bias and the stationary distribution are related in a straightfor-
ward way does not present a straightforward dichotomy. The second model also
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Figure 6.1: Four possible hypotheses in a system with two syntactic variables
(NP and prepositions) and two variants (left-branching or right-branching).
highlights the role of population dynamics, speaker identity and the limits of
rationality.
6.2 Model 1: Allowing multiple hypotheses
Language learners in initial Bayesian models of cultural evolution were ‘mono-
lingual’: speakers only speak one language and learners assume one language
is being spoken (see previous chapter, Kirby et al., 2007; Griffiths and Kalish,
2007). This section looks at what happens to the dynamics of language evolution
when a learner can adopt multiple languages. Although Burkett and Griffiths
(2010)’s model already addresses this issue, it is a useful exercise. Not only will it
demonstrate that the dynamics of language evolution are different with monolin-
gual assumptions, but it will show the extent to which a monolingual approach to
the analysis differs from the analysis demanded by the bilingual approach. The
differences between samplers and maximisers will become apparent.
6.2.1 Model definition
This section defines model 1. The linguistic system has two variables with two
variants each. Imagine, for instance, a system with only determiners, nouns and
propositions. Sentences like “The cat on the mat” and “The on the mat cat”
are possible. The variants are the two syntactic levels and the variants are right-
branching or left branching. Figure 6.1 shows the 4 possible different ‘languages’.
A teacher transmits variants of variables from these languages to a learner. This
can be interpreted as the learning hearing “the cat” or “cat on the mat”, for
example. The number of variants transmitted represents the ‘bottleneck’ on
92
learning (here the bottleneck is set to 5 utterances). There is also some noise
in transmission - that is, a speaker may ‘accidentally’ produce a variant from an-
other language, or the learner may misperceive a variant as belonging to another
language. The learner tries to figure out which hypothesis the teacher is using
by Bayesian inference. A hypothesis consists of one or more languages. It then
adopts this hypothesis, and uses it to produce variants for the next learner in the
chain. There is only one individual at each generation.
Learners have a prior bias towards learning hypotheses that include only consis-
tently headed languages (both levels branch in the same direction). This models
the idea that consistently headed languages are easier to process (Hawkins, 1994;
Dryer, 1992; Haider, 1997), and so are more likely to be learned1.
We can run a chain of iterated learning and record the hypothesis adopted by
the learner at each generation. By doing this for many independent chains, we
can calculate the proportion of learners that adopt a certain hypothesis (or set
of hypotheses) at a given generation (i.e. the probability of a learner adopting
a given hypothesis at a given generation). This is what I will refer to as the
distribution over hypotheses2.
6.2.1.1 Hypothesis space
The hypotheses in the model include any (un-ordered) combination of the above
four languages. There are 15 possible hypotheses: 4 monolingual (e.g. [{Left, Left}]),
6 bilingual (e.g. [{Left, Left}, {Right, Right}]), 4 trilingual and one quadralin-
gual ([{Left, Left}, {Right, Right}, {Left, Right}, {Right, Left}]). See figure
6.2 for a graphic representation. Note that while the original monolingual mod-
els had a symmetrical hypothesis spaces (see Ferdinand and Zuidema, 2009, p.
1790), the hypothesis space here is not symmetrical. Being bilingual does not
incur a penalty of any kind. In this model, the first agent is initialised with a
random monolingual hypothesis.
6.2.1.2 Likelihood
The probability selecting a language from hypothesis hi that can produce sentence






1As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are many ways of interpreting the prior, for
instance the amount of data that a learner needs to see before rejecting a certain hypothesis.
2Note that this is not necessarily the stable distribution, which is the probability of an agent
adopting a given hypothesis over an infinitely long chain. However, 10 generations appears to
be enough for this model to converge on a stable distribution: the same analysis run with 100
generations did not produce significantly different results, and the stable distribution calculated
using the first eigenvector of the transition matrix for 100,000 runs for each hypothesis also
returned equivalent results.
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The perception of each variant may be affected by noise. A variant may be
perceived as any variant with probability n
v
where v is the number of possible
variants in the system (v=2 in the current example). Therefore, when a learner





ps(di|hi)(1− nv ) if di ∈ hi
n
v
if di 6∈ hi
(6.2)
6.2.1.3 Prior
The prior is calculated in the following way. There is a set of hypotheses H
containing hypotheses h1, h2, h3... and a sub-set of hypotheses Hb that are easier
to process. There is a prior parameter α ranging from 0 to 1. α is the proportion














if hi 6∈ Hb
(6.3)
Hb in this model is defined as any hypothesis containing only consistent lan-
guages. In the current example there are 3 hypotheses in Hb: [{Left, Left}],
[{Right, Right}] and [{Left, Left}, {Right, Right}]. This leaves 12 hypothe-
ses that have a lower prior bias. In a model where α = 0.6, the prior bias of
[{Left, Left}] (consistent) is 0.0̇9̇, and the prior bias of [{Right, Left}] (incon-
sistent) is 0.0̇6̇.
6.2.1.4 Posterior






Since p(d) is constant, the posterior is proportional to the numerator of this
equation. A learner receives data and evaluates the posterior probability of each
hypothesis in the hypothesis space. The learner then selects a hypothesis to
generate variants for the next generation. The hypothesis is either chosen by
sampling the hypotheses with probabilities proportional to the posterior prob-
ability (sampling), or selecting the single hypothesis with the highest posterior
probability (maximum a posteriori, see section 5.4.4 in the last chapter)
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Figure 6.2: A representation of the space of hypotheses. There are 4 languages
of two types (a1, a2, b1 and b2) representing consistently headed (a) and incon-
sistently headed (b) languages. Languages within brackets belong to the same
hypothesis. Different criteria can be used to break up the space into different
partitions.
6.2.2 Analysing the distributions
When considering a Bayesian model where learners adopt a single variant, the
analysis of the dynamics were straightforward because there was an obvious unit
of measurement: the distribution of variants. However, allowing individuals to
adopt multiple hypotheses creates more possible analyses because there are more
kinds of ways of measuring the distribution of hypotheses. We could measure
the proportion of consistent hypotheses in the population of hypotheses. In the
‘monolingual’ model, this is the same as counting the proportion of consistent
hypotheses in the population of learners. However, by allowing the adoption of
multiple hypotheses, the population of hypotheses and the population of speak-
ers are now not so straightforwardly linked. We could measure the proportion of
agents speaking only consistent languages, or the proportion of agents speaking
at least one consistent language. Finally, we could look at how the number of
hypotheses are distributed over speakers, for example counting the proportion of
agents who speak at least two languages. This is an approximation of ‘bilingual-
ism’ in the sense that individuals ‘speak’ multiple ‘languages’. However, this is
not bilingualism as defined in this thesis, simply because there is no social vari-
able on which to condition the ‘languages’. Figure 6.2 shows a representation of
the space of hypotheses with different partitions. Note that we could go further
to look at the proportions of speakers speaking 1,2,3 and 4 languages separately.
6.2.3 Results for single languages
The following sections present the results of the first model3. We’ll start by
looking at a simple case. The hypothesis space can be limited to hypotheses with
only one language. This is a ‘monolingual’ model. This will replicate the results
3The implementation of this model was built on top of code made available by Kirby and
Smith (2010)
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Figure 6.3: Proportion of consistently headed languages in a chain of Monolingual
Samplers (red squares) and MAP learners (blue diamonds). Generations are
initialised with equal amounts of data from each type of hypothesis.
of models that did not allow learners to adopt multiple languages. Figure 6.3
shows the average results for 10,000 runs of the model with a bias of 0.6 and a
bottleneck of 5 utterances. For samplers, the proportion of consistently headed
languages converges on the prior bias of the learners (60%), as in Griffiths and
Kalish (2007). For MAP learners, this bias is exaggerated (non-convergence), as
in Kirby et al. (2007).
6.2.4 Results for multiple languages
We can now look at the model dynamics when agents can adopt multiple ‘lan-
guages’. Figure 6.4 shows the results for the sampling learners, including the
different measures mentioned above. Again, these are the averages for 10,000
runs with a bias of 0.6 and a bottleneck of 5 utterances. The proportion of
consistent languages in the population of languages (a single agent may have
more than one language) is lower than in the monolingual case, just above the
50% level. The proportion of agents speaking only consistent languages is much
lower and the number of agents speaking at least one consistent language is much
higher. This means, of course, that the proportion of bilingual agents increases.
Figure 6.5 shows the same experiment with MAP learners. Here, the propor-
tion of bilingualism is much lower, while the proportion of agents speaking only
consistent languages is higher and the proportion of agents speaking at least one
consistent language is higher than in the monolingual case, but equal to the sam-
96
pling chain. The main difference between the samplers and MAP learners, then,
is the prevalence of bilingualism that tends to emerge.
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Figure 6.4: Results for chains of bilingual samplers. Proportion of consistent
languages in population of languages (black circles); agents speaking more than
one language (red triangles); agents speaking only consistent languages (green
crosses); agents speaking at least one consistent language (blue xs)
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Figure 6.5: Results for chains of bilingual MAP learners. As in figure 6.4.
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Figure 6.6: Average distributions of consistently headed languages after 10 gen-
erations for 10,000 chains of Monolingual MAP learners (red triangles) and Sam-
plers (black circles) for varying strengths of bias.
6.2.5 Effects of the bias
Figure 6.6 shows how the proportion of consistently headed languages changes
with the bias strength for learners who only adopt one language4. For Samplers,
the relationship is perfectly linear. That is, the stable distribution of languages
will always reflect the prior. The MAP learners tend to emphasise the bias and
the relationship is an S-curve. This result is in line with previous findings (Grif-
fiths and Kalish, 2007; Kirby et al., 2007).
Figures 6.7 and 6.8 show how other measures of the hypotheses’ distribution
behave under different bias strengths in a model that allows learners to adopt
multiple hypotheses5. The relationship with the number of consistently headed
languages is not linear any more. There is not a symmetrical distribution around
0.5 because there are an uneven number of hypotheses that include only consis-
tently headed languages (3 hypotheses out of 15). In the ‘monolingual’ model,
there were an even number of hypotheses that received the maximum prior bias
as hypotheses that received the minimum prior bias. Note, however, that defining
4Calculated from the average final distributions of 10 generations for 10,000 chains of Mono-
lingual MAP learners.
5Calculated from the first eigen vector of the transition matrix. To construct the transition
matrix 100,000 chains of one generation were run initialised with each hypothesis (total 1.5
million generations). Where necessary, Laplace smoothing was used in order to ensure ergodicity
in the transition matrix with MAP learners.
100
a rule over languages in a combinatoric system is not straightforward (consider
figure 6.2)6.
There are more bilinguals with a lower bias since, as the bias increases, it tends to
make up a larger part of the posterior probability and ‘over-rides’ the likelihood
taken from the data.
For MAP learners, for higher biases, the distribution of consistent languages
behaves like a chain of single individuals adopting single hypotheses (compare
blue lines in figure 6.6 and 6.8). But for lower biases, the proportion of agents
with bilingual hypotheses in the stable distribution is greater than the prior. In-
dividuals with a high prior are likely to converge on the hypothesis with only
consistent languages. There are mostly single-language hypotheses, with a small
proportion being ‘bilingual’. Indeed, the probability of ‘bilingual’ hypotheses is
proportional to the inverse of the probability of consistent hypotheses.
Figure 6.9 shows the difference in the stable distributions between models run
with MAP learners and samplers. As expected, a larger proportion of the stable
distribution is taken up with bilingual hypotheses in a chain of sample learners
than in a chain of MAP learners. This difference is greatest with moderately
strong biases (between 0.6 and 0.9). However, there is little difference between
the two types of learner for the stable distribution of hypotheses containing at
least one consistent language.
Previous models have discussed whether the distribution of hypotheses converges
on the prior probability (see the last chapter). Allowing a form of bilingualism
in this model forces us to choose the kind of bias that applies and the kind of
distribution we measure. Some measures differ greatly from the prior. For exam-
ple, the proportion of bilingual hypotheses is inversely and non-linearly related
to the prior. This isn’t surprising because the prior is not explicitly defined over
the number of languages in a hypothesis.
The distribution that most closely reflects the prior bias is the proportion of
hypotheses with only consistent languages. However, this distribution does not
converge to the prior either and is also affected by the space of possible language
combinations. This demonstrates that the question of whether the learning bias
is reflected in observable distributions depends on our assumptions about how
the prior is related to the unit of the distribution and the space of hypotheses.
6In fact, there are some systems of combinations of X in Y numbers that are impossible
to partition into sub-sets of equal size because they have an odd number of combinations. A
general solution for determining the minimum number of rules for dividing categorical features
into even subsets would be related to the partition problem (Mertens, 2006) or the bin-packing
problem (Lee and Lee, 1985; Martello and Toth, 1990), and would be likely to be NP-hard.
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All Consistent    
Any Consistent
Bilingual
Figure 6.7: Stable distributions for ‘bilingual’ samplers with varying biases. Pro-
portion of consistent languages in population of languages (black circles); Pro-
portion of agents speaking only consistent languages (red triangles); Proportion
of agents speaking at least one consistent language (green crosses).Proportion of
agents speaking more than one language (blue xs); The dashed horizontal line
indicates the distribution equal to the prior bias. Noise = 0.2.
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All Consistent    
Any Consistent
Bilingual
Figure 6.8: Stable distributions for ‘bilingual’ MAP learners with varying biases.
Proportion of consistent languages in population of languages (black circles); Pro-
portion of agents speaking only consistent languages (red triangles); Proportion
of agents speaking at least one consistent language (green crosses).Proportion of
agents speaking more than one language (blue xs); The dashed horizontal line
indicates the distribution equal to the prior bias. Noise = 0.2.
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All Consistent    
Any Consistent
Bilingual
Figure 6.9: The difference in stable distributions between ‘bilingual’ MAP learn-
ers and samplers as a function of the prior bias. A positive value indicates that
the proportion of a given hypothesis type in the stable distribution is higher for
the MAP learners than the samplers. Data and legend is the same as in figures
6.7 and 6.8.
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All Consistent    
Any Consistent
Bilingual
Figure 6.10: Stable distributions for chains of bilingual Samplers with varying
amounts of noise. α = 0.6.
6.2.6 Noise
There are also small interactions between the distributions of languages and the
amount of noise interfering with the transmission of sentences from teacher to
learner. Figures 6.11 and 6.10 show how the distributions change as the level of
noise increases7. Note that with a noise level of zero (and with enough obser-
vations), the learners will never choose a different hypothesis from their teacher.
For the MAP learners, the peaks and troughs in the middle of the distribution
are due to interactions with the size of the bottleneck. The results for samplers is
clearer, with the number of bilinguals falling as the level of noise increases, due to
more agents speaking only consistently headed languages. Bilingualism (as well
as the chain dynamics in general) is more stable under noise for samplers than
MAP learners. Figure 6.12 shows the difference between the MAP and sampler
results.
7Calculated from the first eigen vector of the transition matrix. To construct the transition
matrix 100,000 chains of one generation were run initialised with each hypothesis (total 1.5
million generations). Where necessary, Laplace smoothing was used in order to ensure ergodicity
in the transition matrix with MAP learners.
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All Consistent    
Any Consistent
Bilingual
Figure 6.11: Stable distributions for chains of bilingual MAP learners with varying
amounts of noise. α = 0.6.
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All Consistent    
Any Consistent
Bilingual
Figure 6.12: The difference in stable distributions between ‘bilingual’ MAP learn-
ers and samplers as a function of the noise level. A positive value indicates that
the proportion of a given hypothesis type in the stable distribution is higher for
the MAP learners than the samplers. Data and legend is the same as in figures
6.10 and 6.11.
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6.2.7 Conclusions of model 1
The model above adapted a model of Bayesian iterated learning and allowed
agents to adopt more than one language. As described above, this model vio-
lates the rationality assumption, by not fully taking into account how individuals
select hypotheses. More complex models are available which address this (see
previous chapter and Burkett and Griffiths, 2010; Smith and Thompson, 2012).
However, this model has highlighted two points. Firstly, allowing individuals to
adopt multiple ‘languages’ allows many different kinds of analysis. Specifically,
by introducing the possibility of bilingualism, a distinction arises between the
population of languages and the population of agents. In models with a chain
of single individuals, this distinction was not relevant. One of the main debates
discussed in the last chapter is whether there was a straightforward link between
the biases of learners and the distribution of phenomena in the world. This model
demonstrates that the answer to this question depends on the kind of unit that
the biases and distributions are based on. Moreover, it depends whether you as-
sume that there is a real cognitive bias over the unit that is being measured. For
instance, this thesis argues that the unit of a language is not directly observable
to children (see chapter 3), so it might not be valid to assume a cognitive prior
over the number of languages to expect (see section 5.9.1 in chapter 5). In this
case, the question of how a prior bias over low-level phenomena is linked to a
higher-level, emergent phenomena may be a qualitatively different question than
those addressed by previous models.
Secondly, the proportion of bilinguals that emerge in a Bayesian Iterated Lan-
guage framework depends on the learning algorithm involved (sampling vs. MAP).
While the choice of learning algorithm largely depends on the modeller’s assump-
tions, it is possible to see the two mechanisms as points on a continuum (Kirby
et al., 2007; Blythe, 2009). If agents are able to choose between different learning
algorithms (or choose an intermediate point between the two) to fit the input,
then different kinds of input may sustain different proportions of ‘bilingualism’,
as defined in this model. However, as the bottom-up model presented in the
next chapter will show, drawing conclusions about bilingualism from this kind of
top-down model can be invalid.
The next section extends the model again to include multiple speakers. Models
with multiple speakers and multiple hypotheses have already been investigated
(e.g. Smith, 2009; Burkett and Griffiths, 2010; Kirby et al., 2012). However,
while other models introduced some assumptions to maintain full rationality, the
assumptions in the models in this chapter are made in order to investigate bilin-
gualism. Different conclusions come out of these approaches, demonstrating that
the research questions of researchers can affect the assumptions that go into a
model, but also that the constraints of the model can affect the kinds of research
questions being asked. Furthermore, these conclusions will contrast again with
those of the bottom-up model developed in chapter 7.
108
6.3 Model 2: Multiple learners and multiple
languages
The previous model had individuals with biases over particular languages. The
next model is slightly different in that individuals have biases over the amount
of variation to expect in a teacher’s utterances. Rather than adapting the model
above, I define the next model in its entirety.
6.3.1 Model definition
Teachers know a set of languages (their adopted hypothesis). Teachers produce
utterances for learners to observe. They do this by selecting a language at random
from their hypothesis and producing an utterance from that language. However,
the observation may be affected by noise so that an utterance can be perceived as
belonging to another language. Learners must induce the most likely hypothesis
that their teacher is using to produce these utterances. They do this through
Bayesian induction: They calculate the likelihood of each hypothesis producing
the data they observe and combine it with a prior probability for that hypothesis
to give a posterior probability. Learners then adopt the hypothesis with the
highest posterior probability (maximum a priori learners).
6.3.1.1 Hypothesis space
There are m possible utterances which belong to m languages. For example,
two possible utterances a and b, belonging to two possible languages A and B
respectively. Teachers can know a sub-set of all possible languages. We call
this sub-set the hypothesis. In the example with two languages, there are three
hypotheses: A, B and AB. So, utterances belong to languages, and languages
belong to hypotheses. Some hypotheses have languages in common.
6.3.1.2 Likelihood
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An utterance may be perceived to belong to a hypothesis in two ways: First, the
teacher produces the utterance from a language in the hypothesis (with proba-
bility 1|h|), and it is unaffected by noise (probability 1 − n). Alternatively, the
teacher’s utterance may be affected by noise (probability n), but is still perceived
to belong to a language within the hypothesis (the probability being the size of
the hypothesis divided by the number of possible languages |h|
m
). The rational
approach to this is to assume that, if the utterance is part of the hypothesis that
is being evaluated, then the likelihood of it being produced by that hypothesis
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is the probability of a teacher selecting the corresponding language ( 1|h|) times
the probability of it being unaffected by noise (1 − n), plus the probability of a
teacher selecting the corresponding language ( 1|h|), it being affected by noise (n)
but being changed into an utterance that is still part of the hypothesis.
If an utterance is perceived not to belong to a language in the hypothesis, then
this could still have been produced by hypothesis h if it was affected by noise
(probability n) and ‘changed’ to an utterance belonging to a language not in the




The agents in this model have a prior expectation of the number of languages
that a teacher will speak. The prior probability is based on a beta function.
This is a function that can describe several types of relationships between the
number of languages in a hypothesis and the prior probability the learner assigns
to that hypothesis. The relationship is affected by two parameters. Figure 6.13
shows how this relationship changes with different settings of the two parameters.
For instance, the ‘monolingual’ bias is represented by the blue line and assigns
a high probability to hypotheses where individuals speak fewer languages. The
‘bilingual’ bias represented by the red line is the exact opposite8. For a model
with m possible languages the beta value of hypothesis h is:




where F is the beta distribution function with parameters α and β and |h| in-
dicates the number of languages in hypothesis h. This value is divided by the
number of possible languages plus one because the beta distribution function
only accepts values less than 1. The prior probability of a hypothesis in a set of
hypotheses H is then calculated as the beta value divided by the the sum of beta







8While this is a bias that fits the research question, it is less clear how this abstract bias would
actually relate to a real cognitive bias. Minimally it requires that learners have a mechanism
that can differentiate between languages. Infants appear to have statistical learning abilities
that can do this (see section 3.9 on page 41). It is less clear what units this bias would operate
on. Since linguistic systems vary widely in the amount of variation they exhibit at phonetic,
lexical and syntactic levels, it is difficult to imagine such a bias being effective considering
only a single domain. However, the levels of complexity in each domain may trade-off against
each other (Winters, 2011), meaning that a general measure of variation could be expected.
An alternative solution is to use general learning biases, as suggested in the bottom up model
presented in chapter 7.
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Figure 6.13: Beta Distributions for different values of α (1st number in legend)
and β (2nd number in legend).
This ensures that the total prior probabilities for all hypotheses sum to 1.
6.3.1.4 Posterior
The posterior probability for a hypothesis follows Bayes’ law by combining the







The term at the bottom normalises the probabilities so that they sum to one.
6.3.2 An example
Below is a simple example with two languages A and B, which yields 3 hypotheses
A, B and AB. The noise probability n is set to 0.1. For now, let’s assume a prior
bias that is constant for all hypotheses (so the posterior probability is directly
proportional to the likelihood). We’ll also assume that the learner only hears
one utterance. This means there are two possible situations - either the learner
hears a or the learner hears b. If a learner observes a, then the likelihood of each
hypothesis (p(d|hi)) is as follows:






























Since the prior bias is constant for any hypothesis (p(hi) =
1
3
), then the posterior





























As expected, the posterior probability of hypothesis A given that the learner hears
a is higher than the other two hypotheses. The same process can be followed to





We can now work out the probabilities of transitions between hypotheses from
a teacher to a learner, if we assume single teachers and single learners. For ex-
ample, the probability of a transition from hypothesis A to hypothesis B is the
posterior probability p(A|a) times the probability of A producing a, p(a|A), plus
the posterior probability p(A|b) times the probability of A producing b. Figure
6.14 shows these transition probabilities.
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Figure 6.14: The probabilities of changing hypothesis state between a teacher
and a learner in a system with two languages and a uniform prior bias.
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perfectly balanced, while there is an asymmetry in the transitions for A and B.9
The ‘monolingual’ hypotheses A and B are more ‘learnable’ than the ‘bilingual’
hypothesis AB, in the sense that a learner learning from a teacher who knows A
is more likely to adopt A than any other hypothesis. We might intuitively expect
individuals learning in this system to be monolingual more often than bilingual.
It is possible to calculate the stable distributions over hypotheses by taking the
first eigenvector of the transition matrix. The stable distribution is the prob-
ability that a given learner in an infinitely long chain of teachers and learners
will have a certain hypothesis. It turns out that the stable distribution is shared
equally across all hypotheses with a uniform prior bias (i.e. convergence to the
prior). That is, observing a bilingual speaker is as likely as observing a mono-
lingual speaker of either language. Even though the ‘monolingual’ hypotheses A
and B are more ‘learnable’, because the hypothesis AB sits in a transition phase
between them and so the population-level distribution is skewed10.
This result holds for more than two languages. However, while the stable distri-
bution is constant over hypotheses, increasing the number of languages greatly
increases the number of bilingual hypotheses. This means that with 3 or more
9We can show that, in general, the probability of a transition from the hypothesis that con-
tains all the language types (homni) to itself is constant and independent from noise. Given the
set C of all possible combinations of k utterances of m languages, the probability of transitioning
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This has a counter-intuitive result. It is intuitive that that any given utterance is more likely to
be produced by the hypothesis that most closely and efficiently describes it (e.g. the utterance a
is more likely to be generated by hypothesis A than any other hypothesis). However, the average
likelihood for utterances generated by a teacher who knows all languages, for any hypothesis is
equal. Put another way: a teacher who knows all languages generates many sets of utterances.
The likelihood of each utterance set being generated by each hypothesis is calculated. The
mean likelihood over sets of utterances will be the same for each hypothesis. This is the case
for the teacher who knows all languages because they produce utterances from all languages
with equal probability.
10The asymmetry between the transition likelihoods of monolingual and bilingual hypotheses
leads to another point. The prior biases of learners may have a greater cumulative affect on
the hypothesis they select when they receive data from a teacher who knows all languages than
one who only knows one. This is a similar result to that of Burkett and Griffiths (2010) who
show that the stable distributions are sensitive to the amount of variation that learners expect.
However, a formal proof linking these effects is beyond the scope of this chapter.
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languages, individuals in this system are more likely to be bilingual than mono-
lingual.
6.3.3 Chain dynamics
We can now see how the prior bias affects the stable distribution. First, we as-
sume only one teacher per generation. The distribution over languages over many
generations can be calculated, given different prior biases. The system considered
will include 3 languages and the number of utterances a learner hears is 5.
Three types of bias are used: a monolingual bias which exponentially favours
monolingual hypotheses (beta distribution parameters α = 1, β = 10), a uniform
bias that favours all hypotheses equally (α = 1, β = 1) and a bilingual hypothesis
that exponentially favours hypotheses with many languages (α = 10, β = 1). The
hypothesis space contains three languages. The noise level is set to 0.05.
Figure 6.15 shows the stationary distribution over hypotheses for these three
biases11. For the uniform bias, each hypothesis is equally likely, reflecting the
prior bias. For the monolingual and bilingual biases, the distribution is skewed
towards the three monolingual hypotheses and the bilingual hypothesis respec-
tively. This reflects the prior bias.
However, note that for the bilingual bias, the prior bias is spread over a single
hypothesis which contains all the languages, whereas for the monolingual hypoth-
esis the prior is spread over three hypotheses. That is, the stability (how likely
the learner is to adopt its teacher’s hypothesis) of the chain with a monolingual
bias is lower than that of the chain with the bilingual bias.
6.3.3.1 Memory constraints
Note also that, for the uniform bias, the amount of ‘bilingualism’ (hypotheses
with more than one language) is greater than the amount of ‘monolingualism’
(hypotheses with only one language). This is due to there being more bilingual
hypotheses than monolingual hypotheses.
A hypothesis space can be constructed where the number of monolingual and
bilingual hypotheses are equal. For example, a hypothesis space with 3 lan-
guages, but with a maximum of two languages in a hypothesis. This yields the
hypotheses A,B,C,AB,AC and CB. Figure 6.16 shows the stationary distri-
bution of a chain with such parameters. Now, the monolingual and bilingual
distributions are evenly spread over the same number of hypotheses (the uniform
bias yields a uniform distribution).
11Calculated by Monte Carlo sampling of the transition probabilities between each pair of
hypotheses over 100,000 runs, then taking the first eigenvector of the transition matrix.
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Figure 6.15: Stationary distributions over hypotheses for monadic chains of bilin-
gual learners with the bilingual, uniform and monolingual biases. Monolingual
hypotheses are indicated by coloured stripes, hypotheses with 2 languages are
indicated by solid colours and the hypothesis with 3 languages is indicated by
grey stripes.
For aspects of language learning that have few variants (e.g. aspects of syn-
tax such as basic word order), then the number of bilingual possibilities is likely
to be higher than monolingual possibilities because memory limits are likely to
be large enough to accommodate many variants.
6.3.4 Allowing multiple teachers
We can extend the model to include multiple teachers. A learner is exposed to a
context, which is a set of teachers. The learner then needs a function to choose
a single hypothesis given the data they observe. The teachers all produce utter-
ances, and the learner evaluates the most likely hypothesis for each teacher in
the same way as above. Here we’ll assume that the most likely context is this
set of most likely hypotheses, and that the hypothesis that the learner adopts is
the one that is a super-set of all languages in this context. That is, if a learner
hypothesises that the most likely situation is that teacher 1 speaks language A
and teacher 2 speaks languages A and B, then the learner will become a teacher
who speaks languages A and B (the union of the languages in the context) 12.
Given a population of teachers, a new generation is created in the following way.
Teachers are paired randomly to form two-agent contexts. Each pair produces
data for two new learners. These learners calculate the most likely context given
12This choice of process is slightly arbitrary, and is also not accounted for in the likelihood
function, meaning that the individuals are not strictly rational.
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Figure 6.16: Stationary distributions over hypotheses with the bilingual and
monolingual biases for a hypothesis space with an even number of monolingual
and bilingual hypotheses. Distributions for some hypotheses are too small to be
shown on the graph.
the data and their prior biases. The teachers are then replaced by the two learn-
ers, who become two new teachers as described above. The population is then
paired randomly again and the process repeats. In this way, the number of agents
in the population is kept constant.
We can look at how the prior bias affects population-level phenomena. For exam-
ple, we can look at the distribution of languages in the population, the number
of languages in a population and the proportion of learners who induce the con-
text with which they were presented (the number of ‘correct guesses’ by learners).
The model was run with various settings with a population of 10 agents for 100
generations. The agents were initialised with the same monolingual hypothesis.
The noise level was set to 0.05 and teachers produced 10 utterances each. There
were a total of four possible languages. Figure 6.17 shows results of a single run
of the model. The graphs show the proportion of correct inductions by learners,
the distribution of the number of languages spoken by agents and the number of
different hypotheses in the population for three settings of the prior bias. In the
leftmost column, the bias was set to favour monolingual hypotheses (beta distri-
bution parameters α = 1, β = 10), the middle column the bias was set uniformly
(α = 1, β = 1) and the rightmost column was set to favour bilingual hypotheses
(α = 10, β = 1). The beta distribution meant that, for the monolingual settings,
for example, a hypothesis with a single language received a prior bias of 0.09,
while a hypothesis with four languages received a prior bias of 3.4× 10−7. These
values are switched for the bilingual bias.
The results show that a population does not generally evolve to become mono-
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lingual. This is due to noise in the system and the probability of paired agents
speaking different languages. Even with a strong monolingual bias, only one agent
spoke only one language in the last twenty generations. An average of 9.5% of
agents at each generation spoke two, 53% spoke three and 37% spoke four (also
in the last 20 generations). For the uniform bias, no agents spoke one language,
an average of 0.5% spoke two languages, 6% spoke three and 98.5% spoke four.
For the bilingual bias, all agents spoke 4 languages in the last 20 generations.
A big difference between the monolingual and bilingual biases is the proportion of
correct inductions by learners. The monolingual bias yields much lower correct
inductions than the uniform and bilingual bias. (the model was run with the
monolingual bias for 1000 generations and the correct induction proportion does
not increase for the monolingual bias). Looking at the number of hypotheses in
the population, the reason behind this becomes clear. The bilingual population
quickly converge on the same hypothesis - the one that contains all the lan-
guages. It is able to do this because there is only one hypothesis that is given the
highest prior bias (the one with all 4 languages). The monolingual population,
however, have four hypotheses with the joint highest prior probability13. The
monolingual learner is biased towards believing that its parents speak one lan-
guage each. However, because the model only considers the number of languages
each teacher speaks independently, these languages can be different, making the
learner bilingual when it becomes a teacher. The monolingual population fluctu-
ates around many hypotheses while the bilingual population can converge on one.
Even with no difference between the prior biases for hypotheses (the uniform
distribution), the population tends to become bilingual. The proportion of cor-
rect inductions with a monolingual bias was actually significantly worse than with
a uniform bias (mean proportion of correct inductions for the last 20 generations
for monolingual bias = 6.5%, for uniform bias = 29.5%, t = -6.4, df = 38, p-value
< 0.0001). The bilingual bias performed better than the uniform bias (for bilin-
gual = 72.5%, t = -8.7, df = 38, p-value = < 0.0001).
Figure 6.18 shows the stable distribution over contexts (calculated from a transi-
tion matrix with each transition having a sample size of one million generations)
and reflects much the same picture. For the monolingual bias, there are a large
number of contexts with a high proportion, and many of these have mutually ex-
clusive languages. For the bilingual bias, however, nearly 40% of the distribution
is taken up by a single context, with the next 20% being highly compatible.
The stationary distribution revealed that, for the monolingual bias, 23.1% of
agents spoke one language, 65% spoke two and 11.4% spoke three. For the bilin-
13This is similar to the result of Ferdinand and Zuidema (2009) who find that an asymmetrical
hypothesis space may mean that samplers (who may adopt a range of hypotheses) are more
stable than maximisers (who adopt a single hypothesis). However, all the individuals here are
samplers.
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gual bias, 0.017% spoke one language, 5.54% spoke two and 94.4% spoke three
languages.
6.3.4.1 Memory constraints
The model predicts a strange outcome - that having a bilingual bias will tend to
evolve individuals that are more alike, even if they are multilingual. However,
this may be due to the constraints from the data. If there were many more lan-
guages than an agent could remember, then the bilingual population would not
have the advantage of having a single favoured hypothesis to converge on.
In order to test this, the model was run with the same parameters, but with
5 possible languages. However, the maximum number of languages in a hypoth-
esis was set to 3. This meant that there were 5 hypotheses jointly preferred by
the monolingual bias and 10 hypotheses jointly preferred by the bilingual bias.
Furthermore, no hypothesis contained all languages. The conversion from learner
to teacher was also changed so that if the most likely context contained more
than 3 languages, random languages were omitted from the largest hypothesis in
the context until there were only 3 languages in the set of languages in the context.
It should be noted that, up to this point, the distribution of languages evolves
under directed mutation. However, constraints on memory introduce an aspect
of selection. Figure 6.19 shows the results. The monolingual correct induction
proportions have increased and the number of hypotheses in the bilingual popu-
lation is higher. However, a one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of bias
type on correct induction proportions in the last 20 generations (F(2,57) = 128.7,
p < 0.0001). The bilingual bias still yields a higher average correct induction
proportion than the monolingual bias (for monolingual bias = 13%, for bilingual
bias = 79.5%, t = 17.8, df = 38, p-value < 0.001). The monolingual bias also
performs worse than the uniform bias (for uniform bias = 57%, t = 9.8, df = 38,
p-value < 0.0001).
This can be explained in the following way. Bilingually biased teachers are likely
to have more overlapping hypotheses than monolingual teachers. That is, they
are likely to speak more languages, and so will have more languages in common.
This means that languages that the parents did not have in common were more
likely to be pushed out due to memory constraints (because there were fewer
of them in the context, and languages are removed at random from individual
hypotheses). Monolingually biased teachers, however, were more likely to have
mutually exclusive hypotheses, leading to higher variation in the learners. This
also explains why all three biases have similar numbers of hypotheses in the pop-
ulation, but have different proportions of correct inductions.
For the monolingual bias, no agents spoke only one language in the last 20 gener-
ations, an average of 19% spoke two and 81% spoke three. For the uniform bias,
118
no agents spoke only one language, one agent spoke two languages and the rest
spoke three. For the bilingual bias, all agents in the last 20 generations spoke 3
languages.
6.3.5 Error thresholds
The result that the stationary distribution favours bilingual hypotheses is linked
to the concept of error thresholds in biology (Eigen, 1971). The hypotheses in
the model are sequences of discreet features, like a genome: One can think of
each hypothesis as a sequence of m bits indicating whether a particular language
is known or not. This introduces a sequence assumption. Many other Bayesian
models have a one dimensional hypothesis space where each hypothesis is inde-
pendent from the rest. Kalish et al. (2007) manipulate the amount of overlap
between generations, but hypotheses spaces are usually at least symmetrical (see
Ferdinand and Zuidema, 2009, p. 1790). The hypotheses in this model are not in-
dependent from each other: Some hypotheses contain others (e.g. the hypothesis
{A,B} contains the languages of the hypothesis {A}). This has three conse-
quences. First, the hypothesis space is asymmetrical. Ferdinand and Zuidema
(2009) demonstrate that the stable distribution for samplers gets further from the
prior bias as the hypothesis space becomes more asymmetrical. This is reflected
in the results above. Secondly, there’s the possibility of an error threshold and
thirdly there’s the possibility of changing the fitness landscape.
An error threshold is defined as follows: For a population whose fitness is de-
termined by a sequence of discreet elements (e.g. a genome or bitstring), an error
threshold is approached as the number of elements in the sequence grows. This
is when mutation spreads the distribution of sequence types over the whole hy-
pothesis space. All information (sequence settings that contribute to high fitness)
is lost due to mutation scrambling the sequences. This leads to the distribution
over sequences approaching a uniform distribution. This is related to the likeli-
hood in the model approaching a uniform distribution as the teacher speaks more
languages: The hypothesis A is ‘closer’ to AB than it is to BC in the sense that
A is more likely to ‘mutate’ into AB than BC (a learner with a parent who knows
A is more likely to estimate the most likely hypothesis to be A,B than B,C).
This feature leads to the second consequence: The ‘fitness landscape’ (in the
model, this is the proportion of the stationary distribution represented by a hy-
pothesis) can be affected by the structure of the mutation dynamic. Because
some hypotheses are ‘closer’ to each other, certain transitions are more likely,
affecting the distribution of hypotheses that emerge. Indeed, we see that bilin-
gual hypotheses are more likely to emerge, precisely because they are ‘closer’ to
hypotheses with fewer languages than those hypotheses are to each other.
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6.3.6 Conclusions of model 2
Individuals in model 2 considered hypotheses that were sets of languages. Be-
cause of the way these hypotheses were related (some being sub-sets of others),
the population-level distribution over hypotheses was not straightforwardly re-
lated to the biases of individuals.
With multiple teachers, bilingualism is inevitable in this model, even with very
strong innate biases against it. There are two driving forces for bilingualism
according to this model. First, noise in transmission allows the system to move
between states. Secondly, there is a learning bottleneck in the sense that a learner
is not exposed to data from all members of the population. Therefore, it is likely
that two individuals in a population will have different input. This creates par-
ents that speak different sets of languages, leading to a tendency for a learner in
the next generation to speak more languages than either of its teachers. Thus,
bilingualism becomes the norm.
This model might suggest that research into bilingualism should focus on ex-
amining the strength of an individual’s bias for monolingualism and whether the
social structure causes bottlenecks in transmission. Appendix B uses model 2 to
attempt to estimate the bias of individuals with real data, with limited success.
The results are suggestive of human learners having a weak bias for monolingual-
ism.
A potential problem for the model is that a learner’s hypothesis is the result
of collapsing the context of its parent generation. If some contexts are more
likely to occur given this collapsing (and possible memory constraints), then a
perfectly rational learner should take this into account. In fact, the population
dynamics show that this is the case: hypotheses with more languages within
them are more likely to emerge in a range of situations. However, there are two
responses for this: First, how much of the structure of the problem is it reason-
able to expect an individual to consider (also asked by Ferdinand and Zuidema,
2009)? The emergent properties of a population may be beyond the cognitive
grasp of a limited learner, or too complex to integrate through evolution. There
is also the point discussed in chapter 3 that increasing the psychological reality of
cultural transmission factors does not help the anti-nativist argument. However,
the second response is that the purpose of this model was to demonstrate that
taking into account the distribution of variation over speakers is a rational thing
to do. Building in a rational response to an emergent property of a population
would only re-enforce this point. Put another way, building in a response to the
emergent properties of the model may result in a different stationary distribu-
tion, but would still recognise the importance of the distribution of variation over
speakers and the advantage of bilingualism in structured populations.
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6.4 Conclusion
This section has presented two top-down models of iterated learning with Bayesian
agents who can learn more than one language. Introducing the possibility of ‘bilin-
gualism’ made the model qualitatively more complicated. Firstly, the hypothesis
space is more complex, which affects the transmission dynamics. Secondly, there
are many more ways to measure the linguistic properties of the population, each
of which differs in its relationship with the biases of individuals. Finally, there
is a greater potential for complexity in the learning algorithm of the individuals.
Introducing variation also introduces the possibility of a bias over the expected
amount of variance, as well as over specific languages. Furthermore, there are
many ways to approach this variation, such as considering the variation within
individuals’ utterances (this model), or in the utterances of the whole population
(see the last chapter). A researcher’s choices regarding the assumption of ratio-
nality can also affect the assumptions about the individual’s learning algorithm
(see also Ferdinand and Zuidema, 2009 and last chapter).
The second model helps us to understand part of the bilingual paradox: We
have an intuition that learning two languages is harder than learning one, but
bilingualism seems to be prevalent in the world. The second model showed that
even though hypotheses with single languages are more ‘learnable’, this doesn’t
mean that the distribution of hypotheses that emerge will favour monolingual-
ism. This result partly stems from the encoding of bilingualism in this model as
knowing a set of languages.
However, it is worth considering whether the phenomenon modelled here is really
bilingualism. Certainly individuals can adopt multiple cultural features, but can
these really be seen as multiple languages? Chapter 3 suggested that it might be
invalid to represent whole languages as monolithic, discrete, static entities when
studying bilingualism in a cultural evolution framework. Furthermore, the defi-
nition of bilingualism that this thesis uses is the amount of linguistic optionality
that is conditioned on social variables. There are a few problems with measuring
this in the current model. First, while individuals are sensitive to how variants
are distributed across individuals while they are learning, they do not condition
their linguistic output on social variables. Indeed, there are no social variables
in the model on which linguistic signals can be conditioned. The measure of
bilingualism in this model comes from counting the discrete, symbolic, internal
representations of individuals. The phenomenon that this top down model ex-
plores, then, is not the same kind of emergent population-level phenomenon that
this thesis argues bilingualism must be.
Given their different assumptions, the models in this chapter reach different con-
clusions than other top-down models presented in the previous chapter. For
instance, in model 2, bilingualism is inevitable for a wide range of settings. This
stems partly from the fact that this model is not fully rational (see last chap-
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ter), but also that this model was set up to focus on bilingualism. While this
approach is not more ‘correct’ than others, it demonstrates that a researcher’s re-
search bias can affect the conclusions that come out of models. The next chapter
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Figure 6.17: Results for a population of bilingual learners with different prior
biases. Even with strong biases favouring monolingualism, bilingualism emerges.
Rows, top to bottom: The distribution of the prior bias over hypotheses; Dis-
tribution of the number of languages spoken by agents in the last generation;
Proportion of correct guesses by learners over generations; Number of hypothe-
ses in the population. Columns, left to right: Monolingual bias, uniform bias,
bilingual bias.
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Percentage of stable distribution





















































Figure 6.18: The stable distribution of contexts for a system with three languages,
with two individuals in each generation and where each learner has two teachers.
The hypotheses are shown on the vertical axis. The hypothesis of each teacher is
divided by a forward slash. For example, ABC/B means teacher 1 knew languages





































































































Figure 6.19: Results for a simulation with memory limits lower than the total
number of possible languages. Rows, top to bottom: The distribution of the prior
bias over hypotheses; Distribution of the number of languages spoken by agents
in the last generation; Proportion of correct guesses by learners over generations;
Number of hypotheses in the population. Columns, left to right: Monolingual
bias, uniform bias, bilingual bias.
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Chapter 7
A bottom up model of
bilingualism
“I realised that what I had said at sometime may have overemphasised
rationality or some type of thinking and I don’t want to overemphasise
rational thinking on the part of humans.”
John Nash (in Curtis, 2007)
7.1 Introduction
The last chapter presented a top-down, rational approach to the cultural evo-
lution of multiple languages. The rational framework led to assumptions like
discrete languages, fixed social structures and a specific learning mechanism for
dealing with multiple languages. This chapter presents a bottom-up approach to
the same question but with different assumptions: The linguistic signal is encoded
as low-level and continuous; the linguistic signal is meaningful; social structures
are dynamic and there is a general learning mechanism which has no biases over
‘languages’. The model is not free of biases, but they relate to general statistical
properties of low-level features, unlike the top-down model which had built-in
biases that were specifically designed to address the bilingual paradox. Bilingual-
ism, as measured by the concrete definition developed in chapter 1, emerges in
this model due to dynamic social structures. The results suggest that uncondi-
tioned variation is unstable, and that linguistic diversity tracks social change.
Taking a bottom-up approach means that there is no direct way of measuring
the number of ‘languages’ that a speaker or community knows. Therefore, a
bottom-up definition of bilingualism is required. By constructing this model, rel-
evant measures of the variation in the linguistic signal will clarify what is meant
by ‘bilingualism’. Essentially, this will be based on the difference between the
amount you understand of another speaker’s total variation, and the amount you
understand of another speaker’s variation when they are trying to communicate
with you. When these are not equal, the situation may be interpreted as being
bilingual. That is, bilingualism is a measure of how variation within speakers is
conditioned on social variables. This is the measure of bilingualism described in
chapter 1. The model will explore how variation changes as it is transmitted over
generations in dynamic social structures.
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7.2 Bottom-up approaches
Top down and bottom up approaches focus on different levels of explanation.
David Marr’s levels of explanation include the ‘computational’ characterisation
of the problem, an ‘algorithmic’ description of the problem and an ‘implemen-
tational’ explanation which focuses on how the task is actually implemented by
real brains (Marr, 1982). Top down approaches focus on the computational level
of explanation, while bottom up approaches usually start with an algorithmic or
implementation level of analysis.
A recent debate published in Trends in Cognitive Sciences discussed these two
different approaches to cognitive science (McClelland et al., 2010; Griffiths et al.,
2010). The central issue is which approach is the most productive for explaining
phenomena in cognition. Proponents of the top down, ‘structured probabilistic’
approach argue that it is better suited to answering questions about how much
information is needed to solve a problem, what representations are required and
what the constraints on learning are (Griffiths et al., 2010). Griffiths et al. argue
that using hierarchies of structure means that the model can be influenced by
high-level information. For instance, a speaker may have a different attitude to
a word if they are told its source language. Griffiths et al. argue that (bottom-
up) connectionist models can’t incorporate high-level information so easily, and
can’t ‘change their minds’ based on little data. They also argue that structured
approaches can separate parts of a cognitive problem, for instance learning the
structure and strength of a cause and effect (Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2005).
Connectionist models combine these two aspects, and it is often difficult to inter-
pret at the computational level how a connectionist model is solving a problem
(Eppler, 1993; Touretzky and Hinton, 1988; Intrator and Intrator, 2001). The
advantage of the top-down Bayesian models presented in the last chapter is that
the assumptions about the biases in the model are clear, and so it is relatively
easy to explain the cause of a phenomenon in a model.
Proponents of the bottom-up approach make two counter-claims (McClelland
et al., 2010). First, the ‘top-down’ approach is in danger of building in represen-
tations and structures into a theory that are not compatible with an implemen-
tational or algorithmic level of explanation. Instead of making claims about how
cognition is structured, emergentists argue that structure should be allowed to
emerge from the interaction between the data and a realistic processing mecha-
nism. They note that the brain may not be solving problems optimally, as the
structured approach assumes. Secondly, the emergentists argue that the struc-
tured approach cannot easily account for elements of development. Children
exhibit learning curves and reversals in behaviour which can be captured by an
emergent process, but not by a model that approaches the problem optimally.
Some go as far to claim that Bayesian models are flexible enough to model al-
most any behaviour as optimal, and so are unfalsifiable (Bowers and Davis, 2012).
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I agree with the Emergentists that assuming how the problem is structured is
dangerous. Part of this thesis involves showing that structured approaches have
made assumptions about the structure of the language learning problem that are
not upheld when considering bilingualism1. At the same time, emergentist mod-
els do make assumptions about the problem in the way they represent the input.
For example, the input to neural nets might assume particular linguistic features
are available to the learner (e.g. ‘wickelfeatures’, Rumelhart and McClelland,
1985 or conceptual categories, Rogers and McClelland, 2004)
The distinction between top-down and bottom-up may be a false dichotomy,
however. Indeed, McClelland et al. see both approaches as being focussed on
statistical learning and suggest that results from bottom-up and top-down mod-
els can feed into each other (McClelland et al., 2010, p.350). Also, the iterated
learning model has not been approached exclusively with top-down tools: Smith
et al. (2003) use neural network models of language learners in an iterated learning
framework. Furthermore, the approaches may not be mutually exclusive. Friston
and Kiebel (2009)’s dynamic expectation-maximisation model of learning uses
hierarchies of structured models, but they work like neural nets for learning and
Bayesian models for production. The current model also has aspects of top-down
and bottom-up approaches, as discussed in the next section.
The important feature of a model, for the purposes of this thesis, is how it enables
us to think about the bilingual paradox. In this case, models are tools for explor-
ing the problem rather than definitive descriptions of a theory. One contrast that
will appear from comparing the bottom-up approach and the top-down approach
to bilingualism is that top-down frameworks, like Bayesian iterated learning, bias
the researcher towards thinking about bilingualism as a property of individuals
while bottom-up approaches, like the one described below, allow thinking about
bilingualism as a property of populations.
7.2.1 A ‘bottom up’ approach to the evolution of bilin-
gualism
The term ‘bottom-up’ usually refers to models that try to implement a realistic
cognitive machinery. The learning mechanism in the current model (linear re-
1I also disagree with the claim of Griffiths et al. that structured probabilistic models can
determine how much information is needed to solve a problem. For instance, take visual nav-
igation problems where an agent must navigate home using visual sensors. Early approaches
assumed that you needed an internal map of the environment, an indication of where you were
and your uncertainty, representations of headings etc. Research proceeded to approach this
problem from a very high-level. However, Zeil, Hofmann & Chahl (2003) showed that you
could solve the problem fairly effectively by taking the pixel-by-pixel difference from an image
taken at the current location and an image taken at the target location. Importantly, this only
worked in real, noisy environments, not artificially sparse labs. This may explain why ants and
bees can navigate accurately despite having small brains - there’s enough complexity in the
world for low-level systems to utilise.
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gression) is not a plausible cognitive mechanism at the implementational level.
Instead it is a computational level mechanism, which is usually associated with
‘top down’ approaches. However, the goal of this model is not to explore how
humans acquire multiple languages, but instead to explore linguistic variation
between individuals in a cultural transmission system. This model does take a
bottom-up approach to the phenomenon that it is designed to explore: bilin-
gualism. That is, its assumptions are designed to meet a concrete definition of
bilingualism. While the top-down models in the last chapter had high-level repre-
sentations of bilingualism (speaking multiple discreet languages) built into them,
the current model only represents low-level linguistic variation. This variation
becomes structured around social variables, so that ‘languages’ emerge from the
‘bottom up’.
In this sense, the Bayesian models presented in the last chapter can be seen
to take a ‘bottom-up’ approach to the phenomenon of cultural transmission. The
models are used as ‘null’ models which demonstrate the kinds of phenomena that
can emerge solely due to cultural transmission through a bottleneck (Kirby, 2000;
Smith et al., 2003; Kirby et al., 2007). The assumptions about the cultural trans-
mission process in the current model are borrowed from these approaches. That
is, the model is designed to demonstrate the minimal conditions under which
bilingualism emerges. This chapter argues that a distinction between individuals
and their linguistic systems and variation in social structures are the key fea-
tures, while learning mechanisms that address the problem of learning multiple
languages explicitly are not.
So, the current model is a mixture of techniques used in studies that are broadly
categorised as ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom up’. However, the intended purpose of
the model is to demonstrate that a top-down assumption about the problem -
that learners must acquire discreet languages - biases researchers towards invalid
conclusions about what is required to explore linguistic diversity in models of
cultural evolution.
7.3 Model definition
This model is an iterated learning model (Smith et al., 2003) of the cultural trans-
mission of linguistic signals. The model contains learners who are exposed to a
series of communicative events. Each event involves a ‘teacher’ describing some
semantic data with a linguistic signal. A ‘learner’ observes the event and must
induce a model that predicts the linguistic signal given the semantic data. Per-
haps a more accurate term for the ‘teacher’ is a ‘model’, since they provide data
for the ‘learner’ to observe rather than actively engaging in ‘teaching’. However,
this will become confusing below because each individual has a linguistic ‘model’
and ‘model’ also refers to the system in which the simulations take place, so I
will refer to the individuals as ‘teachers’ and ‘learners’.
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The learner’s learning mechanism is based on a stepwise linear regression of a
set of continuous semantic variables that explain the variation in a continuous
linguistic signal. A stepwise regression is a process of determining the best fitting
model of the data by testing the fit of models with greater or fewer variables,
according to an information criterion. Appendix A.1 has a brief introduction to
stepwise linear regression.
A learner receives data as a sequence of measurements of various variables. The
dependent variable is the linguistic signal. This is a real number that can be
thought of as a representation of an utterance. The independent variables repre-
sent semantic features. These, too, are real numbers. These can be thought of
as properties of the environment that the linguistic signal might be describing,
or semantic properties of the sentence being described. Examples of the second
instance may be gender, number or tense. Some real languages code for some of
these at lower levels in the linguistic structure than others, for instance a mor-
phologically marked past tense rather than a lexically marked past tense (Dahl
and Velupillai, 2011). Some languages may not code for some properties at all,
for example English does not encode different levels of politeness in its pronouns,
but many languages do (Helmbrecht, 2011). The model is set up so that any
semantic property may potentially become an important factor.
The environmental semantic properties are sampled from a specified distribu-
tion. Each semantic variable has a set of hidden parameters which describe the
distribution from which values are sampled. This systematic variation is impor-
tant so that the linguistic signal has some structure to emulate, as described in
section 7.4.2.
Importantly, in addition to environmental semantic variables, the communicative
event also includes the identity of the teacher who described the event. Depend-
ing on how the social structure is set up, this identity might be unique to each
individual, or mark the identity of the community to which the teacher belongs
(see section 7.3.1). This property is always available to the regression, but may
not always be used.
The learning process is an iterated one: Learners receive a sub-sample of the
data in the community, tagged with speaker identity. The probability of receiv-
ing a sample from a particular speaker depends on the structure of the community.
After receiving the sub-sample of data, the learners perform a stepwise regression
to settle on a model that fits the data. A new sample of the semantic variables is
generated (new events occur) and the learner’s model is used to predict the lin-
guistic signal based on these (new linguistic productions). This data becomes the
input for the next generation, after being distorted by a small amount of noise.
A noise parameter controls the level of noise that is applied. All individuals are


















Figure 7.1: A diagram of how the bottom up model works. Teachers produce
linguistic and semantic data for a learner to observe. The learner uses stepwise
regression to build a linguistic model, which is then used to describe some new
semantic variables for the next generation.
This process repeats for many generations. A diagram of the model is shown in
figure 7.1.
7.3.1 Population parameters
Generations of individuals are separated by discreet timesteps t1, t2...tn. A pop-
ulation of Nt learners in the current generation observe data produced by Nt−1
teachers in the previous generation. The probability of any given learner receiving
data from any given teacher is defined by an interaction matrix W (t). A learner
i will receive data from teacher j with probability W (t)i,j.
Since the population size and community membership can change over genera-
tions, a method is needed to specify this matrix succinctly. Therefore, the matrix
is derived from a function with various parameters. The first parameter is the
number of communities Nt at a particular generation. For each generation, a set
C(t) of Nt discrete labels represents which community each individual belongs
to. This community feature is observable to the learners. In a generation with
2 individuals with 2 communities, C(t) = {A,B}. This means, for example that
the first individual belongs to community A. Note that the community identity
of different individuals may be perceived to be the same by learners.
The interaction matrix for individuals W (t) is calculated from an interaction
matrix between communities I(t). The probability of learner i receiving data
from teacher j is proportional to the interaction weight between the community
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The community structure can therefore reflect situations from simple ones such
as ‘there are two communities’ to a weighted, directed graph between individuals.
The community interaction matrix I(t) can be simplified to a vector of single
numbers by assuming that the probability of receiving data from any community










This assumption will be adequate for the examples in this chapter, and allows
manipulation of the social structure through a single parameter for each commu-
nity.
Here are some examples of social structures that can be set up. Given a sit-
uation where there are two teachers and two learners Nt−1 = Nt = 2 and two
communities at each generation C(t) = C(t− 1) = {A,B}, different settings of I
can then result in many social dynamics. Below I give some examples of matrices,
with the learners (rows) labelled as L1 and L2 and the teachers (columns) labelled
as T1 and T2. For example, a society with two communities that are completely
integrated and balanced (effectively a single community):





In the matrix above, for example, learner 1 (L1) has an equal probability of
receiving data from either teacher. Two communities that are completely isolated:





In the matrix above, learner 1 only receives data from teacher 1 and learner 2
only receives data from teacher 2.
The prestige of a community can also be manipulated. Below is the matrix
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for a society with a majority and minority community, which has one community
that receives input from both communities (the minority) and a community that
only receives input from one community (the majority)2:





Another type of transformation can involve distance, for instance assuming that
the learners are spatially distributed over a single dimension, we can define the




The equation above can be multiplied by equation 7.3 to combine spatial and
social factors. More complicated social structures are possible, but these broad
types will suffice for now. By manipulating C and I over generations, changes
in social dynamic can be modelled such as migration, isolation, integration and
social cohesion (majority vs. minority).
7.3.2 Measuring bilingualism
Since ‘languages’ are not encoded in the model, the amount of bilingualism must
be calculated from the bottom up. There are two measures of learners’ linguis-
tic similarity that are based on mutual intelligibility. The first is a measure of
comprehensive mutual intelligibility: the proportion of utterances that one
learner typically produces that another understands. For example, a monolin-
gual speaker of English understands half of the languages spoken by a balanced
bilingual speaker of English and Welsh. In the model, this is a measure of the pro-
portion of the variance in one learner’s productions that is explained by another
learner’s model. If we’re comparing individual A and B, this is implemented in
the following way:
1. Generate semantic data in the same way as data was generated for the
input.
2. Ensure that all speaker identities are sampled evenly in the data.
3. Get A to predict the linguistic signal for these data, based on A’s linguistic
model.
2It is noted that, in a closed population, imbalances in communicative interactions between
communities is only possible if there is an imbalance in the size of communities. However, the
imbalances used above can either be seen as modelling non-communicative interactions (such
as input from television), or the idea that not all input becomes ‘intake’ that can be learned
from (see Schmidt, 1990; Smith, 1993).
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4. Get B to predict the linguistic signal for these data, based on B’s linguistic
model.
5. Calculate the correlation between the two sets of linguistic signals.
See figure 7.2 for a diagram. If two learners have the same model, then they
should be able to account for all of the variation in each other’s productions (as
the sample size approaches infinity). Individual A with a very different model
from individual B will produce linguistic signals with a variation that is poorly
explained by learner B’s model.
We can also define a functional mutual intelligibility score which is the
proportion of utterances that interlocutors understand when they design their
utterances for each other. That is, a bilingual speaker of English and Welsh and
a monolingual speaker of English could always make themselves understood by
using English. In the model, this is calculated in a similar way to the comprehen-
sive mutual intelligibility score, but the speaker identity is fixed to the identity
of the speaker receiving the data:
1. Generate semantic data in the same way as data was generated for the
input.
2. Set the speaker identity in the data to B’s identity.
3. Get A to predict the linguistic signal for these data, based on A’s linguistic
model.
4. Set the speaker identity in the data to A’s identity.
5. Get B to predict the linguistic signal for these data, based on B’s linguistic
model.
6. Calculate the correlation between the two sets of linguistic signals.
See figure 7.3 for a diagram. In this case, an individual with a linguistic model
that used speaker identity as a conditioning factor would adjust its variation to
better suit its receiver (i.e. in the Welsh-English example, by speaking only En-
glish).
This measure has a lot in common with Bell (1984)’s concept of audience de-
sign. Bell notes that variation within the speech of an individual can be due to
linguistic factors, such as phonological effects, or due to the speaker designing
their speech for their interlocutor. The functional intelligibility measure captures
this affect of audience design. This will be discussed further in section 7.7.2.5.
The two intelligibility measures can be combined to get a measure of bilingualism
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by subtracting the comprehensive intelligibility from the functional intelligibility.
Bilingualism = FunctionalIntelligibility − ComprehensiveIntelligibility
(7.8)
This can be calculated for the whole community by taking the mean bilingualism







Cor(L(Mi, G(E, j)), L(Mj, G(E, i)))−Cor(L(Mi, E), L(Mj, E))
(7.9)
Where L(M,E) is a function that takes a speaker’s linguistic model M and se-
mantic variables E and produces a linguistic signal, and G(E,x) is a function that
takes semantic variables E and changes the speaker identity to x.
If the community bilingualism measure is near zero, this means that the compre-
hensive and functional intelligibility are similar, which means that communities
are using the same medium, with possible optionality. A sociolinguistic analysis
of this community might interpret this as a single language (monolingualism).
If the score is negative, the functional intelligibility is lower than the compre-
hensive intelligibility. For example, in the functional measure, speaker A would
adapt their linguistic signal for speaker B and B would adapt their linguistic
signal for speaker A. This yields a low functional similarity. However, their com-
prehensive similarity is high (their overall linguistic system is similar), so the
bilingualism score is negative. This would be interpreted as bilingualism in the
sense that each community has a medium they use within their community, but
they can also use the medium of the other community to some extent. A negative
bilingualism score means ‘more’ bilingualism in the lay sense. This is meant to
represent the amount of linguistic variation that is conditioned on social variables,
and so is analogous to an entropy-like measure where lower values indicate more
order (the linguistic system is more conditioned on social factors = bilingualism)
and higher values indicate more disorder (the linguistic system is less conditioned
by social factors = monolingualism).
If the score is positive, the comprehensive intelligibility score is lower than the
functional intelligibility score. For example, A adapts their linguistic signal for B,
but B does not adapt their linguistic signal for A. This leads to a high functional
intelligibility, but a low comprehensive intelligibility (A has a medium for use in
their own community). This means that both communities share one medium,
but one community has at least one other medium. This might be interpreted as
a minority situation in which one community speaks a minority language as well
as the majority language. As we well see below, it is useful to be able to distin-











Figure 7.2: A diagram of how the comprehensive intelligibility measure is calcu-
lated. Two individuals are given the same semantic data and produce a linguistic














Figure 7.3: A diagram of how the functional intelligibility measure is calculated.
Two individuals are given the same semantic data, but the speaker ID is changed
to the other individual in the pair. They produce a linguistic signal with their
linguistic models. The correlation between these signals is measured.
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7.3.2.1 Applying the measure: Experimental example
One concern with the way the metric is calculated in the model is that it ac-
cesses the internal representations of individuals. To demonstrate that using the
measure above is possible using non-internal measures, this section applies a bilin-
gualism metric to some experimental results.
Gareth Roberts presents an experiment demonstrating the emergence of linguis-
tic diversity in a laboratory experiment (Roberts, 2010b, Roberts, 2010a). This
experiment was a game where individuals had to trade commodities in a series of
rounds. At each round, individuals were paired up either with a partner in their
group or outside of their group, though the speaker’s true identity was hidden.
Players were given random resources, but scored points based on how ‘balanced’
their resources were after trading. A commodity given to another individual was
worth twice as much to the receiver as to the donor.
Players could only interact through an instant-messaging system. Prior to the
game, individuals learned the artificial language that they were to use in these
interactions. All participants were initially given the same starting language. The
experimental conditions manipulated the frequency with which players interacted
with their team-mate and whether the task was competitive or co-operative. In
the co-operative condition, four players were considered as part of the same team
and the task was to get as high a score as possible. In the competitive condition
the four players were split into two groups and the task was to score more than
the other team. In this condition, then, the main task was to identify whether
your partner was a co-operator or a competitor. The only way to do this was
through their utterances.
The results showed that, if players interacted frequently enough with their team-
mates and were in competition with another group, then linguistic diversity
emerged. Over the course of the game each team developed its own ‘variety’,
and this was used as a marker of group identity. For example, in one game two
forms of the word for ‘you’ arose. Players in one team tended to use ‘lale’ while
players in the other team tended to use ‘lele’, meaning that players could tell
group membership from this variation (it is advantageous to learn both your own
group’s variants and the other group’s variants). Thus, linguistic variation arose
due to the linguistic system evolving to encode the identity of the speakers.
We can measure the functional and comprehensive intelligibility of the partic-
ipants in this study by looking at the lexicon in the following way. We’ll assume
that individuals understand words they use, and use all words they know at some
point in the experiment. The comprehensive intelligibility of two individuals’ ut-
terances is the proportion of distinct words they use in common. The functional
intelligibility is the proportion of distinct words that A uses when they think they



























HF Cmp HF Co LF Cmp LF Co
Figure 7.4: The bilingualism score for four conditions from Roberts (2010a).
HF = high frequency (players interacted equally with their team-mates as other
players), LF = low frequency (players interacted with other teams less than their
own team), Cmp = Competitive condition, Co = Co-operative condition.
player they thought they were interacting with at the end of each round).
The mean functional and comprehensive intelligibility was calculated for each pair
in the experiment. Figure 7.4 shows the results. An ANOVA revealed that there
was a significant main effect of frequency of interaction with outsiders (F(1,80)
= 13.2, p = 0.002), whether the individuals were in a co-operative or competitive
condition (F(1,80) = 52.3, p < 0.00001) and a significant interaction between
frequency and condition (F(1,80) = 6.4, p = 0.02). That is, the linguistic sys-
tems of individuals became more conditioned on the identity of interlocutors in
the competitive condition than in the co-operative condition, and low frequency
of interaction with outsiders accentuated this difference. This is in line with the
results from Roberts (2010b).
Interpreting this for the purposes of my thesis, the competitive condition ef-
fectively introduced two community identities, while the co-operative condition
only effectively had a single community identity and therefore fewer salient social
variables to condition the variation on. The frequency of interaction with out-
siders affected the social structure of the groups. Therefore, the results of this
experiment show that community identity and social structure are important fac-
tors in the emergence of bilingualism.
In this thesis, I suggest that the level of bilingualism should be measured as
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the amount of linguistic variation that is conditioned on social variables. There
may be other ways of measuring this given the particular context of the study.
For example, in the case of Roberts’ experiment, we could use conditional en-
tropy. That is, if a community is fully bilingual, then the linguistic system they
use will be fully dependent on the person they are talking to. We can look at how
the distribution of words that each speaker uses is conditioned on the person they
are talking to (or think they’re talking to). We divide the conditional entropy of
the words they use given the identity of the individual they’re talking to by the
entropy of the sequence of words they use. This gives a measure between zero and
1. A high value indicates that there is little conditioning of the linguistic system
on listener identity (with the extreme being full monolingualism) and a low value
indicates that the words speakers choose to use are conditioned significantly on
their interlocutor (with the extreme being full bilingualism).
Figure 7.5 shows the average conditional entropy for games by experimental condi-
tion. The results are broadly similar to the results for the functional/comprehensive
bilingualism score. For instance, the order of conditions by mean values are the
same. An ANOVA revealed, like for the bilingualism score, a significant main
effect of condition (competitive vs. co-operative, F(1,80) = 19.9, p < 0.0001).
However, unlike the bilingualism score, there was no main effect of frequency of
interaction with outsiders (F(1,80) = 0.5, p = 0.5) nor an interaction between
frequency and condition (F(1,80) = 1.7, p = 0.2). This suggests that, while the
functional/comprehensive bilingualism measure is similar to entropy, it is not
the same measure. The functional/comprehensive bilingualism measure may be
more useful because it can tell the difference between bilingualism and a minority
situation.
7.4 Interpreting the model
The data in the model are very abstract. Here is the most valid interpretation
although, as I have shown for the Bayesian models, many interpretations are pos-
sible. Learners acquire a mapping between semantic events and linguistic signals.
The semantic events are continuous and high-dimensional. The set of semantic
variables is a sub-set of all possible semantic variables that the learner can per-
ceive. In other words, the model assumes some sort of perceptual filter.
The linguistic signal is continuous, but one-dimensional. The difference between
the production of the linguistic signal and its perception is modelled by introduc-
ing noise. While it might be easier to interpret this linguistic signal in phonetic
terms (e.g. speech wave or vowel height), and difficult to imagine features such as
syntax as continuous, I make no theoretical commitment. The linguistic variable
could be limited to discrete numbers, or a binary variable without loss of gener-
ality. If the linguistic signal was represented by higher dimensions (e.g. by using
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Figure 7.5: The average conditional entropy of speaker’s choice of words by the
supposed identity of their interlocutor, from different experiment conditions from
GARETH PhD THESIS.
that could do this), then any linguistic structure (or hierarchy of structures) could
be represented. However, this model makes simplifying assumptions about these
aspects in order to explore the phenomena of interest. The purpose of this model
is not to investigate properties of the learning mechanisms of children acquiring
language from real speech, but to illustrate a general model of cultural evolution
in which the minimal requirements for a concrete measure of bilingualism can
emerge.
Having said this, the difference between this model and many other models of
iterated learning is that the mapping between signals and meanings is linear
and continuous, not arbitrary and categorical. Due to the learner’s induction
method being linear regression, certain mappings are not possible. For instance,
synonymy is not possible (two different signals used to describe the same mean-
ing) because a change in the signal necessarily means a change in the meaning.
Homonymy is possible (the same signal used to describe two distinct meanings)
if the slope of the regression is flat or if a learner’s model ignores changes to
one semantic variable. These properties mean that the variation in the linguistic
signal is correlated with the variation in the semantic signals. That is, the system
is more indexical than symbolic.
However, this is a very strict interpretation of the model, and synonymy is not
possible in the real world under this sense, because every signal suggests a slight
difference in meaning (e.g. Clark, 1988; Wierzbicka, 1988). Mappings between
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many signals and one setting of a particular semantic variable (a kind of syn-
onymy) are possible: if we keep one semantic variable static, the linguistic signal
might still change as a function of a change in another variable. More complex
and realistic properties could be obtained by making the learning mechanism
more complex. However, again, the object of this model is not to explore the
mechanisms of learning, but of cultural transmission. While the interpretations
of the data and learning mechanism may be ambiguous, the representation of
the social structure and the measure of bilingualism are not. Learners are in-
dependent individuals who have their own linguistic model. They belong to a
discreet community (whose size may be a single individual). They receive their
data from other individuals in other communities based on a weighted graph (see
section 7.3.1) which represents the social structure. The measure of bilingualism
measures the amount of linguistic variation that is based on this social structure,
which is an implementation of the concrete measure of bilingualism presented in
section 7.3.2.
The model has two purposes: The first is as a proof of concept to show that
an evolutionary model does not need to encode a discrete, static concept of a
language in order to address questions about bilingualism. The model is theoret-
ically valid by incorporating the properties above. In addition, the model should
be empirically valid by being able to produce results that fit with findings in the
field and be used predictively to extend other theories. Although obviously desir-
able, this is an ancillary goal for the purposes of this thesis. As will become clear,
the model makes very general predictions, and ones that are not very surprising
or new to the field of bilingualism. However, the model is supposed to illustrate a
general theory of cultural transmission for the purposes of studying bilingualism.
7.4.1 Human function learning
While humans may not learn language using linear regression, it is at least ob-
vious that humans are capable of learning linear functions. Kalish et al. (2007)
run an experiment in human function learning. Here, participants were exposed
to two co-varying variables whose relationship was defined by a function. The
task was to learn the function and then predict the dependent variable given the
independent one. Kalish et al. then take the independent variable values and pre-
dictions from the test phase of this participant and give it to the next participant
as their input. Thus, an iterated learning chain is set up. Kalish et al. demon-
strate that although trends in the responses of the first generation are unclear,
there is a strong tendency for the chains to converge on a positive linear function,
regardless of the initial function (see figure 7.6). This exposes a bias in individual
learners for positive linear functions3. Kalish et al. also model this process by
3However, Ferdinand and Zuidema (2008a) run a similar experiment with two novel con-
ditions. First, they tell the participants that some of the trials will contain random pairs
(effectively telling the participants that the data will be noisy), and secondly using participants
with mathematical backgrounds, so arguably with different priors. In both cases they find cases
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using the Bayesian linear regression model discussed in section A.1.1. Figure 7.7
demonstrates that the current bottom up model can also simulate results similar
to the human experiment results.
With regards to the iterated regression model discussed in this chapter, these
results give some validity to using linear regression. Human learners are clearly
capable of learning them and prefer them over some random and non-linear rela-
tionships. However, the question remains whether function learning is analogous
to the kinds of problems faced by language learners. While there may be some
analogues with iconic features of language such as sound symbolism (see Hinton
et al., 2006), the general task of learning a language seems to be the formation
of categories from data rather than function learning (e.g. realising that there
are a certain set of discrete prototypical vowels from exposure to many instances
of vowel sounds). Cluster analysis (see section A.2 on page 195) or topographic
learning (which may also be more neurologically plausible, Ellison, 2012, see sec-
tion A.3.1 on page 193) may offer a more parsimonious approach with regards to
the mechanism of learning, but this is left for future exploration.
7.4.2 The role of the environment
In this bottom-up model, the environment is a crucial factor. The distribution
of non-linguistic variables (the structure of the semantic space) will shape the
distinctions that emerge in the language. Furthermore, variation or perturbation
of the environment can keep the variance in the linguistic signal from reducing
to nothing.
Perfors and Navarro (2011) show that the structure of the environment is indeed
important in an iterated learning paradigm with human participants. Partici-
pants had to learn words for stimuli in a continuous meaning space defined by
size and colour (shades of grey). The labels for each meaning were elicited from
the participants and then these labels were passed on as the input to another
participant. This was repeated to create an iterated chain of learning, much
like (Kirby et al., 2008). The chains were split into two conditions with slightly
different meaning spaces that favoured a division by size or colour respectively.
The meaning space that favoured size had a steep gradient in the middle of the
meaning space, leaving a salient categorical boundary. The meaning space that
favoured colour had the same manipulation in the other dimension. Over genera-
tions, labels for different areas of the meaning space merged into one another, but
respected the boundaries defined by their particular meaning space bias. That is,
lexicons in chains with a size-bias meaning space tended to develop a big-small
distinction, while lexicons in chains with a colour-bias meaning space tended to
develop dark-light distinctions (see figure 7.8). They argue that assuming that a
learner’s probability distribution over languages is independent of the structure
of the world may be unrealistic.
where nonlinear functions emerge.
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Figure 7.6: Results of the iterated function learning experiment from Kalish
et al. (2007). Each graph shows the output of a particular participant as the
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Each row is an
individual chain with each column representing subsequent generations. The first
column is the initial input given by the experimenters. These follow a positive
linear function (A), a negative linear function (B) a U-shaped function (C) and
a random one-to-one mapping (D). Series E shows a case where a negative linear
bias emerged.
Figure 7.7: Results from the bottom up model simulating the results from Kalish
et al. (2007), see figure 7.6. 1 speaker, 1 semantic variable with a uniform distri-
bution, 30 data points, error = 0.5, information criterion k =2.
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Figure 7.8: Stimuli (left) and results (right) from Perfors and Navarro (2011).
Left, top: the different meaning spaces. Left, bottom: Predictions for the final
outcome of the lexicon after iteration. Right: The lexicon at the 10th generation
for six chains run in three conditions. In the two experimental conditions the
lexicon has changed to reflect the structure of the meaning space.
The environment variables in the current bottom up model are very flexible.
The only assumptions about the variables are that there is no multicolinearity
(there is enough data), the observations are independent and that the distribution
is homeoscedastic (the variance is constant for a particular variable)4. The prop-
erties of the environment can change over generations, allowing the modelling
of a changing environment. New variables can also be added between genera-
tions to model new innovations, or old ones removed from the analysis altogether
to model a more dramatic change in the environment such as experienced dur-
ing migration or conflict. This differs from a standard Bayesian approach which
assumes that all learners have the same prior probability distribution over hy-
potheses (e.g. Griffiths and Kalish, 2007), or at least all learners have the same
hypothesis space. This is difficult to reconcile with a realistic view of long-term
language change where new conditioning factors are constantly emerging. While
a Bayesian approach could account for this, it would have to change its definition
of the learner’s learning process. Changing the environment in the current model
is valid without changing the learner’s learning mechanism.
7.5 Biases in the model
The Bayesian learners in the top-down models have exactly specified prior biases.
In the bottom-up model, there are no biases that are explicitly built in to the
learner with parameters in the same way. However, there are restrictions on the
space of models, attractors in the space of linear models in an iterated linear
regression process and there is a built-in restriction against learners adopting
models containing only the intercept. These are described below.
4The cluster analysis model also assumes gaussian distributions.
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7.5.1 The restrictions of linearity
The use of a linear regression as the learning mechanism limits the mappings
between the linguistic signal and the semantic variables that an individual can
learn. This is effectively a prior bias over the possible mappings. While there
are statistical mechanisms that can learn non-linear mappings (see the section on
recursive filters A.3.5 on page 199), these are not considered here for simplicity.
However, as mentioned in section 7.4.1 above, there is evidence that humans have
a bias towards linear relationships (Kalish et al., 2007). It is possible that non-
linear learning mechanisms could provide support for more bilingualism by being
able to map more than one signal onto the same meaning. However, the purpose
of the model is to explore the dynamics of bilingualism in a model of cultural
transmission, not to explore cognitive learning mechanisms.
7.5.2 Attractors in the model space
The slope of a semantic variable in learners’ models can change from generation
to generation. In a situation with one individual at each generation, a learner
(slope at time t) will adopt its teacher’s slope (slope at time t − 1) exactly if
there is no noise. However, in the presence of noise, the slope will change. The
amount and direction of this change may be affected by other factors apart from
the slope at the previous generation. This effect represents a bias in the model.
For example, if there was no bias, then the slope difference between generations
should be the same regardless of the value of the teacher’s slope. Instead, the
model exhibits a negative relationship between the teacher’s slope (slope at t−1)
and the difference between the teacher’s slope and the learner’s slope (slope dif-
ference between generations). Recall that slopes can have a coefficient greater
than one, but tend to be limited in the results below to within -1 to 1 due to the
range of the semantic variables.
When the slope of the teacher is small, the slope change tends to be small and
random (equally distributed above and below zero). However, as the slope of
the teacher increases, the slope change decreases. That is, if the teacher has
a slope of 0.5, the learner change between slopes is more likely to be negative
than positive (the learner has a slope smaller than the teacher). This means the
model has a bias against steep slopes. This is partly to do with the stepwise
regression parameters and the distribution of semantic variables. Stronger biases
(against big slopes) result from lower information criterion c value, higher noise
levels and the degree to which the semantic variables are related (see appendix C).
The number of variables in a learner’s model is affected by the information criteria
c value, and tends to increase over generations (see appendix C). The dynamics of
the model can be sensitive to initial conditions (the model of the first generation,
see appendix C.6.1.4). If the first model includes some semantic variables, there
will be no drastic change in how the balance in the use of the semantic variables
145
Figure 7.9: The relationship between the slope of the teacher (slope at t-1) and
the slope change between generations. The red line has an intercept of 1 and a
slope of -1 on this graph, indicating a perfect (negative) 1:1 relationship between
the variables.
over subsequent generations. However, if the first model has no semantic vari-
ables, then the change in the balance between the two semantic variables will be
considerable over generations.
Given differently distributed semantic variables, the linguistic models tend to
select variables with smaller variances (see Appendix C.7). The model dynamics
(regarding slope) are not affected qualitatively by the type of distribution of the
semantic variables (e.g. normal, bimodal, uniform, see Appendix C.5). For this
reason, semantic variables will have normal distributions in the main model.
Allowing an intercept decreases the strength of the bias for small slopes (see
appendix C). The intercept allows a greater range of slope fits and so the models
are more tolerant to larger slopes. For this reason, and to better fit existing linear
modelling theory, the main model will include an intercept term.
Greater noise levels lead to fewer variables in models on average, steeper slopes
and more balance between variable coefficients. However, these effects are small.
Greater sample sizes lead to fewer variables in models on average and smaller in-
tercepts, though these effects are small. However, smaller sample sizes do produce
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shallower slopes on average.
7.5.3 Convergence to the intercept
There is a possibility that the best model that describes a learner’s sample has
only an intercept and no predictor variables. If the learner adopts such a model,
then they will produce no variation in their output. Subsequent generations
will therefore also be unlikely to use semantic variables, and the system will
not evolve (although enough noise in the transmission could lead to a semantic
variable being re-introduced, this is unlikely)5 In order to avoid this, learners only
consider models with at least one variable6. This introduces another bias over
the hypothesis space, although a very general one.
7.6 Example
This section walks through the steps of modelling a particular situation. For this
example, we’ll model two communities with two members each. There’ll be one
semantic variable.
7.6.1 Population Structure
We’ll run the model for two generations (timesteps t0 and t1) with no changes
to the population structure (two members in each community in both genera-
tions). Therefore N0 = 4 and N1 = 4 and the community structure is C(0) =
C(1) = {A,B}. This model will be set up so that learners are three times more
likely to receive data from their own community than from the other community.
So, I(0) = I(1) = 0.75, 0.75, 0.75, 0.75. This yields the interaction matrix from
5This effect might parallel one encountered in the iterated learning paradigm (Kirby et al.,
2008) where the variation in linguistic signals that are passed through a bottleneck tends to
decrease without a counteracting pressure (e.g. for expressivity).
6There are two other possibilities. The first option is that the learner assumes that there
must be some explanation for the linguistic signals they are hearing, so they lower their criteria
for including variables in their model (i.e. presented with low variation, they choose a model
with a single variable or interaction term that explains the greatest amount of variation in their
input). The second option is that the learner assumes that if the best model contains only an
intercept term, then there is no systematic behaviour, so they behave randomly. This could be
modelled by producing data that was normally or uniformly distributed around the intercept
with the same standard deviation as the linguistic input. This would prevent the variation from
dropping rapidly and could create correlations at random that the next generation could pick
up on. The more parsimonious option is the first, since it does not introduce any new dynamics
into the system, apart from an adaptive reduction of the model selection criteria. It also fits
better with a pressure for expressivity. However, this is not guaranteed to stop the convergence
over time. Furthermore, if the information criterion is not necessarily constant, this limits the
ability to analyse the affect of information criteria on the model dynamics.
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Figure 7.10: An example of a randomly generated multimodal distribution for a
semantic variable, used in the example in section 7.6.
teachers T to learners L for t1 as:
I(t) = {0.75, 0.75, 0.75, 0.75} −→
T1 T2 T3 T4
L1 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.25
L2 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.25
L3 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.75
L4 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.75
(7.10)
7.6.2 Parameters
This example will use one semantic variable with a multimodal distribution. A set
of randomly chosen hidden parameters specify the mean and standard deviation
of 4 normal distributions. These combine to give a multimodal distribution (for an
example, see figure 7.10). Each learner will observe and produce 100 utterances.
The Akaike information criterion (AIC) will be used for the stepwise model fitting.
The noise parameter will be set to 0.1. The semantic variable will be re-sampled
between generations, and noise will be added to the linguistic signal between
generations. The linguistic signal that the first generation receive is a uniform
distribution over the range of the semantic variables. The community ID variable
is distributed equally across the whole data between the two communities.
7.6.3 Procedure
First, the semantic variable is initialised (see figure 7.10). The first generation
receive their data, which is a sub-sample of the total data available, sampled
according to the interaction matrix. Individual L1’s data is shown in figure 7.11.
L1 then fits a model to this data, which is also represented in figure 7.11. L1’s
model includes the semantic variable, the community variable and the interaction
between the two.
After each learner has sampled data and fit a model, some measurements can
made. The most important is the measure of bilingualism. Equation 7.9 is ap-
plied by measuring the functional and comprehensive intelligibility between each






























































































































































































































































































































Figure 7.11: The input and output of two individuals in subsequent generations.
The top row represents input (left) and output (right) for an individual in the
first generation. The x axis of each graph represents the semantic variable and
the y-axis represents the linguistic signal. Green circles indicate an utterances
from the individual’s own community and blue triangles represent utterances from
the . The regression lines for each term in the learner’s model are represented.
C=community ID variable, V1 = semantic variable, V1:C = the interaction be-
tween the community ID and the semantic variable. The individual’s output is
calculated based on this regression model. The bottom row represents the input
and output of an individual in the second generation.
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to be around -1.3 (and climbs to about -0.6 in the second generation).
After this, the generation turns over. The learners become teachers, and each
teacher produces 100 utterances, given new semantic data to describe. Individ-
ual T1’s productions are shown in figure 7.11. These productions go on to be
re-sampled by the next generation of learners.
7.7 Results: The cultural transmission of bilin-
gualism in populations
The dynamics of the model are explored in appendix C. Here I present the basic
findings of the model for different kinds of population structure with multiple
speakers and multiple predictors. To summarise them briefly: unconditioned
variation is unstable and bilingualism tracks social change.
First, the model and bilingualism scores behave as one would expect. When
the two communities are completely integrated (integration parameter I = 0.5),
then they quickly converge to using the same linguistic signals. The bilingualism
score quickly converges to zero (figure 7.12). When the two communities are
partially isolated (integration parameter I = 0.8), their varieties will take longer
to converge. Negative bilingualism persists for a number of generations (figure
7.13). The results are slightly different in a minority situation where learners
from one community receive input equally from both communities (the minority,
integration parameter I = 0.5), but the other community mainly receives input
from speakers from its own community (the majority, integration parameter I =
0.9999). In this case positive bilingualism emerges and is maintained for many
generations (figure 7.14).
Figure 7.15 shows the relative importance of speaker rank in the three social
situation scenarios7. In the integrated and isolated scenarios each community
ranks speaker identity with the same importance. The speaker identity is initially
somewhat important, but then becomes less important over time. However, the
rank of the speaker identity in the integrated scenario changes quicker than in
the partially isolated scenario. In the minority scenario, speaker identity remains
relatively important for both communities, but is more important for the minor-
ity community.
These results are for communities with static social structures. We can manip-
ulate the social structure to demonstrate that linguistic diversity also tracks the
change in social structures. Figure 7.16 shows the results of simulations with dy-
namic social structures. The communities go through a cycle of being integrated,
7Calculated as the rank of the speaker identity variable by coefficient magnitude, ignoring
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Figure 7.12: Integrated. Results for 100 simulations with 2 communities of 2
individuals at each generation where learners from one community receive input
equally from both communities (the minority), but the other community only
receives input from speakers from its own community (the majority). The graph
on the left shows the functional (black) and comprehensive (red) mutual intelli-
gibility scores. The graph on the right shows the community bilingualism score
(functional intelligibility minus comprehensive intelligibility).
isolated, integrated and isolated again, with a few transition generations between
each phase where the integration parameter is interpolated gradually. As shown
above, if two communities are integrated, they will come to speak effectively a
single medium (bilingualism score around zero, see figure 7.16). However, as the
communities become more isolated, the bilingualism score increases. This is also
in line with the results above. However, as the communities increase their in-
teractions after this, the linguistic system changes again so that everyone speaks
a single medium. Then we can split them apart and two varieties will emerge
again with some amount of bilingualism. That is, the distribution of linguistic
variation tracks the changes in social structure.
7.7.1 Factors that influence bilingualism
As is evident from the analysis above, the integration parameter affects the bilin-
gualism score to a large extent. However, some further questions remain. For
instance, why does negative bilingualism arise during the first contact phase, but
then positive bilingualism emerge for the other contact phases?
Negative bilingualism is inherently unstable in this model. As soon as individ-
uals start mutually accommodating the linguistic signal of other communities,
this neutralises the distinction over speaker ID. This affect could be exaggerated
because the model assumes that generations are discrete. However, it does not
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Figure 7.13: Isolated. Results for 100 simulations with 2 communities of 2 in-
dividuals at each generation where the integration parameter is set to 0.8 (learn-
ers are more likely to get input from speakers in their own community than the
other) with three semantic variables and one hundred data points of input for each
learner. The graph on the left shows the functional (black) and comprehensive
(red) mutual intelligibility scores. The graph on the right shows the community
bilingualism score (functional intelligibility minus comprehensive intelligibility).
score is not necessarily an index of an intuitive idea of bilingualism. A commu-
nity like those in Catalonia might actually score zero on this bilingualism scale,
because many people speak both languages. Secondly, in the real world, linguistic
variation might be dictated by social factors not modelled here, such as location,
formality or stage of the conversation (e.g. Labov, 1963; Meyerhoff, 2008). Fi-
nally, this model includes no pressures to maintain a linguistic identity such as
prestige, politics or resistance to freeriders (Gareth Roberts, 2010b). Rather, it
demonstrates the kinds of bilingualism that can emerge just from the process of
cultural transmission - a kind of baseline behaviour on top of which more complex
factors are applied.
The main determining factors of the bilingualism score are the importance of
speaker identity as a conditioning factor and how differently each individual
ranks speaker identity (see appendix section C.9.1). Negative bilingualism is
much more likely to emerge if speaker identity is the most important condition-
ing factor, while positive bilingualism scores can emerge if speaker identity is less
important. Negative bilingualism is also more likely if individuals rank speaker
identity in their models similarly. Section C.9.2 discusses some more complex
interactions. For example, negative bilingualism scores (as opposed to positive
bilingualism scores) tend to emerge when: the speaker ID rank is low in the
previous generation (more important), except when the integration parameter is
increasing (communities diverging), when it can be higher; when the community
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Figure 7.14: Minority. Results for 100 simulations with 2 communities of 2
individuals at each generation where learners from one community receive input
equally from both communities (the minority), but the other community only
receives input from speakers from its own community (the majority). The graph
on the left shows the functional (black) and comprehensive (red) mutual intelli-
gibility scores. The graph on the right shows the community bilingualism score
(functional intelligibility minus comprehensive intelligibility).
mean and standard deviations of the speaker id rank are correlated; and when
there is a stronger correlation between the difference in linguistic signal means
and model fit ratio between communities.
In figure 7.16, after the first contact situation, only positive bilingualism tends
to emerge. This is partly due to the linguistic signal of two communities adapt-
ing to the same semantic distributions, and so becoming more alike. Negative
bilingualism requires that there are large differences in the linguistic signals of
each community so that speaker identity conditions a large amount of variation.
In a population with a positive bilingualism score there is an imbalance in the
extent to which different communities adapt to each other’s linguistic signal. It is
possible to identify a ‘superstrate’ community as the one whose linguistic signal
changes least between the generations of contact. The comprehensive intelligibil-
ity score was used to measure the linguistic difference between generations (see
section 7.3.2 above and appendix C.9 on page 240). A linear regression was run
to determine what factors influenced this measure.
The difference in the linguistic signal means between generations is the main
determiner of which community’s language will change the most. If community
A’s mean is higher than community B’s mean in the previous generation, then
community A’s language will change more than community B. This affect arises
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Majority
Figure 7.15: The mean relative rank of the speaker identity variable in comparison
to other variables in the linguistic models of the individuals, for 100 independent
simulations. The results are shown for two integrated communities (left), two
isolated communities (middle) and a minority situation (right). Black lines indi-
cate community 1 and red lines indicate community 2. In the minority situation
graph, the black line is the minority community.
However, this trend is only strong in the first generation of contact (see fig-
ure C.50). During diverging generations, there is a 41% chance of a switch in
superstrate community in the first two generations of divergence (from 100 sim-
ulations, significantly different from no switch: t = 16.7377, df = 399, p-value <
0.000001, but also random switching: t = -3.55, df = 399, p = 0.0004). In contact
situations, there is a 49% chance change of a switch in superstrate community
in the first two generations (from 100 simulations, significantly different from no
switch: t = 13.8, df = 199, p < 0.0000001; but not significantly different from
random switching: t = -0.28, df = 199, p = 0.78). In one generation a commu-
nity might adapt to another, but this can cause the models in that community
to better fit the data, leading to a pressure for the other community to adapt in
the subsequent generation8.
7.7.2 Discussion
Comparing the results of the bottom up model with the conclusions of the top
down model, four points emerge which are discussed below:
7.7.2.1 The model as a proof of concept
Previous chapters suggested that bilingualism is a population-level phenomenon
and that there is no a priori reason to think that a human language acquisition
8Although a preliminary result that requires more investigation, it might be interesting to
relate this to instances of ‘mixed languages’ where the emerging language in a contact situation
uses the lexicon of one source language, but the grammar and morphology of the other (e.g.
Media Lengua, see Muysken, 1997). If lexical items and morphology take different amounts of
time to learn (as suggested by Clahsen et al., 2010), then the ‘mixing’ might be partially due
to this alternation in the community that adapts: the lexicon is taken first from one language,
and later the morphology from another.
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Figure 7.16: The levels of bilingualism in two communities, with two learners
each, which are alternatively integrated (yellow) and semi-isolated (blue).
device has a specific mechanism for dealing with linguistic input from multiple
languages, nor to think that there is a cognitive reality to discrete languages that
such a mechanism could operate on. The bottom up model can be seen as a tool
for thinking about this approach to language evolution. The model works as a
proof-of-concept for the concrete measurement of bilingualism. The amount of
bilingualism is measurable in this model without encoding a discrete, monolithic,
static concept of a ‘language’. This measure behaves as we would expect. In
integrated communities, it is close to zero. For two semi-isolated communities, it
is negative. Furthermore, if we set up a social situation where one community is
a minority, the bilingualism score captures the expected changes to the linguistic
system by reflecting a positive value.
7.7.2.2 Linguistic diversity tracks social change
Dynamic social structures are a key aspect for explaining the emergence of bilin-
gualism in this model. In the top-down model, social structures were static and
so they could not form a part of the explanation. The flexibility of the bottom-
up model derives from its non-rational assumptions. The results above are in
line with the expectation that unconditioned linguistic variation is unstable (see
Smith and Wonnacott, 2010). The linguistic contrast between communities will
diminish if there is no contrast in the social variables on which the linguistic
signal can be conditioned.
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7.7.2.3 Addressing the bilingual paradox
Bilingualism emerges in this model without individuals having a specific mech-
anism for dealing with bilingualism. The top-down model specified a prior bias
over the amount of variation to expect in an agent’s input, fitting the learning
mechanism to the problem being addressed. The bottom up model demonstrates
that bilingualism can emerge from a general learning mechanism which condi-
tions a linguistic signal on semantic variables. There are no expectations over
the amount of variation to expect within or between speakers. Indeed, if social
variables do not explain any of the variance, they do not play any role in an
agent’s internal linguistic representation. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the
model maintains a division between population level phenomena and individual
learning mechanisms: bilingualism can emerge at the population level without
discrete, static languages being encoded in the model of individuals.
This has an impact on the bilingual paradox. Recall that this questioned why
bilingualism was prevalent if learning multiple languages is difficult. The bottom
up model suggests that the paradox derives from invalid assumptions by demon-
strating that ‘bilingualism’ is a property of populations which is not necessarily
related to individual learning biases. That is, whether humans have an expec-
tation about the number of languages that will be in their input, or whether
learning two languages is more difficult than learning one are not necessarily the
most relevant questions to address the prevalence of bilingualism. Rather, one
should ask how contrasts in social variables support the maintenance of linguis-
tic variation. In other words, how do social structures and linguistic variation
coevolve?
7.7.2.4 Implications of the model
The final point is related to the one above and concerns the kinds of questions
each model is biased towards answering. The top-down model could answer ques-
tions like ‘what is the rational, optimal prior expectation about variation in the
input?’, or in other words ‘is bilingualism rational?’. It might suggest that a fruit-
ful avenue of further investigation would be to try to estimate the bias human
learners have over the number of languages to expect in their input, the amount
of noise in transmission or whether the social structure was one that caused bot-
tlenecks on learning. However, in the bottom up model, because the amount
of bilingualism depends on dynamic social structures, asking whether bilingual-
ism is the rational expectation does not make any sense without also thinking
about dynamic social structures. This suggests that the questions asked by the
top-down model are misleading. With regards to future research, the bottom up
model suggests looking at dynamic social structures, and how linguistic variation
is conditioned on social variables. This suggestion is explored further in the next
chapter.
Both the top down and bottom up models are very abstract, and it would be
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a difficult and perhaps pointless exercise to try to determine which model was
more ‘realistic’ or fitted real data better. Rather, both approaches can be seen
as converging on a common solution to the problem from different angles. The
top down model is better at yielding good analytic results, but the bottom up
model allows more flexibility in terms of social dynamics9. The bottom up model
presented here has suggested that some of the assumptions of the top down model
require more scrutiny. In response, a top down model could be built which ad-
dressed the most relevant points raised by the bottom up model perhaps using
techniques such as empirical Bayesian analysis (see section 5.9.3.2 in chapter 5).
Again, it should be emphasised that the difference between the top down and
bottom up models provide useful insights specifically for theories of the cultural
evolution of bilingualism. It may be perfectly valid to use the top down ap-
proaches discussed previously for investigating other levels of linguistic structure.
7.7.2.5 Audience design
The conclusions of the model converge on similar ideas to the concept of audi-
ence design (Bell, 1984). As mentioned above, Bell defined variation in ‘style’ as
variation within a speaker that was not due to linguistic constrains. This con-
trasts with variation between speakers, such as differences between the speech
of members of different social classes. Bell demonstrates that stylistic variation
within a speaker can be affected by the identity of their interlocutor, an affect he
calls ‘audience design’. The bottom up model allows both types of variation to
occur, and the bilingualism measure can be seen as a measure of the amount of
‘audience design’ or ‘style shift’ in the population. The model’s conclusions are
also compatible with Bell’s observations about the relationship between the two
kinds of variation, which he calls the ‘axiom of style’:
“Variation on the style dimension within the speech of a single speaker
derives from and echoes the variation which exists between speakers
on the “social” dimension.”
(Bell, 1984, p. 151)
Bell argues that there must be variation between speakers in a community for
there to be ‘style shift’ in the speech of an individual. This is exhibited in the
model, as individuals only exhibit variation according to the identity of their in-
terlocutor if there are salient differences between groups of speakers. Bell also
argues that stylistic variation derives from social variation, so that social variation
precedes stylistic variation. Similarly, in the model, changes to the social struc-
ture are what causes bilingualism. What the model fleshes out is the diachronic
implications of this hypothesis: that bilingualism (or style shift) will reduce over
9Laboratory experiments with humans can be seen as a third approach which provides good
realism in terms of the learning mechanism, but poor experimental control. See Scott-Phillips
and Kirby (2010) and Cornish et al. (2009, p. 199) for a discussion on models and experiments
being mutually supportive.
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time in a population with a fixed social structure.
The concept of bilingualism used in this model is very compatible with research
questions in sociolinguistics. This is because the model can track the emergence
of linguistic categories and how they coevolve with social structure. The top
down models in the previous chapters were not designed to address questions
of intraspeaker variation, and so may be less compatible. In the next chapter
I will argue that both the field of language evolution and bilingualism consider
the co-evolution of linguistic categoies and social structure, as well as learning
biases. It seems to make sense, then, that the field of language evolution should
be interacting with the fields of bilingualism and sociolinguistics, since they are
converging on similar questions and similar conclusions from different angles.
7.7.2.6 Future research
There are many features of the model that have not been explored here, such as
changing the population size, the number of communities and manipulating the
semantic variable distributions. While the current analysis is enough to demon-
strate the points that are relevant for this thesis, future investigations might
investigate these features further.
7.8 Conclusion
This chapter presented a bottom-up model of cultural transmission which allowed
bilingualism to emerge in a population. I suggested that a learning mechanism
that detected conditioned variation could resolve the paradox of the emergence
of a capacity for bilingualism without an apparent adaptive advantage. This gen-
eral learning mechanism would be domain general. It would allow the learning
of variation at multiple levels of linguistic structure by finding the most salient
conditioning factors on which to structure the variation in the input.
The bottom up model contrasted with the top-down models presented in the last
chapter by assuming that the linguistic signal was a continuous variable which was
conditioned on semantic variables, that social structures were dynamic and that
bilingualism was a property of populations which could be measured by observ-
ing how individuals condition their linguistic variation on social variables. The
bottom-up model demonstrated that thinking about bilingualism in a cultural
framework requires thinking about dynamic social structures. It also suggested
that the bilingual paradox presented at the start of this thesis derived from in-
valid assumptions about bilingualism. This suggests a different perspective on





“The idea that people speak one language is certainly not true ...
everyone grows up in a multilingual environment”
Chomsky (2000), p. 59
8.1 Introduction
The previous chapters have focussed on how a consideration of bilingualism has
an impact on theories of cultural evolution. This chapter looks at how a cultural
evolution approach to language can have an impact on studies of bilingualism.
Bilingualism is not seen as a phenomenon that is central to language evolution
or language acquisition (see De Groot, 2010 and section 8.2). Part of the prob-
lem involves the difficulty of conceptualising bilingualism: a bilingual is often
thought of as being an individual who has native competence in more than one
language. However, chapter 3 demonstrated problems with a categorical approach
to languages, and this chapter demonstrates similar problems with categorising
someone as a ‘native’ or ‘non-native’ speaker. Since a traditional definition of
bilingualism rests on these concepts, it follows that there must be problems with
categorising the linguistic experience of individuals into narrow categories such
as ‘monolingual’ and ‘bilingual’. This chapter suggests some problems that arise
from this in experimental approaches, including the exclusion of certain kinds of
bilingual experience, difficulty in recruiting participants and difficulty in compar-
ing results across studies.
A solution is offered in the form of a cultural evolution approach to bilingual-
ism. The previous chapters have argued that languages should be treated as
complex phenomena that emerge from the way individuals use language. This
suggested a definition of bilingualism based on how low-level linguistic variation
is conditioned on semantic and social variables. Instead of directly comparing
‘monolinguals’ and ‘bilinguals’, the cultural evolution approach suggests using
an individual differences paradigm. This involves using low level measurements
to see how properties of the input affect learning processes which go on to af-
fect learners’ linguistic output. Categories like ‘monolingual’ and ‘bilingual’ can
emerge from the data, but are not assumed a priori. Some studies of bilingualism
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are already taking this kind of approach (e.g. Paradis, 2011; Parra et al., 2011).
Some implications of this cultural evolution approach are discussed. These in-
clude advantages in recruiting participants from a wider pool, the possibility of
building cumulative data, clearer explanations and the ability to address practical
questions about language policies. The cultural evolution approach also realises
that researchers in the field of bilingualism can ask a common question: “how
do linguistic variation, learning biases and social structures coevolve?”. This is
a question also addressed by evolutionary linguists. I discuss tools from cultural
evolution that can broaden the scope of bilingualism studies, including formal
tools, computational models and experimental techniques.
Section 2 demonstrates that bilingualism has been seen as a marked condition in
comparison to the ‘normal’ state of monolingualism. I argue that this should not
necessarily be the case. The next few sections discuss the problems with cate-
gorising linguistic experience into narrow categories. These include categorising
competence into ‘native’ versus ‘non-native’, linguistic variation into discreet ‘lan-
guages’ and language learners into ‘monolingual’ versus ‘bilingual’ categories.
Section 3 discusses the concept of native competence. Many conceptions of bilin-
gualism involve some notion of competence. However, section 3 demonstrates
that a discrete view of ‘native’ versus ‘non-native’ competence is problematic,
in much the same way as chapter 3 demonstrates that the concept of discrete
languages is problematic. Since this has not been dealt with explicitly yet, the
issue is discussed at some length. Two opposing solutions include researchers
being explicit about what they mean by ‘native competence’ and eliminating the
concept of ‘native competence’ from the field of linguistics. However, such drastic
measures may not be necessary, as the next sections demonstrate that researchers
in bilingualism have begun to describe their work without needing to refer to con-
cepts of ‘native competence’.
Section 4 demonstrates that experiments into bilingualism assume that languages
are discreet, although there may be problems with this view. Section 5 shows
that categorising linguistic experience into narrow categories leads to three prob-
lems: making unjustified assumptions about linguistic experience; difficulty in
recruiting participants for experiments; and possible confounding of cause and
effect in bilingual experience.
As an alterantive to the categorical approach to linguistic experience, the cul-
tural evolution approach to bilingualism is presented in section 6. This approach
derives from the concept of bilingualism developed in this thesis and leads to
solutions to each of the problems above. This section will also demonstrate that
recent research has been moving towards this approach, circumventing the dif-
ficulties that arise from a categorical view of linguistic experience. Section 7
discusses the implications of the cultural evolution approach, and how it could
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widen the scope of studies of bilingualism.
8.2 Bilingualism as the marked condition
Bilingualism is often seen as a marked case which is not a central object of
study for the field of linguistics (De Groot, 2010; Cook and Newson, 2007; Gal,
2009; Sorace, 2011b). This section discusses that bias which has influenced the
‘traditional’ approach to bilingualism. As De Groot puts it:
“Several researchers have criticized the practice, common at one time,
of regarding the expressions of monolinguals as the norm against
which the language of bilinguals and multilinguals should be evalu-
ated, a comparison that in the past has often led to the harsh verdict
that the language use of bilinguals and multilinguals, and especially
their use of non-native languages, is inferior to monolinguals’ language
use.”
(De Groot, 2010, p. 340)
In fact, exposure to multiple languages is the norm in the majority of societies
(Crystal and Wang, 1997; Chomsky, 2000; Wolff, 2000; European Commission,
2012). The introductory chapter mentioned some statistics: the majority of Euro-
peans know more than one language, other countries estimate that between 66%
and 80% of the population is bilingual. Despite these facts, there is a common
perception, especially in industrialised western societies, that monolingualism is
the norm (e.g. see Yildiz, 2012; Minnaard, 2012). Indeed, bilingualism is often
approached as a marked case - the ‘default’, paradigmatic object of study being
monolinguals. Chomsky’s ‘ideal speaker’ as the central object of study for lin-
guistics clearly prioritises the study of monolinguals1 and studies often focus on
1Chomsky advocates the study of the ideal speaker ‘ideal speaker’ who knows their language
perfectly in a homogeneous population (Chomsky, 1965). Populations where everyone speaks
two languages, while homogeneous, are also excluded because “the language of such a speech
community would not be “pure” in the relevant sense because it would have “contradictory”
choices for certain of these options.” (Chomsky, 1986, p. 17).
Chomsky also claims that the study of a single language is sufficient to reveal general linguistic
principles, suggesting that the ability to learn a single language is the most basic ability: “...
In the examples I have just reviewed, I have not hesitated to propose a general principle of
linguistic structure on the basis of observation of a single language. The inference is legitimate,
on the assumption that humans are not specifically adapted to learn one rather than another
human language. . . . Assuming that the genetically determined language faculty is a common
human possession, we may conclude that a principle of language is universal if we are led to
postulate it as a “precondition” for the acquisition of a single language”. (Chomsky, 1980,
p. 48). Chomsky appears to claim that the above quote is “invented” (see Chomsky, 2007,
p. 1096). Although this quote often appears elsewhere without the initial qualifier of “In the
examples I have just reviewed” (e.g. in Evans and Levinson, 2009, p. 436; Boden, 2006, p.
645; Itkonen, 1996, p. 487), it does appear in the above citation and Chomsky re-iterates the
argument (Chomsky, 2007, p. 1096).
However, Chomsky is realistic about the actual existence of these ideal speakers: “the idea
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variation within a population or a language while neglecting the variation within
individual speakers (Ke, 2004). The markedness of bilingualism is also evident
in the language used to describe bilingualism. For instance, Roeper defines bilin-
gualism as the “impressive command of two different languages” (Roeper, 1999,
p.169, emphasis mine). Cook and Newson expresses surprise that “somehow two
languages, two grammars can coexist within the confines of one mind.” (Cook,
2010, see also Petitto and Kovelman, 2003). In some cases, there is explicit doubt
about the capacity for bilingualism, even from prominent researchers in the field
of bilingualism:
“When you meet people who tell you they speak four or five languages,
give them a smile to show you’re impressed, but don’t take this claim
very seriously.”
Carol Myers-Scotton (quoted in Erard, 2012, p.13) 2
Petitto and Kovelman (2003) note that attitudes to bilingualism are often para-
doxical: While we are impressed with the acquisition abilities of children, we are
concerned that children raised bilingually will be confused or develop less quickly.
This might stem from the early work on the link between bilingualism and cog-
nitive development. Until the 1960s, studies on the link between intelligence
and being raised bilingually found negative trends (see Hakuta, 1989; Butler and
Hakuta, 2004 for a review). However, methodological errors were pointed out that
biased results against bilinguals (Peal and Lambert, 1962). Since then, there has
been a growing literature demonstrating many linguistic and non-linguistic cog-
nitive benefits to being raised bilingually (see Bialystok et al., 2009; Lauchlan
et al., 2012; Goetz, 2003)3. There is even evidence that bilingual children are less
likely to develop emotional or mental health problems (Han and Huang, 2010).
The focus on monolingualism has “has arguably led to an incomplete conception,
possibly even a false one, of human linguistic ability and language processing”
(De Groot, 2010, p. 3). While there has recently been a lot of work on bilingual-
ism, there is still a continuum of views about the correct approach to bilingualism.
Starting at one extreme, Chomsky suggests that the object of study for linguists
should be the ‘ideal speaker’ who knows their language perfectly in a homoge-
neous population (Chomsky, 1965 as discussed above), which some have argued
that people speak one language is certainly not true ... everyone grows up in a multilingual
environment” (Chomsky, 2000, p. 59);“Bilingualism is normal to the species in the trivial sense
that the world is so complex that strict monolingualism is almost unimaginable.”(Chomsky,
2000, p. 59)
2Erard (2012) discusses cases of ‘hyper-polyglots’ and their perception by academics and
society. A central question of the book is how to measure a speaker’s linguistic capacities,
with no formal answer, but a suggestion that the ability to successfully communicate in real,
open-ended contexts with native speakers of diverse language backgrounds is an index.
3Many domains have been slow to internalise this, however, a recent case being an expert
witness testifying in a court of law that Welsh-medium education in Wales could cause ‘mental
retardation’ (Shipton, 2008).
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has biased researchers towards only looking at monolinguals (Sober, 1980; Cook
and Newson, 2007)4. Grosjean argues that researchers cannot compare mono-
linguals and bilinguals directly (Grosjean, 1985, 1989). Cook (1995) suggests
that researchers should only study bilinguals, and others such as Sternberg and
Christiansen (2006) suggest the bilingual ability is a central part of the faculty of
language. Some claim that there is no such thing as a pure monolingual (Roeper,
1999; Otsuji and Pennycook, 2010; Pennycook, 2010; De Groot, 2010).
I argue, given the approach of this thesis, that the dichotomy between mono-
lingual and bilingual is misleading. Chapter 3 showed that there were problems
with a discrete view of languages, and so the conception of bilinguals as individu-
als with knowledge of two is problematic. The measure of bilingualism suggested
in this thesis sees bilingualism as a continuous measure of the amount of linguistic
variation that is conditioned on social variables. As part of this argument, in the
next section I will demonstrate that a central criterion for identifying bilinguals
- native competence - is also a problematic measure.
8.3 Categorical approaches to native competence
Definitions of bilingualism often involve concepts of native competence (see sec-
tion 1.2.1 in chapter 1). However, the problem of classifying speakers as ‘native’
or ‘non-native’ is problematic theoretically (e.g. Escudero and Sharwood Smith,
2001; Davies, 2003; Medgyes, 1992; Hyltenstam and Abrahamsson, 2003) and
empirically (e.g. Dabrowska, 2010; Street and Dabrowska, 2010; Mulder and
Hulstijn, 2011.). There certainly are maturational effects on language acquisi-
tion abilities (see Long, 1990; Birdsong and Molis, 2001 for reviews). However,
labelling this difference with a discrete category may be problematic because the
concept brings with it implications about various other properties that can affect
choices made in the design of experiments.
In this section I discuss these problems and three solutions. First, researchers
can continue using the concept as long as they explicitly state their definition
of native competence (Escudero and Sharwood Smith, 2001). However, this ren-
ders the concept of a ‘native speaker’ of little value, so a second solution is to
eliminate the concept from the field. That is, researchers should stop using a
categorical distinction between ‘native’ and ‘non-native’ speakers. This section
4“This emphasis on monolingualism has simply been taken for granted by those working
within the UG theory, along with the other areas excluded from competence, and is seldom
discussed or justified. The only true knowledge of the language is taken to be that of the adult
monolingual native speaker.” (Cook and Newson, 2007)
“Additionally, Chomsky remarks that the properties of such social entities are ‘artefacts’ or are
‘epiphenomenal’, meaning, presumably, that they are just the causal upshots of interactions
at the level of individual psychology. So even if line-drawing problems could be solved, there
still would not be a reason for thinking that socially shared languages are needed to explain
anything.” (Sober, 1980, p. 379)
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is mainly concerned with setting out a formal argument for elimination. How-
ever, it is conceded that outright elimination may be difficult to achieve because
the concept of a native speaker is entrenched in the field of linguistics. Instead,
there may be a third alternative between keeping the categorical concept of na-
tive competence and actively eliminating it. The next sections demonstrate that
researchers in bilingualism have started to avoid classifying experimental partic-
ipants into discrete categories such as ‘native’ and ‘non-native’ or ‘monolingual’
and ‘bilingual’. Instead, they use low-level properties as direct measures in their
experiments, bypassing the need to define what ‘native competence’ refers to.
8.3.1 Native competence as a prototype
Escudero and Sharwood Smith (2001) suggest the following definition as charac-
terising a restrictive definition of a native speaker:
“A native speaker of Di is someone who grew up in a community
of speakers where (i) only Di was spoken, and (ii) the linguistic be-
haviour of the individual in question is perceived both by members of
that community of speakers, and by the individual him/herself, to be
that of a full member.”
(Escudero and Sharwood Smith, 2001, p. 277)
Anyone whose linguistic performance matches this group should qualify as native.
The definition makes three assumptions. First, one can identify a single language.
Secondly one can identify a discreet community. Finally, that the perception of
linguistic identity is straightforward. Chapter 3 argued against these assumptions
and demonstrated that the concept of a ‘language’ is related to many linguistic
and non-linguistic factors. Similarly, Escudero and Sharwood Smith (2001) iden-
tify a set of prototypes that are typically thought of when classifying a speaker
as native. These include a set of core prototypes which most linguists would
agree as being central to the concept of native competence, such as knowledge of
the lexicon and grammar, accent, the initial language environment (i.e. if there
was exposure from birth) and whether language use was maintained after initial
exposure. There are also more marginal prototypes such as fluency, literacy, prag-
matics and grammatical intuitions. Finally, there are peripheral prototypes such
as socio-cultural knowledge, paralinguistic knowledge, identity and orthography.
A researcher’s definition of a native speaker typically uses these prototypes. For
instance, a native speaker of a language is an individual who was exposed to the
language from birth. While Escudero and Sharwood Smith admit that there is
little consensus about which prototypes are most important, they suggest that
as long as authors are explicit about what they mean when they refer to native
competence, then it can be a productive concept. An alternative to this would
be to eliminate the concept. An argument for doing this is set out below.
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8.3.2 Eliminating the native speaker
As the section above suggested, there are many properties that can go into clas-
sifying a speaker as having native competence. While there may be prototypical
ideas of the properties of native speakers, they are not a homogeneous population.
For example, experimental work has shown that adults who fit typical prototypes
of native speakers can have different grammatical intuitions, according to their
level of education (e.g. Dabrowska, 2010; Street and Dabrowska, 2010; Mulder
and Hulstijn, 2011). Furthermore, the competence of speakers can undergo attri-
tion over time if the speaker does not maintain use of a language (Lambert and
Freed, 1982; Seliger and Vago, 1991; Andersen, 1982; Sorace, 2004). If a ‘native
speaker’ does not refer to a stable concept, then perhaps it is not useful or even
misleading.
Based on similar observations, section 3.13 in chapter 3 suggested that the con-
cept of languages as discrete, monolithic, static entities could be eliminated. Here
I apply the same methodology to suggest why the concept of native competence
is also a candidate for elimination. Essentially, if a ‘native speaker’ picks out
learners by a single property, for instance age of first acquisition, then there’s
little point having a separate term for it: we can just use ‘age of first acquisi-
tion’. If it is intended to also include frequency of exposure, competence and
attrition, then it seems like a confused concept that is better thought of as a set
of separate measures and mechanisms, each of which can be studied separately.
Similar criticisms of other fields have suggested that concepts such as ‘concious-
ness’, ‘emotions’ and ‘concept’ can be productively eliminated from a given field
(Irvine, 2011; Griffiths, 1997; Machery, 2009).
8.3.2.1 Identifying the target phenomena
If the concept that ‘native competence’ refers to is not coherent, then the concept
may be productively eliminated from the field. One way to demonstrate this is if
the criteria for the judgement of the concept is sensitive to the context of a study
(see Irvine, 2011). Non-linguistic factors can affect people’s perception of the
native competence of a speaker in an effect called ‘reverse linguistic stereotyping’
(Rubin et al., 1997; Kang and Rubin, 2009; Rubin, 2011). In a series of experi-
ments, English-speaking participants listened to speech from a native speaker of
English. However, in one condition the speaker was presented visually as having
a non-local cultural identity. Participants rated the same speech audio as having
a less ‘native’ accent in this condition. The overall comprehension of the speech
was actually worse in this condition. This suggests that judgements of ‘native’
competence can be manipulated by non-linguistic factors and the context of the
task. This means that the concept of a native speaker may not refer to a coherent
phenomenon. Further problems with the concept are discussed below.
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8.3.2.2 Argument from the scientific method
The scientific method usually proceeds in the following stages. Step 1: discover a
dissociation. Step 2: Categorise the phenomena. Step 3: test the categorisation.
A final step may involve discovering problems with the categorisation, and so
seeking more precise dissociations (back to step 1). However, some experimental
studies in linguistics (see example below) have first assumed that there are differ-
ences between ‘native’ and ‘non-native’ speakers (step 2) and then tried to find
measures by which they differ (step 1). These measures are usually motivated by
intuitions about how ‘native’ and ‘non-native’ speakers differ. This goes against
the usual order of the scientific method.
For example, Johnson and Newport (1989) tested the grammatical knowledge
of English of immigrants to the United States of America. They found that the
age of arrival was the only significant predictor of attainment. To test the critical
period hypothesis, Johnson and Newport split the groups into those who arrived
before the age of 16 and those who arrived afterwards. For the early learner
group, they found a significant negative correlation between age of arrival and
attainment (the earlier the exposure to English, the higher the ultimate attain-
ment is). However, there was no significant correlation for the late learner group.
Johnson and Newport claimed this was evidence for a critical period that con-
strains the ultimate attainment possible in a second language.
However, Birdsong and Molis (2001) replicate this study with highly proficient
Italian learners of English and find the opposite effect. There was a significant
correlation for the late learners, but not for early learners. Therefore, the ques-
tion of whether adult L2 learners can achieve native proficiency is sensitive to the
selection criteria for experimental participants (see Hyltenstam and Abrahams-
son, 2003 for a review).
Hyltenstam and Abrahamsson (2003) point out that part of the source of the
conflict is that the studies split the participants into two groups, then test the
correlation between age of first exposure and ultimate attainment. That is, they
were assuming a dissociation after a cut-off point, then trying to measure this
dissociation. In both studies, taking the results for all ages together, there is a
gradual decline in ultimate attainment with age.
However, there are learners who were exposed to a language after puberty who
have an ultimate attainment within the range of native speakers (van Wui-
jtswinkel, 1994; Cranshaw, 1998; Bongaerts, 1999; White and Genesee, 1996;
Sorace, 1993; Sorace et al., 2009, see Birdsong and Molis, 2001). Hyltenstam
and Abrahamsson conclude that “it is inherently difficult, perhaps even im-
possible, to distinguish native from near-native speakers. The slight differences
that exist between them may well be unnoticeable” (Hyltenstam and Abrahams-
son, 2003, p.571). They suggest that a resolution of the literature on matura-
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tional constraints on ultimate attainment requires recognising a category of “non-
perceivable non-nativeness”. However, this appears to mean that these speakers
are only classified as ‘non-native’ based on their age of initial exposure. That is,
“non-perceivable non-nativeness” is not a measure of language attainment, but of
life history. If this is the case, then the usefulness of a discrete division between
‘native’ and ‘non-native’ speakers in an explanation of maturational constrains is
unclear. The scientific approach allows the concept to be eliminated if the disso-
ciations turn out to be a collection of finer-grained dissociations (e.g. the ‘critical
period’ effect is a product of maturational effects, age of exposure, exercise and
social and psychological effects, as suggested by Hyltenstam and Abrahamsson,
2003). However, assuming the concept of the ‘native speaker’ is real before find-
ing a real dissociation can make the concept of the ‘native speaker’ resistant to
development.
8.3.2.3 Underspecification
As we have seen above, there are many definitions of the concept of a ‘native
speaker’ such as age of acquisition (both using fine-grained and cut-off mea-
sures, e.g. puberty), competence and frequency of exposure. However, there are
other concerns that might affect the competence of a speaker such as possible
differences in comprehension versus production (Lincoln, 1979; Croft, 2003), the
distance between the L1 and L2 (Lado, 1957), ‘native’ accent (Kang and Ru-
bin, 2009; Rubin, 2011) and the level of attrition (e.g. Andersen, 1982; Seliger
and Vago, 1991; Sorace, 2004). In a minority scenario, motivation to learn and
use a language and socio-political factors may have an effect on the competence
(Krashen, 1982). This plethora of factors suggests that the concept of a ‘native
speaker’ is under-specifies the phenomenon it tries to describe.
8.3.2.4 Taxonomic errors
A speaker may be ‘non-native’ according to a range of mechanisms. For in-
stance, if the speaker is very young (development) or the speaker has not used
the language in a long time (attrition). Lumping together the results of different
mechanisms under one concept can be confusing. Also, as we have seen above,
the concept of speakers who are indistinguishable in terms of competence may be
labelled ‘native’ or ‘non-native’ based on their life history. Therefore, the concept
also divides individuals that are very similar. Furthermore, different criteria may
be applied when assessing nativeness according to other properties of the speaker.
Adults who achieve native competence in a second language are “the object of
much admiration and astonishment. For child learners, however, everything short
of nativelike levels is seen as a failure.” (Hyltenstam and Abrahamsson, 2003, p.
539).
These three points suggest that the taxonomy of native competence is confused.
As we shall see in the rest of this chapter, recent experimental work in bilin-
gualism has been ignoring the categories of ‘native’ and ‘non-native’ and instead
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talking about specific mechanisms directly.
8.3.2.5 Misidentification
The sections above have shown that there are a range of ways to operationalise
the concept of a ‘native speaker’. As research reveals the increasingly complex
mechanisms behind acquiring a linguistic system that aligns with a population of
speakers, the usefulness of a black-and-white concept like ‘native’ and ‘non-native’
can be questioned. At the very least, the use of the concept requires clarification
in terms of the features that are being referred to(Escudero and Sharwood Smith,
2001). The rest of this chapter will argue that explaining research in terms of
specific mechanisms is more productive than using categorical labels. However,
it is quite another question whether the concept should be actively eliminated.
Below are some arguments for keeping the concept.
It was then suggested that the concept has been made redundant as the field
has progressed to consider finer-grained measures of native competence such as
age of acquisition, frequency of exposure, attrition and so on.
8.3.3 Arguments against eliminating native competence
The sections above argued for the elimination of the categorical distinction be-
tween ‘native’ and ‘non-native’ speakers. However, outright elimination might be
difficult to achieve for four reasons, detailed below.
First, the concept of the ‘native speaker’ may be a useful generalisation. The
vast majority of formalist approaches to language depend on a ‘native speaker’
assumption. Secondly, the concept is entrenched. The ‘native speaker’ is a con-
cept that is the very cornerstone of generative linguistics. However, in the exper-
imental community, researchers are moving towards finer-grained measures.
Thirdly, the concept may promote stability. The very question of how children
achieve ‘native’ competence is the motivation for many studies of second language
acquisition. Eliminating the concept could cause confusion in the field.
Fourthly, the concept may be used unambiguously. ‘Native speaker’ is usually
shorthand for ‘learned this language from birth’ as opposed to ‘learned as an
adult’. While there is little consensus about what is meant by a ‘native speaker’
between studies, the concept may be clear within studies (Escudero and Shar-
wood Smith, 2001). If the concept can be used unambiguously, it may not be
problematic.
Despite these arguments, a categorical concept of ‘native’ versus ‘non-native’
could still be problematic because it can affect the choices made in experiments.
For example, many linguistic and psycholinguistic studies require ‘native speak-
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ers’ as a control. Studies will often use ‘native’ participants who self-identify as
‘native’, without applying scientific measures to check their actual competence
(see De Groot, 2010, p. 3). In contrast, many measures are often applied to indi-
viduals who are considered to be ‘non-native’. However, there may be a middle
ground between eliminitavism and maintenance, discussed below.
8.3.4 Summary
The sections above argued that the concept of a discreet difference between ‘na-
tive’ and ‘non-native’ speakers may not be useful for explaining phenomena in
bilingualism. It is difficult to apply the concept consistently while still being
more useful than appealing to lower-level features directly. Despite this, out-
right elimination may be counter-productive because the concept is entrenched
and historically important. However, the rest of this chapter demonstrates that
research is being carried out in the field of bilingualism that does not rely on
the concept of ‘native speaker’. Perhaps, then, as research reveals the intricacies
of mechanisms that affect language learning, the high-level category of ‘native’
versus ‘non-native’ will be naturally replaced with lower-level explanations.
8.4 Categorical approach to languages
Chapter 3 discussed the difficulty of counting the number of ‘languages’ that an
individual speaks. This poses a problem for studies of bilingualism since bilin-
guals are usually identified using this metric. This problem is discussed in chapter
3. An additional problem with a categorical approach to languages is that it also
affects choices about experimental conditions and stimuli, discussed here. For
example, participants may be primed with stimuli that are assumed to activate a
particular language ‘mode’. However, even with what are traditionally thought of
as well-defined languages, categorisations of linguistic variants can be very sub-
jective. I will illustrate this with an example from Thomas and Allport (2000),
but this problem applies to many studies.
Thomas and Allport (2000) conduct a study of task switching in French-English
bilinguals which used words as stimuli. They state that “no words were used
that existed in both languages” (Thomas and Allport, 2000, p.47). However, the
truth of this assumption depends on the definition of how to categorise words into
languages. We can test this statement by assuming that the words categorised as
French will not appear in English usage. However, 22% of their ‘French’ stimuli
appear in the ‘English-language’ Brown corpus. For example, ‘bureau’ was as-
sumed to be an exclusively French word, but is within the 2,500 most common
words in the English corpus.
Although Thomas and Allport begin with this subjective definition, they actually
then proceed to use objective measures to show that the subjective categorisa-
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tion is valid. This is done in two ways: First, they asked bilinguals to rate how
unique words were to English or French in terms of their spellings (the experiment
involved orthographic stimuli). Secondly, they conduct an analysis of trigrams:
“To verify that the stimulus sets contained, respectively, shared and language-
specific orthography, the candidate sets were subjected to an analysis of their
constituent, overlapping letter trigrams in terms of their frequency of occurrence
in each language. The more language-specific the orthography, the less probable
the occurrence of (at least) some component letter trigrams in the “other” lan-
guage” (Thomas and Allport, 2000, p. 47).
Although both of these measures are more objective, they suffer from a second-
order problem, since the criteria depend on how words are categorised into lan-
guages. Rather than try to find a better measure of how to categorise languages,
the difficulties pointed out above might indicate that the experiment is getting
things back-to-front. The usual scientific method is (step 1) to discover a mea-
surement that shows a dissociation (e.g. switch costs) and then (step 2) label
that dissociation (e.g. different ‘languages’). A characterisation of the experi-
ment above (and many others) is that a dissociation is assumed to exist between
languages (step 2) , and then the experiment demonstrates that this dissociation
can be measured (step 1).
Despite these problems, for the purposes of Thomas and Allport’s paper, their
assumptions are reasonably supported by their measures. However, they ignore
these measures in the final analysis of the experimental results. The final analysis
is based on their original categorical, subjective measure rather than the more
fine-grained measures based on individual ratings and trigram overlap. If the
objective, low-level measures are there to be used, then they should be. For ex-
ample, they could ask whether the words that clustered according to the ratings
and trigram measures also clustered according to switch latency times. Although
the statistics may be more complicated, there are a range of new methods that
help with this type of analysis, for example mixed effects models (e.g. Baayen
et al., 2008; Jaeger, 2008).
Another way of priming a language mode is to do it explicitly. However there are
different ways of doing this. Au and Glusman (1990) conduct experiments into
children’s mutual exclusivity behaviour. In one experiment, monolingual children
were presented with several novel objects and an experimenter labelled one novel
object with a novel English word. Another experimenter then taught the child a
novel label for an unspecified object in Spanish, saying “Do you speak Spanish?
Do you want to learn a word in Spanish? Okay, now I am going to teach you
a word in Spanish. Theri is a Spanish word. Can you say theri? Well, theri is
the Spanish word for a kind of animal which is here” (Au and Glusman, 1990,
p. 1487). As is evident, this explicitly presents the two languages as discrete,
monolithic entities that are either possessed or not. Participants were tested to
see if they would be happy to assign two labels to an object if the labels came
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from different languages. Participants were asked “Can you guess which one
Spanish-speaking children would call a theri?”. Merriman and Kutlesic (1993)
argue that these instructions could bias the child’s decision “not only by remind-
ing the children of the source language of the test word, but also by focusing
their judgment on how a group that did not know the English label would use
the name.” (Merriman and Kutlesic, 1993, p. 246-247).
As an alternative methodology, Merriman and Kutlesic present the children with
a doll that use the novel language in a naturalistic situation and are then asked
“help Suzi pick out the [theri ] in the store.” Merriman and Kutlesic argue that
The instructions in the current study focused children’s judgement
on persons who knew the English label: namely, themselves and the
doll they were supposed to help. Moreover, monolinguals who are
asked to think about how names are used by different groups may be
prompted to reflect on the social conventional nature of naming (i.e.,
on how names are not inherent in objects, but are assigned to them
by group consensus) and therefore may realize that an object can be
assigned more than one name.”
(Merriman and Kutlesic, 1993, p. 246-247)
The approach of Merriman and Kutlesic above is the one that makes sense given
the approach of this thesis. Instead of assuming that children are aware of cat-
egorical languages that align with the experimenters’ intuitions, children can be
presented with characters that demonstrate a particular language mode through
use.
8.5 Categorical approach to bilingualism
The sections above argued that the categorical approaches to native competence
and boundaries between languages are problematic. Despite this, these concepts
are often used to divide experimental participants into ‘monolingual’ and ‘bilin-
gual’ groups. Although this problem is recognised in the literature, it is usually
addressed by checking that the participants conform to a particular prototype
of a monolingual or bilingual, similar to the suggestion of Escudero and Shar-
wood Smith (2001), criticised above. This causes three problems, discussed be-
low.
8.5.1 Problem: Assumptions about linguistic experience
Firstly, it makes possibly invalid assumptions about the linguistic experience of
both groups. Monolinguals are often assumed to be “lacking any knowledge of
any language other than their native language and who do not differ from the
bilinguals in other respects such as socioeconomic status, education level, cultural
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background, age and intelligence”, which might be unrealistic (De Groot, 2010,
p. 342). Many linguistic and psycholinguistic studies require ‘native speakers’
as a control, but often recruit these individuals through self-selection. While
many measures are often applied to individuals who are considered to be ‘non-
native’, these measures are often not applied to those considered to be ‘native’
(see De Groot, 2010, p. 3).
One way to control for these assumptions is to only test participants who fit
a narrow definition of bilingualism. This may mean that only certain types of
bilingual experience are scruitinised, possibly overlooking crucial data (Byers-
Heinlein and Werker, 2009b; Sorace, 2011b). A narrow view of bilingualism can
also constrict the pool of possible participants by excluding participants who do
not fit a prototype.
Furthermore, assigning participants to categories suggested by a theory can lead
to circularity. For instance, groups that may be defined as ‘monolinguals’ and
‘bilinguals’ may have different executive control profiles. However, if the meaning
of ‘bilingual’ reduces to “people with experience of increased linguistic variation”
and better executive control means “better at handling increased variation”, the
result is not so surprising. It might turn out that the ‘bilingual’ group tends to
experience a greater range of non-linguistic cultural practices, or a larger number
of speakers, and that this is a better predictor of executive control ability. This
hypothesis is addressed in a pilot study presented in section 8.7.2.1.
8.5.2 Problem: Recruiting participants
One of the main difficulties of traditional bilingualism experiments is finding par-
ticipants that fit the experimental criteria. This has lead to the strange situation
where researchers often gather a lot of low-level, detailed information about the
linguistic and cultural background of their participants in order to check that they
meet the criteria, but not using these measures in their studies. The following
quote describes a fairly typical set of criteria and considerations for participants
in Serratrice et al. (2011):
“The following selection criteria were applied: no history of language
impairment or hearing loss; bilingual children were included in the
study only if they had been regularly exposed to both languages from
birth and used them on a daily basis with similar competence accord-
ing to teachers’ assessment and parental reports. ... The children
selected for the study were growing up in households where both lan-
guages were spoken by both parents; the majority of the parents only
used their mother tongue with the children, and the children gener-
ally matched the parent’s language choice when talking to them. The
bilingual children in Italy had exposure to English at home through
one of their parents, at school through the curriculum that was taught
predominantly in English, and during visits to the United Kingdom
or the United States. ... In contrast, the bilinguals in the United
172
Kingdom had access to Italian in the home through one of the par-
ents, through other bilingual English-Italian children in some limited
way, and through visits to Italy during school holidays. ... The mono-
lingual control groups ... had no functional competence in a second
language, although most of the Italian speakers had received some
formal language instruction in English at secondary school level.”
(Serratrice et al., 2011, p. 11)
There are a lot of considerations here of both linguistic, cultural and social vari-
ables. As must be obvious, finding participants is difficult, time-consuming and
expensive. Many potential participants have to be excluded. Furthermore, having
collected all this detailed data on the cultural and social background of individ-
uals, none of this was used in the main statistical analyses.
In another example, Treccani et al. (2009) conduct an experiment on spatial
priming in monolinguals and bilinguals. They collect the following data for each
participant: a language proficiency test, a nonverbal reasoning test, years of edu-
cation, handedness, gender, proficiency in other languages, countries lived in, age
of first exposure, use of language on a daily basis throughout their life, current
average use of each language and self-reported fluency in each language. However,
none of this data is used in the main analysis. Instead, a sub-set of the data is
used to demonstrate that monolingual and bilingual groups do not differ in their
averages, meaning that these factors are controlled for. That is, it is reasonable
to assume that the monolingual and bilingual groups are not different except for
the number of languages they have knowledge of. This means that not only do
participants have to conform to the criteria, but the two experimental groups also
have to match. Researchers recognise that ideal bilingual criteria may not always
be possible:
“Although adopting such stringent criteria may yield an elegant re-
search design, implementation will quickly run afoul of reality. Very
few children have balanced input, and the balance of language expo-
sure changes as family circumstances and compositions change. We
have taken the approach of trying to capture the variability in chil-
dren’s bilingual environments (and then studying its consequences)
rather than trying to restrict the variability through selection crite-
ria.”
(Hoff, 2011, p. 317)
This approach is similar to the individual differences solution discussed below.
However, Hoff still uses a categorical approach to labelling participants, claiming
that “even with this inclusive approach, we have to reject some potential partic-
ipants because they cannot clearly be categorized as bilingual or monolingual by
our criteria” (Hoff, 2011, p. 317).
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8.5.3 Problem: Confounding mechanisms
Another problem with categorising participants into ‘monolingual’ and ‘bilin-
gual’ is that it can confound the causes and effects of bilingualism. For example,
Treccani et al. (2009) begin by asking “whether the continuous experience of
handling two languages, and the mechanisms that bilinguals develop to control
the two language systems, have any repercussions on nonlinguistic cognitive abil-
ities” (Treccani et al., 2009, p. 320). They conclude that “our results represent
evidence in support of a substantial effect of bilingualism on executive control
processing” (Treccani et al., 2009, p. 326). However, there is a disconnect be-
tween the question and answer. They assume that one of the mechanisms that
cause the differences in the participants so that they come to be categorised as
‘bilingual’ (e.g. handling different languages) is the same one that causes the dif-
ference in the executive control tasks. While there is good reason to believe this
is true, the research question could be addressed more directly. One prediction is
that bilinguals who use each language equally on a day-to-day basis would have
better executive control than those who only used one language occasionally. In
fact, this question could be addressed with the existing data collected by Treccani
et al..
Some current research questions involve complex relations between variation
in linguistic input, social structure, development, linguistic output and non-
linguistic abilities. For instance, to what extent does dealing with linguistic
variation improve executive control in non-linguistic domains (see Calabria et al.,
2011, see section 5.9.3.1)? There’s a danger that categories like ‘monolingual’
and ‘bilingual’ which are effects of lower-level experience could be reinterpreted
as causes of effects in other domains. This might not be valid, since fitting linguis-
tic experience to these categories involves simplifying assumptions. The effects
of these assumptions could be amplified when extending them into complex re-
lationships like the one mentioned above, or into evolutionary models where the
output of one generation becomes the input of the next generation.
As the next section will demonstrate, a cultural evolution approach to bilin-
gualism allows low-level properties in the input to be linked directly to low-level
properties in the output. This avoids having to fit linguistic experience into
narrow categories in the first place.
8.6 A cultural evolution approach to bilingual-
ism
The sections above presented some problems with using categorical approaches
to bilingualism. As a potential solution, this section introduces the idea of the
cultural evolution approach to bilingualism, suggested by the argument of thesis
and the bottom-up model. Central to this approach is to realise that although
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there are differences in cognition between ‘monolinguals’ and ‘bilinguals’, these
individuals begin life with a common cognitive profile. This common profile is
then affected by linguistic input and social factors that shape what is learned,
but also how it is learned. That is, there is a co-evolution of input and learning
biases that deal with the input.
Taking one step further leads to a cultural evolutionary perspective: The above
process affects the linguistic output of a learner which goes on to be part of the in-
put for, and shape the learning processes of, another learner. This is the iterated
learning model conception of cultural evolution (Kirby, 2001; Smith et al., 2003;
Griffiths and Kalish, 2007; Kirby et al., 2008)5. There are therefore two levels of
adaptation. Firstly, the learning biases of an individual adapt to the linguistic
input within an individual’s lifetime. Secondly, the language is adapting to the
learning biases of individuals over cultural time (many generations). Therefore,
features such as the distribution of variation in a population (the levels of ‘bilin-
gualism’) are part of a complex adaptive system where learning biases and the
input to be learned are co-evolving.
Studies of cultural evolution have developed theories of how language adapts
to learning biases (e.g. Kirby, 2001; Kirby et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2003), but
rarely the converse (although see Smith and Thompson, 2012, discussed in sec-
tion 5.7). It is possible to see the field of bilingualism as filling this gap. The
cultural evolution approach to bilingualism suggests that the main research ques-
tion for bilingualism should be how linguistic variation, learning biases and social
structures coevolve. An example would be the effect of being exposed to socially
stratified linguistic variation on executive control (e.g. Bialystok and Craik, 2010;
Hernández et al., 2010; Bialystok and Martin, 2004), which in turn supports in-
teractions in a society where linguistic variation is socially stratified.
Conceptualising the input and output as mediated by a learning mechanism is
similar in many ways to the Language Acquisition Device (LAD) conceptuali-
sation of language learning (Chomsky, 1965). The LAD conceptualisation sees
linguistic input being processed by general learning principles yielding an output
of the grammatical knowledge of a language, which produces linguistic output.
However, the cultural evolution approach to bilingualism differs in two ways6.
First, a minor point, it recognises that the linguistic input was itself the output
5This argument is similar to that of Chater and Christiansen (2010) who argue that language
acquisition should be looked at in the light of language evolution. They argue that language
acquisition does not need to be viewed as a hard task, because culturally transmitted systems
will be adapted towards the child’s learning biases. Therefore, a learner’s intuitions are likely to
be correct. However, while this may be true for acquiring a single language, acquiring multiple
languages with possibly conflicting features may be hard if we imagine the learner as having
simple biases. In order to be able to co-ordinate with multiple linguistic systems, a learner
would at least have to have flexible biases, at which point the question of whether learning is
easy becomes more complicated.




































Figure 8.1: A diagram of the traditional approach to studying bilingualism. Par-
ticipants are assumed to belong to either a bilingual or monolingual category,
according to features of the input (which also depend on the category of their
cultural parents). Inference about processes of language learning is made between
these categories and properties of the output.
of a previous learner (as in the iterated learning model, see Smith et al., 2003).
Secondly, the cultural evolution approach to bilingualism sees the states as con-
current rather than sequential: The ‘grammatical knowledge’ can change over
time (Andersen, 1982; Seliger and Vago, 1991; Sorace, 2004), and continuously
interacts with aspects of processing (Sorace, 2011b, 2004). Finally, the general
learning principles are general, flexible biases that can adapt to the input (see
section 5.9.3 on page 82).
The cultural evolution approach to bilingualism naturally fits with an individ-
ual differences approach to experimental design (e.g. see Skehan, 1989; Bates
et al., 1991; Skehan, 1989; Vogel and Awh, 2008; Kanai and Rees, 2011). Studies
that take account of individual differences use low-level measurements of multi-
ple factors as independent variables, then use statistics to explore which factors
of the learner’s input affect specific aspects of their output. Rather than try
to define bilingualism more precisely, individual differences studies avoid putting
participants into binary categories. The individual differences approach has sev-
eral benefits. These include broadening the pool of possible experimental par-
ticipants, allowing studies to use each other’s results, prioritising explanations
in terms of specific mechanisms and answering questions that are important to
bilingual families. These are discussed below.
8.6.1 Solution: Controlling for linguistic experience
Rather than seek groups that are not different except for the measure that is the























Figure 8.2: A diagram of the individual differences approach to studying bilin-
gualism. Learners have flexible biases that are affected by features of the input.
Inference takes place between features of the input and features of the output
directly.
variation in the participants. Under this approach, participants are not split into
two groups, but many low-level measurements are modelled statistically to de-
termine which of them predict the performance in the experimental task. Some
studies use statistical methods such as linear mixed effects modelling (Baayen
et al., 2008; Jaeger, 2008) to achieve this (e.g. Ota et al., 2010; Hatzidaki et al.,
2011). The differences between ‘monolignual’ and ‘bilingual’ individuals should
emerge from the data. If the researchers feel that participants do clearly belong
to a ‘monolingual’ and ‘bilingual’ group, then this can be introduced as another
factor.
Recently there have been examples of research that move away from questions
such as ‘What is the difference between monolinguals and bilinguals?’ towards
questions that address individual differences. For example, Paradis (2011) con-
ducted an extensive survey of English acquisition by children from newcomer
families to Canada. Rather than compare these children to ‘native’ child learn-
ers, Paradis took a range of measures of input and competence factors in order
to ask whether child-internal or external factors had the largest affect on levels
of attainment. There were two types of input factors. The child-internal factors
included the following:
• Age at testing
• Age at onset of English
• Comprehensive Test of Phonological Processing (phonological short-term
memory measured by digit span and non-word repetition)
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• Columbia Mental Maturity Scales (non-verbal IQ scores as a measure of
analytic reasoning)
• Whether the L1 marked tense and agreement on verbs
The child-external factors included the following:
• Months of exposure to English
• Proportion of English spoken among family members in the home
• Number of older siblings
• Mother’s self-rated fluency in English
• Mother’s education in years
• Richness of the English environment outside school
• The child’s experiences with media, organized activities and playmates
The measures of competence included the following:
• Receptive vocabulary (Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test)
• Verb morphology test (Test of Early Grammatical Impairment)
The range of measures employed in this study are indicative of a shift away from
studying differences between two groups towoards studying how specific aspects
of the input affect specific aspects of linguistic performance and competence. Sta-
tistical analyses were used to explore this question. This involved mainly linear
regressions. Given the amount of detail in the data, more powerful statistical
techniques such as linear mixed effects modelling, which takes advantage of in-
dividual differences, might have been more insightful7. Nevertheless, studies like
this one are sure to be productive in the future.
A similarly detailed questionnaire was used in Unsworth et al. (in press). This
included details about individuals interacting with the child, the amount of time
the child spends in different contexts and doing different activities and the pro-
portions of languages used in each context or during each kind of activity. As well
as traditional measures such as length of exposure, age of onset and age of test-
ing, a measure of cumulative exposure was used (the ‘Utrecht bilingual language
exposure calculator’ see Unsworth, in press). This measure involves collecting
data about the proportion of a child’s input in a given language at regular peri-
ods of their life. The cumulative exposure is then the number of years they have
been exposed to the language modulated by the proportion of exposure to that
language. This avoids confounding age of onset with amount of exposure. For
7Indeed, Paradis speculates “Perhaps the role of maternal education is modulated by inter-
actions with other factors.” (Paradis, 2011, p. 232), and has the data that could test this, but
does not attempt an analysis.
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instance, a child can be exposed from birth to two languages, but receive very dif-
ferent proportions of input from each language. The measure is a useful, low-level
factor that helps explain variation in language acquisition data (see Unsworth;
Unsworth et al.). However, a confound that persists in the cumulative measure
is the possible change in levels of exposure to different languages over a child’s
life. Either this could be included as a separate measure (i.e. the standard devi-
ation of proportions from year to year), or the statistical analyses could use the
year-by-year proportions directly. A mixed effects modelling approach could test
whether change over time was an important factor to include in the main analysis.
In another example, Parra et al. (2011) investigate the extent to which phonolog-
ical memory (storing sequences of sounds) is shaped by language experience. The
participants were children raised with exposure to Spanish and English. Their
relative exposure to each language, their vocabulary size in each language and
their grammatical complexity were compared with their phonological memory for
English-like non-words and Spanish-like non-words. Hierarchical regressions were
used to demonstrate the extent to which their language exposure predicted their
phonological memory
The results showed the same links between phonological memory and language
development as found in monolinguals (Gathercole, 2006), but also found effects
of the proportion of exposure to each language. Parra et al. suggest that lan-
guage exposure supports the development of language-specific phonological mem-
ory skills that, in turn, support language development. The conclusions of the
research address the research question directly and are stated directly in terms of
the direct measures involved: Parra et al. state that “language exposure showed
language-specific relations to phonological memory and to language development
and that phonological memory partially mediated the effect of exposure on de-
velopment” (Parra et al., 2011, p. 124).
There were no monolingual controls, and the focus of the paper is not the differ-
ence between monolinguals and bilinguals, but the insight into the development
of learning biases. That is, effectively using bilinguals as their own control, an
idea that is gaining currency:
“Using other bilingual speakers as a term of comparison, rather than
only the ‘classic’ monolingual speaker, is not only methodologically
more sound (as has been known for a long time by researchers working
on child L2 acquisition - see Schwartz, 1998) but helps to see the
‘forest’ of a general model of bilingualism beyond the individual ‘trees’
of bilingual types. This in turn is a concrete move away from the
concept of bilingualism as the ‘sum of two monolinguals’.”
(Sorace, 2011b, p. 27)
In the traditional approach, despite researchers’ best efforts to demonstrate that
‘monolingual’ and ‘bilingual’ groups are compatible in all other respects except
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language experience, there may be hidden variables that separate the two groups
(Diaz, 1983). While an individual differences approach can’t help solve this di-
rectly, at least it can demonstrate that groupings of participants emerge from the
data which align with notions of ‘monolingualism’ and ‘bilingualism’.
This approach is good for exploring hypotheses. However, the individual dif-
ferences approach does not mean a lack of commitment to an experimental hy-
pothesis. A priori hypotheses are still useful guides, but the focus shifts from
predictions about categories of people to the causes of those categories. The tradi-
tional approach makes predictions along the lines of ‘bilinguals and monolinguals
differ in X behaviour’. The individual differences approach makes predictions
like ‘increased variation in the input affects X behaviour’. Indeed, many studies
could describe their outcomes without reference to the coarser and more vague
categories of ‘monolingual’ or ‘bilingual’ at all.
However, refraining from making assumptions about speakers’ linguistic expe-
rience is not easy. For instance, while Paradis (2011) uses low-level features to
describe the linguistic experience of the experimental participants, the parents of
the participants are assigned to coarser categories. Furthermore, thinking about
how complex populations of speakers interact can be difficult. The cultural evo-
lution approach can offer solutions by using tools from the study of language
evolution.
8.6.1.1 Using tools from language evolution
As discussed above, studies of bilingualism have moved away from categorising in-
dividuals into high-level categories towards measuring low-level features of many
aspects of the input. Some of these aspects relate to properties of the individuals
providing the input, such as parents. However, if the new focus of bilingualism
research is to study how specific measures of variation affect specific measures
of learning, where to stop measuring can be difficult to judge. For example, a
child’s executive control is affected by the proportions of languages the mother
uses. Therefore, an experiment into executive control will want to measure the
mother’s variation. However, the mother’s variation would be affected by her par-
ent’s variation, so maybe the grandmother’s variation should be measured too,
and so on. Worse, considering the input of both parents, every generation the
analysis steps back in time doubles the number of people that need to be taken
into account. Worse still, children receive input from multiple speakers who are
connected in complex social structures and overlapping generations.
Of course, attempting these measurements would be very difficult. Typically,
only the immediate family of the child are considered. However, this common-
sense approach actually has a formal basis which is often used in models of lan-
guage evolution, namely a Markov chain assumption (see Gardiner, 2009, ch. 3).
This assumes that the properties of an infinite chain of states can be analysed by
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considering just a local part of the chain, for instance the previous state. Markov
chain assumptions have been used in models of language evolution (e.g. Griffiths
and Kalish, 2007). As well as recognising that states are affected by a chain of
preceding states, Markov analyses also provide a way of linking the observations
of a single generation to the general dynamics of the chain (calculating the stable
distribution, as used in Griffiths and Kalish, 2007). For instance, from data on
the probability of a child acquiring two languages in different social situations,
one can calculate the bias a child has for bilingualism. I apply this technique
to data on children acquiring minority languages (from De Houwer, 2007) in ap-
pendix B, page 201).
As demonstrated by chapters 5 to 7, computational models can be used to help
think about conceptual issues surrounding bilingualism. For example, this thesis
argues that a central factor in bilingualism is dynamic social structures. As exper-
imental questions become more complex, computational models can help clarify
the predictions made by different theories. This is already used, for instance,
in experiments on lexical selection (e.g. Calabria et al., 2011). They can also
be used to work out predictions or baseline performances in experiments where
multiple individuals interact. This is useful when considering the feasibility of a
study. For example, for a pilot experiment that simulated the minimal naming
game (see section 5.3 in chapter 5 on page 60) with multiple human participants,
I used a computational model to work out whether a manipulation of the strat-
egy of a player controlled by computer would be reflected in the performance of
the group (see section D.2 in appendix D). The model results showed that the
experiment results should provide an insight into the strategies that the human
individuals were using.
The field of bilingualism can also inform computational models of language evolu-
tion. For example, the bottom up model allowed social structures to change over
time, but the social structure was not affected by the linguistic divisions. The
literature on bilingualism and sociolinguistics suggests that the social structure
to adapts to the linguistic identities of individuals, (e.g. individuals who speak
similarly form communities, Berndt, 1959; Yallop, 1969; Chagnon, 1968, or cul-
tural practices such as marrying outside your linguistic community, e.g Jackson,
1983). Quillinan et al. (2010) uses agent-based models to explore the kinds of
social structures that emerge when individuals preferentially interact with other
individuals who speak in a similar way (see also Gong et al., 2004). The two fields
can negotiate so that the field of bilingualism suggests reasonable abstractions
for computational models, and computational models suggest reasonable baseline
behaviour for the kinds of systems that researchers in the field of bilingualism
study.
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8.6.2 Solution: Recruiting participants
The traditional approach faces problems in recruiting participants. The partici-
pant pool may be restricted due to narrow linguistic criteria and many partici-
pants may be needed to ensure statistical control between groups. An individual
differences approach can help solve these problems.
An individual differences approach exploits all responses from participants, in-
stead of averaging responses within participants (as in some other statistical ap-
proaches, such as ANOVAs). This has two implications. First, given the same
experiment, an individual differences approach might need fewer participants to
gain the same level of statistical power as a traditional approach. Secondly, this
means that it is feasible to include participants with a greater range of linguistic
experience. The differences in non-experiemntal variables between individuals
can be controlled using statistics.
An individual differences approach also allows unbalanced groups, or groups
where there is a continuous range of linguistic experience. For example, the lin-
guistic experience of some participants may have overlapping factors (e.g. some
participants who were late learners of a language also use the language on a regu-
lar basis). It also allows controlling for conditions or combinations of factors that
are not observed in the experiment (e.g. maybe there are no participants who
were exposed from birth and did not have two bilingual parents). This is useful
if studies of bilingualism want to explore a greater range of bilingual experience.
However, the individual differences approach does not mean that an experiment
can use any sample of the population. Participants are needed who exhibit di-
versity in the relevant factor or factors under investigation, so researchers must
still exercise their judgement in selecting participants. In many cases researchers
could use the same populations, but analyse them differently. An experiment
where groups are used to control for other factors may be more convincing, but
an individual differences approach may be useful when exploring new hypotheses
or when experiment participants are difficult to find.
8.6.2.1 Cumulative results
If experiments collect a lot of low-level, context-independent data, then exper-
iments may be able build on each other’s data more easily. Given the same
experimental set-up, it may be valid to include data from previous experiments
in the current one. This would mean that there may be no need to recruit ad-
ditional control participants. Furthermore, statistical inference would become
increasingly powerful as results accumulated.
In order to realise this potential, studies would need to collect compatible, low-
level, context-independent data. This is already suggested by the cultural evolu-
tion approach. Detailed questionnaires about linguistic experience are already in
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use (see De Houwer, 2009; Gutiérrez-Clellen and Kreiter, 2003; Jia and Aaronson,
2003; Paradis, 2011; Unsworth, 2011).
An individual differences approach allows freedom from constraints such as only
including participants that fit a narrow definition of bilingualism and being able
to compare data from different experiments. This could broaden the scope of
studies of bilingualism.
8.6.3 Solution: Conclusions in terms of mechanisms
As chapter 3 suggests, the concept of bilingualism involves many different con-
siderations apart from just the knowledge of two languages. As well as features
of proficiency and context of learning, it involves the knowledge of who to use
those languages with, which often goes along with experience of a wider variety
of people, cultures or places. That is, a measure of the number of countries lived
in, for example, can be seen as part of the measure of bilingualism. Rather than
impose an idea of what bilingualism is onto the research, an individual differences
approach can let the relevant features that define bilingualism emerge from the
differences in the experimental task.
The conclusions from this kind of approach will be described in terms of lower-
level measures. For example, rather than saying that bilinguals have better cog-
nitive control than monolinguals, a conclusion could say that enhanced cognitive
control occurs with exposure to contexts where individuals must inhibit certain
responses based on social variables. The latter statement better reflects the hy-
pothesised mechanism. This is a reductionist approach, which might be necessary
if the concepts behind ‘bilingualism’ are changing or are to be integrated into
other fields such as cultural evolution.
8.7 Implications
The solutions above allow experiments to make more valid assumptions about
the linguistic background of participants, recruit a wider range of participants
and link properties of the linguistic input directly to learning mechanisms. Below
I discuss some possible studies that fall out of the cultural evolution approach.
8.7.1 Answering relevant questions
The cultural evolution approach suggests collecting low-level data from a wide
range of bilingual experiences. This could help give more concrete answers to
questions from outside of academia. Parents who raise bilingual children often
express anxiety about whether their child will acquire a given language and the
best methods for ensuring bilingual acquisition (e.g. Petitto and Kovelman, 2003;
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De Houwer, 2007). The Bilingualism Matters Network8 aims to provide parents
with relevant, accurate information about bilingual language acquisition, based
on current research. However, parents’ questions often describe a quite specific
context, then ask how they can improve the chances of their child becoming fully
bilingual. Here’s one example posted online to an online Bilingualism Matters
forum 9:
“I live in a remote place in Scotland with my Scottish husband and our
two kids. Although I would like my kids to be able to speak Dutch (my
mother tongue) I find it really difficult to be consistent and persistent
as I am their only source of the language. I now wonder if I left it too
late for them to really pick up Dutch. They are 5 and 8. My 8-year
old’s Dutch is ok-ish as he lived in Holland for the first 3 years of his
life but my daughter’s Dutch is very dormant. The other issue that
I find difficult is that Dutch is not a major language in the world. It
doesn’t have the same importance as for example Spanish or French.
Please advice [sic].”
The features here include age of acquisition, exposure to multiple speakers, ex-
posure to a native culture, access to linguistic resources, consistency in parental
language use and the perception and prestige of the language. Current experi-
ments are usually set up to answer one or two of these features in a very general
way. The majority of advice to parents from the ‘Bilingualism Matters’ group is
to stop worrying, citing general findings that children are flexible and sensitive
learners.
The cultural evolution approach could lead to more specific answers. It sug-
gested that experiments should use low-level, context-independent measures to
build cumulative databases of compatible experiment results from a wide range
of bilingual experiences. These data could be used to create a statistical model of
the effects on and results of bilingualism. For example, one could build a model so
that parents could enter relevant factors of their situation and be given the likeli-
hood of their child acquiring proficiency in a minority language. The model could
also predict other areas of bilingual advantage such as executive control (e.g. Bi-
alystok and Craik, 2010), reading skills (e.g. Edwards and Christophersen, 2011)
and interpersonal skills such as empathy (e.g. Dewaele and Wei, 2012). The
model would exploit the individual differences of experiment participants to fit
predictions as close to the situation of the parents as is possible. Doing this with
the traditional approach (presuming results were compatible) would involve first
assigning the child in question to a categorical group, which might not be suitable.
More importantly, the model could suggest key areas where a change would have
the biggest impact. This might depend on the context. For example, in one sit-




to lead to good acquisition while in another context a ‘one-parent-one-language’
approach might be more likely to yield greater benefits.
This kind of model could have a practical impact on bilingual communities in
the short-term. It would also be useful in terms of understanding how linguistic
variation, learning biases and social structures coevolve. This is a speculative
project, not least because it would require collaboration and sharing of data be-
tween institutions and researchers. However, sharing data has been productive in
other areas of language acquisition such as the CHILDES database (MacWhin-
ney, 2000). There are also several projects that are addressing the theoretical
and practical problems involved in building collaborative databases for language
acquisition research (e.g. McCue et al., 2007; Steinhart et al., 2008; Lust et al.,
2010).
8.7.2 Artificial language learning
A major challenge for many studies of bilingualism is finding participants with
the relevant language background, especially when considering infants. However,
finding participants with the relevant language background for some language
evolution studies is essentially impossible, since they would require humans with-
out knowledge of language. Despite this, there are a number of experimental
techniques that have been used to study language evolution. Artificial language
learning paradigms have been used to investigate how individuals learn multiple
conflicting grammars (e.g. Nation and McLaughlin, 1986; Nayak et al., 1990;
McLaughlin and Nayak, 1989). Learners who have experience with a greater
number of natural languages learn artificial grammars better and faster (Kemp,
2001) and also use a greater range of learning strategies (Kemp, 2007). Partici-
pants can also adapt to relevant sources of information in the input (e.g. Gómez,
2002; Saffran et al., 1999; Smith et al., 2011).
Artificial languages have also been used in the iterated learning paradigm (Kirby
et al., 2008; Tamariz et al., 2012; Perfors and Navarro, 2011). Participants learn
an artificial language, and then are asked to reproduce it. Their reproduction
then becomes the input for the next generation. This happens repeatedly to cre-
ate a chain of learners. The way the language changes can be tracked over time.
If the study of bilingualism can be reformulated as the study of how linguistic
signals and social structures coevolve, then this paradigm could be used. Some
preliminary investigations of the impact of social structure in this paradigm sug-
gest that it has an impact on the emergence of structure in the linguistic system
(Tamariz et al., 2012; Line, 2010; Tan and Fay, 2011).
There are two ways artificial languages may be used in studies of bilingualism.
These involve testing participants with profiles of interest, and priming partici-
pants to have profiles of interest. The former participant group can be studied
using iterated learning. Griffiths et al. (2008) demonstrate that chains of iterated
185
learning can reveal the inductive biases of individuals (also reviewed in section
7.4.1 in chapter 7). Participants were exposed to a learning task and then tested
to produce data for the next participant in the chain. While the change between
individuals was slight, over many iterations the distribution of the data converged
to reflect the learning biases of participants10. It would be therefore possible, for
example, to estimate in real learners the strength of their cognitive bias for ex-
pecting variation in the input. As long as the data that a participant sees is the
result of the output of a previous learner, the eventual distribution of the data
should be informative for the hypothesised biases. This means that it may be
possible to run this kind of experiment with infants. It may be possible to track
the strength of particular learning biases of ‘monolinguals’ or ‘bilinguals’ over the
course of development to examine how cognitive biases adapt to different types
of input.
Alternatively, it may be possible to ‘create’ bilinguals in the lab. That is, ex-
pose (monolingual) adults to an artificial language learning environment that
will prime a cognitive profile compatible with real bilingual profiles. For exam-
ple, adults completing a cross-situational word learning task11 adapt their learn-
ing strategies according to whether words are presented in blocks or interleaved
(Smith et al., 2011). One could imagine, then, constructing an artificial language
learning experiment where participants had to learn two languages, L1 and L2
and then were then tested on one (see figure 8.3). The order of learning could
be manipulated to prime different profiles: L1 first then L2 second, then tested
on L2 would prime an L2 learner profile. L1 fist then L2 second, then tested on
L1 would prime an attrited speaker. Being exposed to interleaved rounds of L1
and L2, then tested on L1 would prime a balanced bilingual profile. It would be
interesting to see if similar effects to the ones mentioned above could be obtained
in the short term. In a similar way, it may be possible to prime executive control
profiles in the short term, helping to explore the questions raised about how lan-
guage experience and executive control are related (see above and section 5.9.3).
The advantages of this kind of experiment are, firstly, that it allows very de-
tailed control over the language experience of the participant. Secondly, finding
eligible participants is much easier and experiments are quicker to run. Finally, it
is possible to construct control conditions that might be very rare or not actually
10This task was a function learning task where participants were exposed to images of two bars
whose lengths covaried. They were asked to learn the function that determined the relationship
between the bar lengths. Then they were asked to produce the correct length of one bar given
the length of another. Regardless of the function in the initial data, the data converged to a
linear (usually positive) relationship, suggesting a bias towards positive linear relationships.
11Cross-situational word learning tasks involve participants learning mappings between novel
words and novel objects by being exposed to many instances of a novel word paired with a set
of novel objects. There is referential uncertainty in any one of the exposures, but by combining







Figure 8.3: Methods to prime different cognitive profiles in the lab, based on
training and testing different artificial languages in different orders. Grey and
white boxes indicate blocks of training or testing in different artificial languages.
exist in the world12. Artificial language learning experiments trade off realis-
ticness for control. This is similar in many ways to the trade off between real
experiments and simulations, and results from each can mutually support each
other (see Scott-Phillips and Kirby, 2010 and Cornish et al., 2009, p. 199). In the
next section I present a pre-pilot experiment which demonstrates that creating
bilinguals in the lab may be feasible.
8.7.2.1 Creating bilinguals in the lab: a proof of concept
Bilinguals have been shown to have better executive control than monolinguals
(e.g. Bialystok and Craik, 2010; Hernández et al., 2010; Treccani et al., 2009).
Children raised bilingually have more linguistic variation they need to inhibit,
but might also be exposed to more variation in other non-linguistic cultural as-
pects. Controlling for this is difficult. However, while many studies use previous
experience as an independent variable, it could be used as the dependent variable.
It might be possible to prime executive control in the short-term, therefore ‘cre-
ating’ participants with the cognitive profiles similar to bilinguals, but without
necessarily knowledge of two languages. These could serve as useful controls. An
informal experiment tested whether this was possible.
Method: 18 participants were recruited13 and split evenly into two groups: A
switching group and a control group. The participants in the switching group
played alternating rounds of ‘rock-paper-scissors’ (see “Rock-paper-scissors”, n.d.)
12For instance: where utterances are not uttered by specific individuals (e.g. Mackey, 1965);
a system where responses must be in a different language to the requesting language (e.g. Lo,
2002); where communicated strings are covertly scrambled (Hurford, 1999); where objects have
impossible properties (Scott-Phillips et al., 2010)
13The participants were from diverse language backgrounds. The purpose of this informal
experiment was to demonstrate that the concept worked, so no detail about the linguistic
background of individuals was taken. Obviously, given the arguments of this chapter, a full
experiment would control for these factors. While this experiment is informal, it provides more
support for the ‘creating bilinguals in the lab’ proposal than mere speculation.
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and ‘odds or evens’ (see “Odds or Evens”, n.d.) in pairs for five minutes while the
non-switching group played only ‘rock-paper-scissors’14. The rules of the game
were explained to the participants before starting. Tokens were used to help
participants keep score. The participants then completed an inhibition task to
measure their executive control performance. The inhibition task involved writ-
ing a list of nouns (in their native language) where no adjacent pairs had an
obvious semantic connection. Participants wrote as many as they could think
of in a minute. It was predicted that the switching group will do better at the
inhibition task.
Results: The switching group did significantly better at the inhibition task
than the control group (mean for switching group = 17.3 items, mean for control
group = 12.7 items, t = -2.7, p = 0.01, see figure 8.4). The qualitative results
were not altered by taking into account the participant’s score for the priming
games. Priming a non-linguistic executive control task affected linguistic inhibi-
tion in the short-term. If this effect can be shown to be robust, then it might
suggest that the bilingual advantage in cognitive control stems from experiences
in non-linguistic domains. Bilingual children may be exposed to a greater range
of non-linguistic cultural stimuli (e.g. because they may have parents or extended
family from different cultural backgrounds). If this is the case, then the results
suggest that non-linguistic executive control advantages might stem from varia-
tion in non-linguistic domains, thus resolving part of Sorace (2011a)’s ‘bilingual
paradox’ (bilingual children appear to exhibit benefits in non-linguistic domains,
but deficits in some areas of language competence).
8.7.3 Comparative approach
If the central question about bilingualism is how input factors affect learning
mechanisms which affect communicative output, then the scope of relevant ob-
jects of study could extend beyond just humans. That is, we might be able to
use insights from studies of how non-human animals learn and communicate to
inform theories of bilingualism in humans. This comparative approach (Hauser
et al., 2002) recognises an evolutionary relationship between the cognitive mech-
anisms of humans and other animals. There is already some work along these
lines. For example, Hayashi and Matsuzawa (2003) use the same experimental
conditions for human and chimpanzee infants (including the same experimenters,
stimuli and laborotory), observing differences in the way the two species play and
interact with their parents.
The central requirement for a bilingual ability, according to this thesis, is the abil-
ity to condition linguistic variation on social variables. As chapter 2 suggested,
14These are popular children’s games based on co-ordination and chance. For example, in
“odds or evens”, one player takes the role of ‘odds’ and one the role of ‘evens’. Both players
choose to display either one or two fingers at the same time. If the sum of the fingers is odd,



























Figure 8.4: Mean number of responses to the inhibition task by group with 95%
confidence intervals. The group who switched between two tasks prior to the
inhibition task gave significantly more responses on average.
other species primarily learn how signals are conditioned on social variables, and
it is the conditioning on other semantic variables (identity of tertiary objects,
objects displaced in space or time) that is difficult. This might suggest that the
basis of a ‘bilingual’ ability is evolutionary very old, and amenable to a compar-
ative approach.
One area that has been studied in both bilingualism research and animal be-
haviour is word learning and mutual exclusivity. Human children can use the prin-
ciple of mutual exclusivity to disambiguate the referent of an utterance (Mark-
man and Wachtel, 1988; Markman, 1992). However, children raised bilingually
do not consistently use the mutual exclusivity principle (Au and Glusman, 1990;
Merriman and Kutlesic, 1993; Healey and Skarabela, 2009; Byers-Heinlein and
Werker, 2009a; Houston-Price et al., 2010). Recent research in animal behaviour
has shown that non-human animals are capable of using mutual exclusivity, too,
including dogs (Kaminski et al., 2004; Pilley and Reid, 201115) and parrots (Pep-
perberg and Wilcox, 2000). For a direct comparison of animals and children,
see Grassmann et al. (in press) and Markman and Abelev (2004) discusses how
results from experiments with dogs informs theories of mutual exclusivity in hu-
mans. These results might suggest that the use of the mutual exclusivity principle
is not the ‘default’, but just a particular heuristic that is learned in the right sit-
uation.
15Alliston Reid suggests that Chaser could ‘learn by exclusion’ (eliminate objects with
known labels as the target of a novel label), but also learned multiple words for the
same object (a proper-noun like ‘bunny’, but also a common noun like ‘toy’), which goes
against mutual exclusivity (see response to my blog post http://replicatedtypo.com/
dog-exhibits-mutual-exclusivity-bias).
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Other experiments could also have an impact on theories of mutual exclusivity.
For example, Inoue and Matsuzawa (2007) found that chimpanzees can correctly
remember the location of 9 randomly arranged numerals displayed for 210ms -
shorter than an average human eye saccade. Humans, however, perform poorly
at this task. Matsuzawa (2012) suggests a semantic link hypothesis: while chimps
have good visual, eidetic memory, humans are good at symbolic associations (see
Roberts and Quillinan, in press, for an empirical test of this hypothesis). The
extra information in the semantic, linguistic links that humans possess increase
the load on working memory and make this task difficult for them. Indeed,
chimpanzees trained to use a basic language also performed poorly. This could
be linked with the effect found in Mather et al. (2010), which shows that 9-21
month old human infants take longer to develop a visual novelty preference for
objects when they are presented simultaneously with auditory labels. If the effect
is additive, so that multiple labels delay the novelty preference further, then this
might explain the difference in mutual exclusivity behaviour. Rather than a prag-
matic response, bilingual children’s tendency to assign novel labels to novel and
known objects equally often may be a delayed novelty preference, underpinned
by a processing explanation. This insight could affect the kinds of controls that
are considered in research on word learning.
8.8 Conclusion
Traditional approaches assume a qualitative, categorical difference between mono-
linguals and bilinguals. This thesis has argued that there are conceptual flaws
with this approach which lead to some problems with research into bilingualism.
This chapter presented a cultural evolution approach to bilingualism, which sug-
gests exploiting the variation in individual differences to broaden the scope of
bilingualism studies. Indeed, some recent research takes an individual differences
approach using low-level measurements and avoiding placing participants into
discrete categories.
The question that arises out of this approach is how input factors affect the way
individuals learn and how this, in turn, affects features of the linguistic output.
The object of study, then, is not individuals with a particular type of linguistic
experience, but the way a wide range of linguistic experience and cultural ex-
perience interact. This brings the research questions of the field of bilingualism
closer to those of the field of language evolution, which also considers how lin-
guistic variation, learning biases and social structures coevolve.
The sections above suggest that the scope of the field of bilingualism could be
increased by taking a cultural evolution approach which promotes the integration
of detailed linguistic measures with new experimental paradigms, computational
models and comparative evidence. This will necessarily mean interdisciplinary
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work, and the need for collaboration across fields. While the bulk of this thesis
has shown how bilingualism is relevant for language evolution, it should also now




“Behind these new ideas about how society should be managed was a
model of the individual as a rational, calculating machine whose self-
interested behaviour could be analysed by numbers. They had made
an assumption that we were like that, simply in order to make their
equations and their models work. But what was was now rising up
was a powerful scientific proof that this was not just an assumption.
That we really were computing machines, guided by numbers.”
Curtis (2007)
9.1 An evolutionary approach to Bilingualism
This thesis set out to explore bilingualism from an evolutionary perspective. It
quickly became clear that traditional concepts used to define bilingualism become
problematic when thinking about biological and cultural change in the long term.
Through a consideration of the abilities of other species, and through modelling
cultural evolution, a concrete definition of bilingualism emerged which represents
this thesis’s contribution to knowledge. This definition of bilingualism is the
amount of linguistic optionality that is conditioned of social factors. The ability
to condition optionality on social factors is argued to be evolutionarily old. This
implies that, instead of seeing bilingualism as a peripheral ability to be studied
after monolingualism is well understood, bilingualism can be a central part of the
story of language evolution.
The thesis presents two types of model that look at the dynamics of bilingual
cultural evolution. Top down models assume that languages are discrete, mono-
lithic, stable entities and individuals have a specific, rational learning mechanism
for learning multiple languages. These models suggest that the key factors that
affect the dynamics of the prevalence of bilingualism in a population are the
cognitive bias towards learning multiple languages in each individual and the
structure of the transmission chain. Although allowing computational agents to
learn more than one language might seem like a trivial task, it requires qualitative
changes to the models. A bottom up model, on the other hand, assumes that
languages dynamically emerge from use and that individuals have general learn-
ing mechanisms that condition linguistic variation on salient semantic variables.
The key factor that affect bilingualism in this model is dynamic changes to the
social structure.
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Previous chapters suggested that there were three resolutions to the ‘bilingual
paradox’: If learning two languages is harder than learning one, why is bilin-
gualism so prevalent? First, an evolutionary approach to bilingualism (chapter
2) suggests that the paradox is using the wrong unit of analysis. Rather than
the number of ‘languages’, it is the complexity and saliency of the conditioning
factors that poses a challenge to learning.
The other two resolutions come from different types of computational model.
The top down model suggests that the inference in the paradox does not hold.
Population-level phenomena (e.g. the number of bilingual speakers) are not
straightforwardly linked to individual learning biases (e.g. an expectation there
will only be one language in the input). Cultural transmission can lead to dis-
tributions at the population level that exaggerate the individual bias, or in some
cases, go completely against them.
In contrast, the bottom up model suggests that the paradox considers both the
wrong unit of analysis and the wrong conception of bilingualism. That is, bilin-
gualism is not just a measure of the variation in linguistic variables in a pop-
ulation, but how those variables are conditioned on social variables. If social
variables are salient conditioning factors, then bilingualism emerges. This fits
with the evidence from the literature on bilingualism that shows that children
are adept at learning multiple languages simultaneously due to flexible learning
mechanisms. However, a key factor that leads to salient social conditioning fac-
tors is dynamic social structures. Social distinctions in stable populations may
be hard to maintain, and the amount of bilingualism will decline, not due to
competing variants, but due to a lack of variation at the social level.
The results of the bottom up model suggests a change to research questions
in language evolution and language acquisition. Rather than asking why there
is so much linguistic variation, evolutionary linguists could equally ask why the
language acquisition capacity is so flexible. Similarly, researchers in the field of
bilingualism could shift from asking ‘what are the differences between monolin-
guals and bilinguals’? to ‘How do linguistic variation, learning biases and social
structures coevolve’?
The differences between the results of the two types of model demonstrate that
the tools that are suitable for studying one kind of problem (e.g. cultural evolu-
tion of linguistic variants) are not necessarily suitable for studying another (e.g.
the cultural evolution of bilingualism). The top down models are not fundamen-
tally opposed to the bottom up approach, but the constraints of the top down
method tend to bias researchers towards making certain kinds of simplifying as-
sumptions. These will be specific to the research question, so applying them to
other questions may not always be valid. This suggests that researchers must
continually uncover and test the assumptions that they make. It may be diffi-




This thesis suggests that applying assumptions designed for one research question
to a different research question may not be valid. Applying assumptions across
fields may also be problematic, so researchers should be careful to articulate their
assumptions behind and limits of their models. For example, in the 1950s, John
Nash developed mathematical models of strategising called Game Theory which
assumed that individuals were self-interested, rational beings (e.g. Nash, 1950).
The legacy of this theory ran deep, in theories of biology (Smith and Price, 1973)
and theories of economics (e.g. Shapiro, 1989) but also in political strategies
(Downs, 1957), social policy (e.g. Kahan et al., 1992), foreign policy (see Mintz
and DeRouen Jr, 2010, ch. 4), morality (e.g. Sober and Wilson, 1999) and even
psychiatry (e.g. Colman and Wilson, 2011). In a series of television documen-
taries, Curtis (2007, 2011) argued that these have had damaging consequences on
society. Recently, Nash has stated that he “may have over-emphasised rationality
... on the part of humans” (Curtis, 2007).
Many models used to explore cultural evolution assume that humans are rational.
These are attempts to create a science of how culture changes and evolves. This
thesis has argued that assumptions about rationality and about the ideal speaker
and community can affect the direction of research, leading to a disregard for the
reality of the individual and a view of bilingualism as a paradoxical, minor, even
unwanted situation.
This thesis has demonstrated that bilingualism is a complex concept which often
relies on identity, history and politics. In fact, the linguistic uniformity between
individuals is independent from the amount of linguistic variation within individ-
uals. Everyone can agree that there’s more than one way to say something. A
model with a non-rational, flexible learning mechanism demonstrates that, while
populations typically strive towards uniformity, social factors shape what features
become important parts of that uniformity. It is important that researchers’ as-
sumptions are constantly uncovered, clearly defined, explored and re-evaluated.
There’s no telling where these assumptions may be reapplied.
9.2.1 Language Policy
Perhaps one obvious area of possible impact is language policy. Language policies
can have a big impact on societies and are heavily politicised. For instance,
Pifer (1979) claims of bilingual education policies that “few other educational
experiments in recent years have managed to arouse such passionate debate”
(Pifer, 1979, p. 4). Researchers in the field of language policy have been drawing
on work from language evolution. Indeed, in the introduction to Language Policy,
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Spolsky discusses language evolution, citing some of the literature reviewed in this
thesis and concluding that dynamic social structures are an important factor in
language policy:
“Language evolution is to be explained not just by small random vari-
ation strengthened by geographical isolation, but also by including
functional and social selection. Nettle (1999:79) proposes that dif-
ferent “ecological regimes favored different kinds of social networks,
which in turn produce different-sized linguistic groups.” The activat-
ing factor in his model is “ecological risk,” managed by non-industrial
societies by forming social networks that reduce diversity as people
communicate with each other. The greater the ecological risk, the
more interaction and so the fewer languages there will be in a country
of a given size and population. The change from hunter-gatherers to
farmers and herders reduced linguistic diversity, as did European ex-
pansion and industrialization. It is social policy rather than language
policy that is needed to maintain it.”
(Spolsky, 2004, p. 7-8)
In another example, Grundy (2007) relates the iterated learning model to meth-
ods of teaching English as a foreign language. Grundy “considers the significance
of Kirby’s iterated learning account of language evolution”, suggesting that there
are “striking parallels between the evolution of pragmatic inference and choices
in second language teaching methodology” (Grundy, 2007, p. 219-220) and con-
cludes that the interaction between learning biases and cultural evolution would
naturally favour a “use-in-order-to-learn” approach to teaching English as a for-
eign language. Grundy also argues that “the current status of English [as a global
lingua franca] is not only a consequence of political and social development but
also of language evolution and iterated learning” (Grundy, 2007, p. 219).
Furthermore, rational approaches to linguistics have been explicitly linked with
rational approaches in language policy (see Ingram, 2003, p. 11). Some extend
this rational approach to language learning to implications about the dynamics
of bilingual cultural transmission. For example, Mackey suggests that “a self-
sufficient bilingual community has no reason to remain bilingual, since a closed
community in which everyone is fluent in two languages could get along just as
well with one language” (Mackey, 2000, p. 22). The bottom up model presented
in this thesis demonstrated that bilingualism decreases when social structures are
stable. However, the result of the model does not endorse Mackey’s statement.
The model was extremely simple and contained no aspects of cultural identity,
prestige, economics, politics and so on. It was a ‘null’ model that demonstrated
some basic factors of bilingual cultural evolution, and used a concept of bilingual-
ism that is not immediately analogous with situations recognised as ‘bilingual’
in the real world. The results of the model should not be taken as a proof or
validation of policies that limit linguistic variation. In fact, they suggest quite
the opposite, as will now be outlined.
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The aims of a language policy should be to maximise people’s access to education
and to maximise cohesion in order to increase co-operation and national develop-
ment (Ingram, 2003; Kaplan, 2008). Some models discussed in this dissertation
show how populations achieve cohesion. However, many have an implicit assump-
tion that variants are in competition and increasing cohesion involves decreasing
variation (see section 5.3 in chapter 5). Some models see the choice to learn lan-
guages as rational and self-interested, based on personal gain (e.g. Iriberri and
Uriarte, 2012). Those belonging to the majority group therefore don’t have a ra-
tional reason to learn the languages of minority groups. The language policy that
makes sense given these assumptions is to emphasise the incentives the minority
groups have to learn the majority language.
However, there is another possible route to cohesion which involves maintaining
the levels of variation, but altering the distribution of variation so that everyone
speaks all languages. A policy that makes sense under this approach is to give
everybody an equal opportunity to learn all the languages, and to emphasise the
incentives the majority group has to learn the minority language. This might seem
as an unrealistic policy, but is in fact being used to promote languages like Welsh,
Scottish Gallic and multilingual schools in the UK and Europe. For instance, the
Bilingualism Matters (http://www.bilingualism-matters.org.uk/) organisa-
tion encourages parents to raise their children bilingually for the benefits to cog-
nition (e.g. Bialystok and Craik, 2010; Bialystok, 2011; Lauchlan et al., 2012),
among others. Indeed, while some assume that linguistic diversity in education
can only be disruptive (e.g. Shipton, 2008; Penman, 2010), a UK school with
pupils from 72 language backgrounds was seeing 92% of its students receive 5
A-levels at A*-C level recently (Sollis, 2010). While some areas have less linguis-
tic diversity to take advantage of, similar benefits may be achieved by educating
people about linguistic diversity through the study of linguistics in schools (see
Arnold, 2012). Multilingual language policies have been shown to have advan-
tages over monolingual policies, including advantages beyond the ability to com-
municate (e.g. Hornberger, 2002, 2009).
Some models make explicit links to language policy. Abrams and Strogatz sug-
gest that their model “may be useful in the design and evaluation of language-
preservation programs” (Abrams and Strogatz, 2003, p. 900, see section 5.2 in
chapter 5). However, this statement has been criticised (Fernando et al., 2010),
not least because bilingualism was not possible in their model (see section 5.2),
and their only suggestion - to raise the prestige of the minority language - is
undermined by the fact that simpler models without prestige can produce the
same results (Reali and Griffiths, 2010, see section 5.9.1 in chapter 5).
In another example, Iriberri and Uriarte (2012) use a game theory approach
(a Hawk-Dove game) to the stability of bilingualism. They conclude that reduc-
ing the uncertainty about a bilingual’s identity can increase stability of minority
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language, and expressly link this to possible language policies. However, this may
not be a realistic solution, as they also note that “a language policy consisting
of marking or labelling people to denote their bilingual nature could be an addi-
tional source of conflict” (Iriberri and Uriarte, 2012, p. 21).
Fernando et al. (2010) demonstrate the difference between extending an inter-
pretation of a model to implications for language policy and building models
whose purpose is to explore language policies. Fernando et al. present a mathe-
matical model of the transmission dynamics of a community with a high-status
language and a low-status language. The baseline behaviour of the model is that
low-status language eventually becomes extinct. This is compared with the dy-
namics under 3 types of intervention: (1) promoting the status of the low-status
language so that learners are more motivate to learn it; (2) using government
programs to increase exposure to the low-status language and (3) formal teach-
ing of the low-status language to children who speak the high-status language.
These interventions can maintain the low-status language in the population. The
most effective strategy is to increase the amount of exposure to the low-status
language (2), followed by teaching the low-status language to children who speak
the high-status language (3). Increasing the status of the low-status language (1)
had little effect unless the change was drastic, in contrast with the conclusions of
other models (Abrams and Strogatz, 2003). The solution involves increasing the
number of bilingual speakers, rather than maintaining a monolingual low-status
language community. Fernando et al. actually suggest that governments could
estimate their parameter settings and use the model to decide which intervention
strategy to invest in.
In summary, the models discussed in this thesis are very abstract, and it is
easy to re-interpret them as representing cultural factors other than language.
Researchers should be explicit about the assumptions they are making and the
scope of their models since it is difficult to predict where they will be re-applied.
9.3 Future work
This thesis presented two types of model with different assumptions and demon-
strated that they can lead to different conclusions. The most productive model
given the research questions of this thesis was the bottom up model. As mentioned
in chapter 7, there are still many aspects of this model that could be explored,
such as manipulating the environment, modelling migration between groups, or
allowing the cultural identity of individuals to be influenced by their behaviour.
As suggested in appendix A.1, there are options for extending the model so, for
instance, the linguistic signal has more than one dimension. Manipulating the
learning biases of individuals was also not explored to a great extent (although
see manipulations of the stepwise information criterion, appendix C).
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Although the bottom up model suited the current research questions, there is
no reason why top down models could not model the same process. I have ar-
gued that the constraints of top down models may lead researchers towards mak-
ing certain simplifying assumptions initially, but as chapter 5 demonstrated, top
down models are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Since top down techniques
might yield more robust results, it is hoped that the bottom up model in this
thesis can highlight the kinds of considerations that needed to make a valid top
down model of bilingualism.
The conception of bilingualism used in this thesis is intended to be one that
can unite different fields of linguistics under a common research question. I have
argued that language evolution and bilingualism have much in common. I have
also suggested that theories of sociolinguistics such as audience design have a
very compatible view of language systems, but it would be interesting to work
out further parallels between language evolution and sociolinguistics. Since cul-
tural identity involves geography, history, politics and the psychology of identity,
it is possible that many fields could contribute towards the question of how lin-
guistic (or cultural) variation, learning biases and social structures coevolve.
9.4 Conclusion
Bilingualism is best thought about as the amount of linguistic optionality that is
conditioned on social variables. Rather than an atypical experience or an ancillary
object of study, bilingualism can be seen as a central feature of language use and
a central part the story of language evolution. This opens up the scope of the
object of study for both the fields of bilingualism and language evolution. This
thesis suggests that researchers in both fields are converging on similar questions
and may have methods, tools and data to share. Researchers should keep an open








Linear regression attempts to explain the variance in a dataset by assuming the
dynamics are linear. For each independent variable x1, x2...xn there is a slope β
and an error or intercept ε which is fitted to a variable y which is to be explained.
yi = β1x1 + ε1 + β2x2 + ε2...+ βnxn + εn (A.1)
Commonly, the ε terms are collected under a single error term. The model pre-
sented in chapter 7 would like to capture the ability of language learners to detect
which semantic variables are important in explaining the variation in a speech
signal. That is, not all variables are necessarily entered into the model. One may
represent this by setting β for variables that are not to be entered to zero. How-
ever, this is slightly misleading, since values of β near to zero are not necessarily
unimportant. A variable with a small slope might explain a lot of the variance
while a variable with a steep slope might explain little. More commonly, variables
are removed altogether from the model. This means that, as well as each variable
having an optimal slope and intercept, there is a space of models containing all
possible combinations of variables.
Stepwise regression is a method of searching this space for the best model (a
set of variables which have been identified as important conditioning factors for
the dependent variable). There are many criteria for comparing models. One
consideration is the size of the model. Models with fewer variables may be sim-
pler (low variance), but they may also miss some important explanatory variables
(high bias). Models with many variables may cause overfitting. In this model, this
may be analogous to the tension between a language that is learnable (simple but
also expressive (accounts for many aspects of meaning). Another consideration
in model selection is the amount of variation explained. Adding more variables
to a model will improve its accuracy.
However, we would like to take into account both the accuracy and simplicity
of the model. We don’t want to add a variable to the model unless it improves
the results significantly. Information criteria is used to compare models in this
way. For a set of nested models (where the variables used in each successive
model is a sub-set of the previous model), information criteria can be used to
measure the improvement of the model after each variable is added variables. A
typical information criterion used in stepwise regression is the Akaike information
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criterion (AIC). AIC is calculated as
AIC = 2k − 2ln(L) (A.2)
Where k is the number of variables in the model and L is the maximised value of
the likelihood function of the model (the likelihood of the data occurring given
the model). The model with the lowest AIC is considered the best. This means
that AIC rewards accuracy (large L) but punishes models with many variables
(large k).
There is a Bayesian information criteron (BIC, also called the Schwarz infor-
mation criterion or SIC) where the model score is calculated as
BIC = ln(n)k − 2ln(L) (A.3)
where n is the number of data points. This punishes the size of the model more
harshly than AIC. Shtatland and Barton (1998) suggest parametrising the two
measures as:
IC(c) = ck − 2ln(L) (A.4)
Where c = 0 is the classical likelihood statistic, c = 1 is equivalent to the gen-
eralised linear interactive modelling (GLIM) goodness-of-fit, c = 2 is AIC and
c = ln(n) is equivalent to BIC. Shtatland and Barton (1998) also point out that
it may be better to take the information criteria scores as probabilistic, and fo-
cus on a probability distribution over models rather than selecting a single ‘best’
model. They suggest that the models in the ‘window’ between the AIC and BIC
selections may provide a sub-set of relevant models for tractability. That is, AIC
and BIC may choose different models in the nested space of models and we can
consider all the models between these two.
The c variable here could be used as a kind of bias in the model for learnability
versus expressivity. With c = 2, the more complex models are favoured while
higher values of c favour more ‘expressive’ models.
A.1.1 Bayesian linear regression
It is possible to take a rational Bayesian approach to regression (see Griffiths
et al., 2009; Kalish et al., 2007, also textbooks on Bayesian statistics e.g. Gelman
et al., 1995). Given a space of models, the likelihood of the model is simply how
well it predicts the data - this is no different from the likelihood evaluation above
(with c = 0). In addition to this, a prior probability distribution over the model
space is defined, giving a higher a priori probability to certain models. This is
similar to the term in the information criteria method for punishing large mod-
els. However, the Bayesian prior is more flexible and can be used to punish any
type of model. The prior is defined as a Gaussian distribution over the βi and
εi variables. Learners may have a bias towards a particular variable or a more
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general bias, for instance favouring models with steep slopes and low intercepts.
Being able to control a bias over low-level statistical properties of the learner
is a useful property. However, it is unclear why one would assume anything else
other than a bias for steeps slopes and low intercepts. As mentioned above,
Shtatland and Barton (1998) suggest that a fully Bayesian approach may not be
necessary, especially since the specific priors are initially unknown. A Bayesian
approach will not be pursued for now.
A.2 Cluster analysis
Cluster analysis attempts to define categorical clusters from a set of data. For
instance, given a set of unlabelled data on vowel quality (F1 and F2), a cluster
analysis would reveal the statistically significant clusters. That is, it could ‘learn’
the relevant contrasts in the language.
Cluster analysis has been applied to many problems in language learning (see Val-
labha et al., 2007). Vallabha et al. (2007) apply cluster analysis to a real corpus
of child-directed speech. They use an extension of the Expectation-Maximisation
algorithm1 that assumes that vowel clusters are defined by a gaussian distribu-
tion which themselves have a probability of generating an instance. The model
predicts both the number of vowels, the parameters of those vowels and the prob-
abilities of those vowels occurring. In order to generate training and test data,
the parameters of the real data were estimated and then used to generate more
data. Thus, this paper defines both learning and production.
It would be a relatively simple process to iterate this model. However, the algo-
rithm is more complicated than is required for an abstract model. More straight-
forward off-the-shelf models are available such as parametrised Gaussian mixture
model determined by Estimation-Maximisation. The cluster analysis algorithm
searches a space of models defined by a number of categories. Each category is
defined by a mean and a variance for each semantic variable. The best model is
selected based on information criteria (as discussed in section A.1). This is sim-
ilar to stepwise linear regression in terms of the kinds of analysis that would be
done. For instance, the bilingual measurements discussed in section 7.3.2 would
also work for a cluster analysis model. The flexibility of social structure and
semantic variables would also be unaffected. However, while the linear regression
model will ignore some variables (by dropping them from the model), the cluster
analysis model is more continuous, making it less ‘clean’. An iterated cluster
analysis model would have a lot in common with Perfors and Navarro (2011)’s
experiment discussed in section 7.4.2.
1The Online Mixture Estimation algorithm developed in Vallabha et al. (2007) is an on-
line Expectation-Maximisation algorithm that calculates its covariance matrix using gradient
descent.
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The implementation is fairly simple. In fact, here is the code for implement-
ing an iterated cluster analysis model in R (for some results, see figure A.1):
library(mclust)





for(px in 1:num.params){ data[,px] = runif(n)}
# run iteration
for(g in 1:10){
# get best model
dataModel <- mclustModel(data, mclustBIC(data))
# produce new data
dataSim <- sim(modelName = dataModel$modelName,
parameters = dataModel$parameters, n = nrow(data))




The learner finds clusters in the data and reproduces new data based on their
model. In this model, there is no distinction between the ‘linguistic’ variables
and the semantic variables except that the ‘linguistic’ variables are culturally
transmitted. It is also possible to easily define more than one ‘linguistic’ variable,
while in the linear regression model having more than one independent variable
complicates the model. This model could also be extended to include hierarchical
clustering to create hierarchies of clusters.
A.2.1 Learning categories and symbolic links at the same
time
Part of the problem with using linear regression is that the links between the
linguistic signal and the semantic variables are not arbitrary nor symbolic. One
way to address this is to combine the statistical learning properties of cluster
analysis with a symbolic learning approach2. For instance, the learner could use
cluster analysis to determine a set of categorical clusters in the linguistic vari-
ables (analogous to words or phonemes) and another set for the symbolic variables
(analogous to concepts). It could then construct an exemplar corpus of categori-
cal data given the raw data. For example, a particular case might have linguistic
variables that were categorised under word X and semantic variables that were
categorised as concept Y. This would mean that word X refers to word Y and the
learner could store this example in its memory (see figure A.2). While determin-
ing the categories models statistical learning, building the corpus is more like an
2This idea was developed with Márton Sóskuthy
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Figure A.1: Categories changing over generations (left to right, top to bottom)
in an iterated cluster analysis model. An initial language with many categories
reduce to three then two then one category. 2 linguistic variables, 1 non-linguistic
variable, n=30, initialised with uniformly distributed random variables.
exemplar theory model. The advantage over a simple cluster model is that it has
non-arbitrary links between linguistic and semantic variables while the advantage
over exemplar models is that categories are estimated rather than pre-specified.
Words could also refer to more than one object, brining this model closer to being
able to answer questions about mutual exclusivity.
While the description above suggested defining clusters based on all the seman-
tic data at the same time (multivariate clusters), clusters could also be defined
for each variable separately. For instance, a semantic variable that represented
shape could divide into two clusters (square versus circle) while the variable that
represented colour could divide into three (blue, red, green). The same could be
done for the linguistic variables (e.g.vowel height variable and voice onset time
variable). The corpus is now much richer with multiple linguistic and semantic
variables, allowing the possibility that systematicity could occur (one linguistic
category representing a single semantic category).
Obviously, the cluster-exemplar model is more complicated than a linear regres-
sion model. However, it still fulfils the requirements outlined at the start of this
chapter. Furthermore, it may be more cognitively plausible since the learner has
to extract categories out of its input data rather than build a linear model of how
a linguistic signal varies with a semantic signal. The move to a discrete exemplar
model where the structure of the semantic space influences the language may also
be more extendable.
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Figure A.2: Learning process in an cluster exemplar model. The grey dots are
points generated by the same event (as are the red dots).
A.3 Other modelling techniques
A.3.1 Topographic learning
Topographic mappings are mappings between an input and an output where the
distances between input-output pairs are maximised. Ellison (2012) presents a
model of cultural evolution where agents learn mappings between signals and lex-
ical meanings using topographic learning. Communities of such agents with over-
lapping generational turnover rapidly converged on categorical, arbitrary map-
pings between signals and meanings (Ellison, 2012). The topographic learning
mechanism is a potential candidate for replacing the linear regression learning
mechanism in the bottom up model in chapter 7, since they are relatively simple
and neurologically plausible (Silver and Kastner, 2009).
A.3.2 Iterative regression
Iterated regression is not to be confused with an iterative approach to regression
(e.g. Holt and Benfer, 2000) where missing values are filled in by using a regression
on other predictors which can then be updated in the same manner.
A.3.3 Linear regularisation
Various methods for introducing biases into the model are possible using linear
regularisation methods such as ridge regression (or Tikhonov regularisation) or
the LASSO method. There are a lot of similarities with the Bayesian regression
model or information criteria approaches, and the choice between them often
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depends on application. Since this is a theoretical model, these complications
will be put aside for now.
A.3.4 Hidden Markov Models
Language evolution has already been modelled using hidden Markov techniques
(e.g. Griffiths and Kalish, 2007) and the current model can be also captured by
a hidden Markov model: There are a set of hidden variables (the slope and error
parameters of the regression) which must be estimated using only the observed
linguistic and semantic variables of the last generation. The model space is there-
fore traversed by a chain of learners in a Markov chain.
There are reasons for avoiding a Markov analysis for the purposes of the cur-
rent model, however. The benefit of hidden Markov models is that the dynamics
are analysable given certain assumptions. For instance, the Markov chain repre-
sents the changing model trajectory of a single individual. However, this model
would like to be able to model multiple learners learning form multiple teachers
in a changing social structure. In this case it becomes unclear what the current
state represents - an individual’s language or the community’s language or some-
thing in between. Furthermore, it’s unclear how to model individuals that take
different trajectories in the state space. Also, the model would like to be flexible
with regards to the observable variables available at each generation, but a hidden
Markov model assumes that all states are specified in advance. Therefore, using
the hidden Markov model to capture this could be very complicated and perhaps
intractable.
Particle filtering is a type of online method for estimating latent variables in
a Markov chain where the latent variables are continuous and the state space is
not sufficiently well defined. This may help in giving more flexibility with regards
to the semantic variables, but still has the problem of representing more than one
individual realistically. However, the more advanced methods of estimation may
be more useful for engineering solutions in the real world than abstract models
of learning and transmission.
A.3.5 Recursive filters
A Kalman filter is a simple implementation of an online recursive Bayesian es-
timator for a multivariate normal distribution. That is, given a set of noisy
independent variables the Kalman filter estimates the dependent variable and
updates its estimation as new data is available. It does this by predicting a value
for the dependent variable given its current model and current data. It then
updates its model when new data appears to a weighted mean of its prediction
and the new estimate. The process is therefore online because it only requires the
current data and the previous model. Using a particular weighting, this method
is guaranteed to produce estimates that are closer to the true values. The method
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is similar to a hidden Markov model, except the latent variables are continuous
and have a Gaussian distribution.
The Kalman filter has some similarities with the current model. A model is
repeatedly updated given only the data available in the last timestep. This is
somewhat analogous to new generations receiving input from the previous gen-
eration. However, in the Kalman filter model the next generation would also
inherit the parameters for the model directly from the last generation. While the
Kalman filter may provide some interesting possibilities and has some nice formal






This section applies real data to the Bayesian bilingualism model presented in
chapter 6.
De Houwer (2007) conducted a survey of parental input patterns in Flanders
leading to the successful acquisition of a minority language. It should be kept in
mind that it’s likely that many social factors had an impact on the acquisition of
the minority language. The two most successful patterns for the transfer of the
minority language were where both parents spoke only the minority language, or
where one spoke only the minority language and one spoke both minority and
majority languages. The pattern least successful for the transfer of the minority
language was the opposite of the latter case: where one parent spoke only the
majority language and one spoke the majority and the minority language (see
Table B.1).
Language Pattern Successful Transfer
Min / Min 96%
Min+Maj / Min 92%
2 x Min + Maj 79%
Min / Maj 74%
Min + Maj / Maj 36%
Table B.1: Percentage of children acquiring the minority language from parents
with different input patterns. Min = Minority language, Maj = Majority lan-
guage, parents are separated by a forward-slash. Data from (De Houwer, 2007,
p. 419)
Although De Houwer argues against a frequency based account of these find-
ings, a rough estimate of the proportion of minority language input is revealing:
By counting each language spoken by an adult as a single unit of input (so a
Min+Maj/ Maj couple would have 1 Minority unit out of 3 total units), and by
adding two Majority units for influence from outside the home, the proportion of
Minority language input is significantly correlated with the transfer success rate
(r = 0.87, df = 3, p = 0.05). Of course, and as De Houwer argues, the proportions
of languages spoken may not be even and the amount of language input in each
family may not be constant (De Houwer, 2007, p. 420).
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The above study shows the importance of how language input is distributed
across speakers. Typical models of language evolution (e.g. Burkett and Grif-
fiths, 2010) model the language input as a single mass without the identity of
the speaker. Even Burkett and Griffiths (2010)’s model which considers multiple
teachers speaking multiple languages does not consider the distributions of lan-
guages within individuals. The following model looks at language evolution in
the light of multiple patterns of input.
B.1.1 Stable distribution
The data from De Houwer (2007) details the probabilities of transitioning from
various parental states to a state where a child is bilingual or monolingual. Un-
fortunately, this transition is not between equivalent states (it’s from the state
of two people to the state of one), so the stable distribution over monolingual-
ism/bilingualism given these transition probabilities is not straightforward to cal-
culate. Furthermore, we’d have to assume that the probability of a child learning
a minority language if neither parent spoke it was very near zero, leading to a
stable distribution where the vast majority of the distribution was taken up by
the state where both individuals speak only the majority language.
The paper does include the transition probabilities for mothers and fathers sepa-
rately, however. From this we can construct the following transition matrix. We
assume that all children learn the majority language. We calculate the probabil-
ity of transitioning from a state where the mother only speaks the majority lan-
guage to a state where the child speaks both the majority and minority languages
as follows: Take the probabilities that a child will speak both languages given
parental patterns where one parent only speaks the majority language (Min/Maj
and Min+Maj/Maj), multiply these by the probability of this situation (provided
in De Houwer, 2007) and take the sum.
Child
Mother Min Maj Min + Maj
Min 0 5.97 94.03
Maj 0 57.23 42.77
Min + Maj 0 26.66 73.34
Table B.2: The transition probabilities (as percentages) between a mother’s lan-
guage state and their child’s language state from De Houwer (2007).
This leads to a stable distribution of 38.39% speaking only the majority language
and 61.60% speaking both the majority and minority languages (the proportion
speaking only the minority languages is very close to zero, assuming very small
probabilities for the transition to only knowing the minority language to ensure
ergodicity). If we assume a chain of single individuals who adopt a hypothesis
by sampling (as in Griffiths and Kalish, 2007), then this distribution also reflects
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the prior bias of the learners. A more complex system (e.g. as used in Kirby
et al., 2007) might suggest that the prior biases were weaker than the stable dis-
tribution. At any rate, the empirical results suggest a moderately weak bias for
monolingualism.
We can attempt an analysis of the two-parent data in the following way. We’ll
assume there are two individuals in the population. There are 6 states: The five
detailed in the tables above, plus the state of two individuals who only speak the
majority language (Maj/Maj). This is the state that the system transitions to
when neither child learns the minority language. The transitions probabilities to
the 2 x Min + Maj state are the joint probability of two children acquiring the
minority language (as given in table B.1. The transition to the Min+Maj/Maj
state is the joint probability of one child acquiring the minority language and one
child not acquiring the minority language. The transition to the Maj/Maj state
is the joint probability of two children not acquiring the minority language. We
assume that the probability of transitioning from the state where both parents
only speak the majority language to that same sate is equal to the transition
from (2 x Min) to (2 x Min+Maj). The remainder of the transition probability is
shared out equally between the other states. All other transition probabilities are
set evenly so that the probabilities sum to one. This yields the transition matrix
show in table B.3.
Min/Min Min+Maj/ 2 x Min/Maj Min+Maj/ Maj/Maj
Min Min+Maj Maj
Min/Min 1.00 1.00 93.93 1.00 2.99 0.09
Min + Maj / Min 2.05 2.05 87.27 2.05 6.15 0.43
2 x Min + Maj 5.50 5.50 62.69 5.50 16.49 4.33
Min/Maj 6.37 6.37 55.12 6.37 19.12 6.64
Min+Maj/Maj 7.65 7.65 12.74 7.65 22.96 41.34
Maj/Maj 0.00 5.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
Table B.3: Transition matrix estimated from De Houwer (2007)
This matrix has stable distribution shown in table B.4. In this chain, the prob-
ability that a given individual will be bilingual is 41.7%. Taking this as a rough
reflection of the bias of an individual, the data suggests that individuals have a
weak bias towards monolingualism.
State Stable Distribution
2 x Min 5.10
Min + Maj / Min 5.10




Table B.4: Stable distribution (percentages) from the data from De Houwer
(2007), given certain assumptions.
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B.1.2 A model of language patterns
The Bayesian model described in chapter 6 was used to explore the effects of
parental language patterns on the acquisition of minority languages by learners.
The model was set up to contain two languages (m = 2). This yielded a hypoth-
esis space of two ‘monolingual’ and one bilingual hypotheses. Several contexts
were constructed to model those in De Houwer (2007), with the ‘minority’ lan-
guage being defined as the language least prevalent in the input. The teachers
produced data and a learner induced the most likely context. This learning in a
single generation was repeated 10,000 times and the proportion of learners who
ended up speaking the equivalent of the ’minority’ language was calculated. These
proportions were compared to the results from De Houwer (2007). The learning
bottleneck was set to 4 utterances per teacher and the noise level was set to 0.05.
The three bias parameters from the section above were used to model monolin-
gual, uniform and bilingual prior probability distributions over the number of
languages spoken by individuals.
B.1.3 Results
The tables below show the results of the modelling. Table B.5 shows the percent-
age of correct inductions made by learners with various biases given various input
patterns. Table B.6 shows the proportions of learners who acquire the minority
language. Learners with bilingual biases always acquire the minority language
because they have a strong bias to select the bilingual hypothesis. Comparing this
with the data from De Houwer (2007) above, only the uniform and monolingual
biases fit the data. In fact, the fit is pretty close, predicting that parents who only
speak the minority language transfer it with high success, whereas a learner with
only one bilingual parent does much worse. However, the model over-predicts
the proportion of learns who will learn the minority language in the ‘one parent,
one language’ situation (min & maj). Since the ranking of the different input
patterns are not correct, no further attempt to fit the model was carried out.
Context Monolingual Uniform Bilingual
A & A 99.52 75.91 0.06
A & B 99.52 75.16 0.06
A & AB 3.58 64.22 2.23
AB & AB 0.17 54.4 99.22
Table B.5: Percentage of Correct Context Inductions by Learners for various
input patterns.
B.2 Discussion
The results above are a crude attempt to fit the Bayesian model of bilingualism
to some real data. Under some reasonable assumptions, the data fits best with a
weak bias towards monolingualism. Where the model diverges from the data, this
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Pattern Real Data Monolingual Uniform Bilingual
Min & Min 96 100 100 100
Min/Maj & Min 92 99.91 100 100
Min/Maj x2 79 77.0 98.28 100
Min & Maj 74 99.83 99.9 100
Min/Maj & Maj 36 51.12 88.71 100
Table B.6: Percentage of learners selecting hypotheses with the minority lan-
guage, given various parental input patterns.
might suggest that additional forces are involved (that is, the Bayesian model can
be seen as a ‘neutral’ model). As discussed in the main thesis, this bias might
adapt to the situation the learner finds themselves in, and so assuming that all
learners have the same bias might not be valid. Furthermore, this data comes
from situations where there was a clear majority language. Other factors such
as socio-economic status, perception of language and types of language input






There are several ways to measure the amount of linguistic diversity in this model.
The main thesis chapter uses the measure developed in the thesis of the amount
of optionality that is conditioned on the social variables. This section explores
some other measures.
The first measure is the number of semantic variables used in a learner’s model.
The second is the rank of speaker identity as a conditioning factor. This is de-
termined by ordering the variables in a speaker’s model by the magnitude with
which it explains the variation in the linguistic signal (in the best model, the
t-test magnitude of the probability that the coefficient of a variable is not zero).
Speaker identity may not be used in the model, in which case it is assumed that
it ranks lowest of all variables. Speaker identity may have different rankings for
different learners in the same generation. A related measure is, in a monte-carlo
simulation, the average rank of speaker identity in comparison to other variables.
That is, how likely is speaker identity to become an important factor compared
to other semantic variables.
There are two measures of similarity between agents in the same generation
which may be thought of as addressing the similarity in internal representations
(I-Language) and external expression of language (E-language, used in the main
thesis chapter). The I-Language measure measures the similarity of the regression
models of individuals in the model. This is calculated as the average Levenshtein-
Damerau distance between the ordering of variables used in each pair of learners’
models. Consider two learners, A and B. Learner A has a model that uses (or-
dered from most important factor to least) variables a, b, d and e. Learner B has
a model that uses variables a, c, e and d. We define the distance between these
two models as the edit distance: How many changes would it take to make the
two models the same. To make Learner B’s model the same as A’s, we would
have to add variable b (one step) and remove variable c (one step). We would
also have to swap the orderings of d and e. Under the Damerau assumption, this
swapping of adjacent symbols counts as a single step. So, A’s model is 3 steps
away from B’s. This distance is normalised by the size of the largest model of
the pair. For a population, the distance between each pair of learner’s models is
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calculated, and the mean is taken.
C.2 Variable selection
The stepwise regression model of cultural transmission has many parameters.
While the model is flexible in some respects as a requirement of the point it is
trying to make, this flexibility can make it difficult to analyse. The main method
used here to explore the model dynamics is an empirical one: The model is run
with many parameters and the effects are observed. A full understanding of the
entire limits of the model is outside the scope of this thesis. However, some vari-
ables are not important to the main thesis, and so they will be explored briefly
in order to select sensible values that can be fixed during the main exploration of
the model.
This appendix proceeds by first using a monte-carlo method of exploring singe
generation transitions to explore possible biases in the model dynamic. Since
there are few precedents for iterated stepwise regression, the exploration focuses
on basic questions such as the bias for small slopes. The next section uses a
simplified version of the full model (including successive generations) to confirm
some of the dynamics.
Below is a table showing the parameters of the model and the selections that
were made for the final model.
Model variable Type Choice
Semantic variables:
Number of semantic
variables (N) Discrete, > 0 2,5
Distribution of semantic
variables normal, bimodal, uniform... normal
Relationship between
variables (y) Continuous, 0-1 Continuous, 0-1
Transmission variables:
Noise level Continuous, unbounded 0.1
Sample size Discrete, > 0 100
Stepwise regression variables:
Allow intercept? Yes/No Yes, No
Stepwise regression direction Forward/Backward/Both Both
Information criteria ( c ) continuous, unbounded AIC,BIC
Population variables:
Social structure integration Set of continuous weights Isolated, Integrated
Social structure balance Set of continuous weights Equal, Minority/Majority
Population size Discrete, > 0 2,4,100
Social structure dynamics Weight transform function
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C.2.0.1 Semantic parameter settings
The number of semantic variables will be limited to 2 and 5. Runs show that
this range provides enough variation to allow interesting interactions and robust
conclusions (2 variables = 3 parameters, 5 variables = 31 parameters). As de-
scribed above, the distribution type of the semantic variables will be normal. The
relationship between variables will be a free parameter that will be explored in
the 2 variable model.
C.2.0.2 Transmission parameters
A noise level of 0.05 is enough to allow changes between generations without
destroying the information. A sample size of 100 allows a stable transmission
dynamics while also allowing the model to be tractable.
C.2.0.3 Regression parameters
As mentioned above, intercepts will be allowed in order to allow better fits and
to reduce the bias against large slopes. The stepwise regression will be applied
in both directions for a better model selection. Both AIC and BIC will be used
to compare the affect of the bias against large models.
C.2.0.4 Population parameters
The population parameters are the main parameters that will be explored. They
will be explained at greater length in the next section.
C.3 Monte Carlo tests
The model bias was explored by examining thousands of single-generation transi-
tions with randomly set parameters. In all cases, there was only one teacher and
one learner at each generation. The data was constructed in the following way:
1. The first semantic variable was sampled from a uniform distribution be-
tween -1 and 1.
2. The second semantic variable was created by sampling a percentage R of the
first semantic variable, and a percentage 100−R from a uniform distribution
between -1 and 1.
3. The three model slopes (for the first semantic variable, the second semantic
variable and the interaction between the two) were chosen from a uniform
distribution between -1 and 1.
4. Up to two model slopes could be set to zero at random.
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5. The linguistic signal was then computed from the semantic variables and
the model slopes.
The learner then used this data in the same way as the full model. The change
in slopes between generations was recorded.
Model variable Value/Range
Semantic parameters:
Number of semantic variables 2
Distribution of semantic variables Uniform






Stepwise regression direction ‘Both’
Information criteria ( c ) 0, 2 (AIC), ln(100) (BIC), 10
As mentioned in the main thesis, when the slope of the teacher is small, the
slope change tends to be small and random (equally distributed above and below
zero). However, as the slope of the teacher increases, the slope change decreases.
That is, if the teacher has a slope of 0.5, the learner change between slopes is
more likely to be negative than positive (the learner has a slope smaller than the
teacher). This is further illustrated by showing that, although the step sizes are
normally distributed around zero, the distributions are skewed when considering
generations where the teacher had a positive or negative slope separately (figure
C.2). This means the model has a bias against steep slopes.This bias is mediated
by the information criteria c value, R and the noise level.
Figure C.1: The relationship between the slope of the teacher (slope at t-1) and
the slope change between generations. The red line has an intercept of 1 and a



















































Figure C.2: Histogram of slope changes for all generations (left) and for teachers
with a positive slope (middle) and a negative slope (right).
Higher values of c produce a weaker bias (figure C.3). That is, the slopes tend to
move towards zero faster with lower values of c (the change between generations
is likely to be greater with smaller values of c). However, if the teacher’s slope
is small (less than 0.2), then smaller values of c will produce a smaller change
between generations (the regression line crosses the 1:1 line in graph C.3).
Higher values of R result in a larger bias (figure C.4). That is, when the two
semantic variables are strongly linked, the slope is more likely to move towards
zero.
Higher noise levels produce a stronger bias (figure C.4). That is, with a small
noise level, the change in slope is not strongly related to the teacher’s slope size.
However, a high noise level makes it more likely that a the slope will move to-
wards zero.
Altering the stepwise regression to rule out the use of intercepts increases the
strength of the bias against strong slopes. Without the intercept, the correlation
between the teacher’s slope and the slope change (when the teacher’s slope for the
semantic variable is not zero) is -0.896 (48,000 observations). With the intercept,
the correlation is -0.777 (48,000 observations). For this reason, and to better fit
existing linear modelling theory, the main model will include an intercept term.
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Figure C.3: The relationship between the (absolute) slope of the teacher (slope at
t-1) and the (absolute) slope change between generations, by information criteria
c value. Data shown is for semantic variables which are 100% related (although
with a range of noise distorting the relationship). Red lines have an intercept of
zero and a slope of 1. The green lines show the regression lines of the actual data.
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Figure C.4: The relationship between the (absolute) slope of the teacher (slope at
t-1) and the (absolute) slope change between generations. Left: solid lines show
the regression for different ranges of the amount that variables are related. Data
shown is for noise levels less than one. Right: Solid lines show the regression for
different ranges of noise. The dotted red line has an intercept of zero and a slope
of 1.
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Figure C.5: The relationship between the slope of the teacher (slope at t-1)
and the slope change between generations for models with intercepts (left) and
without intercepts (right). The red line has an intercept of zero and a slope of -1.
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C.3.1 Model transitions
Figure C.6 shows the probabilities of the linguistic model transitioning from one
state to another in a model with two semantic variables and the possibility of
using the interaction between variables. Figure C.6 shows the stable distributions
over model states given these transition probabilities. The lower the information
criteria, the more variables are likely to be used in the linguistic model. Linguistic
models that use the interaction term are more unstable than those that do not.
If the interaction term is used, then it’s likely that the other two variables will
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Model at t−1
Figure C.6: Transitions between linguistic model states. The top of each graph
is the state at generation t− 1 and the bottom is the state at generation t. Lines
represent transitions, with the thickness proportional to the transition probability.
0 = no parameters, 1 = variable 1, 2 = variable 2, x = interaction between variable
1 and 2.
C.4 Model generation dynamics
This section explores the dynamics of an iterated regression model (IRM). The
first section considers an IRM with a single semantic variable. This demonstrates
that, if the model includes nose, the slope and intercept variables change over
generations according to a random walk. The dynamics of this random walk
are affected by the sample size and noise level. The distribution of the semantic
variable does not affect the shape of the distribution of step sizes, but some dis-
tributions produce smaller step sizes on average.
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Figure C.7: Stable distributions for model types for AIC (left) and BIC (right).
From first eigenvector of transition matrix for 372,600 runs. Transition probabil-
ities were smoothed to ensure ergodicity.
The full model will include iterated multivariate stepwise regression. Before those
dynamics are explored, the basic dynamics of iterated regression are examined.
In this more basic model, the learner receives a single semantic variable (gener-
ated by a function) and a single linguistic variable (transmitted from previous
generation). There is no exploration of models - the learner simply works out
the intercept and slope that best describe a linear relationship between the two
variables. The learner is then given new semantic data and produces a new lin-
guistic signal using the linear model. This linguistic data is passed on to the
next learner with a certain amount of noise. The data is assumed to come from
a single speaker. The initial linguistic signal is sampled from the same function
as the semantic variable.
The parameters of the model are the sample size s (how much data the learner
receives and transmits), the noise level in the transmission channel e and the
function that generates the semantic data.
C.5 Single semantic variable
Given a normally distributed semantic variable, the learner in the first genera-
tion will induce a model with a certain intercept and slope. With no noise, this
intercept and slope will not change over time since the learner will produce a
linguistic signal that perfectly corresponds to its model 1. The only possibility
of change is if the transmitted signal is generated by precisely the same semantic
value, leaving no variation to analyse. In this case, however, the linear model has
1In the actual implementation zero noise is not possible due to rounding errors.
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no unique solution.
Determining the factors that affect the dynamics of the model with e > 0 was
done empirically. 100 runs of 200 generations were carried out for noise levels
0,0.001,0.01 and 0.1 and sample sizes 10 to 100 in 10 sample increments.
When the noise level e is greater than zero a learner receives data whose best
linear fit may deviate from the model of its teacher. The probability of change,
however, is not related to the sampling size. The probability of the slope of the
teacher and the slope of the learner differing is 52% for noise levels of 0.001, 0.01
and 0.1. The same probability holds for the intercept2.
With transmission nose, the slope and intercept of successive generations ef-
fectively take a random walk through the space of models (see figure C.8). A
random walk is a function that cumulatively adds a random amount of noise to
a signal. The effect is a trajectory whose distribution above and below the mean
is a bimodal distribution with size of 1 and probability of 0.5. In the case of
this model, the noise being added is the difference in the models of successive
generations brought about by transmission noise coupled with sampling errors.





















Figure C.8: The evolving slope and intercept of successive generations of learners
for a single run of the model with e = 0.1 and s = 50 (left). The evolving
intercept for many individual chains (e = 0.1, s = 10) (right).
The mean and standard deviation of the difference between generations is mod-
ulated by the sample size and noise level (see figures C.9-C.12. Larger sample
sizes yield exponentially lower means and standard deviations. Larger noise lev-
els yield linearly higher means and standard deviations. This is because a larger
sample produces a more accurate estimate of the teacher’s model, so a decreasing
sample sizes will cause exponentially larger change between generations (see also
figure C.13). More noise will have the same effect, although the relationship is
linear.
2This is probably affected by rounding errors. The probability of two successive models
being truly the same under transmission noise is very small.
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Figure C.9: The mean size of the change between generations as a function of
sample size for the intercept (left) and the slope (right)














































Figure C.10: The mean size of the change between generations as a function of
the noise level for the intercept (left) and the slope (right)
If there was a bias, then the magnitude of the slope or intercept would corre-
late with the change in that variable between generations. Figure C.13 shows
that this is not the case.
Despite the walk being random, the trajectory of the intercept or slope can be
highly positive or negative. This can be measured by the correlation between the
intercept or slope value and the generation number. A large correlation coeffi-
cient suggests a steadily increasing or decreasing variable. Figures C.14 and C.14
show the distribution of correlation coefficeints for intercept and generation. The
results of the model do not seem to differ from a true random walk process with
the same parameters.
A random walk is a stochastic process which can be thought of as a walker
taking a number of independent identically distributed steps (see textbooks on
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Figure C.11: The mean standard deviation of the change between generations
as a function of sample size for the intercept (left) and the slope (right)
























































Figure C.12: The mean standard deviation of the change between generations
as a function of the noise level for the intercept (left) and the slope (right)
complexity, e.g. Mainzer, 2004). The walker takes n steps of size xi over time
t. The position of the walker is the sum of the steps Sn = x1 + x2 + .... The
variance of the stochastic process x(t) grows linearly with the number of steps.
The shape of the probability density function of the steps P (xi) affects the shape
of the probability density function of positions P (Sn).
However, the probability density function of the semantic variables does not affect
the shape of the probability density function of the slope and intercept variables.
Compare the graph showing the probability density function for translation for a
true random walk and for the IRM model (figure C.16). The density for the IRM
is normal with a high kurtosis with the semantic variable being drawn from a
normal, uniform of bimodal distribution. True random walks looks lightly differ-
ent, with the bimodal distribution looking more triangular. The distribution of
step sizes is also similar for models with different semantic variable distributions
(figure C.17). However, the kurtosis is different: A normally distributed semantic
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Figure C.13: The intercept (left) and slope (right) as a function of the change in
intercept and slope between generations for many runs and parameterisation of
the model. The sample size is indicated by colour with lower sample sizes being





















Figure C.14: The distribution of correlation coefficeints for intercept and gener-
ation. A high positive correlation indicates a steadily increasing intercept value.
The red dotted line shows the distribution for a simulated random walk with the
same parameters and number of runs.
variable produces a step-size distribution with the lowest kurtosis (34 in the sam-
ple of non-zero noise level model runs), followed by the uniform distribution (54)
and the bimodal distribution (531). That is, a bimodal semantic distribution
tends to produce lower step-sizes than a normal distribution on average. The
process of linear regression neutralises the differences in semantic variable distri-
bution to produce step sizes that are normally distributed (although perhaps the

















Figure C.15: The distribution of correlation coefficeints for slope and generation.
A high positive correlation indicates a steadily increasing slope value. The red
dotted line shows the distribution for a simulated random walk with the same





































Figure C.16: Left: Probability density function of the translation from the origin
for a simulated random walk with step sizes sampled from a normal distribution,
uniform distribution, bimodal distribution and delta function (the normal and
delta lines lie on top of each other). Right: The probability density function of
translation from the origin for the intercept variable for the simple IRM model






































Figure C.17: The probability density function of step sizes in the intercept
variable for a semantic variable with a normal distribution (left), uniform distri-
bution (middle) and bimodal distribution (right). The lines show kernel density
estimates (gaussian kernel estimator with a bandwidth of 0.02).
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C.6 Multiple semantic variables: Identical dis-
tributions
Including more than one semantic variable changes the model qualitatively. First,
there is the stepwise regression element, whereby variables can be excluded from
the model. There is also the possibility of including interactions between vari-
ables.
The model was run with two semantic variables, each being drawn from a normal
distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1.
C.6.1 Generation
C.6.1.1 Number of variables in the model




























1 8 16 26 36 46 56 66 76 86 96
Figure C.18: The mean number of variables in the model for runs with a noise
level greater than zero (with 99.99% confidence intervals).
C.6.1.2 Intercept
The intercept rapidly converges for small noise levels, but increases slowly for
larger noise levels (figure C.19). The significance of the intercept is not affected
by the information criteria (figure C.20).
C.6.1.3 Slope
The slope magnitude starts low, increases to a high level in the first generation
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Figure C.19: The mean significance of the intercept in models over generations
for different error values.

























Figure C.20: The significance of the intercept over generations for different
information criteria.
the noise level (figure C.21) and the information criterion (figure C.22). The slope
significance (as measured by the t-test magnitude) follows a similar pattern (see
same figures). As the mean number of variables increases over generations, there
is more competition between variables on average which means relatively lower
slopes and slope significance in the model. This is demonstrated by observing
models where the information criterion variable c is zero (i.e. there is no punish-
ment for including a variable in the model). The slope and slope significance in
these models stays relatively stable over generations (unlike the for other values
of c) because both variables are being included in learner’s models from the start









































Figure C.21: The mean slope magnitude (left) and slope significance (right) over
generations by noise level.
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Figure C.22: The mean slope magnitude (left) and slope significance (right) over
generations with different information criteria.
C.6.1.4 Slopes ratio
Slopes in a model with two semantic variables can be compared using a ratio.
This is calculated as the smallest slope magnitude divided by the largest slope
magnitude. For instance, a model with one slope with a value of 0.2 and another
of 0.4 would have a ratio of 0.5. The smaller the ratio, the more similar the two
slopes are.
Although the mean slope ratio has a wide range over generations, the variance in
slope ratios over many parameterisation of the model does decrease marginally in
the first 50 generations (figure C.23). However, the trajectory of the slopes ratio
for individual runs can be quite chaotic or hardly moving (figure C.24). That
is, the slopes ratios for some runs with the same parameterisation have a large
standard deviation, while others have a very small standard deviation. This sug-
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gests that there are two types of model dynamic (a bifurcation)divided by initial
conditions. Note that while many model runs with a low slope ratio standard
deviation have a low slope ratio, this isn’t always the case.
The most crucial factor that decides the model dynamic is the number of vari-
ables in the first generation’s model (figure C.25). That is, the model dynamics
are sensitive to initial conditions (the number of variables in the model in the first
generation is largely an accident of how the first linguistic variable is distributed).
If the first model has no semantic variables, then the standard deviation of the
slope ratio (how much the balance between the two semantic variables changes)
will be considerable. If there are one or two semantic variables in the first gen-
eration’s model, however, the standard deviation of slopes ratios will be small
(i.e. there is no drastic change in how the semantic variables are used by learners
over generations). Note that the relationship has weakened after 50 generations
(figure C.25, right). This suggests that a change in the distribution of semantic
variables can make a qualitative difference to the dynamic of the model.














































Figure C.23: The mean slope ratio (box-and-whisker plot, top) and variance of
slope ratios over generations (bottom).
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Figure C.24: The slopes ratio over generations for 20 runs of the model with a
noise level of 0.001, a sample size of 80 and AIC model selection. Some trajectories





















































Figure C.25: The standard deviation of slopes ratio (how the balance shifts
between semantic variables over generations) as a function of the number of se-




C.6.2.1 Number of variables in the model
Overall, most models include 2 variables. There is a small affect of noise on the
number of semantic variables in the model: With zero error, the proportion of































Figure C.26: The number of semantic variables used in the model as a function
of the noise level.
C.6.2.2 Intercept
The noise level is not related to the mean intercept (see figure C.27). However,
the noise level does affect the significance of the intercept in the model, with




































Figure C.27: The mean intercept (left) and intercept significance (right) as a
function of noise level.
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C.6.2.3 Slope
A higher noise level produces larger slopes on average (figure C.28). This is be-
cause a higher noise level increases the average step size in the random walk. An
increase in noise level from a small amount of noise has a bigger effect on the






































Figure C.28: The slope magnitude (left) and slope significance (right) as a
function of noise level.
C.6.2.4 Slopes ratio
The ratio between the slopes of the two semantic variables (when there are two
variables in the model) decreases linearly as the noise level increases (figure C.29).
That is, with less noise, the slope for one variable will be many times greater
than another. Under uncertainty (more noise), the effect of a single variable
decreases and the slopes become more similar. The relationship between the slope
significance ratio and noise level is very similar because of the strong relationship
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Figure C.29: The ratio between the magnitude of the slopes of semantic variables




C.6.3.1 Number of variables in the model
The sample size has a small effect on the number of variables used in the model,




























Figure C.30: The slope magnitude as a function of noise level.
C.6.3.2 Intercept
Larger sample sizes produce smaller intercepts on average (figure C.31). This is
because a larger sample size produces a more accurate estimate of the semantic
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Figure C.31: The intercept magnitude as a function of the sample size for runs
with a noise level greater than zero.
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C.6.3.3 Slope
Larger sample sizes produce smaller slopes on average (figure C.32, left). There
is no strong relationship between slope significance and sample size (figure C.32,
right). The pattern in figure C.32 is different for sub-samples with different noise
levels. That is, sample size has a much weaker effect on the slope significance
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Figure C.32: The slope magnitude (left) and slope significance (right) as a
function of the sample size for runs with a noise level greater than zero.
C.6.3.4 Slope ratio
There is no relationship between the sample size and the ratio between slopes in
a two-variable model (although the graph suggests a u-shaped relationship, the
pattern is different for sub-samples with different noise levels), nor does sample
size affect the standard deviation of the ratio between slopes over generations of
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Figure C.33: The ratio between slopes in a two-variable model (left) and the
standard deviation of the slopes ratio within runs (right) as a function of the
sample size for runs with a noise level greater than zero.
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C.6.4 Information criteria
C.6.4.1 Number of variables in the model
The number of variables in the model is affected by the parameters of the infor-
mation criteria by which the stepwise regression is evaluated. Low values of c
(how much the stepwise regression punishes models with greater number of vari-
ables, see section A.1) result in a greater proportion of the models that use both
semantic variables (figure C.34. Higher values of c result in a greater proportion































Figure C.34: The proportion of models using 0, 1 and 2 variables for stepwise
regressions with different information criteria.
C.6.4.2 Intercept
The intercept is lower on average for higher values of c (figure C.35).
C.6.4.3 Slope
Higher values of c produce lower slopes on average (figure C.35).
C.6.4.4 Slopes ratio
Extreme values of c (very low or very high) result in higher ratios between slopes
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Figure C.35: The mean intercept (left) and slope (right) magnitude for stepwise
regressions with different information criteria.









































c=0 AIC BIC c=10
Figure C.36: The mean ratio between slope magnitudes (left) and and standard
deviation for the ratio between slopes within runs (right) for models with two
semantic variables for stepwise regressions with different information criteria.
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C.6.5 Relationship between slopes ratio and slope signif-
icance
Although there is only a weak relationship between the magnitude of a semantic
variable’s slope and the significance of the variable in the model (as measured by
its t-test value, see figure C.37), in models with two semantic variables there is a
positive linear, heteroscedastic relationship between the ratio of slope magnitudes
and ratio of slope significance (figure C.38).
Figure C.37: Relationship between slope magnitude and slope significance for
several parameteristations of the model (noise level is greater than zero) coloured
by noise level (left) and sample size (right). Each point represents an individual’s
linguistic model in a particular generation.
Figure C.38: Relationship in models with two semantic variables between the
ratio of slope magnitudes and ratio of slope significance for several parameteris-
tations of the model (noise level is greater than zero). Each point represents an
individual model in a particular generation.
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C.7 Multiple semantic variables: Different dis-
tributions
The model was run with two semantic variables sampled from different normal
distributions. Variable 1 had a mean of -1 and a standard deviation of 0.5, while
variable 2 had a mean of 1 and a standard deviation of 1.5. The linguistic variable
was initialised with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
The model prefers variables with lower variance, assigning them higher slopes
which account for more of the variance (figure C.39).






























Figure C.39: Mean slope magnitudes for variable 1 and variable 2 by generation
for 100 runs of models using AIC with a noise level of 0.001 and a sample size
of 80. Left: Semantic variables with the same distribution (mean = 0, sd = 1).
Right: Semantic variables with different distributions (Variable 1: mean = -1, sd
= 0.5; Variable 2: mean = 1, sd = 1.5).
C.7.1 Noise level
C.7.1.1 Slopes ratio
The pattern for slopes ratio and information criteria type is broadly the same:
Extreme values of c produce higher slope ratios on average (figure C.40). However,
with differently distributed variables, the c = 0 (no punishment of models with
many variables)setting now produces higher slopes ratios than the c = 10 setting









































Figure C.40: The ratio between slopes (left) and standard deviation for the ratio
between slopes within runs (right) for semantic variables in two-variable models
as a function of the noise level.
C.7.2 Information criteria
C.7.2.1 Number of variables in the model
With high levels of c, differently distributed variables produce more single-variable
































Figure C.41: The proportion of models using 0, 1 and 2 semantic variables by
information criteria.
C.7.2.2 Intercept
The significance of the intercept term tends to start high and decrease to a plateau
over generations. The eventual stable significance of the intercept interacts with
the information criteria (figure C.42). While there is no change for low values
of c (or a rapid convergence to the plateau), higher values decline over about
50 generations. The intercept in models using BIC begin by explaining more of
the variance on average than models using AIC, but by about 50 generations
this pattern has reversed. After the plateau, more extreme values of c result in
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higher significance for the intercept on average. This contrasts with the results
for a model with identically distributed semantic variables where the intercept
significance is less affected by the information criterion parameter (see figure
C.20).
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Figure C.42: The significance of the intercept over generations by information
criteria for a model with differently distributed semantic variables.
C.7.2.3 Slope
Despite the difference above, there is no difference between the identically dis-
tributed and differently distributed semantic variable models in how the informa-
tion criterion affects the slopes.
C.7.2.4 Slopes ratio
AIC tends to lead to higher slopes ratios and higher standard deviations of slopes
ratios than BIC (see figure C.43).
C.8 Allowing interactions
The probability of an interaction between variables increases over generations.
However, this just reflects the increasing average number of variables in the model
(see section C.6.1). For models with two variables, the probability of an interac-
tion between them does not increase significantly.
The presence of an interaction is sensitive to initial conditions. The following
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Figure C.43: The ratio between slope magnitudes (left) and the standard de-
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Figure C.44: The proportion of generations with models with an interaction
between the two semantic variables over generations for all models (left) and
models with two semantic variables (right).
above zero. 36% of runs which had an interaction in the first generation main-
tained the interaction for all subsequent generations. 1% of runs which started
with no interaction maintained no interaction for all subsequent generations. 99%
of generations following a first generation with an interaction had an interaction,
while only 50% of generations following a first generation with an interaction had
an interaction.
For models with two variables, the noise level has a small effect on the prob-
ability of an interaction (more noise decreases the probability of an interaction),
while the sample size only has a marginal effect (a larger sample size decreases the
probability of an interaction, figure C.45). The probability of an interaction in
models with two variables decreases linearly with the information criteria c value



















































Figure C.45: The proportion of generations with models with an interaction


























Figure C.46: The proportion of models with two semantic variables with an
interaction as a function of information criteria type.
C.9 Full model examples
The model was run with the dynamic community structure described in chapter
7. Two communities of two individuals each went through stages of being isolated
and integrated. The factors that affected the model dynamics were investigated
by running many simulations and using a linear regression to determine important
factors. The following measures were used:
• Speaker ID rank mean: The mean speaker ID rank for all linguistic models
for all individuals.
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• Speaker ID rank sd: The standard deviation for speaker ID rank for all
linguistic models for all individuals.
• Speaker ID rank ratio: The ratio between communities of their mean rank
of speaker ID in their linguistic models. A ratio of 1 indicates that commu-
nities have a similar speaker ID rank. Deviations from 1 indicate different
ranks. The comparison is always community 1:community 2, so a value
above 1 means that speaker ID has a higher mean rank in community 1
(speaker ID is less important). Every ratio in this set works in this way.
• Linguistic output mean ratio: The ratio between communities of their lin-
guistic signal mean values. That is, for each community, calculate the mean
of all linguistic signals produced, then compare the means for both commu-
nities.
• Linguistic output sd ratio: The ratio between communities of their linguistic
signal standard deviations.
• Linguistic output mean diff: The absolute difference between each commu-
nity’s mean linguistic signal.
• Model fit ratio: How well the linguistic models in a community fit the
linguistic input they receive. Calculate how well each speaker’s model fits
the data they observe (using the sum of squares of the residuals), take
the average within each community and compare these values. One might
predict that a community with a better fitting model would change less
during contact.
• Model similarity ratio: A measure of the similarity between linguistic mod-
els in a community. Within each community, compare how well each indi-
vidual’s model captures the data that another observed, then compare these
values between communities. This is calculated by comparing the linguistic
output of each individual given the same semantic data, then taking the
mean of the residuals. One might predict that the superstrate community
would be the one with the greatest similarity between individuals.
• Model size ratio: The ratio between the mean number of parameters in the
linguistic models of each community. One might predict that the commu-
nity with the largest model would change less.
• Interactions ratio: The ratio between the mean number of interaction pa-
rameters in the linguistic models of each community.
• Model size mean: The mean number of parameters in all linguistic models.
• Transition generation: The number of generations after the community
structure transition has started.
• Generation: The number of generations since the simulation started.
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For looking at positive bilingualism situations where there is an imbalance in the
extent to which each community adapts to the other, a measure of the extent to
which a community’s linguistic signal changed over generations was used. The
comprehensive intelligibility score, as described in section 7.3.2 of chapter 7 was
calculated between individuals within the same community but belonging to dif-
ferent generations. The mean for each community was taken. The community
with the highest value can be identified as the ‘superstrate’ community, since its
linguistic signal has changed the least.
C.9.1 Explaining bilingualism scores
Table C.1 shows the results of a linear regression fit to the data from 100 simu-
lations with the dynamic social structure described in chapter 7. The model ex-
plained 16.9% of the variation in the bilingualism scores (adjustedR2, F(30,7368)=51.15,
p < 0.000001). See section 7.7.1 on page 146 for a description of these results.






















Figure C.47: The bilingualism score as a function of the mean speaker ID rank
of the previous generation.
C.9.1.1 Bilingualism tracks social change
A linear regression was run to see which measures correlated best with the changes
to the social structure. These measures included the bilingualism score, the rank
distance (a Levenshtein distance between the ranked variables of all pairs of
individuals’ linguistic models is calculated, then the mean distance between com-
munities is taken), the vector distance (each linguistic model can be seen as a
high-dimensional vector with a component for each possible variable and magni-
tudes being the coefficient magnitude, distances between models are the distances
between these vectors) and the residual standard deviation of models (the model
similarity ratio described in this section on page 240). The measures were col-
lected for 100 independent simulations of the dynamic social structure scenario
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Variable Estimate Std Error t value p
(Intercept) 0.021 0.22 0.09 9.25E-01
Speaker ID rank ratio (t-1) -0.0075 0.04 -0.2 8.38E-01
Ling. Output mean ratio (t-1) -0.00054 0.01 -0.06 9.56E-01
Ling Output sd ratio (t-1) 0.039 0.1 0.4 6.92E-01
LingOutput.mean.diff (t-1) 0.086 0.05 1.73 8.36E-02 .
Model fit ratio (t-1) -0.082 0.19 -0.43 6.68E-01
Model similarity ratio (t-1) 0.19 0.11 1.68 9.32E-02 .
Model size ratio (t-1) -0.21 0.12 -1.73 8.39E-02 .
Interactions ratio (t-1) 0.025 0.07 0.36 7.15E-01
Model size mean (t-1) -0.0097 0.01 -1.19 2.33E-01
LingCorrBetweenGen.ratio -0.0072 0.01 -0.56 5.76E-01
In.tMinus1 -0.34 0.09 -3.67 2.40E-04 ***
Speaker ID rank mean (t-1) 0.046 0.01 7.99 1.54E-15 ***
Speaker ID rank sd (t-1) 0.064 0.03 2.51 1.22E-02 *
In.1 -0.11 0.24 -0.45 6.54E-01
gen 0.00091 0 1.94 5.23E-02 .
Speaker rank ratio (t-1):Contact gen. -0.019 0.04 -0.5 6.14E-01
Ling. Output mean ratio (t-1):Contact gen. 0.00034 0.01 0.03 9.73E-01
Ling. Output sd ratio (t-1):Contact gen. -0.022 0.1 -0.22 8.26E-01
Ling. Output mean diff (t-1):Contact gen. -0.099 0.05 -1.91 5.62E-02
Model fit ratio (t-1):Contact gen. -0.047 0.2 -0.24 8.12E-01
Model similarity ratio (t-1):Contact gen. -0.18 0.12 -1.52 1.29E-01
Model size ratio (t-1):Contact gen. 0.23 0.12 1.86 6.36E-02 .
Interactions ratio (t-1):Contact gen. -0.016 0.07 -0.23 8.19E-01
Model size mean (t-1):Contact gen. 0.0038 0.01 0.38 7.05E-01
LingCorrBetweenGen.ratio:In.1 0.0077 0.01 0.53 5.98E-01
In.tMinus1:In.1 0.48 0.1 4.68 2.90E-06 ***
SpeakerRank.all.mean.tMinus1:In.1 -0.02 0.01 -2.81 4.91E-03
SpeakerRank.all.sd.tMinus1:In.1 0.14 0.02 6.7 2.25E-11 ***
In.1:gen -0.00076 0 -1.43 1.54E-01
Speaker ID rank (t-1) mean:sd -0.022 0 -7.08 1.59E-12 ***
Table C.1: Results of a linear regression predicting the bilingualism score.
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described in section 7.7 (number of semantic variables = 4; number of peaks in
the semantic distributions= 2; number of data points per individual = 100; error
parameter = 1; Information criterion k = 2). The bilingualism score predicts the
integration parameter better than some other measures of linguistic variation: In
a linear model containing all variables it has the largest t value (model explained
14% of the variation F(7543,4)=308.9, p < 0.0000001).
Variable Estimate Std. Error t value p
(Intercept) 9.010e-01 6.834e-03 131.833 <2e-16 ***
Bilingualism score 4.061e-01 1.248e-02 32.541 <2e-16 ***
Rank distance -2.990e-01 1.675e-02 -17.857 <2e-16 ***
Vector distance 1.562e-05 2.083e-06 7.501 7.07e-14 ***
RSD -4.898e-03 3.301e-03 -1.484 0.138
Table C.2: Results of a linear model predicting the integration parameter I based
on different measures of linguistic variation.
Also, in a linear regression, it significantly improves the fit of the model after
all other variables have been entered, (F(7543,1) = 1058, p < 0.000001). This
suggests that the bilingualism score reflects more than just typological distance.
C.9.2 Complex interactions
In order to discover some more complex interactions between variables, I ran a
stepwise regression on the data from many simulations. The initial model in-
cluded all pairwise interactions between the variables discussed above, plus those
interactions with the integration parameter and generation number. The step-
wise regression was run with the Bayesian Information Criterion (log(N) where
N=100) to reduce the number of parameters in the final model. The final model
accounted for 21.4% of the variation in the bilingualism score (F(55,7343) =
37.62, p-value: < 0.000000001). However, this still resulted in 56 parameters, 42
of which were interactions between at least two variables (see table C.3). Below
are some analyses of the most significant factors. They will try to identify what
differentiates generations that exhibit negative bilingualism scores from positive
bilingualism scores. For convenience, the analyses are included in the caption of
the graphs. The graphs include the following relationships with the bilingualism
score: Speaker ID rank ratio and model size ratio; Integration and speaker ID
rank means; Speaker id rank mean and standard deviation; Model fit ratio and
difference in the linguistic signal.
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Var.# Variable Estimate Std.Error t value p
9 ModelSize.interaction.ratio.tMinus1 0.14 0.08 1.77 7.68e-02
39 LingOutput.sd.ratio.tMinus1:In.1 -0.34 0.16 -2.17 2.98e-02
36 In.tMinus1:SpeakerRank.all.sd.tMinus1 -0.43 0.19 -2.30 2.14e-02
4 LingOutput.sd.ratio.tMinus1 0.41 0.15 2.68 7.41e-03
8 ModelSize.ratio.tMinus1 -0.59 0.21 -2.74 6.14e-03
23 LingOutput.sd.ratio.tMinus1:SpeakerRank.all.sd.tMinus1 -0.44 0.16 -2.74 6.14e-03
38 SpeakerRank.ratio.tMinus1:In.1 -1.41 0.51 -2.75 6.00e-03
10 ModelSize.mean.tMinus1 0.07 0.02 2.79 5.36e-03
18 SpeakerRank.ratio.tMinus1:RSquareds.ratio.tMinus1 -1.47 0.51 -2.90 3.74e-03
44 ModelSize.mean.tMinus1:In.1 -0.09 0.03 -2.97 3.04e-03
49 LingOutput.sd.ratio.tMinus1:SpeakerRank.all.sd.tMinus1:In.1 0.48 0.16 2.99 2.83e-03
27 RSquareds.ratio.tMinus1:RSD.ratio.tMinus1 0.08 0.03 3.01 2.66e-03
17 SpeakerRank.ratio.tMinus1:LingOutput.mean.diff.tMinus1 -0.08 0.03 -3.01 2.62e-03
31 ModelSize.ratio.tMinus1:SpeakerRank.all.mean.tMinus1 0.09 0.03 3.09 1.99e-03
2 SpeakerRank.ratio.tMinus1 1.58 0.51 3.11 1.89e-03
48 SpeakerRank.ratio.tMinus1:RSquareds.ratio.tMinus1:In.1 1.61 0.51 3.16 1.61e-03
29 RSD.ratio.tMinus1:ModelSize.interaction.ratio.tMinus1 -0.08 0.03 -3.17 1.51e-03
7 RSD.ratio.tMinus1 0.04 0.01 3.26 1.13e-03
30 ModelSize.ratio.tMinus1:ModelSize.interaction.ratio.tMinus1 0.03 0.01 3.28 1.05e-03
13 SpeakerRank.all.sd.tMinus1 0.63 0.19 3.34 8.52e-04
25 LingOutput.mean.diff.tMinus1:ModelSize.mean.tMinus1 0.23 0.07 3.42 6.21e-04
43 ModelSize.interaction.ratio.tMinus1:In.1 -0.33 0.10 -3.46 5.36e-04
53 ModelSize.ratio.tMinus1:SpeakerRank.all.mean.tMinus1:In.1 -0.12 0.03 -3.50 4.61e-04
56 In.tMinus1:SpeakerRank.all.sd.tMinus1:In.1 0.70 0.20 3.56 3.75e-04
40 LingOutput.mean.diff.tMinus1:In.1 -5.53 1.49 -3.72 2.00e-04
15 SpeakerRank.ratio.tMinus1:LingOutput.mean.ratio.tMinus1 0.04 0.01 3.76 1.72e-04
3 LingOutput.mean.ratio.tMinus1 -0.04 0.01 -3.78 1.58e-04
28 RSquareds.ratio.tMinus1:ModelSize.interaction.ratio.tMinus1 -0.10 0.03 -3.84 1.23e-04
42 ModelSize.ratio.tMinus1:In.1 0.92 0.24 3.87 1.08e-04
51 LingOutput.mean.diff.tMinus1:ModelSize.mean.tMinus1:In.1 -0.28 0.07 -3.91 9.49e-05
6 RSquareds.ratio.tMinus1 2.30 0.58 3.95 8.00e-05
5 LingOutput.mean.diff.tMinus1 5.87 1.48 3.97 7.28e-05
41 RSquareds.ratio.tMinus1:In.1 -2.51 0.59 -4.27 1.95e-05
54 ModelSize.mean.tMinus1:SpeakerRank.all.mean.tMinus1:In.1 0.03 0.01 4.42 9.95e-06
47 SpeakerRank.all.sd.tMinus1:In.1 -0.90 0.20 -4.50 6.80e-06
32 ModelSize.interaction.ratio.tMinus1:In.tMinus1 0.30 0.06 4.60 4.37e-06
52 LingOutput.mean.diff.tMinus1:SpeakerRank.all.mean.tMinus1:In.1 -0.18 0.04 -4.69 2.82e-06
34 ModelSize.mean.tMinus1:SpeakerRank.all.sd.tMinus1 0.02 0.00 4.75 2.08e-06
26 LingOutput.mean.diff.tMinus1:SpeakerRank.all.mean.tMinus1 0.17 0.03 4.94 7.92e-07
33 ModelSize.mean.tMinus1:SpeakerRank.all.mean.tMinus1 -0.02 0.00 -4.95 7.57e-07
21 SpeakerRank.ratio.tMinus1:In.tMinus1 -0.27 0.05 -5.09 3.66e-07
46 SpeakerRank.all.mean.tMinus1:In.1 -0.34 0.07 -5.10 3.54e-07
11 In.tMinus1 2.13 0.38 5.63 1.88e-08
37 SpeakerRank.all.mean.tMinus1:SpeakerRank.all.sd.tMinus1 -0.02 0.00 -5.66 1.56e-08
22 SpeakerRank.ratio.tMinus1:SpeakerRank.all.sd.tMinus1 0.05 0.01 5.93 3.16e-09
12 SpeakerRank.all.mean.tMinus1 0.32 0.05 5.93 3.08e-09
24 LingOutput.mean.diff.tMinus1:RSquareds.ratio.tMinus1 -8.69 1.44 -6.02 1.84e-09
50 LingOutput.mean.diff.tMinus1:RSquareds.ratio.tMinus1:In.1 8.77 1.45 6.06 1.47e-09
1 (Intercept) -4.09 0.67 -6.07 1.33e-09
14 In.1 4.36 0.70 6.24 4.76e-10
20 SpeakerRank.ratio.tMinus1:ModelSize.interaction.ratio.tMinus1 0.04 0.01 6.44 1.29e-10
45 In.tMinus1:In.1 -2.47 0.38 -6.44 1.28e-10
35 In.tMinus1:SpeakerRank.all.mean.tMinus1 -0.39 0.06 -6.56 5.89e-11
16 SpeakerRank.ratio.tMinus1:LingOutput.sd.ratio.tMinus1 -0.07 0.01 -6.88 6.62e-12
55 In.tMinus1:SpeakerRank.all.mean.tMinus1:In.1 0.45 0.06 6.97 3.45e-12
19 SpeakerRank.ratio.tMinus1:ModelSize.ratio.tMinus1 -0.15 0.02 -7.14 1.05e-12
Table C.3: Results of a stepwise regression of factors that influence the bilingual-
ism score in a simulation with dynamic social structures. Parameters are ordered

































Figure C.48: Interaction between bilingualism score, speaker ID rank ratio and
model size ratio. In generations preceding populations with negative bilingualism
scores, speaker ID rank ratios tend to be greater than one when the model size
ratios are greater than one. That is, negative bilingualism scores resulted when






















































Figure C.49: Left: Interaction between bilingualism score, speaker ID rank mean and the
change in the integration parameter. The rank of the speaker ID tends to be similar for all
bilingualism types when the integration parameter is increasing (communities becoming more
isolated, see figure C.49). However, in populations with a negative bilingualism score, the
speaker ID rank of the previous generation tends to be lower (more important) when the
integration parameter is low (fully integrated), high (isolated) or decreasing (becoming less
isolated). Right: Interaction between bilingualism score and the mean and standard deviation
of the speaker ID rank in the previous generation. Populations with negative bilingualism scores
tend to be preceded by generations where the mean and standard deviations of the speaker id
rank are correlated. That is, when there is little difference between the speaker id ranks of the
individuals, and the speaker id rank is low (more important), then the next generation tends












































































Figure C.50: Left: The interaction between the bilingualism score, the model fit ratio and
the difference in linguistic signal means. There is a stronger correlation between the difference
in linguistic signal mean and model fit ratio for populations with a negative bilingualism score
than any other. That is, populations with negative bilingualism scores tend to be preceded by
generations where the community with the best model fit is also the community whose linguistic
signal mean has changed the least. Right: The interaction between the model similarity ratio
between generations and the difference in linguistic means between generations, by contact
generation (1=first generation of contact, 2=second generation of contact). If community A’s
mean is higher than community B’s mean in the previous generation, then community A’s
language will change more than community B. However, this trend is only strong in the first
generation of contact.
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C.9.3 Predicting linguistic change
A linear regression was run with the linguistic correlation between generations
as the dependent variable and a range of measures described above as indepen-
dent variables. The regression was run separately for generations in which the
communities were diverging and converging in their interaction. Table C.4 shows
the results for when a population where the interaction between individuals is
becoming more structured. The regression was based on 374 runs of the model
and accounted for 11.2% of the variance (F(26,373) = 1.8, p = 0.01). Table C.5
shows the results for when the population is becoming more integrated. The
regression was based on 176 runs of the model and accounted for 20.7% of the
variance (F(24, 175)=3.17, p = 0.00006). See section 7.7.1 in chapter 7 for a
discussion of the relevant results.
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 2.02 0.6 3.39 7.81E-04 ***
Speaker ID rank ratio (t-1) -0.04 0.05 -0.85 3.98E-01
Ling. Output mean ratio (t-1) 0.01 0.02 0.29 7.70E-01
Ling Output sd ratio (t-1) 0.03 0.14 0.24 8.13E-01
LingOutput.mean.diff (t-1) -0.02 0.06 -0.35 7.27E-01
Model fit ratio (t-1) -1.01 0.59 -1.73 8.49E-02 .
Model similarity ratio (t-1) -0.27 0.16 -1.69 9.14E-02 .
Model size ratio (t-1) 0.62 0.15 4.23 2.91E-05 ***
Interactions ratio (t-1) -0.36 0.09 -3.92 1.07E-04 ***
Model size mean (t-1) 0 0.01 0.31 7.56E-01
Contact gen. -0.76 0.35 -2.2 2.85E-02 *
Speaker ID rank mean (t-1) -0.01 0.01 -0.7 4.87E-01
Speaker ID rank sd (t-1) 0.02 0.03 0.59 5.52E-01
Gen. 0.0004 0.0006 0.87 3.84E-01
Speaker rank ratio (t-1):Contact gen. 0.02 0.03 0.72 4.72E-01
Ling. Output mean ratio (t-1):Contact gen. -0.004 0.02 -0.25 8.00E-01
Ling. Output sd ratio (t-1):Contact gen. 0.03 0.09 0.37 7.09E-01
Ling. Output mean diff (t-1):Contact gen. 0.002 0.04 0.05 9.58E-01
Model fit ratio (t-1):Contact gen. 0.67 0.34 1.97 5.01E-02 .
Model similarity ratio (t-1):Contact gen. 0.23 0.1 2.35 1.91E-02 *
Model size ratio (t-1):Contact gen. -0.37 0.1 -3.82 1.55E-04 ***
Interactions ratio (t-1):Contact gen. 0.21 0.06 3.27 1.16E-03 **
Model size mean (t-1):Contact gen. -0.004 0.01 -0.72 4.74E-01
Contact gen.:Speaker ID rank mean (t-1) 0.004 0 0.92 3.56E-01
Contact gen.:Speaker ID rank sd (t-1) -0.01 0.01 -0.45 6.52E-01
Contact gen.:Gen. -0.0002 0 -0.64 5.22E-01
Speaker ID rank (t-1) mean:sd (t-1) -0.002 0 -0.53 5.97E-01
Table C.4: Results of a linear regression predicting the model similarity ratio for
generations where the population is becoming more structured.
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Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 2.42 1.75 1.38 1.68E-01
Speaker ID rank ratio (t-1) -0.05 0.1 -0.52 6.06E-01
Ling. Output mean ratio (t-1) -0.05 0.07 -0.65 5.19E-01
Ling Output sd ratio (t-1) -0.46 0.3 -1.54 1.26E-01
LingOutput.mean.diff (t-1) 0.58 0.17 3.49 6.01E-04 ***
Model fit ratio (t-1) -0.42 1.61 -0.26 7.96E-01
Model similarity ratio (t-1) 0.07 0.57 0.12 9.06E-01
Model size ratio (t-1) -0.33 1.09 -0.31 7.60E-01
Interactions ratio (t-1) 0.24 0.63 0.37 7.09E-01
Model size mean (t-1) -0.05 0.05 -0.91 3.62E-01
Contact gen. -0.66 1.17 -0.57 5.72E-01
Speaker ID rank mean (t-1) 0.01 0.03 0.26 7.93E-01
Speaker ID rank sd (t-1) 0.02 0.14 0.12 9.08E-01
Speaker rank ratio (t-1):Contact gen. 0.03 0.08 0.35 7.27E-01
Ling. Output mean ratio (t-1):Contact gen. 0.04 0.06 0.7 4.85E-01
Ling. Output sd ratio (t-1):Contact gen. 0.64 0.23 2.83 5.13E-03 **
Ling. Output mean diff (t-1):Contact gen. -0.55 0.12 -4.7 5.34E-06 ***
Model fit ratio (t-1):Contact gen. -0.23 1.11 -0.21 8.33E-01 .
Model similarity ratio (t-1):Contact gen. -0.18 0.36 -0.48 6.28E-01
Model size ratio (t-1):Contact gen. 0.11 0.7 0.15 8.79E-01
Interactions ratio (t-1):Contact gen. -0.09 0.39 -0.23 8.17E-01
Model size mean (t-1):Contact gen. 0.04 0.03 1.24 2.15E-01
Contact gen.:Speaker ID rank mean (t-1) -0.01 0.02 -0.29 7.73E-01
Contact gen.:Speaker ID rank sd (t-1) 0.03 0.06 0.56 5.77E-01
Speaker ID rank (t-1) mean:sd (t-1) -0.01 0.02 -0.44 6.60E-01
Table C.5: Results of a linear regression predicting the model similarity ratio for
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Monolingual Biases in Simulations of Cultural Transmission
Seán Roberts
Abstract Recent research suggests that the evolution of language is affected by the inductive biases of its learners. I
suggest that there is an implicit assumption that one of these biases is to expect a single linguistic system in the input.
Given the prevalence of bilingual cultures, this may not be a valid abstraction. This is illustrated by demonstrating that
the ‘minimal naming game’ model, in which a shared lexicon evolves in a population of agents, includes an implicit
mutual exclusivity bias. Since recent research suggests that children raised in bilingual cultures do not exhibit mutual
exclusivity, the individual learning algorithm of the agents is not as abstract as it appears to be. A modification of this
model demonstrates that communicative success can be achieved without mutual exclusivity. It is concluded that complex
cultural phenomena, such as bilingualism, do not necessarily result from complex individual learning mechanisms. Rather,
the cultural process itself can bring about this complexity.
1 Introduction
Cultural groups are very rarely isolated. They interact for trade, politics and war. Communication is key to these interac-
tions, and so a common language is important. The emergence of common languages has been studied using computational
models. However, one aspect of cultural interaction has been left largely ignored - the ability to learn many languages at
once, or bilingualism. This chapter considers the importance of incorporating bilingualism into studies of cultural evolu-
tion.
Bilingualism is by no means a rare phenomenon. Statistics on the exact prevalence of bilingualism are difficult to ob-
tain. In the USA 18% of the population are estimated to speak two or more languages [1]. The estimate is 34% for
Canada[2], 66 % in the EU [3] and 80% in China [4]. Bilinguals are a majority in about a third of countries [4]. These
are likely to be conservative estimates, and with over 6,000 languages squeezed into in around 200 nations, it’s likely that
contact with multiple languages is an everyday feature of most people’s lives.
Recently, industrialisation and globalisation have meant that, in the first world, the perception of the prevalence of bilin-
gualism is artificially low - especially for native speakers of global languages such as English [5, 6, 7]. It’s no surprise,
then, that when cultural processes come to be modeled, one of the first simplifying assumptions would be that people
speak one language. However, the abstraction to monolingualism ignores several linguistic phenomena such as the preva-
lence of bilingualism in societies and the ease with which children learn more than one language [8].
This chapter will consider the validity of monolingual assumptions in models of cultural evolution. Firstly, the way in
which bilingualism might affect the evolutionary dynamics of language is explored. Next, a case-study of the ‘Minimal
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Naming Game’ will reveal an implicit monolingual bias, namely mutual exclusivity (the assumption that each object only
has one name and each name only refers to one object, see [9, 10]). Since bilinguals do not exhibit mutual exclusivity
[11, 12, 13], the model is generalised to weaken this constraint. The model demonstrates that communicative success can
be achieved even without mutual exclusivity, in opposition to previous research [14, 15]. The model suggests that cultural
phenomena adapt to the function they are required to fulfill (e.g. [16, 17]). When seeking to model the integration of
cultures a common measurement is required. However, even small differences in the way different communities interact
can lead to fundamental cultural differences between them, meaning that a common metric might be very abstract.
1.1 Bilingualism and cultural evolution
The dynamics of language evolution have been extensively studied through computational modelling. The canonical lan-
guage learner in these models is an agent that tries to settle on a single grammar that explains the variation in its input.
This implicit monolingualism is seen as a necessary abstraction in order to get at the more fundamental dynamics of
language evolution. There is a sense in the field of language evolution that bilingualism is a sociolinguistic phenomenon
that is the product of the interactions of several monolingual communities who have already evolved language. Implicitly,
bilingualism is seen as a secondary linguistic ability - a sort of by-product.
For instance, many models represent languages as discrete entities which compete with one another [18, 19]. Even when
language is modelled as distributions over words, two standard simplifying assumptions are made by many approaches
to language evolution and change (e.g. [20, 21, 22]). Firstly, it is assumed that there are discrete generations with one
agent per generation. This limits the amount of complexity that can be added by the cultural system. Secondly, it is as-
sumed that all learners use the same learning algorithm, or that learning algorithms do not change over a learner’s lifetime.
The first assumption has already been criticised[23, 24] and recent research has shown that the complexity of cultural
dynamics can effect the eventual distribution of languages in a population [15]. A model has also been proposed which
allows agents to speak and acquire multiple languages from multiple speakers[24].
However, the second assumption may also be called into question. I will illustrate this with research on the mutual
exclusivity bias, and continue in the next section to show that this bias exists in certain models of language evolution
and change. It has been demonstrated that monolingual children and adults exhibit a mutual exclusivity bias [9, 10]: a
tendency to assume that each object only has one name and each name only refers to one object. However, recent research
has shown that bilinguals do not exhibit mutual exclusivity [11, 12, 13]. It is hypothesised that the bias is overridden
because of a higher variance in the input of children in bilingual contexts. Applying mutual exclusivity when presented
with two languages is not suitable, since there will be at least two words for each object.
If the amount of linguistic variance (at any level of description) influences the learning strategy for that variance, then
this will affect the selective pressure on languages. This will, in turn, affect the kinds of languages that emerge, thus
feeding back into the amount of linguistic variance. These aspects would then co-evolve.
Given this, there are two possible fundamental states of the language learner. Either they begin with a mutual exclu-
sivity bias which is overridden in certain situations or they begin with no assumptions and develop mutual exclusivity
if the conditions are right. In the next section, it will be shown that some models make implicit assumptions about the
development of mutual exclusivity and see it more as a fundamental part of language acquisition and language evolution
rather than an acquired heuristic that is applied in suitable contexts. It will be argued that the most abstract learner is one
without the mutual exclusivity bias, and so models should not assume mutual exclusivity as part of the learner’s bias.
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Fig. 1 An example of how two agents might split the meaning space into categories and label those categories. The meaning space spans the
interval 0.0 to 1.0. Agent A and B both have the same conceptual space, but Agent A has multiple labels in each category while agent B only
has one label in each category. The representation for agent A above pulls apart sections of the space that are contiguously labelled with the
same label into two systems.
2 Categorisation Games
This section presents a case-study of a model of cultural evolution - the Categorisation Game - and demonstrates implicit
monolingual biases that obscure some interesting dynamics. The Categorisation Game looks at how agents in a population
converge on a shared system for referring to continuous stimuli [25, 26, 27]. This paradigm is often couched in terms of
deciding on words for objects referred to by their colour. The colour spectrum is continuous, so agents must decide
where to place category boundaries as well as the label for that category. The ‘minimal naming game’ [28] (also used
in [29, 30, 31]) is a simplification of the categorisation game which “possibly represents the simplest example of the
complex processes leading progressively to the establishment of complex human-like languages” [28]. I’ll show that even
this ‘minimal’ algorithm has implicit monolingual assumptions. First, however, a note is made about the measurements
that researchers have used to study the categorisation game.
2.1 Measurements of coherence
Other models looking at this problem have considered measurements apart from communicative success. For instance,
the ‘level of lexical coherence’ in the system, according to [32] is the average proportion of shared lexical items in a
population. The category overlap function [28, 30] measures the level of alignment between the category boundaries of
the agents. However, an appropriate measurement when considering the possibility of ‘bilingualism’ is less clear. For
instance, consider the example of two agents with categories and labels as described in figure 1. Adapting the lexical
coherence measurement from [32] gives a coherence of 75%. This measurement fails to capture the fact that agent B
would always be understood by agent A and that agent A could always make itself understood to agent B given the right
choice of lexical item. In other words, although the agents have differences in the words that they know, they are still able
to communicate unambiguously about the whole spectrum.
Measuring category overlap is also problematic. Agents with category boundaries at exactly the same locations will have
a category overlap of 1.0. However, the overlap of the example above is 0.09, despite the relatively good communicative
success possible between the pair. This is because the measurement collapses the category boundaries of an agent into a
single system before comparing it to another agent. By doing this, the division between the two ‘languages’ of agent A in
figure 1 is ignored.
These measures reflect the level of coherence in the population, but only effectively for a population whose goal it is
to converge on a single, ‘monolingual’ system. Researchers have used these measurements to gauge the progress of their
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model, demonstrating a monolingual bias in their approach. Further research is required to find a good way of measuring
coherence in a heterogenous population (see [33, 41, 34]). This paper will proceed assuming that communicative success
should be the most important measure of coherence between agents.
2.2 The minimal naming game
The algorithm for the categorisation game is reproduced below. However, two of the steps are re-analysed as heuristics
rather than essential elements. These heuristics impose a mutual exclusivity bias in the agents. The steps are as follows
(following [30]): There is a population of N agents, each able to partition the perceptual space into categories. Each
category has a list of associated words. Each agent has a minimum perceptual difference threshold dmin, below which
stimuli appear the same. At each time step:
1. Two individuals are chosen at random to be the speaker and the listener.
2. They both have access to a scene containing M stimuli. The stimuli must be perceptually distinguishable by the agents
(perceptual distance ≥ dmin).
3. The speaker selects a topic and discriminates it in the following way:
• Each stimulus is assigned to a perceptual category
• If one or more other stimuli are assigned to the same category as the topic, the agent splits its perceptual categories so
that each stimulus belongs to only one perceptual category. Within a category with two or more stimuli, a boundary
is placed halfway between the first two stimuli.
• The new partitions inherit the associated words of the old partition.
• Heuristic A: Each new partition is given a new, unique name. It’s assumed that no two agents will create the same
name.
4. The speaker transmits a word that it associates with the topic to the listener. If it has no words associated with the
category, it creates a new one. If it has more than one word associated, it transmits the one that was last used in a
successful communication.
5. The hearer receives the word and finds all categories which have the associated word and which identify one of the
stimuli in the scene. Then:
• If there are no such categories, the agent does nothing.
• If there is one such category, the agent points to the associated stimulus.
• If there is more than one such category, the agent points randomly at an associated stimulus.
6. The hearer discriminates the scene, as above.
7. The speaker reveals the topic to the listener.
8. If the hearer did not point to the topic, the communication is a failure. The hearer adds the transmitted word to the
category discriminating the topic.
9. If the hearer pointed to the topic, the communication is a success.
Heuristic B: Both agents delete all other words but the transmitted one from the inventory of the category discriminat-
ing the topic.
Heuristic A, above, invents new words for each sub-category when a category is split. This is an implementation of the as-
sumption that each name only refers to one object, hence when there are two objects with the same name, the agent should
discriminate between them linguistically. This interacts with Heuristic B which removes all competing names associated
with a category from the listener’s lexicon when communication is successful. The effect is that the listener conforms to
the speaker’s labeling, but also ‘forgets’ any previously associated words. This is an implementation of the assumption
that each object only has one name.
These two heuristics, then, implement a mutual exclusivity bias: Each name only refers to one object and each object
is only labeled by one name. Stable bilingualism is impossible in this model because only one name is retained after
successful communication. The role of the two heuristics in the evolution of a shared communicative system is clear:
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heuristic A creates new labels for categories, introducing variation into the system needed to distinguish between cate-
gories. Heuristic B causes the agents to converge on shared labels for categories by selecting for labels common to an
interacting pair.
However, these heuristics are still arbitrary. As we have seen, not all human learners assume mutual exclusivity. In the
next section, it will be demonstrated that a population of agents can converge on a shared communication system without
these heuristics.
3 Convergence without mutual exclusivity
The algorithm was modified to remove the mutual exclusivity bias in order to test the effects on communicative success.
However, the changes to the dynamics will not be explored in detail. The purpose of the changes, here, is not to explore
the best way of modelling the cultural evolution of language, but to demonstrate that the biases of the researcher can
influence the dynamics of the model and thus the conclusions drawn from it.
Heuristic B can be modified while retaining communicative success [35]. If the hearer, but not the speaker applies heuris-
tic B, a coherent vocabulary still emerges in a similar time with similar memory resources required. If only the speaker
applies heuristic B a coherent vocabulary does emerge, but on a longer timescale and in a qualitatively different way
(approached as a thermodynamic system, consensus is reached due to large, system-size fluctuations of the magnetisation
[35]). However, this research was concerned with the effect of feedback on the convergence dynamics. This study looks
at the assumptions built in to the individual learning algorithm.
The heuristics were modified by generalising the algorithm. Firstly, agents in a population either all applied heuristic
A or all did not apply heuristic A. Heuristic B was made optional in the same way. If heuristic B did not apply, a maxi-
mum number of words sMAX were retained after a successful communication. A first-in, first-out stack memory was also
implemented so that the oldest stored form would be removed first. A word was pushed further back in the stack (safer
from deletion) when a listener heard it being used by a speaker. This is a generalisation of the mechanism that weakens
links between signals and meanings which do not co-occur.
The purpose of generalising the model was to allow bilingualism. However, the advantages of knowing more than one
word for an object are not yet fully available. A bilingual, failing to communicate with one word, might try another.
Therefore, the algorithm was modified to allow an arbitrary maximum number of attempts aMAX at communicating before
communication failed. If speakers had more than one label for a perceptual category, they transmitted them in a random
order until this maximum was reached. Listeners searched their lexicon at each attempt until either they found a match in
their own lexicon and made a guess at the referent or the maximum number of attempts was reached and they signaled
failure, as before. Each guess was independent of any other, so successful communication was not always guaranteed,
even when aMAX = M.
It has been shown that an algorithm which leads to successful communication in a population of agents must strengthen
connections between signals and meanings that appear together (or are absent together) and weaken connections between
signals and meanings that do not co-occur[14]. The changes to the algorithm above do not violate these conditions, but
simply weaken their strength.
4 Results
Four versions of the algorithm were run: with both heuristics, as in the original, with only heuristic A, only heuristic B
and with neither heuristic. Results shown here are for a population of 4 over 10,000 rounds with a context size of 2.
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Heuristics Max t p Final t p
A and B 0.84 23.89a < 0.0001 0.62 3.06a 0.01
A only 0.95 44.26b < 0.0001 0.86 7.17b < 0.0001
B only 0.77 9.04a < 0.0001 0.52 1.44a 0.18 (N.S.)
None 0.94 43.50b < 0.0001 0.84 5.96b < 0.001
aCalculated with chance level at 0.5.
bCalculated with chance level at 0.75.
Table 1 Communicative success for different heuristics for 10 runs each with 4 agents and aMAX =2 and sMAX =2 for 10,000 rounds. The
maximum communicative success was calculated as follows: for each run, the average communicative success for data grouped into 100-round
bins. The average of a bin was taken as the value of that bin. The values shown in the table are the average of the maximum bin values for 10
runs. The final communicative success is the average success for last 100 rounds over 10 runs. The statistics show a two tailed t-test indicating
performance above chance.




















































Fig. 2 Maximum communicative success (left) and final communicative success after 10,000 rounds (right) for ten runs of populations with
various heuristics. Statistics in table 1.
4.1 Communicative Success
Table 1 and figure 2 show the communicative success for the algorithm run with different heuristics with aMAX =2 and
sMAX =2. All heuristics manage in achieving good communicative success at some point (shown by the maximum com-
municative success achieved). That is, a mutual exclusivity bias is not necessary for communicative success in this model.
It should be noted that the probability of choosing the correct referent by chance is 1c = 0.5 (where c is the context size)
because the algorithm tends to limit the number of words linked to a perceptual category to one. However, algorithms
without heuristic B (i.e. ‘A only’ and ‘None’) have a higher probability because they are more likely to be able to take
advantage of extra communicative attempts. Therefore, for algorithms without heuristic B, the probability of selecting the









For the current settings, this is 0.75. Even taking this into account, all algorithms are able to reach stable periods with
high levels of communicative success. The result is robust against changes to sMAX : The relative communicative success
between the different heuristic combinations remains the same for sMAX up to 1000, while the absolute communicative
success drops about 5% for sMAX of 4 and remains around that level for sMAX up to 1000.
However, eventually all agents converge on a single word for the whole meaning space. This is typical behaviour for
this model [36]. This reduces the communicative success, since agents cannot distinguish linguistically between referents.
Table 1 shows the average final communicative success after 10,000 rounds. These are less than the maximum. In the
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Agent 1 (Heuristic A and B):
Agent 2 (No heuristics):
Fig. 3 The linguistic labels of an agent after 3,500 rounds for separate runs. Agent 1 (above) used heuristics A and B and agent 2 (below) used
neither heuristic. The perceptual space runs from left to right. Contiguous linguistic categories are indicated by boxes with the linguistic label
(a number in this implementation) drawn in the centre. Agent 2 has more than one label for a given perceptual stimulus.
case of using heuristic B only, the communicative success is no better than chance. The other algorithms still yield a
communicative success above chance, but the algorithms without heuristic B (A only and no heuristics) do better than
algorithms with heuristic B (average with B = 0.57, without B = 0.85, t= 10.9, p< 0.0001). The same collapsing process
occurs as in the algorithm without heuristic B, but since there is more variation within perceptual categories due to extra
labels being stored, a single label takes longer to dominate. In fact, a single linguistic item tends to spread over the whole
meaning space as with the original algorithm, but a sort of secondary ‘language’ keeps distinctions between perceptual
categories for longer.
Figure 3 illustrates this with a diagram of agents’ memories from mid-way through separate runs. Agent 1 was run in
a population using both heuristics and agent 2 was run in a population using neither heuristic. Agent 1’s linguistic cate-
gories are already heavily collapsed while Agent 2 has a greater variation which allows it to communicate more effectively.
The memories of both agents at this point are nearly perfectly similar to the other agents that they interact with.
Another measure of communicative efficiency is the entropy efficiency of an agent. Effectively, this is the average proba-
bility that an agent has a different linguistic label for any two stimuli. An agent has a set of linguistic labels which uniquely








Since dmin is set so that there can be a maximum of 10 perceptually distinct regions, the highest entropy efficiency is given
by an agent who can uniquely label 10 regions of equal length (entropy efficiency of 1.0). The lowest possible entropy
efficiency is given by an agent with no labels or one label spanning the whole meaning space (entropy efficiency of zero).
Figure 4 shows that the algorithm with both heuristics achieves a lower entropy efficiency than the algorithm without
heuristic B and degrades faster than the algorithm without heuristic A.
4.2 The development of mutual exclusivity
The model has shown that mutual exclusivity is not necessary for communicative success. However, the mutual exclusiv-
ity bias is exhibited by monolinguals. The model can be manipulated to explore the rationale behind this and the most
likely starting assumptions of a language learner.
Simulations were run where the mutual exclusivity heuristics were ‘switched on’ after some rounds. Figure 5 shows
the difference between an algorithm that has no heuristics and one that changes to incorporate them after 1,500 rounds.
For a population of two agents (low cultural complexity), switching on the heuristics makes no difference to the commu-
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Fig. 4 Entropy efficiency for populations of agents with different heuristics. Number of agents = 4, aMAX =2 and sMAX =2.




















































Fig. 5 Communicative success for a population of 2 agents (left) and a population of 4 agents (right). Solid lines indicate success for a consistent
algorithm where no heuristics are applied. Dashed lines represent success for an algorithm that incorporates the heuristics after 1,500 rounds.
nicative success. Therefore, in this situation, applying mutual exclusivity makes rational sense in order to save memory:
The application of heuristic B will reduce the number of words stored for each category. However, in a population of 4
agents, switching on the heuristics decreases the communicative success. In this situation, the most rational approach is to
keep the heuristics switched ‘off’. This is because the complexity of the cultural system is greater with 4 agents, leading
to more variation between agents. The system evolves to store many words for an object to cope with this variation. The
drop in this difference reflects the empirical findings that bilinguals do not exhibit mutual exclusivity. Figure 6 shows
that this difference increases with larger populations. However, when sMAX becomes many times greater than the number
of agents, the disadvantage of switching decreases. That is, agents retain words that have already been discarded by others.
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Fig. 6 The difference in percentage communicative success when switching from using no heuristics to using both heuristics for different
population sizes (the difference between solid and dashed lines after 1500 rounds in figure 5). Values shown are mean and 99% confidence
intervals for 5 runs. Positive values indicate an advantage for using no heuristics. In a population of 2, there is no difference between using the
heuristics or not, as shown in figure 5.
The most rational strategy for any agent is not to assume mutual exclusivity to begin with, and only to activate it un-
der relevant conditions. This reflects the findings that 14-month-old children do not exhibit it while 17-month-olds do
[37]. From this model we might conclude that mutual exclusivity is an acquired heuristic which is applicable in situa-
tions where there is likely to be low variation (monolingualism). More research is required into this kind of model. The
point here is that the assumptions of the original model obscure the distinction between mutual exclusivity as an innate,
universal bias and an acquired, culture-specific one.
5 Discussion
Communicative success can emerge without mutual exclusivity. The results of this model stand in opposition to previous
research (e.g. [14, 38, 39, 40, 41]). For instance, it has been claimed that “human language learners appear to bring a
one-to-one bias to the acquisition of vocabulary systems. The functionality of human vocabulary may therefore be a con-
sequence of the biases of human language learners” [42, p. 127]. The current research suggests that mutual exclusivity is
not an innate bias. Furthermore, the bias becomes functional as a consequence of the variance in the vocabulary and social
dynamic. A related model shows similar results [43]: Mutual exclusivity is not necessary for communicative success, but
helps agents co-ordinate linguistically when they have conceptual differences. Multiple consensus systems can be main-
tained in a population with complex social structures [44]. However, the current model shows that mutual exclusivity does
not always aid the co-ordination process.
However, rather than directly opposing the claims of some previous models, the constraints in the current model can
be seen as a relaxation of the constraints embodied by the mutual exclusivity bias. Both models contribute the neces-
sary ingredients for an evolutionary system: Heredity, variation and differential fitness (e.g. [45]). Although generational
turnover is not modelled, there is heredity in the sense that each agent inherits its own memory from the previous round.
Heuristic A introduces the variation by adding new words. Heuristic B introduces differential fitness by selecting words
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which are successful in communication. Without heuristic A, variation is still introduced by agents creating new words
at early stages of the game when they have no words at all (step 4 of the algorithm). The generalisation of Heuristic B
to keep an arbitrary number of words after successful communication allows selection to operate over groups of words
rather than single ones.
Heuristics A and B, then, are an efficient way of introducing the ingredients for evolution into the system. However,
cultural processes can also introduce these ingredients - the individual learning processes need not be the source. Other
processes could also introduce variation such as errors in production or perception or differences in contact with other
agents.
6 Conclusion
The naming game was reanalysed in the light of evidence from bilingual language acquisition research. The measurements
used to analyse the model were also re-assessed and shown to favour monolingual systems. Steps in the categorisation
game were re-analysed as implementing a mutual exclusivity constraint. To explore the effects of these steps, the learning
algorithm was generalised so that the steps could be omitted. Communicative success at the lexical level was achieved
without mutual exclusivity constraints. In fact, in some cases, the constraint impedes the process.
This goes against some previous research which argued that mutual exclusivity is necessary for communication to emerge.
What seems to be important is the presence of the ingredients for evolution - inheritance, variation and selection. The mu-
tual exclusivity bias is seen as an efficient way of integrating these ingredients. However, the model also showed that
rational agents should not assume mutual exclusivity to begin with. This reflects research which shows that children only
start using mutual exclusivity in certain situations. Mutual exclusivity is not appropriate in a bilingual environment, so
bilinguals do not exhibit it. Given this, the monolingual assumptions of the naming game are unrealistic for two reasons.
First, a learner’s learning algorithm may change over time, as demonstrated by the differences found between monolin-
guals and bilinguals. Secondly, they are not valid abstractions because the heuristics which implement mutual exclusivity
are optional extras, so the simplest, default assumptions of learners should be bilingual. That is, monolingualism is a
specialised form of bilingualism.
When modelling cultural processes, abstraction is necessary. However, the cultural phenomena that appear simplest (e.g.
monolingualism) may not be caused by the simplest learning mechanisms. Much of the complexity in cultural phenom-
ena stem from complex interactions between individuals. That is, the cultural transmission process itself can shape and
influence the cultural practices it transmits.
6.1 Integrating cultures in the light of cultural adaptation
The communication system in the model above adapts to fit the needs and constraints of its users. Indeed, the hallmark of
a cultural phenomenon is that it has adapted to the cognitive niche of its community’s members [16, 17]. If different com-
munities have different dynamics, such as population size or differences in social structures, then the cultural phenomena
that emerge in them may be radically different. In the model above, the communication system between two agents be-
came optimised for efficiency while the communication system in a more complex social structure became optimised for
flexibility. Biases in communities towards these different optimisations could be amplified by cultural transmission [46].
Over many generations, and for a more complex cultural phenomenon (e.g. a language system, judicial system or musical
form), the commonalities between two communities may erode to very abstract principles. When seeking to integrate
them, then, a common measure for separate cultures may be difficult to find. Even something as simple as assuming each
object only has one associated word may reflect the deep structure of the culture in which it is embedded.
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The Naming Game is a game where players must communicate about stimuli in a continuous meaning space. This
is often couched in terms of names for coloured objects. Through a process of trial and error, words come to be
associated with a range of the spectrum, and these associations are shared between players.
I have shown that computational agents in the naming game do not need to apply mutual exclusivity in order to
converge on a successful communication system. Furthermore, in a complex network, a mutual exclusivity constraint
may hinder communicative success. The difference may be to be due to the optimal approaches to simple and complex
networks. In a simple network with two people one has complete knowledge of the interactions of the other agent.
An optimal approach is to work to find a single shared lexicon. However, in a more complex network, one does not
have access to the interaction history. A good approach here may be to be more accommodating and retain several
lexicons for use with each individual. That is, the speaker’s identity becomes important.
So far, research on the Naming Game has been done with agent-based modelling. This experiment presents the
same task to human participants. The primary question is whether participants behave differently in different net-
works. Specifically, whether different kinds of network encourage the emergence of mutual exclusivity behaviour.
Since this is the first human Naming Game that I am aware of, it will also be important to compare the behaviour of
humans and the computational agents.
2 Estimating human learning algorithms with confederate computa-
tional agents
This experiment would like to demonstrate that human participants are more likely to develop a mutual exclusivity
bias in a simple social network (2 players) than in a complex social network (4 players). However, because the learning
algorithms of humans are not transparent, a method of estimating them is required. The current study is concerned
with whether humans are applying a mutually exclusivity bias while playing the naming game. One way to test
this is by having a number of human participants play with a computational confederate whose learning algorithm is
transparent. By manipulating the confederate, differences in the communicative success of the group might reveal the
learning algorithm of the humans.
In order to do this, two assumptions are made. Firstly, the humans in the same population will have the same
learning algorithm. Secondly, that the humans will respond to a computational agent in the same way as a human
agent.
Given these assumptions, adding either an agent with or without a mutual exclusivity bias will create a heterogeneous
group. The computational model was run (with only computational agents) to compare performance in homogenous
and heterogenous groups. In populations of two and four, a homogenous group always had a higher communicative
success than a heterogenous group (see figures 1 and 2). There was no significant difference in the communicative
success of agents with majority and minority algorithms.
Therefore, three conditions for each population size (2 player and 4 player) would be run: A baseline condition
where the entire population was human and two test conditions which would involve one computational confederate.
In the first test condition the computational agent would have a mutual exclusivity bias and the second test condi-
tion the computational agent would have no mutual exclusivity bias. It is assumed that the test condition in which
communicative success was better would be a heterogenous group. That is, the group that does better has the same
learning algorithm as its computational confederate.
1
It is predicted that, in the two player condition, the best performance comes from interacting with an agent with
a mutual exclusivity bias. In the four player condition, the best performance is predicted to come from interacting
with an agent without a mutual exclusivity bias.
One possible confound is the ratio of human to computational players. In the two player condition, half of the
population is human while in the four player condition two thirds are human.





























Figure 1: Communicative success for agents in homogenous and heterogenous populations with 2 agents.

























































Figure 2: Communicative success for agents in homogenous and heterogenous populations with 4 agents. The dashed
line shows the communicative success of the agent with the minority algorithm. The data is split into two graphs for
clarity.
3 The Naming Game with Human Participants
This experiment replicates the Naming Game with human participants. Participants are presented with a context of
several coloured squares and a fixed set of words that they can use to communicate about them. The main dependent
variable of the experiment is social network type. In other words, how many other people you communicate with. A
simple network contains two players who communicate with each other all the time. A complex network contains four
players, each of whom interacts with each other player a third of the time.
2
4 Predictions for the lexicon
For the experiment with only human players, it is predicted that the approach to learning will be affected by the
complexity of the social network. However, the eventual communicative success will be equally high. Lexicons will
develop differently in the simple and complex networks. Specifically, lexicons in the complex network will be larger
than in the simple network. Participants in the complex network may remember more than one label for a given range
of colours to accommodate separate interaction histories.
Participants in the simple network are likely to develop mutual exclusivity behaviour. However, this is less ap-
propriate in the complex network. Therefore, it is predicted that participants in the complex network will be more
willing to violate mutual exclusivity. This will be tested using a mutual exclusivity test (similar to the DAX test) at




A key parameter in the model is dmin - the distance at which two colours become perceptually indistinguishable.
The colours presented to the human participants in the context must be at least perceptually distinguishable, but
human sensitivity to colour is not uniform over the spectrum. Figure 4 shows the difference in wavelength needed to
cause a Just Noticable Difference (JND) accross the spectrum (from Long et al., 2006). The human eye is better at
discriminating colours in the cyan and yellow areas than the red and purple areas. Data on the average human JND
from Long et al. (2006) was used to define a colour space with approximately uniform perceptual difference.
Figure 3: The wavelength change in a monochromatic stimulus needed to elicit a just noticeable difference in hue
(Long et al., 2006).
Figure 4: Twenty evenly spaced colours according to the human JND (top) and a physical (linear) colour scale
(bottom). The transitions between each colour should appear smoother for those adjusted for the human JND.
5.1.2 Labels
Labels were automatically generated nonsense words. The vowels a,e,i,o,u, plus some diphthongs and all consonants
except x and q combined to form 500 consonant-vowel syllables. These were combined to produce a large number of
two-syllable words. Any incidental real words were removed. The order of appearance of the words was the same for
all experiments. The order was set to maximise the average edit distance between any adjacent labels. This meant
that new labels presented to the participants would be relatively distinct, on average, from those already seen.
3
5.2 Procedure
The experiment proceeds in three parts: The Naming Game, a mutual exclusivity test and an elicitation of the
participant’s representation of the meaning space. Participants are seated at separate computer terminals. There may
be two or more participants. Participants are paired randomly at each trial. Each participant has an avatar - an image
of a character that represents them - so that participants can recognise who they are communicating with. Figure 5
shows a mock-up of the interface participants see.
Figure 5: Screen-shot of the naming game interface. The participant’s own avatar is on the right, their partner is
shown on the left. Three coloured stimuli appear above. A hand symbol indicates the target to the speaker.
5.2.1 Naming Game
A single trial proceeds as follows:
1. Two individuals are chosen at random to be the speaker and the listener.
2. They both see M coloured squares. The perceptual distance between any pair of colours is at least greater than
the human Just Noticeable Difference. One of the squares is selected as a topic (by the computer).
3. The speaker is presented with a list of labels with which they can label the colour. The speaker can also request
that a new word be added to the list. The speaker selects a label and this is transmitted to the listener.
4. The listener receives the label and must guess which colour the speaker was referring to.
5. The speaker and listener receive feedback on whether they were correct or incorrect.
6. If the listener is correct, the word is added to the list of words which the listener can use in future rounds (if it
is chosen to be a speaker).
The procedure above constitutes one trial. There are many trials in an experiment with the role of the speaker and
listener being assigned randomly for each trial. In experiments with more than two people, who is paired with whom
may also be randomised.
The experiment continues until a set number of trials have been completed.
5.2.2 Mutual exclusivity test
One final set of trials administers a mutual exclusivity test. Participants are told that they will meet an alien who
they must try to understand. All participants are put in the role of a listener, communicating with a novel ’alien’
avatar. This avatar is controlled by the computer and this test involves no real communication. They are shown a
context with a familiar stimuli and a novel stimuli (either a colour in a part of the spectrum reserved for this test or
a multi-coloured/patterend stimuli). The alien transmits a novel label. The participants must choose which stimuli
the alien is referring to. Participants also indicate their confidence about their choice, rated on a 7 point Likert scale.
4
5.2.3 Meaning space representation
At the end of the experiment, the participants are given representations of the meaning space (a continuous coloured
strip) and asked to label it with the labels they have learned, indicating which range each label refers to. In order to
facilitate the largest number of possible approaches, this part will be done with pen and paper.
5.3 Quantification
The major measures of the model are the communicative success rate, the number of labels an agent has and various
measures of how well co-ordinated agents’ labels are. Communicative success is straightforward to measure. However,
in this experiment, access to the internal representation of the meaning space and its labelling is impossible. The fixed
list of possible responses is used as a way of limiting the participant’s internal representation. Participants have to
make their decision to create a new label explicit in the experiment. A measure of the increase in labels over time will
be a key measurement.
In addition, the representations of the meaning space which the participants create at the end of the experiment
will be used as if they were full and accurate representations of the meaning space. Measurements such as bin packing
depth and efficiency, number of labels recalled, average width of category and entropy efficiency can be calculated.
There is an issue with colour calibration, but there is no easy solution.
Results from the mutual exclusivity test will be compared across network types. These include preference for pairing
the novel label with a novel stimuli or a familiar stimuli and confidence ratings. It is predicted that participants in
the complex network will be more likely to choose the familiar object and less confident about their choice.
6 Extensions
This paradigm can be extended to larger networks. Also, the avatars of the participants can be manipulated. This
can be done to change the identity of a speaker or to give the impression that there are greater or fewer participants
in the network than there really are. This will affect the apparent distribution of variation over speakers.
7 Pilot
A short pilot was run with four human participants. The aim was to test the functionality of the experiment program
rather than to run a full experiment. The context size was three and dmin was set at 0.1, meaning that there would
be a maximum of roughly ten distinguishable colour categories. The brightness and saturation of colours were set
at 90%. The network was balanced, so that everyone played everyone else an equal number of times. The intention
was to give each player an equal number of turns as speaker and listener. Due to a programming error, however, two
participants only ever played one role (speaker or listener). Players completed 25 rounds in about 13 minutes.
The results are shown below in figures 6 and 7. Communicative success improves, but drops off again towards
the end. I interpret this as the words beginning to compete with each other and the system turning. Given more
trials, the communicative success should improve. Figure 7 shows the use of signals during the experiment. One can
see that, as the experiment progresses (moving up the chart), particular signals are re-used to refer to the same range
of colours (horizontal range). For instance, ’romiku’ takes up the middle, with ’belafu’ and ’racoka’ to each side. Even
though the listeners are not always interpreting them correctly, the situation looks promising as far as communicative
success is concerned.
At the end of the experiment, I asked participants to label a colour spectrum with the labels they could recall.
Participants couldn’t recall all the labels. For the one label that participants did recall, the average distance between
the colour associated with the signal (romiku) was 11% of the spectrum This is reasonably good, considering that a
maximally efficient category width is 10% of the spectrum. In subsequent experiments, the list of labels could be given
to the participants to ease this task.
Although this pilot was generally successful, there is not enough data here to make a judgement with regards to
whether the participants are accommodating more than one lexicon.
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Tôjô, M. (1954). Nihon Hogengaku. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan. [35]
Tokugawa, M. and Miyazima, T. (1977). Ruigigo jiten. Tokyo: Tokydo Shuppan.
[35]
Tomasello, M. (2006). Why don’t apes point? In Enfield, N. J. and Levinson,
S. C., editors, Roots of Human Sociality: Culture, cognition and interaction,
pages 506–524. Oxford & New York: Berg. Reprinted in R. Eckhardt (Ed.),
(2008) Variation, Selection, Development: The evolutionary model of language
change. Berlin: Mouton. [22]
Touretzky, D. and Hinton, G. (1988). A distributed connectionist production
system. Cognitive Science, 12(3):423–466. [122]
Treccani, B., Argyri, E., Sorace, A., and Della Sala, S. (2009). Spatial negative
priming in bilingualism. Psychonomic bulletin & review, 16(2):320–327. [53,
167, 168, 181]
Unsworth, S. (2011). Utrecht bilingual language exposure calculator. Unpublished
manuscript, Utrecht University. [176]
Unsworth, S. (in press). Assessing the role of current and cumulative exposure
in simultaneous bilingual acquisition: The case of dutch gender. Bilingualism:
Language and Cognition. [172, 173]
Unsworth, S., Argyri, F., Cornips, L., Hulk, A., Sorace, A., and Tsimpli, I. (in
press). On the role of age of onset and input in early child bilingualism in greek
and dutch. Applied Psycholinguistics. [172, 173]
Valdés, G. and Figueroa, R. (1994). Bilingualism and testing. Ablex Publishing.
[6]
Vallabha, G. K., McClelland, J. L., Pons, F., Werker, J. F., and Amano, S.
(2007). Unsupervised learning of vowel categories from infant-directed speech.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of Amer-
ica, 104(33):13273–8. [195]
van Wilgenburg, E., Sulc, R., Shea, K., and Tsutsui, N. (2010). Deciphering the
chemical basis of nestmate recognition. Journal of Chemical Ecology, 36:751–
758. 10.1007/s10886-010-9812-4. [19, 20]
309
van Wuijtswinkel, K. (1994). Critical period effects on the acquisition of gram-
matical competence in a second language. Language Learning, 42(2):217–248.
[161]
Voegelin, C. and Harris, Z. (1951). Methods for determining intelligibility among
dialects of natural languages. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Soci-
ety, 95(3):322–329. [34]
Vogel, E. and Awh, E. (2008). How to exploit diversity for scientific gain: Us-
ing individual differences to constrain cognitive theory. Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 17(2):171–176. [170]
Vogt, P. (2005). Meaning development versus predefined meanings in language
evolution models. In In Pack-Kaelbling, pages 1154–1159. [60]
von Frisch, K. (1947). The Dances with the Honey Bee. Institute for the Study
of Animal Behaviour. [22]
Warner, W. (1937). A black civilization. Harper & Row. [34]
Wei, L. and Milroy, L. (1995). Conversational code-switching in a chinese com-
munity in britain: A sequential analysis. Journal of Pragmatics, 23(3):281–299.
[9]
Weinreich, U. (1953). Languages in contact. The Hague: Mouton. [6]
Werker, J. and Byers-Heinlein, K. (2008). Bilingualism in infancy: first steps
in perception and comprehension. Trends in cognitive sciences, 12(4):144–151.
[16, 83]
White, L. and Genesee, F. (1996). How native is near-native? the issue of
ultimate attainment in adult second language acquisition. Second language
research, 12(3):233–265. [161]
Whittaker, E. (1910). A History of the Theories of Aether and Electricity from
the Age of Descartes to the Close of the Nineteenth Century. Longmans, Green
and co. [44]
Wichmann, S. and Holman, E. W. (2009). Population size and rates of language
change. Human Biology, 81(2-3):259–74. [47]
Wierzbicka, A. (1988). The semantics of grammar, volume 18. John Benjamins
Pub Co. [135]
Winford, D. (2003). An introduction to contact linguistics, volume 33. Wiley-
Blackwell. [47]
Winter, B. and Christiansen, M. H. (2012). Robustness as a design feature of
speech communication. In Phillips, T. C., Tamariz, M., Cartmill, E. A., and
Hurford, J. R., editors, The Evolution of Language: Proceedings of the 9th
International Conference (EVOLANG9), pages 384–391. World Scientific. [20]
Winters, J. (2011). Crossing those curious parallels: Investigating the relation-
ships between segment inventory size, demography and subsystem tradeoffs.
Master’s thesis, Cardiff University. [10, 106]
Wolff, E. (2000). Language and society. In Heine, B. and Nurse, D., editors,
African Languages - An Introduction, 317. Cambridge University Press. [5,
156]
310
Yallop, C. (1969). The Aljawara and their territory. Oceania, 39(3):187–197.
[175]
Yamagiwa, J. (1967). On dialect intelligibility in japan. Anthropological Linguis-
tics, 9(1):1–17. [34]
Yildiz, Y. (2012). Beyond the Mother Tongue: The Postmonolingual Condition.
Fordham University Press. [5, 156]
Zahavi, A. (1975). Mate selectiona selection for a handicap. Journal of theoretical
Biology, 53(1):205–214. [22]
Zuberbühler, K. (2000). Interspecies semantic communication in two forest pri-
mates. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 8(267-713). [21,
22]
311
